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Abstract 
 
The goal of this study is to ascertain how Thailand wages counterinsurgency 
(COIN).  Thailand has waged two successful COINs in the past and is currently 
waging a third on its southern border.  The lessons learned from Thailand’s 
COIN campaigns could result in modern irregular warfare techniques valuable 
not only to Thailand and neighboring countries with similar security problems, 
but also to countries like the United States and the United Kingdom that are 
currently reshaping their irregular warfare doctrines in response to the situations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
The first set of COIN lessons comes from Thailand’s successful 1965-85 
communist COIN.  The second set comes from Bangkok’s understudied 1980s-
90s COIN against southern separatists.  The third set comes from Thailand’s 
current war against ethnic Malay separatists and radical Islamic insurgents 
attempting to secede and form a separate state called “Patani Raya,” among 
other names. 
 
Counterinsurgency is a difficult type of warfare for four reasons: (1) it can take 
years to succeed; (2) the battle space is poorly defined; (3) insurgents are not 
easily identifiable; and (4) war typically takes place among a civilian population 
that the guerrillas depend on for auxiliary support.  Successful COINs include 
not only precise force application operations based on quality intelligence, but 
also lasting social and economic programs, political empowerment of the 
disenfranchised, and government acceptance of previously ignored cultural 
realities. 
 
Background:  In 1965, communist insurgents, backed by the People’s Republic 
of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), began 
waging an insurgency against Thailand in order to overthrow its government and 
install a Marxist regime.  The Thai government struggled, both politically and 
militarily, to contain the movement for years, but eventually, it prevailed. Its 
success was based on a combination of effective strategy and coordination, plus 
well-designed and run security, political, and economic programs, the latter 
nowadays called the “three pillars of COIN,” a phrase developed by David 
Kilcullen, a modern COIN theorist and practitioner.  One of Bangkok’s most 
successful initiatives was the CPM program (civil-military-police), which used a 
linked chain of local forces, police, and the military to not only provide security 
for villages, but also economic aid and administrative training to rural peoples.  
State political programs that undercut communist political programs backed by 
masterful diplomacy and a constant barrage of rural works helped erode the 
communist position. 
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The 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists followed similar lines.  The 
far South’s four border provinces, comprised of 80 percent ethnic Malay 
Muslims, had been in revolt on and off for decades since Bangkok annexed the 
area in 1902.  Bangkok had waged haphazard COIN campaigns against rebel 
groups there for decades with mixed results.  But after the successful 
communist COIN was up and running in 1980, Bangkok decided to apply similar 
ways and means to tackle the southern issue.  The government divided its COIN 
operations into two components: a security component run by a task force called 
CPM-43, and a political-economic component run by the Southern Border 
Provinces Administrative Center, or SB-PAC.  SB-PAC also had a Special 
Branch investigative capacity.  Combined, the 80s-90s southern COIN strategy 
relied on extensive military intelligence networks to curb violence, civilian 
administrators to execute local political reforms, and local politicians to apply 
traditional Malay and Muslim problem solving techniques to keep the peace.  
These programs worked well against the multitude of southern insurgent groups 
that conducted sporadic attacks against government and civilian targets while 
also running organized criminal syndicates.  By the end of the 1990s, with a 
dose of Thailand’s famed diplomacy and help from Malaysia’s Special Branch, 
Bangkok defeated the southern separatists. 
 
In January 2004, however, a new separatist movement in southern Thailand 
emerged – one based on ethnic Malay separatism and radical Islam.  It is a well-
coordinated movement with effective operational expertise that attacks at a 
higher tempo than past southern rebel groups.  It moreover strikes civilian 
targets on a regular basis, thereby making it a terrorist group.  Overall, it dwarfs 
past southern movements regarding motivation and scale of violence. 
 
Thai officials think the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate, or BRN-C, leads 
the current rebellion, but there are several other groups that claim to also lead 
the fight.  Members of the insurgency are nearly exclusively ethnic Malays and 
Muslims.  The movement demonstrates radical Islamic tendencies thought its 
propaganda, indoctrination, recruitment, and deeds.  It is a takfiri group that kills 
other Muslims who do not share its religious beliefs, so it wrote in its spiritual 
rebel guidebook, Fight for the Liberation of Patani. 
 
BRN-C seeks to separate the four southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat, and Songkhla from Thailand in order to establish an Islamic 
republic.  The separatists base their revolt on perceived military, economic, 
cultural, and religious subjugation going back to the early 1900s.  And they have 
a point.  The central government has, at different times in the past, indeed 
treated southerners with tremendous disdain and sometimes violence – 
especially those considered insurgents.  But Bangkok has also instituted scores 
of economic and social aid programs in the south – mosque building, college 
scholarships, and medical aid, for example – so it has not been a continual anti-
Muslim “blood fest” as government detractors have painted it.  Still the 
maltreatment, certainly many times less than yesteryear, has provided today’s 
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insurgents with ideological fodder for a steady stream of recruits and supporters.  
Combined with radical Islam, it has bonded the insurgents to a significant 
degree. 
 
Statistically, in the 2005-07-time frame, insurgents assassinated 1.09 people a 
day, detonated 18.8 bombs a month, and staged 12.8 arson attacks a month.  In 
2005, they conducted 43 raids and 45 ambushes.  The militants target security 
forces, government civilians, and the local population.  They have killed fellow 
Muslims and beheaded numerous Buddhist villagers.   
 
The insurgents’ actions have crippled the South’s education system, justice 
system, and commerce, and also have maligned Buddhist-Muslim relations.  
Overall, the separatists pose a direct threat to Thailand’s south and an indirect 
threat to the rest of the country.  Moreover, their radical Islamic overtones have 
potential regional and global terrorist implications. 
 
The Thai Government spent much of 2004 attempting to ascertain whether the 
high level of violence was, in fact, an insurgency.  To begin with, the 
government, led by PM Thaksin Shinawatra, was puzzled by the fact that the 
separatists had not published a manifesto or approached Bangkok with a list of 
demands.  By mid-2004, however, the insurgents had staged a failed, region-
wide revolt, and their prolific leaflet and Internet propaganda campaign clearly 
demonstrated that a rebel movement was afoot.  By fall 2005, the separatists 
had made political demands via the press, all of which centered on secession.  
By 2006, a coup against PM Thaksin succeeded and the military government 
that replaced him instituted a new COIN strategy for the south that by 2008 had 
reduced violence by about 40 percent.  Some of the tenets of this new strategy 
were based on Thailand’s past successful COIN strategies.  Whether or not the 
government has concocted a winning strategy for the future, however, remains 
to be seen. 
 
This paper analyses these COIN campaigns through the COIN Pantheon, a 
conceptual model the author developed as an analytical tool.  It is based on 
David Kilcullen’s three pillars of COIN.  The COIN Pantheon has as its base the 
concept of strategy, and then as the next edifice, coordination.  Three pillars of 
security, politics, and economics rise from these to push against the insurgent 
edifice.  The roof is the at-risk population.  By researching the specifics of all 
these issues for the three COINs discussed here, the Thai way of COIN 
emerges.  Then, by measuring these results against the tenets of COIN 
theorists David Galula, Sir Robert Thompson, and Kilcullen, the Thai Way of 
COIN is more clearly illuminated. 
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CHAPTER  1 
 
INTRODUCTION:   
RATIONALE, LITERATURE SURVEY AND METHODS 
 
 
1. Rationale 
 
The goal of this study is to ascertain how Thailand wages counterinsurgency 
(COIN).  Thailand has waged two successful COINs in the past and is currently 
waging a third – victory yet assured – on its southern border.  The lessons learned 
from Thailand’s campaigns could result in COIN techniques valuable not only to 
Thailand and neighboring countries with similar security problems, but also to 
countries like the United States and the United Kingdom that are currently 
reshaping their irregular warfare doctrines in response to the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. 
 
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN manual, the book that revolutionized U.S. 
strategy and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, drew lessons from scores of 
COIN campaigns throughout history, some successful, some not.  These include 
Vietnam, Ireland, Malaysia, Algeria, the Philippines, China, ancient Persia, 
Lebanon, Spain, and Haiti.  It did not cite examples from Thailand’s successful 
COINs, despite their prima facie value.  One may reasonably assume that this is 
because so little is in fact known about them. As the Literature Survey will show, 
few authors, save for American Tom Marks and Thai scholars such as Suchit 
Bunbongkarn, Chai-Anan Samudavanija, and Kusuma Snitwongse, have analyzed 
Thai COIN, and even these focused on Thailand’s communist rebellion, not the 
subsequent wars.  There is not a study that analyses Thailand’s two past and one 
ongoing COINs for lessons learned.  This thesis fills that gap. 
 
This project analyzes Thailand’s successful 1965-85 communist COIN, its 
understudied 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists, and its current war 
against ethnic Malay and radical Islamic insurgents attempting to secede and 
establish Patani Raya, a kind of Islamic Republic.  The communist COIN engulfed 
the entire country and nearly toppled the government.  China and North Vietnam 
sponsored the insurgents, and the war occurred at the same time as insurgencies 
in Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia.  The communists succeeded in all cases 
except Thailand.  This was a complicated war.  Not only were the insurgents 
difficult to counter, but also the top tiers of government ignored effective COIN 
strategies and opted for autocracy and heavy suppression until COIN savvy 
officers took over in 1977 and instituted reform.  Victory ensued. 
 
The 1980s-90s COIN in the far south addressed a longstanding rebellion that had 
surged with violence on and off since the end of WW II.  Bangkok did not apply 
effective COIN measures to this conflict until 1980, but when it did, the insurgents 
withered.  Intra-government wrangling regarding command and control and budget 
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issues delayed ending the insurgency sooner, but by 1998, it was done.  Lack of 
follow through, however, dampened the state’s military victory and made room for 
a new crop of rebels but a few years later. 
 
The current war in Thailand’s far south, which began in earnest in 2004, is a 
reconfiguration of the remnants of the 1980s-90s insurgency, this time with radical 
Islamic tenets to better combat Bangkok’s political and economic operations that 
helped achieve victory in 1998.  The new insurgency has dedicated followers that 
murder civilians wholesale, including fellow Muslims.  They are takfir, a mentality 
in league with al Qaeda.  To date, Bangkok has applied past COIN techniques to 
the new insurgency, and, along with some new tactics, has experienced some 
success in decreasing levels of violence and insurgent controlled villages by 
nearly half. 
 
Even though the current war is unfinished, patterns of Thai COIN are clear.  
Thailand uses a baseline strategy to coordinate and drive forward its COIN 
operations, which include a mix of security, politics, and economics.  It goes 
through great lengths to define and infiltrate the insurgents.  It strives to treat the 
population as the object of victory.  While Thailand has not always applied these 
principles flawlessly – indeed, some of its efforts have been rough and even 
counterproductive – it has, nevertheless won its past COINs.  It has experienced 
some success in its current five-year COIN, a young conflict compared to most 
insurgencies.  Thailand’s way of COIN, therefore, is worthy of study, and in many 
cases, emulation. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Thai COIN and Associated Literature 
 
There is no significant literature – and not a single book – describing or analyzing 
the Thai way of counterinsurgency (COIN) across the wide spectrum of Thailand’s 
COIN campaigns.  This is curious, because while Thailand does not have a central 
COIN doctrine, it does have consistent strategic, operational, and tactical methods 
it applies to its small wars, and they have been successful.  The Thai, however, by 
their own admission, say they are not the most prolific war historians. 
 
There are several books and monographs that describe individual facets of Thai 
COIN campaigns written by a handful of Thai and an array of foreigners.  These 
cover Thailand’s communist COIN, the southern COIN in the 1980s-90s, and the 
current war on its southern border.  When reading them comparatively, these 
works help shed light on Thailand’s COIN methods. 
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Tom Marks’ Making Revolution: The Insurgency of the Communist Party of 
Thailand in Structural Perspective1 is the most prolific and comprehensive study of 
Thailand’s communist COIN.  Making extensive use of document research and 
interviews with one of Thailand’s central COIN figures, General Saiyud Kerdphol, 
Marks analyzes Thailand’s COIN against Maoist revolutionaries through the lens 
of Theda Skocpol’s, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of 
France, Russia and China.  Marks depicts how insurgents built a counter state 
structure based on social, economic, and political issues.  He analyzes the 
strengths and weaknesses of the counter state and then describes how Thailand 
toppled it.  Any Thai COIN study would be remiss without using this text. 
 
General Saiyud Kerdphol’s own The Struggle for Thailand, Counter-Insurgency, 
1965-1985,2 discusses Thailand’s strategies and tactics in the communist COIN, 
but not through an analytical framework that reveals COIN lessons learned.  
Instead, Saiyud’s book is a collection of speeches he gave from 1965-85 on 
Thailand’s communist COIN with some analysis and commentary in the 
conclusion. Technically, it is a primary source.  It is an exceptionally valuable 
book, however, that reveals COIN programs and the processes that fostered them 
in detail that no other work reveals.  Because it is a series of speeches over a 20-
year period, it also offers a series of “snapshots” of Thai strategic, operational, and 
tactical COIN thinking.  
 
George K. Tanham’s Trial In Thailand3 depicts Thailand’s communist COIN up to 
1974, the time of the book’s writing.  Tanham was the main U.S. State Department 
official tasked with supporting Thailand’s COIN at the time.  He details communist 
strategies and tactics and those of the state, but since the war had not concluded, 
there were few lessons learned.  His book, nevertheless, demonstrates how the 
Thai first aimed to counter the communist rebellion. 
 
Katherine Bowie’s Rituals of National Loyalty4 depicts Thailand’s main political-
paramilitary program, the Village Scouts, designed counter the communists’ 
mobilization of the people.  Bowie provides intricate details on the foundation of 
this decisive program and how it functioned.  Her use of a Marxist model to 
analyze the Scouts and the war, however, is problematic.  By using Marx to 
analyze a COIN program meant to stifle communist rebels, her final analysis is 
predetermined.  Bowie sees the conflict as the upper classes radicalizing the 
population – via the Village Scouts – against the masses who simply wanted more 
freedom via political representation and a soft form of socialism.  She does not 
admit communists, overtly backed by China and North Vietnam, tried to overthrow 
the government using a strict Maoist model, which entailed mass propaganda, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  T. Marks, Making Revolution; The Insurgency of the Communist Party of Thailand in 
2 S. Kerdphol, The Struggle for Thailand: Counterinsurgency 1965-1985, (Bangkok: S 
Research Center, Co, Ltd, 1986). 
3 G. K. Tanham, Trial in Thailand, (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1974). 
4 K. A. Bowie, Rituals of National Loyalty; An Anthropology of the State and the Village 
Scout Movement in Thailand, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).	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countrywide guerrilla warfare, and some terrorism.  Even the rebels themselves 
admit these points. 
 
Curiously, Bowie says the insurgents were not a threat to Thailand.  More, she 
compares the Village Scouts to the Nazis and her bias shines through when she 
wrote of a Village Scout rally, “…to me, the whole thing seemed noisy and silly”5.  
None of these descriptions are professional anthropological analyses.  They are 
personal political attacks on a government she appears to dislike.  In doing so, 
Bowie scuttles an opportunity to objectively apply her detailed and useful research 
to arrive at meaningful conclusions. 
 
There are two rare and masterful analyses of Thailand’s communist COIN by Thai 
scholars in English.  They are pivotal to understand Thai COIN.  The first is Suchit 
Bunbongkarn’s The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86, published in 1986.6  The 
second is From Armed Suppression to Political Offensive: Attitudinal 
Transformation of Thai Military Officers Since 1976, published in 1990 by Chai-
Anan Samudavanija, Kusuma Snitwongse, and Suchit Bunbongkarn.7  Suchit’s 
1986 book discusses the rise of General Prem Tinsulanonda and the complicated 
political maneuvering by his faction, supporting factions, and opposing ones and 
their ideas about waging COIN as the war against the communists raged.  From 
Armed Suppression, which Suchit helped write, tracks the COIN thinking of the 
Thai military from the 1960s to 1980.  Both books shed light on how Thai officers 
developed and applied their wining COIN doctrine against the communists.  As 
illuminating as they are, however, these books approach COIN from a strategic 
level, and they intentionally leave out how Thailand made that strategy operational 
in the field. 
 
Interestingly, these two books secured their core understanding of Thailand’s 
winning COIN strategy from Kanok Wongtrangan’s monograph, “Change and 
Persistence in Thai Counter-Insurgency Policy,” published by Bangkok’s 
Chulalongkorn University in 1983.  Kanok appears to be the original Thai-English 
translator and English language analyst of Thailand’s COIN strategy, quite a feat 
because of the difficult aspects of Thai government language.  Being close to the 
origins of the strategy, time wise, his work is invaluable, his insights penetrating. 
 
There are few accounts of the understudied southern COIN in the 1980s-90s, and 
none approach it from a COIN point of view.  Panomporn Anurugsa’s 1984 
University of Texas PhD, “Political Integration Policy in Thailand: The Case of the 
Malay Muslim Minority,” discusses the southern border insurgency and the 
government’s political efforts to assuage it.  Ornanong Noiwong’s 2001 Northern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid., pp. 159. 
6 S. Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86. (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian studies, 1986).  
7 C. Samudavanija, K. Snitwongse, and S. Bunbongkarn, From Armed Suppression to 
Political Offensive, (Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies, 
Chulalongkorn University, Aksornsiam Press, 1990). 
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Illinois University PhD, titled, “Political Integration Policies and Strategies of the 
Thai Government Toward the Malay-Muslims of Southernmost Thailand (1973-
2000),” does the same thing.  Yet another doctorate on the far south, Surin 
Pitsuwan’s  “Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of Malay-Muslims of 
Southern Thailand,” (1982) covers nearly identical subject material.  This is not to 
say these works are not useful: without them there would be precious little written 
about the subject.  Nearly all studies of the 1980s-90s COIN and even the current 
COIN rely on them. 
 
They each discuss the origins of the Thai Malay Muslim insurgency with its 
beginnings in the post WW II era and its gaining violent momentum in the 1970s.  
And while they also discuss certain COIN programs, none of them discuss Thai 
COIN theory and how the government applied it to the far south.  Instead, they 
focus on political and economic integration programs the government used to 
merge locals into the greater Thai system. But integration was only one facet of 
COIN.  None of these works objectively cover the state’s security programs, 
referring to them as blundering or overly harsh while providing little detail on 
military and police structure and operations.  While many were blundering, some 
were effective, and this angle sidelines Thailand’s security programs as unworthy 
of study.  More, none of these doctorates critically analyze the government’s 
1980s integrated security-political-economic strategy that ended with a decisive 
military victory over the insurgents in 1998. 
 
As a result, there is a gap in the research on this particular insurgency.  More, 
there is so little done on this conflict that writers looking to the past for answers on 
Thailand’s current insurgency continually recycle Panomporn, Ornanong, and 
Surin.  While they hold valuable material, their defects become replicated in the 
present COIN literature, skewing the picture. 
 
There are scores of supporting works on the 1980s-90s insurgency that are 
helpful, but they mostly cover insurgent groups.  One of the best is in Thai by 
General Kitti Rattanachaya titled, Thailand’s Southern Insurgency: Creation of 
Pattani State.8  Kitti was Fourth Army Commander in the mid-1990s and has first 
hand knowledge of these groups. 
 
Northern Illinois University’s Ladd M. Thomas wrote prolifically on the insurgents in 
the 1970s and early 80s in works such as, “Political Violence in the Muslim 
Provinces of Southern Thailand,” for Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies (ISEAS), and “Thai Muslim Separatism in South Thailand,” in The Muslims 
of Thailand, Volume 2: Politics of the Malay-Speaking South, for the Centre for 
Southeast Asian Studies in Bihar, India.9  Ladd’s work was groundbreaking at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 General K. Rattanachaya, Thailand’s Southern Insurgency: Creation of Pattani State, 
(Bangkok: Sor. Pichit Publication Co Ltd., 1 November 2004). 
9 M. L. Thomas, “Thai Muslim Separatism in South Thailand,” in A. D. W. Forbes (ed.) 
The Muslims of Thailand, Volume 2: Politics of the Malay-Speaking South, (Bihar, 
India: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), and Political Violence in the Muslim 
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time; he was perhaps the first to chart insurgent violence during the 1970s and 
80s.  Wan Kadir Che Man, an insurgent leader from the 1990s, wrote, Muslim 
Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern 
Thailand in 1990.  While helpful in deciphering many aspects of the internal organs 
of the insurgency and its foreign support network, like other books, Man provides 
details on the “who” and “how” and “why” of the movement, but little on the COIN 
aspects of the war. 
 
Several other works address aspects the origins of the 1980s-90s insurgency, but 
none use it as historical background to the current Thai COIN.  These include, but 
are not limited to, Walailak University’s, Knowledge and Conflict Resolution: The 
Crisis of the Border Region of Southern Thailand, and Chaiwat Satha-Anand’s 
“Silence of the Bullet Monument,” a chapter in, Rethinking Thailand’s Southern 
Violence. 
  
Ibrahim Syukri’s History of The Malay Kingdom of Patani,10 translated by Conner 
Baily and John N. Miksic, is a fascinating version of “Patani history” told by a 
presumed Thai Malay Muslim based in Pasir Putih in Kelantan, Malaysia.  
Publication date was post WW II.  It describes Patani – the old name for Thailand’s 
border provinces when they were an independent state – as a glorious and rich 
Islamic kingdom and the cradle of Islam in Southeast Asia.  It is not a work of 
research, however.  There are no sources cited, nor are their critical analyses.  
This does not mean it is wholly inaccurate.  The book generally follows regional 
and Thai historical timelines.  For example, it accurately chronicles Burmese-Thai 
wars and how, in 1563, Burma recruited Patani troops to help sack Ayutthaya.  
Trouble arises, however, when Syukri narrows his historical vision.  For example, 
he writes only of Patani troops toppling Ayutthaya, making it seem as if Patani 
alone destroyed the doomed capital (pp. 26). 
 
There are more odd anomalies.  The author cites Patani’s heroic seafaring abilities 
and immense riches but does not quantify them or probe their origins. Instead, he 
writes generally of agriculture, regional trade, and cannon manufacturing.  While 
all three were economic sectors at the time – there are several Patani cannon at 
the Thai Ministry of Defense – there is no evidence supporting the author’s case; 
no proof, for example, Patani ever made more than a few cannon.  The book, 
then, is more lore than anything else.  It does, however, provide insight into the 
current insurgency.  Present day rebels use the exact themes in the book to 
propagandize and indoctrinate the at-risk population.  Because this source and 
others’ limitations, deciphering the 1980s-90s COIN demands copious interviews 
and news articles from the actual time period of the war. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Provinces of Southern Thailand, Occasional Paper No. 28, (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1975). 
10 Ibrahim Syukri’, History of The Malay Kingdom of Patani, translated by Conner Baily 
and John N. Miksic, (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 1985). 
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This is not the case with Thailand’s current insurgency.  There are volumes of 
articles, monographs, think tank pieces, and books on the subject.  However, as 
with the 1980s-90s war, none of these address the ongoing conflict from a 
professional COIN perspective. 
 
Duncan McCargo’s recently published Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and 
Legitimacy in Southern Thailand, provides insight into insurgent activities and 
some government efforts to quell them, but it is more a hypercritical attack on 
Bangkok’s policies by an author self-avowedly uninterested in COIN studies.11  
Moreover, while some of his information is helpful in revealing insurgent tactics, 
McCargo’s readiness to believe insurgent interviewees who claimed they had no 
intention of killing anyone as they joined assault teams that killed police and 
military personnel with machetes and firearms, smacks of naiveté. 
 
Yet another one of McCargo’s books, this one a collection of essays written by 
Thai and foreign scholars on the background of the current insurgency, is 
Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence.  It contains excellent historical material 
demonstrating the social, political, economic, and cultural angst of the far south.  It 
moreover depicts PM Thaksin Shinawatra’s policy toward the region as a violent 
one – not wholly accurate because of his political and diplomatic programs, but 
overall in keeping with the events of the far south in 2004-05.  Unlike his 2008 
book, however, the evidence brought together by McCargo suggests in Rethinking 
that organized criminal elements and corrupt politicians were somehow behind the 
insurgency instead of a movement bent on secession. 
 
The Royal Thai Government has published several works on the insurgency.  One 
was the Krue Se report of 2005.12  Translated by The Nation newspaper, it 
explains how Thai forces reacted to a mass uprising by insurgents on 28 April 
2004 that ended with the Royal Thai Army storming insurgents holed up in Krue 
Se Mosque in Pattani.  A government report on security forces’ neglectful actions 
that resulted in the deaths of more than 70 protestors at Tak Bai police station in 
October 2004 reveals another blunder, but not government COIN policy.13 None of 
these explain Thai COIN policy, however. 
 
Scores of researchers and pundits have produced a wide array of literature on the 
current war, among them Dana R. Dillon’s, “Insurgency in Thailand: The U.S. 
Should Support the Government,” for the Heritage Foundation.  Her paper argues 
the U.S. should lend COIN support to Thailand, but she does not explain Thai 
COIN policy.  Marc Askew’s “Fighting with Ghosts: Confronting Thailand’s 
Enigmatic ‘Southern Fire’,” a paper he delivered at ISEAS in Singapore in March 
2009, is exceptional regarding insurgent tactics, but not government COIN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  As expressed by McCargo to the author in Washington, DC, at a conference at the 
East West Center in 2006. 
12  available on http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/takbai/p2.htm. 
13  available on http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/takbai/p1.htm.   
	  	   19	  
strategy and tactics.  Askew’s plethora of articles on the subject, however, 
demonstrate his extraordinary value at deciphering the current conflict.14 
 
The International Crisis Group (ICG), a Brussels-based think tank, published a 
monograph on 23 October 2007 titled “Southern Thailand: The Problem with 
Paramilitaries.” It critiqued government local force COIN programs and largely 
accused them of being brutal, useless, and only adding to the carnage of 
insurgency.  It offered negative stories of Thailand’s local forces and suggested 
they be replaced with Thai soldiers.  In saying so, the ICG demonstrated a poor 
understanding of COIN in general.  Local forces are necessary, at the very least, 
to guide national forces in insurgent territory, and at the most, fight the insurgents 
as agents of the government at the local level since they know the local “human 
terrain” – culture, social connections, people, etc.  This is common in nearly all 
COINs, and local forces proved decisive in Thailand’s past COINs.  Having said 
this, the monograph provides good historical background of the current COIN and 
the evolution of some local units. 
 
Ball and Mathieson’s Militia Redux, Or Sor and the Revival of Paramilitarism in 
Thailand, fares the same.15  While they provide good information on the breadth of 
Thailand’s local forces, the authors make little reference to COIN theory and the 
contribution of local forces.  Instead, they criticize local forces as criminal and 
contributing to insurgency, not quelling them.  Such a one-sided book provides 
little use in COIN analyses, but its historical information on Thailand’s COINs, 
particularly the number of local forces vs. insurgents, is useful. 
 
Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand, edited by Acharya, Chua, and 
Gunaratna16 sheds light on the present insurgency by depicting its methods and 
operations.  Particularly helpful is the translation of the insurgent guidebook, “Fight 
for the Liberation of Pattani,” which reveals religious goals and indoctrination 
methods like no other source.  But, as with other books mentioned here, it does 
not discuss Thai COIN doctrine or strategy. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, valuable sources on the current COIN are three Thai English 
dailies: The Nation, the Bangkok Post, and the Thai News Agency (TNA).  Their 
reporters cover the war on a daily basis, writing not only about the insurgents, but 
also Bangkok’s COIN operations.  For example, the Bangkok Post’s 13 March 
2005 “Distrust ‘needs urgent solution’,” provided insight into how the Thaksin 
administration and the army began to shape their COIN strategy.  PM Thaksin 
appointed as minister of defense Thammarak Ayudhya, a former intelligence chief 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Such as “Conspiracy, Politics, and a Disorderly Border” (2007), “Landscapes of Fear, 
horizons and Trust (2009), and “Performing Political Identity: The Democratic Party in 
Southern Thailand (2008). 
15 D. Ball and D. S. Mathieson, Militia Redux; Or Sor and the Revival of Paramilitarism 
in Thailand, (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2007). 
16 A. Acharya, S, Chua, and R. Gunaratna, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand, 
(Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2006). 
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under famed communist COIN era General Harn Leenanond.  As a result of his 
former position, Thammarak well understood the insurgent dynamics and COIN of 
the south.  More, many southerners accepted him as a just man.  No other book or 
monograph revealed this valuable information.  TNA, in its 24 June 2009 piece, 
“Cabinet proposes to move border agency to PM’s control,” reported on PM 
Abhisit’s aim to seize the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center from 
control of the Ministry of Interior is insightful regarding COIN coordination issues 
and not found in any other media. 
 
In summary for the above writings, the literature available on Thailand’s 
insurgencies, except for the 80s-90s COIN, is prolific and rich.  And even for this 
COIN there are nuggets of information to be gleaned by comparing well-used 
sources with elusive press material from the 1990s and person-to-person 
interviews.  Thai COIN literature, however, is replete with unprofessional analyses 
that speak nothing of COIN – Marks and a handful of Thai authors from the 1980s 
excluded.  Most are content to tackle insurgents or individual programs from 
individual wars.  None look at Thailand’s COINs from a comprehensive and 
professional analytical framework.  This is odd, because the Thai government has, 
for the most part, countered its insurgencies within a specific framework, just short 
of stated doctrine.  Building and applying that framework was never seamless, but 
it was indeed methodical.  This thesis intends to demonstrate how the Thai 
constructed and fielded their COIN strategies and tactics for three wars, thereby 
revealing the Thai way of COIN. 
 
 
Key Classic and Modern COIN Literature and Where Thai COIN Fits Into It 
 
Aside from the comparatively narrow scope of literature that directly address 
Thai COIN, there is a wide body of work on COIN concepts this PhD fits into.  
This collection consists of COIN advice from Cold War practitioners who fought 
in Malaya, Vietnam, the Philippines, Algeria, Kenya, and the like, and calibrated 
COIN advice from practitioners and observers from recent campaigns such as 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  David Kilcullen, Australian Army officer and Chief 
Strategist of the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, is one of the latter.  The U.S. hired him to aid America in 
redesigning its irregular warfare strategies.  He says COIN is divided between 
classic and modern COIN. 
 
Classic COIN ranges from the end of WW II to the 1980s and is generally 
characterized by COIN theorists David Galula and Sir Robert Thompson.  Their 
concepts remain to this day the core foundations of nearly every COIN 
campaign in post WW II history.  Even modern COIN, despite being different 
from classic COIN, is rooted in Galula and Thompson.  Broadly, their lessons 
include politically de-marginalizing the insurgent and physically separating them 
from the people.  It is a broad but set series of concepts ideal for fighting 
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communist subversives, and rebels building shadow governments, and like 
revolutionary movements. 
 
Modern COIN theorists recognize classic COIN concepts but add additional 
notions that address fanatical religious ideologues that do not always harbor 
self-preservation, state building, and control of territory as key goals as classic 
insurgents do.  Some modern insurgents simply strive to globally mass political 
allies to ideologically beat their opponents in the international arena.  Others aim 
for an amoebic kind of regional or global state bound together by strict religious 
beliefs that govern business, social, legal, and military practices while 
simultaneously rejecting wealth, Western style empire building, modern 
amenities, and set territories.  Here, modern COIN theorists postulate, classic 
COIN strategies do not always suffice. 
 
But most COIN theorists admit COIN theories are just that – theories.  There are 
basic laws of COIN that should be adhered to, yes, but COIN is a counter to a 
highly fluid political-economic-social-military security challenge, and the exact 
strategies, operations, and tactics applied to solve one insurgency will rarely, if 
ever, be the same for another.  Beyond fundamental, baseline practices, then, 
COIN is a tailored affair.  That is why the continual study of insurgency and 
COIN is vital – because of the dramatic variety of problems and solutions 
involved.  And that is why this study is relevant to the wider body of COIN 
literature. 
 
Specifically, because Thailand has fought insurgencies in both the Cold War 
and modern arenas, Thai COIN lessons can add insightful layers to existing 
COIN literature.  The Thai offer examples of strategies and operational concepts 
in security, political, and economic realms that successfully defeated insurgents, 
just like many COIN studies of today and yesterday.  There are both new and 
previously proven COIN tenets offered here.  The latter will reinforce literature 
that purports traditional COIN measures.  The former will stimulate COIN 
thinkers with examples of innovative solutions and challenge some traditional 
theories.  Additionally, this study demonstrates how and why the Thai made the 
COIN decisions they made; many resulted in failure, and success was 
frequently achieved the hard way – effective command and control of the COIN 
effort is an obvious one.  So this study of Thai COIN also provides glaring 
examples of what not to do and what to do in COIN – for given situations and 
scenarios such as Thailand’s.  They should be helpful to Thailand regarding its 
current insurgency problems, the US and its allies regarding Afghanistan, and 
for other countries dealing with asymmetric threats. 
 
Glancing forward toward the conclusions of this study, it is interesting to note 
Thailand – either by default or design – has both followed classic COIN 
concepts by, for example, Galula, and ignored those by the same man – all with 
great success.  In its current war, Thailand is indeed using modern COIN 
techniques, especially with regard to assuaging threats in the international 
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sector, but, interestingly, it was always taken this approach, even in the Cold 
War.  More, where Thailand has recognized the international ideological fight of 
its current insurgency, it has been slow to do the same domestically at the 
village level.  So studying Thai COIN is not only valuable to COIN theory writ 
large, it is also fascinating from a cultural security problem solving point of view. 
 
In order to gauge how this study of Thai COIN fits into this swath of classic and 
modern COIN theories, a brief survey of these theories is needed.  The classic 
COIN theorists and their books cited here are David Galula (Counterinsurgency 
Warfare; Theory and Practice), Sir Robert Thompson (Defeating Communist 
Insurgency; The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam,) Richard Clutterbuck (The 
Long, Long War; The Emergency in Malaya, 1948-1960), and Sir Frank Kitson 
(Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping).  These – 
especially the first two – are the premier COIN “anchor books” that contain the 
heart of all COIN theory.  Clutterbuck differs from the others by delving into 
operational and some tactical details about how the British waged COIN in 
Malaya, similar to how David Kilcullen’s most recent book, Counterinsurgency, 
discusses many operational and even some tactical COIN methods used on 
modern COIN battlefields.  Kitson was generally known for bringing COIN 
lessons from the 1950s into the 1970s, expanding on the intelligence 
contribution to COIN, and addressing riots and protests. 
 
In the post Vietnam era, there were COIN theory critics that are addressed here, 
too.  There were scores of low intensity conflicts around the globe, and 
multitudes of authors critiqued U.S. COIN policy and theory plus that of its allies, 
including the UK.  Vietnam had not gone well – the U.S. lost that war – and its 
involvement in Latin America’s many small wars such as Nicaragua, sponsored 
by the Soviet Union and its proxies, especially drew fire.  These critical authors 
included Andrew Mack (“Counterinsurgency in the Third World: Theory and 
Practice,”) and D. Michael Shafer (“The Unlearned Lessons of 
Counterinsurgency.”) 
 
COIN did not garner much attention in the 1990s, save for a few farsighted 
thinkers.  But it experienced a renewed impetus post 9-11 with the modern 
COIN theorists and authors who did not refer to themselves as such but simply 
security and defense thinkers who embraced COIN as one of many solutions to 
the Global War on Terror, particularly regarding the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Some of these were so fervent in their cause they became known 
inside Washington, DC, as “COINdinistas,” a play on the 1980s era Soviet and 
Cuban-backed Nicaraguan revolutionaries, the Sandinistas. 
 
Modern COIN theorists are personified namely by David Kilcullen (“Countering 
Global Insurgency,” “Counterinsurgency Redux,” “The Development of 
Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics,” and his most recent book, 
Counterinsurgency, which came on the heels of his first, The Accidental 
Guerrilla).  Yet another is John Nagl, perhaps the best known “COINdinista” 
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(Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam; Learning to Eat Soup 
with a Knife).  Both Kilcullen and Nagl had a major influence on the new U.S. 
COIN manual that came out in 2006 specifically for the Iraq war (FM 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency) but certainly intended for wider application, including 
Afghanistan.  Its insightful and Thompson/Kitson-like British counterpart, UK 
Joint COIN guide (Security and Stabilization; The Military Contribution, JP 3-40), 
is also discussed here. 
 
Aside from these texts, there is a never-ending flood of articles and books that 
discuss COIN from a multitude of angles, all relevant to this study because of 
their strategic and operational nature.  Authors here include Rupert Smith (The 
Utility of Force,) David Ucko (The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming 
the U.S. Military for Modern Wars), the RAND Corporation (Victory Has a 
Thousand Fathers; Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency), Heather S. 
Gregg (“Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding Counterinsurgency”), 
Octavian Manea (“Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach: 
Notes on the British Army Field Manual Weltanschauung; An Interview with 
Colonel Alexander Alderson”), Bill Ardolino, (“A Counterinsurgency Conundrum 
in Salaam Bazaar,”) the indispensible Kalev I. Sepp, (“Best Practices in 
Counterinsurgency,”) Paul Dixon, (“Hearts and Minds? British Counter-
Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,”) Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, (“From 
Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding Conflict and Peace-
Building in the New World Disorder,”), and Robert R. Tomes, (“Relearning 
Counterinsurgency Warfare.”) 
 
Published in 1964, David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and 
Practice, is a lessons learned book based on the author’s experiences waging 
COIN against the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Algeria from 1956-58.  The 
war lasted from 1954-62.  Galula’s first and exceptionally valuable book, 
Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, reads like a COIN diary of his day-to-day 
activities in separating the population from the NLF.  It contributed to the final 
theories contained in Counterinsurgency Warfare.  Before briefly exploring 
Galula, it should be noted that while the French achieved a military and 
administrative victory over the insurgents, the NLF ultimately succeeded in the 
ideological sphere by lobbying the United Nations to achieve independence.  It 
should also be noted Algeria has since known little peace.  The NLF, its rivals, 
other insurgent organizations, and the government have bloodied each other 
there for decades. 
 
Turning to Counterinsurgency Warfare, then, Galula asserts there are both 
conventional and unconventional “laws of warfare” and they “cannot be seriously 
challenged.”17  He cites Napoleon’s axioms such as  “Victory goes to the largest 
battalion” as indisputable.18  He moreover admonishes the counterinsurgent not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 D. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice, (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger Inc. 1964), p. x. 
18 Ibid. 
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to attempt to mimic the insurgent – it is a “trap,” he explains, that will lead to 
defeat.19 
 
These latter two notations are curious for an astute man who wrote prolifically 
on the type of warfare that demands more flexibility and adaptation than any 
other.  And Napoleon’s advice falls flat on its face in light of battles such as 
Chancellorsville, Virginia, 1863, where a force of 60,000 Confederates routed a 
Union force of 133,000.  This type of upset is the crux of insurgency – the “fly vs. 
the lion,” as Galula so eloquently puts it.20  Regardless of these less than apt 
precepts, Galula’s overall work offers timeless COIN tenets that can be followed 
by any counterrevolutionary force, be it military, police, or civilian.  It cannot be 
overstated that Galula was perhaps the first to formalize these concepts in the 
post WW II world, and they have served as anchor concepts for COIN 
practitioners worldwide ever since. 
 
Galula asserts there are broad concepts to understand regarding insurgency 
and COIN.  First, he says, the objective is the population because insurgency is 
a political war.21  Galula says insurgencies are protracted and costly, and the 
insurgent has the advantage of fluidity over the government’s rigidity.22  He 
moreover asserts ideology is more powerful than physical armaments, and the 
counterinsurgent must not only size up the physical terrain, but also the political, 
economic, and cultural aspects of the conflict area in order to comprehend the 
nexus between the enemy and the people.23  Galula furthermore stresses the 
importance of isolating the insurgent from outside political and military support, 
and COIN forces must have some kind of metric to measure “pacified” areas, 
such as color coding them red (hostile), pink (semi-hostile), or white (non-
hostile).24 
 
Galula is perhaps most famous for his “four laws of COIN” and what he refers to 
as his “strategy for pacification.”  Both serve as the core of his COIN theory.  
The laws are:25 
 
1)  “Support of the Population Is as Necessary for the Counterinsurgent as for 
the Insurgent; 
 
2) Support Is Gained Through an Active Minority; 
 
3) Support from the Population Is Conditional; 
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20 Ibid., p. x. 
21 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
22 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
23 Ibid., pp. 10, 26. 
24 Ibid., pp. 28-29, 52. 
25 Ibid., pp. 55-58. 
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4) Intensity of Efforts and Vastness of Means Are Essential.” 
 
Galula’s strategy of pacification is as follows:26 
 
“In a Selected Area 
 
1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of 
armed insurgents; 
 
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in 
strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the 
population lives; 
 
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off 
its links with the guerrillas; 
 
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organizations; 
 
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities; 
 
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the 
softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-
defense units; 
 
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement; 
 
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. Order having been re-
established in the area, the process.” 
 
Within this process, Galula provides details regarding the how and why of this 
strategy.  He writes troops living amongst a population that shield a people from 
insurgents allow that population to build up their own protective forces that will, 
in the long term, keep insurgents out without close government supervision.  In 
doing this, the government has to identify those people who are against the 
insurgents and embolden them, not just militarily, but politically.  This is key, he 
says.  The insurgent must be politically undermined. 
 
Also in this process, says Galula, leaders emerge that are better able manage 
and benefit the people, and the key turning point is when a village or hamlet, 
embraced and protected by the government, embraces the COIN ideals of the 
government and choses sides against the insurgent.  The process requires a 
mix of military, police, and wide array of civil servants, because harnessing the 
population requires uplifting it from poverty, social strife, a lacking educational 
environment, and political doldrums.27 
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All this requires massive coordination and singularity of purpose by a diverse 
group of government employees, writes Galula.  And these personnel must be 
diverse enough to cross over occupational specialties.  Soldiers, for example, 
must be able to conduct civil affairs, teach, and do social work as well as 
neutralize the enemy until the conflict zone is safe enough to be stocked with 
civil servants.28 
 
Galula also provides strategic guidance and command and control advice.  He 
says, for example, “‘A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 
percent political’…”29  And since COIN is mostly political, the military should be 
subordinate to civilian control.30  Achieving these ends and the others mentioned 
here requires the military and civilian assets arrayed against the insurgent to 
change their mindset from their traditional roles to one of COIN, something 
Galula calls “adaptation of minds.”31  This includes learning from mistakes, he 
warns, as war theory and war in practice always differ, and mistakes naturally 
happen.32 
 
As for security operations – which, says Galula, pave the way for civil affairs and 
political operations – he advises a combination of mobile strike forces and static 
occupying forces working in tandem to continually pressure insurgent forces.  
Propaganda aimed at the both the insurgent and the at-risk population is 
paramount.  That aimed at the insurgent convinces him or her to give up their 
fight.  That aimed at the population is designed to assuage its fears of military 
action and also to let it know the government is there to protect and uplift them.33  
 
Published in 1966, Sir Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency; 
The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, was born out of the victory over 
communist insurgents that tried to take over Malaya from 1948-60.  Unlike 
Galula, who wrote from the view of an infantry officer, Thompson – who had 
served as a British-India “Chindit” Special Forces officer in Burma during WW II 
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modern theorists advise one does what is practical to solve the problems at hand.  It 
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30 Ibid., p. 67. 
31 Ibid., p. 69. 
32 Ibid., p. 76. 
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– waged COIN as Permanent Secretary of Defense in Malaya in the 1950s.  The 
purpose of his book, he writes in the preface, is to explain in layman’s terms 
how insurgency and COIN function to the average “newsreader” and also to 
provide a COIN framework for the “professional” who counters irregular warfare.  
It is not a complete work, he admits, and he purposefully left out the intricacies 
of operations and military vernacular. 
 
Thompson begins with a tutorial on insurgency, the insurgent situations in 
Malaya and Vietnam, and then posits his five principles of COIN that state what 
the government must do to halt subversion:34 
 
1) “…have a clear political aim” – to set up an independent, stable, and 
prosperous country with “respected institutions”;35 
 
2) “…function according with law” – establish effective and just laws to assuage 
the insurgency and maintain legitimacy by acting within the law, not outside it; 
 
3) “…have an overall plan” – design a flexible COIN plan that addresses 
security, political, economic, cultural, timing, and territorial issues that forces 
insurgents to react to the government; and a proper military-civilian balance is 
key; 
 
4) “…give priority to defeating political subversion” – the main focus of the 
government’s efforts should focus on identifying and removing the insurgent 
political structure from the population; destruction of the enemy’s war making 
abilities is secondary; 
 
5) “…secure its base areas first.” – the government should establish bases of 
operation in areas it can hold and work out from those points to wage COIN; this 
is, in effect, erecting interior lines of communication, which allows for a 
systematic, section-by-section clearing of guerrillas – what Thompson calls “a 
steam roller outlook”36 that gives the population a clear view of government 
progress and power, which then induces it to join the government’s cause. 
 
After listing these principles, Thompson leaps into strategic and operational 
concepts that enhance his basic premises.  First is establishment of the 
government cause, which essentially frames strategy.  And the number of 
government supporters in the population might be small, so the aim is to co-opt 
the neutrals.  This is done by harnessing three key influences on a population, 
writes Thompson, which are, “Nationalism and national policies, religion and 
customs, material well being and progress.”37 
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Thompson also heralds good governance as pivotal to effective COIN.  The 
government’s administrative structure, he asserts, must be efficient and work for 
the people, such as having a robust and effective education ministry and public 
school system that provides education people can believe in and prosper from.  
Government also must be “fair, honest, and dependable” to succeed in COIN.  
As for COIN administration, it needs to have a war council stocked with military 
and civilians but run by a civilian who understands COIN, and it needs a director 
of operations who holds central power – these lessons coming straight from the 
effectiveness of Sir Gerald Templer who brought order and proficiency to the 
Malaya COIN effort.  Finally, Thompson says respect and cooperation of the 
people must be earned, not forced.  This is quite different from Galula who tells 
in Pacification in Algeria of forcing what he described as unorganized, 
lackadaisical, and leaderless villages into organized and motivated entities 
under a central, local leadership.38 
 
Thompson addresses intelligence throughout his book and furthermore gives it a 
short, standalone chapter.  He writes it is impossible to wage effective COIN 
without good intelligence on the opposition.  Intelligence mainly needs to focus 
on 1) identifying key insurgent agitators, and 2) providing timely information to 
police and military so said agitators can be captured or killed.  The overall goal, 
he asserts, is “total eradication of the threat.”39  More, Thompson says there 
should just be a single organization processing COIN intelligence, ideally police 
Special Branch (but linked to other intelligence entities such as that of the army) 
since it is ideally suited for investigative work and identification of hostile 
personnel.  In these cases, intelligence cooperation and sharing is key.40 
 
Next, Thompson addresses information services.  These are designed to, 1) 
entice insurgent surrenders, 2) cause damaging friction within insurgent ranks, 
and 3) demonstrate a government that is effective, fair but firm, and in control. 
Careful use of language is important; for insurgent walks-ins, for example, a 
constructive and noble term should be used in lieu of the defeatist sounding 
term “surrendering insurgent” and the like.  Thompson further describes the role 
of psychological operations and press relations – persuading vs. informing – and 
how important it is to couple these concepts with actual deeds and progress.41 
 
Regarding balance of forces, it depends on terrain, the makeup of the 
government, and the scope of the guerrilla threat.  In Malaya, Thompson says 
the police were the main counter guerrilla force because the war was a people’s 
war, and the police were closest to the people on a day-to-day basis.  The police 
investigated, identified and captured suspects, and patrolled urban areas.  The 
military fought in remote areas.  And the military should be, as Thompson writes, 
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39 Ibid., p. 84. 
40 Ibid., pp. 85-86. 
41 Ibid., pp. 68, 90-96. 
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a “small, elite, highly disciplined, lightly equipped and aggressive” force that is 
mobile and intertwined with, and again, subordinate to, the civilian leadership.42 
 
The police, however, need paramilitary capabilities, Thompson says.  It also 
needs a home constable force made up of citizens augmenting them to help 
provide blanket security and to further co-opt the population to the government’s 
side.43  A local force of government guerrillas conducting counter-guerrilla 
activities is necessary, too, especially amongst ethnic tribes and the like.  But 
Thompson warns forces and operations of these latter types cannot, by 
themselves, defeat insurgency.44 
 
As for basic operational concepts, Thompson summarizes COIN field operations 
as, “clear, hold, winning, and won.”45  The exact types of operations will vary 
according to the threat level, population terrain, extent of subversion, political 
issues, etc., but the general thrust is universal – first clear the area of guerilla 
military forces, then set up security and civil affairs and political programs to 
maintain a presence, then expand and improve those programs to win the 
population, and, when the population turns to the government and rejects the 
guerrilla, victory is achieved.46  More, Thompson writes local forces are ideal for 
COIN, sometimes better than government forces because of the former’s local 
knowledge.  These forces are essential to the holding phase of COIN – which 
can be messy as certain stubborn insurgents will need to be rooted out.  He 
describes it as going after a fierce tomcat, the guerrilla, with a fiercer tomcat, the 
state’s guerrilla.47   Looking forward to the conclusion, the Thai describe it as, 
“getting a gangster to go after a gangster.” 
 
Also addressing the holding aspect of COIN – the most difficult aspect of the 
operational concepts, Thompson discusses strategic hamlets.  Here, Thompson 
refers to a defense force at the lowest level of organized society – Malay 
kampongs and/or “Chinese villages” in Malaya.  The latter were essentially 
squatter camps on the jungle fringes.  The next highest unit of societal 
organization was the mukim, and then above that was the district.  In Vietnam, 
Thompson describes it – from the lowest level to the highest – as hamlet, 
village, district.  In COIN, Thompson asserts, the hamlet/mukim level of society 
needs a professional home guard type force made up of well trained and 
professionally led locals to hold a subdivision after it has been cleared of main 
force insurgents.  The goal is to protect the population and allow economic and 
political development.48  It moreover allows conditions to isolate guerrillas from 
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society, which includes population control, censuses, issuance of identity cards, 
and like measures.49 
 
As Galula and Thompson captured COIN lessons from wars they waged, 
Richard Clutterbuck explains in, The Long, Long War exactly how the British 
waged COIN in the Malayan Emergency.  From 1956-58, he served on the 
Director of Operations staff in Kuala Lumpur and, like Thompson, helped wage 
the war against the communists.  As an aside, this PhD on the Thai way of 
COIN fits between Clutterbuck and Thompson/Galula regarding its approach – it 
is both a “how they did it” and a lessons learned study where the conclusions 
are linked to a description of actions taken.  Thompson wrote the foreword to 
Clutterbuck’s book, heralding it as “…the first case study of the Emergency in 
Malaya and how it was won.”50  He also says the COIN lessons in it were 
valuable to other such practitioners, even the United States that was then 
becoming increasingly embroiled in Vietnam.51 
 
Clutterbuck divides his book into historical periods – “Part One: The Defensive 
(1941-51);” “Part Two: Offense (1952-55);” and “Part Three: Victory (1955-60) – 
And Then What?”  Each explains the insurgent situation and the government 
strategy, operations, and tactics for dealing with it.  In doing so, Clutterbuck 
deftly maneuvers through a labyrinth of security, political, and economic issues 
while explaining the history of the war and the lessons learned from it.  His 
COIN lessons are in line with Galula’s and Thompson’s, though he explains 
actual security and political operations in great detail – so much so that 
Clutterbuck’s book could be used as a supplement to a military’s official COIN 
field manual.  And in fact, The Thai used it, and biographies of Clutterbuck say 
he served as an advisor to the Thai in the late 1960s, as did several Malaya 
COIN fighters.52  As described later in this text, the Queen Mother gave a copy of 
The Long, Long War to the head of the Border Patrol Police as a guide for 
COIN.  The results speak for themselves. 
 
In summarizing his book, Clutterbuck offers four wide metrics to gage if COIN is 
working or not.  First, he says, local government will be working effectively, 
honestly, and enforcing “the rule of law.”53  Areas where authorities pretend 
insurgents are not, are, by default, insurgent.  Second, if the size of guerrilla 
units expands, it is an indicator of their success.  If the size decreases, it is an 
indicator of their lack of progress, and possibly failure.  Third, if the people 
increasingly provide information to COIN forces, it is an indicator of their 
confidence in the government and good progress.  Fourth, if “genuine guerrillas” 
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51 Ibid., p. ix. 
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surrender at a steady rate – not passive or suspected guerrilla supporters – then 
it is also an indicator of success.54  Finally, Clutterbuck provides a piece of COIN 
wisdom not preeminent in other theorists’ work: “The way in which the war is 
won decides how long the peace will last.”55 
 
Sir General Frank Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations, published in 1971, brought 
Thompson and like COIN theorists’ lessons into the 1970s but with added 
insight from the author’s personal experiences waging COIN and stability 
operations in Malaya, Cyprus, and Kenya.  Kitson was a decorated infantry 
officer in these wars with The Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own), and he later 
commanded troops in the Falklands and Northern Ireland.  Kitson's stated 
purpose is to prepare the British Army in the early 1970s to quell subversion and 
insurgency for the second half of the 1970s.  In this regard, his book is akin to 
an army officer’s guide to COIN.  He asserts that other armies might also find 
the lessons useful for identical purposes.56  Kitsons’ book was necessary 
because, in light of the increase in small wars globally, including Vietnam, the 
British, Americans, and other nations had forgotten COIN lessons of the past. 
 
Kitson, like other COIN theorists, describes what it takes to be an insurgent; that 
they have two tasks regardless of what strategy they use, be it Mao, Lenin, or 
Vo Nguyen Giap: 1) rally the population to their side, and 2) topple the 
government by force of arms or “unendurable harassment.”57  Kitson says a 
broad COIN approach is to categorize the opposition into three parts: 1) the 
party and/or front organization, 2) the insurgent armed forces, and 3) the people.  
Paraphrasing Mao’s famous axiom, “the population are the water and the 
insurgents the fish,” Kitson says the party is the head of the fish, the armed 
forces the body, and the people are the water.  Separating them takes on many 
forms – he uses fishing metaphors – such as nets, hooks and lines, or doing 
“something to the water.”  But he also says none of this is simple because of the 
complex nexus between the insurgent and the people.58 
 
Like other COIN writers, Kitson describes the importance of rectifying popular 
grievances, gaining the people’s trust, the destruction of the insurgent 
organization and war making ability, the balance of COIN forces, unity of effort 
and command and control, and the importance of legitimacy and rule of law – all 
Galula and Thompson tenets brought forward.59  He moreover discusses COIN 
clear and hold type operations and offers advice on weapons and equipment.60 
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He dedicates an entire chapter (Chapter 6) and other pages to intelligence, 
covering subjects such as identifying the opposition; destroying the opposition; 
development of sources; analysis of tactics, techniques, procedures; identifying 
key personnel, and getting timely intelligence to direct action assets who can 
capture and/or kill the enemy.61  Kitson additionally differentiates himself from 
other COIN theorists by providing counter civil disturbance advice.  He says 
nonviolence can be divided into 3 types: 1) pickets/street corner meetings, 2) 
non cooperation such as strikes/boycotts, and 3) non violent intervention such 
as sit-ins.62  Kitson says the army can advise civil powers on riot reduction and 
defense, plus identifying weak spots.63  More than likely, Kitson was influenced 
by the IRA infiltrating and co-opting the Bogside riots in 1968 and ‘69 in 
Northern Ireland that began the “troubles” – the IRA’s terror campaign – that 
lasted into the 1990s and has flared up yet again in the 2000s. 
 
In a similar chapter, Kitson discusses peacekeeping and how it can be 
“extremely exacting” for troops, and they must be well disciplined and trained for 
this task.64  Peacekeeping might include things the army is not used to, including 
conducting or supporting negotiations, which is the best way to prevent 
bloodshed, he writes.  To do so, the military must have good intelligence on 
problems, local issues, and the current movements of opposing sides.65  And 
while peacekeeping and riot control seems on the surface to have little to do 
with COIN, in the present war in southern Thailand, there have been insurgent 
sponsored protests and confrontations where, in many cases, women and 
children harass and block government forces.  In one case, they provided cover 
for the torture and murder of two Royal Thai Marines. 
 
Andrew Mack, in “Counterinsurgency in the Third World: Theory and Practice,” 
discusses U.S. COIN policy up to the 1970s.66  His is a critical analysis based on 
anti-Vietnam War sentiment popular at the time because of the haywire and self-
destructive path of the war.  Mack asserts U.S. COIN was historically rooted in 
protecting colonial or neocolonial interests.  He furthermore notes U.S. COIN 
methods served to counter an irrational obsession with communism and fantasy 
domino theory.  He says the methods used to support COIN were based on 
torture, “dirty tricks,” and manipulation of international treaties.67 
 
Using an historical timeline, Mack recounts how U.S. COIN activity increased in 
the 1960s with the Kennedy Administration’s ideas for rapid deployment 
capabilities, but also that a soft approach developed as an alternative to 
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bombing and outright war.  The U.S., writes Mack, employed sociologists to help 
develop social, political, and economic methods to prevent insurgencies from 
happening via extensive research done by the likes of the RAND Corporation 
and the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency.68  
Operation Camelot was one such result, but it failed to produce results in Chile 
in the 1960s.69  Mack finishes his essay by decrying the use of torture in COIN, 
how it was used extensively by Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and indicates that it might 
become a stable of U.S. COIN unless checked by human rights best practices.70 
 
Similar to Mack, D. Michael Shafer in 1988 wrote critically of U.S. Cold War 
COIN strategy in, “The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency,” saying, 
“…counterinsurgency doctrine obscures rather than illuminates critical 
distinctions among insurgency-threatened governments and the prospects for 
aid to them.”71  He moreover says U.S. COIN policy since the 1960s was 
misguided.72  This is in part because, says Shafer, all U.S. security concerns 
assumed communists would seep into various global conflicts, and 
corresponding COIN policy, strategies, and methods that targeted communist 
activities were framed by a particular understanding of communist revolutionary 
methodology.73  This understanding blinded the U.S. to more critical issues at 
stake in insurgency situations, he says.  “Hearts and minds analysts’ 
assumptions cloud assessment of the three issues areas critical to an outside 
power contemplating supporting an insurgency-threatened government: the 
constraints on leverage; intragovernmental limits on reform by the would-be ally; 
and the nature of relations between government and populace or, conversely, 
between insurgents and populace.”74  These three core issues, rather than 
dogmatic adherence to popular COIN phrases and a boogeyman ideology, 
should influence COIN strategy, admonishes Shafer. 
 
In 1999, Goodhand and Hulme were ahead of their time in assessing the future 
of warfare in, “From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies.”  In it, and similar 
to Kilcullen years later, they assert complex political emergencies (CPEs) are 
multiplying at a dramatic rate, and typical approaches in dealing with them – the 
state-to-state, military-to-military approach – is less than effective.  Their aim in 
this paper offers alternative conflict resolution approaches rooted in political, 
cultural, economic, and social methods.75  For example, Goodhand and Hulme 
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say CPEs alter male-female status quo in societies.  In Afghanistan, they point 
out, males have assumed a warrior-like occupational specialty while the women 
tend to homemaking and village upkeep roles.  In Sri Lanka, they say women 
have been instrumental as combatants for the LTTE.  As result, Goodhand and 
Hulme conclude, is “A gendered analysis of conflict offers increased insights into 
possible entry points for the ‘smart relief’ that might make the likelihood of peace 
less distant.”76  By doing so, Goodhand and Hulme add innovative problem 
solving tools to the COIN toolbox.  The Thai, in fact, have empowered widows of 
slain men killed in the insurgency by providing them specialized housing, job 
training, and jobs via compounds called “widow farms.”  In doing so, the Thai not 
only care for the disadvantaged, they also send a political and cultural message 
to society that Bangkok does indeed care about disadvantaged Muslims, a 
political plus in Islamic and Malay culture.  
 
Among the modern COIN theorists, Kilcullen is the most prominent.  While he 
embraces classic COIN theory, he warns modern COIN demands additional 
methods that meet today’s more sophisticated asymmetric threats.  His articles 
“Countering Global Insurgency,” “Counterinsurgency Redux,” and “Globalisation 
and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics,” support his 
most recent book, Counterinsurgency, which was his second behind The 
Accidental Guerrilla. 
 
The avant-garde “Countering Global Insurgency” appeared in the Journal of 
Strategic Studies in 2005, just as the U.S. was reeling from the insurgency in 
Iraq and secretly looking for alternative methods for stabilizing the country.  In it, 
Kilcullen offers what he calls “a new strategic approach to the Global War on 
Terrorism.”77  He posits since scattered and loosely linked Islamist movements 
are waging a global insurgency to subject the world to their version of Islam, the 
classic COIN approach to defeating insurgency in a single country with high 
levels of civil-military coordination conducting synchronized security, political 
and economic operations are near impossible on a global scale.  His solution is 
to first analyze movements as complex systems of operations, personalities, 
activities and other variables and the links between all these variables as 
“biological systems” and/or insurgent “ecosystems.”  Once achieved, this can 
facilitate a new COIN strategy called “disaggregation.”78 
 
Kilcullen says disaggregation is to “return the insurgency’s parent society to its 
normal mode of interaction, on terms favourable to us.”79  He also says to do 
this, we must understand what “normal” is and see that military operations are 
not a solution but leverage to allow other operations – economic and political, for 
example – to decisively address core insurgency drivers.  This, he reiterates, 
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demands the COIN practitioner achieve an intricate level of understanding of all 
assets, people, and forces within the insurgent ecosystem.  Kilcullen says it 
further demands “a common strategic understanding” with allies regarding COIN 
solutions such as constitutional and legal ways and how the inundation of 
coalition forces in a given area impact a population.80  All this, he summarizes, 
requires a tailored approach to each insurgency.81 
 
In “Counterinsurgency Redux,” Kilcullen reasserts tenets from “Countering 
Global Insurgency,” stating classical COIN and modern COIN differ, and 
because of that, classical COIN approaches are not enough to quell today’s 
insurgencies.  Because insurgency is highly fluid, especially that which is fused 
with Islamist goals and methods – “resistance insurgency” that seeks simply to 
disrupt and/or damage the status quo82 – Kilcullen argues, “There is no constant 
set of operational techniques in counterinsurgency…”83 
 
As a result, Kilcullen says new COIN methods need to be added to the 
traditional COIN arsenal, and that adherence to classical COIN methods need 
not be so rigid.  Kilcullen’s suggestions are:84 
 
1. “…the side may win which best mobilizes and energizes its global, regional 
and local support base – and prevents its adversaries doing likewise; 
 
2. … the security force ‘area of influence’ may need to include all neighboring 
countries, and its ‘area of interest’ may need to be global; 
 
3. … the security force must control a complex ‘conflict ecosystem’ – rather than 
defeating a single specific insurgent adversary; 
 
4. …a common diagnosis of the problem, and enablers for collaboration, may 
matter more than formal unity of effort across multiple agencies; 
 
5. Modern counterinsurgency may be 100% political – comprehensive media 
coverage making even the most straightforward combat action a ‘political 
warfare’ engagement; 
 
6. … ‘victory’ may not be final – ‘permanent containment’ may be needed to 
prevent defeated insurgents transforming into terrorist groups; 
 
7. …secret intelligence may matter less than situational awareness based on 
unclassified but difficult-to-access information.” 
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In “Globalisation and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency 
Tactics,” Kilcullen provides a detailed account of how in the in 1950s, the 
Indonesian Army co-opted Indonesian villagers – both willing and unwilling – 
into COIN operations against the Darul Islam (DI) insurgent movement.  One of 
the government’s most successful methods was stationing armed groups of 
villagers – militias called “a fence of legs”85 – ringed around mountains to keep 
isolated DI at higher elevations until they surrendered or regular military forces 
engaged and destroyed them.  Kilcullen argues while these methods were 
decisive in the 1950s, today’s media-borne and globalized environment will not 
politically allow such COIN ways.86  This type of analysis segued well with his 
theories on modern COIN. 
 
The Accidental Guerrilla was Kilcullen’s first book, and it recounted the gist of 
the theories in his articles against a backdrop of personal experiences waging 
COIN and/or stability operations as an Australian Army officer in East Timor, 
globally with the U.S. State Department, and as an advisor to General David 
Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Kilcullen wrote Counterinsurgency at the 
behest of the United States Marine Corps that was looking for “how to” type 
COIN solutions at the ground level – things the venerable new COIN field 
manual did not address, according to the Marines.87  So Kilcullen, following in the 
footsteps of COIN theorist T. E. Lawrence, developed, “The Twenty-eight 
Articles,” COIN advice for the trooper on the ground.  Still, while these articles 
are akin to advice given by past COIN theorists such as Galula and Thompson, 
Kilcullen cautions “..there are no standard templates or universal solutions to 
counterinsurgency,”88 and that while COIN theories and laws abound, “…there is 
no substitute for studying the environment in detail,”89 which, he says, should 
result in highly tailored solution sets that should remain flexible to meet the 
fluidity of an insurgent environment.90  Not all 28 are necessary to list here as 
some synch with Thompson and Galula and the like, but some of them are in 
“soldier speak” and worth mentioning.  They include, but are not restricted to:91 
 
1. “Know your turf; 
 
2. Diagnose the problem; 
 
3. Organize for intelligence; 
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4. Organize for inter-agency operations; 
 
6. Find a political/cultural adviser; 
 
9. Have a game plan; 
 
11. Avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions.” 
 
Others are obviously borne of hard earned experience from Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and still some others coincide directly with Kitson, who wrote from 
a similar point of view:92 
 
7. “Train the squad leaders – then trust them; 
 
8. Rank is nothing: talent is everything; 
 
18. Remember the global audience; 
 
19. Engage the women, beware the children; 
 
22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves; 
 
23. Practice armed civil affairs; 
 
24. Small is beautiful; 
 
25. Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces; 
 
26. Build your own solution – only attack the enemy when he gets in the way.” 
 
Aside from Kilcullen, there is the impactful John Nagl who wrote 
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam; Learning to Eat Soup 
with a Knife.  Nagl’s book describes how two different armies, untrained in 
COIN, tried to adapt and defeat insurgent movements – the British in Malaya 
and the Americans in Vietnam.  The former, of course, was successful, and the 
latter was not.  The simple reason, says Nagl, was the British Army was an 
institution designed to learn – this based on its decades of colonial experience 
and associated political-military-economic actions across a wide gamut of 
security and defense operations.  The U.S. Army, in contrast, was not designed 
to learn – this based on its tried and true mastery of conventional battlefields, 
the lessons hard won as they were.93 
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The British, Nagl explains, also had a unified strategic vision of what they 
wanted to achieve in Malaya, its soldiers adopted tactical innovations in the field 
that impacted the war writ large, and they had men with broad experience such 
as Harold Briggs and Gerald Templer who were ideally suited not only to 
improvise, adapt, and overcome, but to lead the force, not simply manage it.94  In 
Vietnam, the conventional U.S. Army culture was so strong it failed to realize, 
despite copious reports from excellent officers in the field, anything beyond the 
shortsighted strategy of destruction of the enemy’s abilities in an effort to force 
him to political settlement.  COIN, as demonstrated by Galula and Thompson – 
and proven in the field, cites Nagl – is firstly political and then military, the 
opposite of the American strategy in Vietnam.  All the exceptional firepower and 
military innovations such as helo air assault, C-47 gunships and the like were 
built upon destruction of the enemy, which, while effective regarding kill ratios, 
were no substitute for a better strategy, Nagl posits.  He further points out U.S. 
Army leaders, steeped in conventional warfare, had no need to be flexible, and 
calls in the field for change went unheeded.95 
 
Nagl, Kilcullen, and a host of COIN minded experts ranging from direct action 
specialists to human rights officials had a hand in writing yet another noteworthy 
COIN volume, the US Army/Marine Corps COIN manual, officially known as FM 
3-24, Counterinsurgency.  Launched in 2006 at a major COIN conference in 
Washington, DC – the author was there as a participating analyst – the manual 
brings together lessons from Thompson, Galula, scores of teachings from low 
intensity conflicts though the ages, modern COIN thought, and new planning 
innovations to help U.S. forces deal with insurgencies.  Lessons from lesser-
known insurgencies came from El Salvador, and Greece and Uruguay.  
Interestingly, Thailand was not mentioned in the COIN manual for its successes 
in this field, yet another reason this doctorate is important to COIN literature. 
 
And while there are chapters in the manual on what insurgency is (Chapter 1), 
the importance of intelligence (Chapter 3) and how to get it – at least the surface 
version (there are more in-depth intelligence manuals by the U.S. government) – 
and, certainly, operations planning and execution (Chapters 4 and 5), there are 
new issues here, too.  The beginning of Chapter 4, for example, discusses 
“campaign design.”  Campaign design describes a process of the deployed 
force probing the human terrain and the conflict environment and then 
establishing a “feeler” type strategy and executing associated operations to 
establish a test strategy and experimental methods to gauge the insurgent 
situation.  Campaign design operations, after being fielded and tested, says the 
manual, will reveal more about the insurgent situation and environment that will 
allow more formal definitions of the conflict that will then lead to a more formal 
strategy and subsequent operations planning.  This not only informs troops on 
the ground on how to plan to quell insurgency, it also forces them to realize 
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COIN is indeed a different type of warfare from conventional undertakings 
because the planning steps are different from what they are used to.96 
 
The British also published a COIN manual: Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 
Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (aka, JDP 3-40).  The British 
deftly let the reader know immediately that, via the title, stabilization operations 
are more than a military endeavor – that the military is contributing to an effort 
and not necessarily running it, twinges of Ktison and Thompson, for sure.  The 
manual clearly states its purpose is for the military to plan for how to reverse 
worst-case episodes of instability.  The main audience is students and staff of 
the Command and Staff College and like institutions.  A secondary audience is 
British commanders in COIN arenas such as Afghanistan, so JDP 3-40 is not 
purely an educational textbook.97  It is perhaps more stability operations focused, 
however, than FM 3-24, with its chapters on Governance and Institutional 
Capacity Building (Chapter 6), Economic and Infrastructure Development 
(Chapter 7) and Political and Social Analysis (Chapter 9) – all classic COIN 
issues, but not called COIN here, possibly for domestic political reasons that 
decry full on combat type missions. 
 
This is not to say that JPD 3-40 rejects security – clearly it does not.  In fact, it 
states security is the foundation of stabilization.  It moreover has pictures and 
diagrams demonstrating that warfighting is indeed part of stability operations.  
Good governance, stable politics, and cultural normalcy are impossible without 
it, so there are chapters and continual references to security and defense issues 
as well.98 
 
There is also a chapter on learning and adapting (Chapter 12) that highlights the 
fluid environment of the insurgent or like destabilizer – key in effective planning, 
reacting, and, more importantly, getting ahead of and/or inside the protagonist’s 
decision cycle.  The manual provides examples from Afghanistan where an air 
operations center adapted to command and control realities on the fly.  Another 
example comes from 1942 where Field Marshal The Viscount Slim reorganized 
his jungle-fighting force to better meet the demands of maneuver warfare upon 
his anticipated breakout from closed to open terrain in southern Burma.99 
 
Aside from these two valuable manuals, there are scores of additionally recently 
published books, journal articles, and monographs touting COIN.  Rupert Smith 
argues in The Utility of Force organized state vs. state warfare “no longer exists” 
and has been replaced by asymmetric warfare with leaderless movements, 
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fighting forces with little or no formation, combat that does not gain or loose 
territory, movements not supported by “industrial warfare,” and the proliferation 
of global ideology that has no state home.100  He cites examples of the 
diminishing classic conventional warfare – the iconic tank battle, for example – 
as having not occurred in the past 30 years but that “war amongst the people” 
has increased on a dramatic scale.101  Because of this, Smith asserts the military 
can no longer simply see security problems and solutions as military, and 
neither can the civilian leadership (of the United States).102  Smith suggests a 
totally new security approach by first asking the key question, “is the conflict 
purely in the national interest,” and secondly, “can the conflict be won by 
applying all elements of national power,” including the media, to win over the 
population that the asymmetric opponent is fighting in.103  Adapting to these 
realities requires a new mindset on behalf of the civilian government and the 
military, he says. 
 
David Ucko’s The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military 
for Modern Wars, analyzes the U.S. Department of Defense’s transformation 
from a pre-9-11 conventional warfare mindset to the mentality and force 
designation needed to fight the Global War on Terror, specifically, the war in 
Iraq.  It looks at three key issues: 1) the U.S. military’s steps to morph itself into 
a stability operations force, 2) how these changes triggered institutional learning, 
and 3) what part this institutional learning played in success in Iraq.104  In 
answering these questions, Ucko takes the reader through the military’s steep 
learning curve in Iraq.  He discusses how this curve was pushed upward by a 
combination of soldiers and officers speaking out regarding innovations needed 
in the field combined with a corps of PhDs and learned people in COIN and 
stability operations – part of a broader “COIN community” that desired change in 
the American approach to Iraq and, by default, the U.S. military.105  Also 
important here, says Ucko, is the first ever application of FM 3-24, a direct 
product of the COIN community’s learning curve, to the February 2007 
Operation Fardh al-Qanoon.  He also discusses the intellectual gravitational pull 
by COIN expert General David Petraeus who took over all fighting forces in Iraq 
in 2006.106 
 
Rand’s collective COIN lessons study that appeared in Small Wars Journal, 
“Victory has a Thousand Fathers; Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency,” 
offers a “qualitative comparative approach” to assess why COIN campaigns fail 
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and/or succeed.107  Written in 2010 by Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and 
Beth Grill for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the study looks at the 
“world’s 30 most recent resolved insurgencies” via 76 variables.108  Some of the 
broad conclusions are:109 
 
“1. Effective COIN practices run in packs; 
 
2. The balance of good versus bad practices perfectly predicts outcomes; 
 
3. Poor beginnings do not necessarily lead to poor ends; 
 
4. Repression wins phases, but usually not cases; 
 
5. Tangible support trumps popular support.” 
 
Within these main issues are illuminating facts; for example, RAND discovered 
in every single case there was a COIN success – there were 30 in this study – 
the COIN forces applied a, “strongly positive balance of good COIN versus 
detrimental factors.”110  And in every COIN loss, it was the opposite.  RAND 
writes, “This is truly remarkable given that we are told again and again that 
‘every insurgency is unique’.”111 
 
Heather S. Gregg writes in, “Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding 
Counterinsurgency,” quelling violence, stabilizing an area, and separating the 
insurgents form the people are commonly known short term COIN goals, but the 
long term goal of legitimate, highly functional, and effective state institutions are 
the true benchmarks for COIN victory.112  In order to achieve these, Gregg cites 
the US Institute of Peace’s “five pillars” of governing stability as key goals to aim 
for from the out start of an insurgency:113 
 
1) “safe and secure environment;  
 
2) rule of law; 
 
3) stable democracy; 
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4) sustainable economy;  
 
5) social well-being.”	  
	  
As such she then proceeds to map out core conditions for these; security, 
governance, etc., and pays close attention to formulating justice institutions that 
are based on local norms and run effectively to the point they inspire confidence 
in the people that the government is just.114  As such, Gregg urges COIN 
planners to focus on final victory and its components as part of short and near 
term planning so they will more easily transition into long term planning goals. 
“Without these,” she writes, “stability is unlikely.”115	  
 
Octavian Manea interviewed Colonel Alexander Alderson for a Small Wars 
Journal article titled, “Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach: 
Notes on the British Army Field Manual Weltanschauung; An Interview with 
Colonel Alexander Alderson.”  COL Alderson was the lead writer for the most 
recent British COIN manual, and he established and directs the British Army 
Land Forces Stability Operations and Counterinsurgency Center.116  In the 
article, Manea asked COL Alderson, steeped in both classic and modern COIN 
via experience and study, about his views of current and past COIN theories 
and their application in the field. 
 
For example, COL Alexander comments on key COIN issues such as Galula’s 
80% political - 20% military formula, saying the military is useful for wide ranging 
security operations when police are overwhelmed.117  And when asked what is 
the main purpose of the counter-insurgent, he responds with the penetrating 
strategic wisdom; “Dealing with the insurgent alone is not going to solve the 
problem of why the insurgent emerged in the first place.”118  As for classic vs. 
modern COIN, COL Alexander says his studies of insurgencies the world over 
indicate many have similar characteristics that classical COIN indeed helps 
quell.119  He also warns not to let the population-centric strategic axiom dictate 
the actual strategy for a specific COIN plan, clarifying that, “population-centric 
COIN places the population as the vital ground, which means that COIN 
responses need to be centered around and focused on the population.”120  This is 
different from having an entire war strategy revolve around a single tenet or law 
of COIN. 
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Bill Ardolino’s, “A Counterinsurgency Conundrum in Salaam Bazaar,” in The 
Long War Journal from 2 August 2010, offers, like many other valuable articles 
from the field, an on-the-ground view of COIN complexities in Afghanistan.  In 
this case, Ardolino writes about the contention surrounding the destruction of an 
illegal but prosperous Taliban-controlled market, the Salaam Bazaar, in northern 
Helmand province.  Destroying the market was key for U.S. and Afghan forces, 
and like operations had been successful in other areas, but people entrenched 
in the Taliban ideology and economy, mainly a poppy and arms-driven one, 
were against this market’s demise.  Destroying it did not endear parts of the 
local population to U.S. forces and the Afghan government. 
 
Ardolino also highlights a key tool for eroding the Taliban’s influence over the 
people at the market – security.  A lot of Afghanis would have supported the 
Marine’s offers of food, money, and jobs and join the government COIN effort to 
help displace the market and the Taliban, but they feared the latter’s retribution.  
The main issue here was, despite the presence of the Marines and Afghan 
security forces, the allies had not enough manpower nor was perceived as 
loitering on location long enough to protect government supporters.  COIN 
efforts at Salaam Bazaar, then, limped forward halfheartedly into an uncertain 
future.121 
	  
The prolific Kalev I. Sepp, who also was a significant force in writing FM 3-24, 
wrote, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, which in 2005 appeared in Military 
Review.  In it, he encapsulates a list of what not to do and what to do from 17 
insurgencies and 36 like conflicts that were low intensity in nature.  It is a highly 
concentrated list that the author intended to be considered as advice for helping 
turn Iraq around, and, since successful, is worth listing here.122 
 
Successful COIN campaigns entailed: 
 
1. Emphasis on intelligence 
 
2. Focus on population, their needs, and security 
 
3. Secure areas established, expanded 
 
4. Insurgents isolated from population (population control) 
 
5. Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader) 
 
6. Effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns 
 
7. Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents 
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8. Police in lead; military supporting 
 
9. Police force expanded, diversified 
 
10. Conventional military forces reoriented for counterinsurgency 
 
11. Special Forces, advisers embedded with indigenous forces 
 
12. Insurgent sanctuaries denied. 
 
 
Unsuccessful COIN campaigns entailed: 
 
1. Primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency 
 
2. Priority to “kill-capture” enemy, not on engaging population 
 
3. Battalion-size operations as the norm 
 
4. Military units concentrated on large bases for protection 
 
5. Special Forces focused on raiding 
 
6. Adviser effort a low priority in personnel assignment 
 
7. Building, training indigenous army in image of U.S. Army 
 
8. Peacetime government processes 
 
9. Open borders, airspace, coastlines 
 
Paul Dixon, in “Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to 
Iraq,” discusses the UK way of COIN, highlighted by British successes in Malaya 
and the lessons from Sir General Gerald Templer, the lead coordinator and 
implementer of the Briggs Plan, and originator of the phrase, “hearts and 
minds.”123  Dixon says early in the article “hearts and minds” is a misnomer and a 
misused term because the British in Malaya indeed were coercive.  For 
example, under Templer, the British used collective punishment of 
uncooperative villages, coercive food rationing programs, and daily searches 
and seizures of thousands of relocated Chinese families in their daily work 
routines.  Nowadays, these would be considered brutal and mass torture-like 
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methods by human rights groups, nongovernment organizations, and the 
media.124  More, Dixon points out that core UK COIN concepts are, in reality:125 
 
1) political will is the pivotal key; 
 
2) hearts and minds come from a) “good government and nation-building, b) 
psychological operations, and c) the use of ‘minimum force’; 
 
3) police supremacy over the military in security issues; 
 
4) a central, coordinated effort is essential for martialing all COIN assets forward 
together under a single strategy. 
 
Hearts and minds, Dixon clarifies, are just parts of British COIN strategy, not its 
core.  Moreover, he describes them as, “Hearts – winning the emotional support 
of the people,” and “Minds – the people as pursuing their ‘rational self-
interest’.”126  This does not at all mean coddling the population and bowing to its 
every whim as some interpret the common phrase to mean.  
 
As Iraq began to shift from a conventional war in 2003 to a guerrilla war in 2004, 
Robert R. Tomes wrote in a Parameters article, “Relearning Counterinsurgency 
Warfare” that “Lessons and insights from past low-intensity wars deserve 
revisiting. They provide perspective as well as context for what may be a 
defining period for the American war on terrorism.”127  His aim, then, was to bring 
forward COIN lessons from the past to aid U.S. and Allied planners in Iraq.  In 
doing so, Tomes quoted Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare: A French View of 
Counterinsurgency, Martin Van Creveld’s 1991 book, The Transformation of 
War, plus Galula and Kitson.  He stressed these were but a few of the COIN 
philosophers that could help reshape strategy for Iraq.128 
 
For example, Tomes quoted Galula’s tenets regarding the need for “tight 
organization” and concise command and control while repeating a timeless 
COIN principle with a smattering of his own flare: “The ultimate goal is to 
separate the fish from the sea, leaving it exposed to the state’s spear.”129  He 
moreover cites Galula’s political adage of insulating the population from political 
ill will by making “a body politic resistant to infection.”130  In the end, Tomes says 
history can be used as a tool to help shape COIN operations in Iraq, and he 
wrote this in 2003, just as the insurgency was beginning to take shape and 
multitudes in the Department of Defense discounted such a phenomenon.  To 
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drive his point home, he quotes what John Lewis Gaddis said about history, that 
“[it] has a way of introducing humility – a first stage toward gaining detachment – 
because it suggests the continuity of the problems we confront, and the 
unoriginality of most of our solutions for them.”131 
 
This doctorate fits into this wide body of COIN in many ways.  First and 
foremost, like Clutterbuck and Nagl, it drives through the history of a specific 
insurgent war – in the Thai case, three wars – explaining the background of a 
conflict, the key issues and personalities involved, and the outcomes.  And, like 
these books, this doctorate reveals how the state defeated the insurgents, and 
how effective or ineffective it was in doing so.  Second, this study compliments 
works by the likes of Galula, Thompson, and Kitson by bringing to life their COIN 
lessons.  For example, “The Thai Way of COIN” gives military, political, and 
economic anecdotes of how the Thai physically and politically separated the 
insurgent “fish” from the popular “water.”  It also demonstrates that not all the 
laws and tenets of these COIN theorists need to be followed dogmatically.  The 
Thai on many occasions ignored the likes of Galula and Thompson and 
achieved success.  By and large, however, the Thai followed these theorists’ 
core tenets. 
 
Third, This study both rejects and sheds truth on some of the critics of COIN 
policies mentioned here.  Mack’s anti-domino theory is disproven in light of the 
facts behind the communist war in Thailand – it was indeed a communist 
conspiracy backed by China, Laos, and North Vietnam, and for certain, Thailand 
was where the dominos stopped falling.  Admittedly, Mack could not have 
foreseen this in 1975.  The dominos were still falling, the communists 
maneuvering to push more of them over.  Shafer’s more fact-based analyses 
regarding the importance of decoupling dogmatic enemy theory – Mao, Ho Chi 
Minh, etc. – and instead analyzing limits of government actions such as the 
constraints on leverage, intragovernmental reform, and the nature of relations 
between government and/or the insurgents and populace help highlight faults in 
Thai COIN, specifically regarding intragovernmental limits on reform.  
Specifically, what Thai COIN planners set out to do was frequently blocked by 
rival government factions, a continual problem in Bangkok’s national security 
and even domestic problem solving capabilities.  This not only prevented 
excellent programs from being carried out in the field, it prolonged wars and got 
people killed.  It continues to be a problem to this day. 
 
Fourth, Thai COIN methods touch on many aspects of the modern COIN 
theorists, “COINdinistas,” and recent COIN writers.  While the Thai have not to 
any great degree adopted Kilcullen’s disaggregation and insurgent ecosystem 
approach, they well understand the leverage insurgents can muster on the 
international stage to achieve victory, especially in their own neighborhood – 
witness East Timor and Aceh.  As such, the Thai have dedicated considerable 
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diplomatic resources to keep the Organization of Islamic Conference from 
outwardly supporting the cause of their current, ongoing insurgency.  There are 
scores of tenets from Kilcullens’ “Twenty-eight Articles” the Thai both follow and 
violate, the latter to their detriment.  Also in this vein, Kalev Sepp’s best 
practices serve as an effective quick guide to assess if the Thai are following 
effective ways and means or not, but such an analysis is beyond this particular 
study – the author has the COIN Pantheon for the paper’s main analysis 
(explained below, under Methodology), and also Galula, Thompson, and 
Kilcullen as backup analytical filters to help put Thai COIN into context against a 
wider backdrop of COIN theory. 
 
Additionally, Smith’s theory of industrial and conventional war being replaced by 
asymmetric conflict surely rings true in Thailand.  All its wars since the close of 
WW II, and really past WW I, have been overwhelmingly as Smith describes.  
Ardolino’s article coincides exactly with a problem the Thai have at present 
regarding the lack of protection for informants and also not providing a 
permanent physical security barrier between insurgents and villagers afraid to 
cooperate with the government and/or those who are waiting to see who in the 
conflict will win. 
 
Overall, every COIN study will touch on security, political, economic, strategic, 
command and control, population, and enemy issues in some way shape or 
form.  It is unavoidable, because in COIN, all these are interconnected and 
influence each other like yin and yang.  For every push, there is a pull, and vice 
versa.  But in the space of COIN literature writ large, “The Thai Way of COIN” 
closely parallels the style and approach of Clutterbuck, though Clutterbuck wrote 
from a first hand perspective.  This study was based on literature, current events 
research, and 38 interviews, mostly with Thai COIN practitioners.  One would 
hope, like the exceptional COIN writers mentioned here, lessons from Thai 
COIN benefit Thailand and its allies – the U.S. included.   
 
 
3. Definitions and Methodology 
 
Definitions 
 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) defines insurgency as: “An organized 
movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of 
subversion and armed conflict.”132 Insurgents live and operate amongst the 
people, essentially militarizing swaths of the population to join their underground 
“army” as secret logisticians, intelligence agents, bomb makers, assassins, and 
light infantry fighters.  They usually do not wear uniforms, and they never field 
massive standing armies that clash, for example, in the desert as Montgomery and 
Rommel did in North Africa during WW II. 
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Instead, the insurgent’s most important weapon usually is politics – the ability to 
convince as much of the population as possible the state is invalid and the 
insurgent cause just.  This requires extensive propaganda, indoctrination, and 
manipulation of the hapless, sometimes, into death.  Insurgency is a massive 
clandestine movement that depends on popular support, as Mao proscribed, 
forced, tricked, or volunteered. 
 
All insurgencies use subterfuge warfare – hit-and-run raids, ambushes, 
assassinations, and bombings, for example.  Some use subterfuge to drive the 
state into exhaustion and sue for political settlement.  Others use it to buy time and 
mass a conventional army to battle the state on equal military terms. 
 
The DoD defines COIN as: “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”133 
COIN is a difficult type of warfare for five reasons: 1) it can take years to succeed 
with hard-to-define results; 2) the battlespace is poorly defined; 3) insurgents are 
not easily identifiable; 4) war typically takes place among a civilian population the 
guerrillas depend on for auxiliary support; and 5) it requires that civilian and 
military assets coordinate at the strategic, operational, and tactical level.  
Successful COINs include not only precise force application operations based on 
quality intelligence, but also lasting social and economic programs, political 
empowerment of the disenfranchised, and government acceptance of previously 
ignored cultural realities. 
 
Methodology 
 
As previously inferred, this research uses a model called the COIN Pantheon as 
a tool to help discern the Thai Way of COIN.  It is a subjective and qualitative 
model based on David Kilcullen’s ‘three pillars of COIN’ famework.  It is 
necessary here to discuss Kilcullen’s three-pillars model in order to a) explain it, 
b) discuss its position in relation to other COIN theorists’ approaches, and c) 
describe how it was altered to facilitate the COIN Pantheon employed in this 
thesis. 
 
As Marshall and Rossman wrote in, Designing Qualitative Research (Fifth 
Edition), “The early work of conceptualizing is the most difficult and intellectually 
rigorous in the entire process of proposal writing.”134  This was true of this PhD.  
There were scores of analytical models to choose from ranging from the COIN 
theories of David Galula to Sir Robert Thompson and even the 2006 U.S. Army-
Marine Corps COIN manual, FM 3-24.  Ultimately, however, Galula seemed too 
narrow in scope, Thompson too entrenched in “classic COIN, ” and FM 3-24 
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was too wide in scope.  More, these models were French, British, and American 
– all well and good, but the goal was to ascertain the Thai way of COIN, so a 
neutral model was needed that would allow to the surface Thai thinking and Thai 
approaches, if possible.  (It should be noted that it became necessary to gauge 
this COIN against the likes of Galula, Thompson, and Kilcullen later on to help 
flush out fully Thai COIN methods.) 
 
David Kilcullen’s three-pillars-of-COIN model was inviting because of its 
simplicity, its combination of classic and modern COIN tenets, and openness 
that 1) fostered objectivity, and 2) allowed the right information to be examined 
but not on too wide a forced scale.  This seemed a good baseline to begin with 
regarding choosing the right model; an imperative step of qualitative research 
fundamentals, say Marshall and Rossman: 
 
As noted earlier, exploring possible designs and strategies for 
gathering data also enters into this initial process.  The researcher 
must let go of some topics and captivating questions as he fine-
tunes and focuses the study to insure its do-ability.  Although this 
entails loss, it bounds the study and protects the researcher from 
impractical ventures.135 
 
Again, Kilcullen’s three pillars of COIN was not exactly what was needed, but it 
certainly provided the basis. Kilcullen describes his three pillars as “A framework 
for inter-agency counterinsurgency.”136  He also calls it a model. (See appendix 3 
for an illustration). 
 
Specifically, since insurgency is a complex mix of political, social, religious, 
cultural, security, defense, and economic problems, Kilcullen says it needs a 
likewise response.  But since there is no single government agency that meets 
all these ends, the response must be interagency.  And there, Kilcullen 
suggests, lies the rub.  Security, political, and economic agencies are loth to 
work together because their cultures, personnel, and missions are different.  But 
for COIN, this must change; there must be, as he says, “unity of effort.”137  
Otherwise, the COIN effort will waddle on, uncoordinated and ineffective with 
agencies working at cross-purposes.  Kilcullen stresses unity of effort goes well 
beyond simple harmonization: 
 
Each player must understand the others’ strengths, weaknesses, 
capabilities and objectives, and inter-agency teams must be 
structured for versatility (the ability to perform a wide variety of tasks) 
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and agility (the ability to transition rapidly and smoothly between 
tasks).138 
 
The model itself, as described by Kilcullen, consists of: a) a base of information, 
b) three pillars – security, politics, and economics, and c) a roof of control.  It 
comes from classical COIN theories, and also input from peacekeeping and 
stability operations.  The utilitarian aspect of the model is multifold, says 
Kilcullen.  First, it is a framework, not an operations planning template, to show 
COIN practitioners where their operations coincide with those of others in a 
given war.  Second, it can help measure COIN progress, or lack thereof.  Third, 
it helps guide teamwork efforts across a wide scale of different types of 
operations.  Fourth, it can be used for stabilization and emergency/disaster 
response operations as well.139 
 
Next, says Kilcullen, is information.  It is the foundation of all COIN operations.  
Far more than just intelligence – which is critical in COIN – information is also 
about understanding the human terrain of an insurgent arena, facilitating 
information operations in the form of both public relations and psychological 
operations, and comprehending local, national, and regional, politics. 140 
 
As for the three pillars, they “develop in parallel and stay in balance, while being 
firmly based in an effective information campaign” .141  Politics and economics are 
not necessarily dependent on security first, for example.  All three can build up 
at the same time, but obviously, they also support each other.  Security consists 
of military and police assets and all associated operations protecting and 
policing the population, and also offensive operations against guerrillas and 
terrorists.  Politics, says Kilcullen, “focuses on mobilizing support,” and 
concentrates on establishing a polity more legitimate than that of the 
insurgents.142  The latter includes expanding political space for the 
disenfranchised, establishing rule of law, social programs, diplomacy, 
compromise, etc.143  Economics includes immediate relief for the destitute, local 
anti-poverty programs, and longer-term initiatives such as investment in small, 
medium, and large enterprises.144  The end goal of pushing all these forward is 
control – control of the monopoly of force, law, constitutional legitimacy, and 
prosperity – not simply stability.145 
 
Being rooted in classical COIN, Kilcullen’s model uses tenets of COIN theorists 
Galula and Thompson, and the stability operations utility meshes with Kitson’s 
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theories.  For example, Galula addresses command and control in Chapter 6, 
“From Strategy to Tactics,” and writes, “…tasks and responsibilities cannot be 
neatly divided between the civilian and the soldier…”146  As noted, Kilcullen’s 
entire three-pillars model is anchored in addressing this issue. 
 
Galaula further explains because of the political supremacy in COIN, the 
military, while integral to the process, must be subordinate to civilian leadership, 
which requires specialized training, education, a change in mindset, and a 
unique war command for all forces involved.147  Thompson says the same thing, 
but he goes into greater detail than his counterparts when he describes not just 
the justification for an interagency approach, but the actual makeup of a war 
cabinet on pages 81-83 of Defeating Communist Insurgency.  In comparison, 
Kilcullen, in his framework, helps illustrate how a war cabinet or like structure 
might work, and/or how various government entities fit their methods and 
operations into a COIN campaign. 
 
Where the model employed in this thesis -  the COIN Pantheon - differs from 
Kilcullen’s, is here.  The present study required a model to use as an analytical 
filter to feed critical aspects of COIN into, and then compare across three 
insurgencies.  This is known in intelligence parlance as a “conceptual model.”148  
The basic idea is to break a subject down into logical, manageable pieces – but 
connected pieces – then analyze the individual components, then analyze how 
they all fit and work together, and then analyze the greater meaning of it all.  
Kilcullen’s framework is a model for interagency cooperation.  In layman’s terms, 
the latter is a “how to do it” model, and the COIN Pantheon is a “figure out how 
they did it” model, but it could be used a, “how we might do it” model, as well as 
explained below. 
 
The logic behind altering Kilcullen’s model is as follows.  The three pillars are 
essential to understand how to wage COIN and to understand how a COIN 
campaign took place or is unfolding; Kilcullen himself says his framework can be 
used to measure COIN progress.  But more elements are necessary to 
understand a COIN campaign than just the three pillars, Kilcullen’s base of 
information, and his roof of control. 
 
Specifically, underlying every military campaign in history, successful or not, is 
strategy, so strategy must form the base of an analytical model aimed at 
deciphering a military campaign, including a civil military COIN campaign.  More, 
executing every strategy of every military campaign in history is some kind of 
command and control element.  In COIN, the command and control element 
must be interagency, as Kilcullen, Thompson, Galula, Kitson and others explain.  
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So command and control, overall known as coordination in COIN, must be 
included in the model as well. 
 
The enemy is yet another crucial aspect that must be addressed to understand 
a war, specifically, their intentions and capabilities.  These two issues must be 
mastered because COIN operations begin protecting against them, and then 
eventually, when and if the government achieves effectiveness, attacking and 
then overcoming them.  And in COIN, since insurgency is population based, 
comprehending the at-risk population is also necessary, especially the junction 
points where the insurgency and the population interface. 
 
These elements, then – strategy, coordination, the three pillars, the insurgents, 
and the population – make up the edifice for a new model, one based on 
Kilcullen’s three pillars.  (See appendix 4 for an illustration). It is a tool to 
decipher a COIN effort against an insurgent movement.  By default, since they 
include the most basic elements of war, the COIN Pantheon can also be used 
as a COIN planning tool, but more for strategic design, as stipulated in FM 3-24, 
rather than actual operations planning. 
 
 
The COIN Pantheon Explained 
 
Strategy is the base that provides doctrine, commander’s intent, and defines the 
mission.  Coordination is the next edifice.  It synchronizes all operations and 
funnels material and manpower where needed.  The columns consist of security, 
politics, and economics.  They push against the next edifice, which defines 
insurgent capabilities and intentions.  The roof is the population the government 
structure aims to uplift and support. 
 
In broad terms, the security pillar entails quelling guerrilla and terrorist operations.  
The ultimate goal of security is protection of the population.  Destruction of 
insurgent forces is of secondary importance, but if the chance arises, COIN forces 
usually seize it.  The military is one component in the security pillar; the police, 
intelligence services, local forces, human rights groups, and the media all have a 
part to play. 
 
The political pillar entails instilling effective and just governance that reduces the 
political reasons for revolt.  Government over insurgent legitimacy is the ultimate 
goal.  Tasks in this pillar might include, but are not restricted to, reintegrating 
surrendered insurgents into society, disarming fighters, instituting population-
friendly government reforms, correcting grievances, and increasing the at-risk 
population’s political participation. 
 
The economic pillar includes micro and macroeconomic initiatives designed to 
build capacity to grow and develop a sustainable economy, including resources 
and infrastructure management.  Poverty reduction is a key aspect.  Local buy-in 
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regarding what development projects will work is pivotal.  Development is rarely 
decisive, however. 
 
The research process here was to answer specific questions of each section of the 
COIN Pantheon for the two insurgencies Thailand fought in the past and the one it 
continues fighting today.  The analytical method aimed to compare the answers to 
the questions from each war and look for similarities.  In the end, this method 
sought to reveal how the Thai waged COIN.  
 
For strategy, it entailed researching the end goals for each war and how the 
government sought to achieve them.  Researching coordination encompassed 
investigating the coordinating body for each COIN campaign – why the Thai 
needed them, how they were structured, and their effectiveness.  Security 
research included exploring police, military, intelligence, and local force activities 
used to quell insurgent violence.  Examining political COIN measures included 
local and national political reform, psychological operations, social aid, and 
international diplomacy.  Delving into economics entailed everything from local 
projects – such as village wells and footbridges – to massive road building projects 
and building factories to spur job growth.  Research on the guerrillas for each war 
followed a “capabilities plus intentions” formula, and exploring the at risk 
population for these wars entailed looking at their political, cultural, and socio-
economic context. 
 
Within the COIN Pantheon framework, it was then a matter of extracting 
information from the relevant books, monographs, websites, and articles that 
helped answer these questions.  Interviews with personnel who were and are 
involved in these wars, however, was critical because of the lack of 
comprehensive literature on Thai COIN.  Through networking over 100 people, 38 
interviews in Southeast Asia – mostly in Thailand – were achieved in four months, 
which revealed much ground truth not available in scant written records.  In the 
end, only by combining all mentioned sources together – written and oral – was a 
quality level of research and analysis possible. 
 
Still, there were pitfalls.  The memories of some interviewees were fallible, which 
forced additional research.  A few interviewees had political aims, and they needed 
filtering and also forced additional research.  Some written sources suffered similar 
biases.  One renowned text on the war in the far south decisively stated the 
government’s rubber plantation scheme would never work.  Years later, however, 
rubber was the south’s main export. Accordingly, wading through political biases 
about Thailand’s insurgencies was, on occasion, tantamount to deciphering an 
actual insurgency. 
 
An additional frustrating research pitfall was lack of access to certain “windfall” 
sources.  General Harn Lennanond, the man who helped design victories for two 
of Thailand’s COINs, was reclusive and not readily available.  Southern insurgents 
had no intentions of speaking to certain foreigners, and the dangers of seeking 
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them out was quite real.  Most village security forces from present and past wars 
were far and remotely located. 
 
 
Research Method Explained 
 
Because interviews were pivotal to the information collection phase of this PhD 
– again, the Thai have few written historical accounts of these wars – the author 
began searching for people to question in fall 2007 while on campus at Exeter.   
 
Hammersley and Atkinson underscore the importance of interviews, especially 
in cases such as with ascertaining the Thai way of COIN: 
 
Interviewing can be an extremely important source of data: it may 
allow one to generate information that it would be very difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain otherwise – both about events described 
and about perspectives and discursive strategies.  And, of course, 
some sorts of qualitative research rely very heavily if not entirely 
on interview data, notably life-history work.149 
 
Marshall and Rossman also observed:  “Qualitative researchers rely quite 
extensively on in-depth interviewing. Kvale (1996) describes qualitative 
interviews as ‘a construction site of knowledge’ (p. 2), where two (or more) 
individuals discuss a ‘theme of mutual interest’ (Kvale & Brinkman, 2009, p. 
2).”150  This was ever so true with this research.  Regarding in-depth interviewing, 
multiple interviewees gave the author several hours of time, particularly a senior 
ex-intelligence officer who had unique knowledge and insight into all three of 
Thailand’s wars.  Several of his interviews took many hours and generated, in 
one case, nearly 20 pages of notes.  As for “theme[s] of mutual interest,” many 
interviewees gave information that overlapped, which added validity to their 
subject material by way of confirmation and reinforcement.  And information 
from one person frequently gave the author new information, which could be 
brought up with other interviewees to probe subjects more deeply. 
 
At any rate, interviews began with identifying and locating interviewees.  There 
were three methods for this.  The first was to research key individuals discussed 
in the scant literature on Thai COIN and make a list of who they were and what 
their positions were during each war.  The next step was to search for them via 
the Internet by “Googling” them via different queries and filtering the results.  Dr. 
Tom Marks, for example, made reference in his book, Making Revolution, to an 
elusive Somchai Rakwijit who was instrumental to intelligence for the communist 
COIN.  His name was placed on a personnel roster and then searched for on 
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the Internet via his name and also a wide array of possible e-mail configurations.  
In this particular case, Somchai was found working for a business consulting 
firm and agreed to a series of interviews after being briefed on the entire 
structure and purpose of the PhD.  Identifying interviewees using this method 
was rare, however.  Many people on the roster were not traceable this way, and 
others were not too receptive to e-mail queries.  This was a cultural issue – the 
Thai did not like to engage via e-mail, preferring phone and face-to-face 
conversations instead.  It was also a practical issue as the subject material was 
sensitive, rarely discussed, and person-to-person engagement gave the Thai 
assurance of the PhD’s validity.  But as a “starter” method, “Googling” key COIN 
personnel mentioned in Thai military literature was valuable in gaining a toehold 
in the interviewee identification process.  As an aside, providing transparency of 
purpose and scope of questions, being 100 percent open, and following strict 
ethics paved the way for success in obtaining interviewees.  In short, trust and 
quality begat good information. 
 
A more effective way of obtaining interviewees was through corporate security 
consultants in Thailand.  This was effective because security personnel had 
access to ex-Thai military and police.  Security consultants were found via 
Internet searches, and, again, by a transparent and ethical pitch, scores of 
interviewees were identified and later agreed to meetings.  These happened in 
Thailand, however, and the consultants were foreigners, or farang, as the Thai 
call them.  No security consultants agreed to aid in the interviewee identification 
process until the author had physically arrived in Thailand.  Proximity, then, was 
a driver to achieve effective information.  Like the e-mail phenomenon, this was 
likely a trust and transparency issue.  Once contact was made with an 
interviewee and the questioning finalized, however, they would often provide the 
name and contact information of yet another person to interview; this was a 
highly dependent on making a good first impression during the interview. 
 
This latter point is very important to the qualitative research process – getting 
interviewees to provide additional interviewees.  Marshall and Rossman refer to 
it as “snowballing.”  They write: “…the researcher may start with ‘theory based’ 
sampling (e.g., social justice leadership theory directs the researcher to 
interview two people who fit) and then proceed to “snowball,” sampling by 
seeking interviews with people suggested from the first two interviews.”151  This 
was pivotal in massing more and more interviews during the field research 
phase in Thailand. 
 
The next most effective interviewee identification method was through university 
contacts.  Specific Thai professors, steeped in national security issues, had 
access to key COIN personnel, past and present.  The author identified these 
professors by reading their quotes in news stories, books, and monographs.  
Once engaged face-to-face and briefed on the scope and purpose of this study, 
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some willingly provided contacts of senior level personnel and of those in the 
field.  A handful engaged at only a cursory degree.  Like the contacts made from 
the security consultants, interviewees gained via this method frequently 
provided additional contacts to speak with at the behest of the author, and the 
contact list snowballed, as Marshall and Rossman so aptly put it. 
  
The interviews flowed as follows: the author would a) identify himself and his 
institution, the University of Exeter, b) identify how he located the subject – 
usually through a third party, such as a Thai university professor (this 
established an additional measure of validity to the approach), c) explain his 
project briefly and offer to forward the potential interviewee a PowerPoint 
presentation explaining the PhD in more detail, d) offer to send questions ahead 
of time – but reserve the right to ask spin-off questions, and, finally, e) close the 
pitch with either a planned interview date and time, or a rejection.  The author 
used this method because it had shown positive results in his 15-years of 
experience interviewing people for Department of Defense research projects as 
a contractor, writing freelance journalism pieces for a multitude of magazines, 
and from writing a book published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press.  It was also 
a technical and sanctioned approach by research experts – some already 
mentioned – such as Hammersley and Atkinson in Ethnography: Principles in 
Practice, Third Edition, Creswell and Vicki Clark in Designing and Conducting 
Mixed Methods Research, and Marshall and Rossman’s, Designing Qualitative 
Research, Fifth Edition. 
 
Regarding the actual face-to-face interview process, the author followed 
schematics established by the likes of Hammersley and Atkinson who wrote, 
“This underlies an important feature of much ethnographic interviewing: that, 
within the boundaries of the interview context, the aim is to facilitate a 
conversation, giving the interviewee a good deal more leeway to talk on their 
own terms than is the case in standardized interviews.”152  Specifically, these 
were semistructured interviews that relied on open-ended questions based on 
the COIN Pantheon model.  Creswell and Clark cite the validity and importance 
of this approach:  “…qualitative data consists of open-ended information that the 
researcher gathers through interviews with participants.  The general, open-
ended questions asked during these interviews allow the participants to supply 
answers in their own words.”153 
 
Throughout the interview process, the author maintained neutrality so as not to 
lead the interviewee down a logic path of a certain conclusion.  The author 
wanted objective information, not predetermined outcomes.  Marshall and 
Rossman cite the importance of this issue: “A more traditional qualitative 
researcher learns from participants’ lives but maintains a stance of ‘empathetic 
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neutrality’ to collect data and provide descriptive representations.”154  This was 
especially necessary in Thailand where culture, far different from American and 
British thinking, played a part not only in the historical information provided, but 
the quality of information as well.  And after all, the author was looking for Thai 
information through Thai eyes, not American or British eyes.  Neutrality was 
critical to understand Thai thinking behind national security issues. 
 
At any rate, most interview requests ended with positive responses.  A few did 
not, and a handful agreed to interviews but infinitely delayed, a possible 
rejection mechanism.  These latter instances were rare, however, and most Thai 
generously gave their time and exceptional information – they wanted to get this 
story out to the public once they understood the project in its entirety.  As such, 
it cannot be understated that without the gracious and willing participation of 
Thai military, police, intelligence personnel, national security civilians, 
professors, politicians, and ordinary civilians, primary source information, the 
bulwark of this PhD, would not have been possible. 
 
But the Thai were exceptionally forthcoming and provided outstanding 
information.  And after assembling all interviews – the author took dictation as 
interviewees spoke; the Thai as a rule did not want to be recorded – the 
interviews were all coded according to what war they spoke of and what edifice 
of the COIN Pantheon they spoke to.  Creswell and Clark assert: “Researchers 
need basic skills in analyzing qualitative text data, including coding text and 
developing themes and description based on these codes.”155  This was indeed 
done.  For example, interviews with Somchai Rakwijit almost exclusively dealt 
with the war against the CPT, though he did comment on the subsequent wars.  
As for the war against the CPT, his quotes were coded according to strategy, 
coordination, security operations – namely intelligence – politics, and 
economics.  He moreover commented on the at risk population and the CPT’s 
capabilities and intentions. 
 
The words of the interviewees were then positioned in the outline for each 
chapter and footnoted.  Positioned as such, they were the first pieces of 
information to fill in the outline.  This information was critical to the path of 
discovery regarding the Thai way of COIN.  Creswell and Clark argue that “In 
qualitative research, the data tend to be words from participants (e.g., 
transcripts from interviews of field notes from observations).”156  This was 
certainly the case with Thai interviewees.  And from there, the author used 
information from books, journals, and articles to fill in the gaps and add layers of 
understanding to what the interviewees had said.  The result was an overlapping 
field of information of interviews buttressed by books, journal articles, and 
newspaper articles that helped complete a complex and elusive picture. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 C. Marshall and G. Rossman, op. cit., Kindle version, location 1,431. 
155 J. Creswell and V. Clark, op. cit., Kindle version, location 2,004. 
156 Ibid., 456.	  
	  	   58	  
Ultimately, the research plan for this thesis did unfold as designed, and quality 
sources were accessed.  It resulted in eight core research questions and a 
methodical outline that demonstrates to the reader specific aspects of the COIN 
Pantheon that demonstrate the Thai way of COIN. 
 
The eight core questions this paper sought to answer were: 
 
1. What is the Thai strategic approach to COIN? 
 
2. How do the Thai, if at all, coordinate COIN? 
 
3. What security programs – ranging from military to police to local forces (and 
intelligence throughout) – did the Thai apply to COIN? 
 
4. What political programs – from the national, regional, local levels, and 
international levels (and other related political issues such as social and 
information campaigns such as propaganda) – did the Thai apply to COIN? 
 
5. What economic programs – from the national, regional, local levels, and 
international levels – did the Thai apply to COIN? 
 
6. What have been the insurgent capabilities and intentions in Thailand’s 
COINs, and how has that shaped Thailand’s COIN efforts? 
 
7. What has been the situation of the at-risk population in Thailand’s COINs and 
how has their plight shaped Thailand’s COIN efforts? 
 
8. Given the collective answers to all these questions for all three Thai COINs, is 
it possible to identify a ‘Thai way of COIN’ – and if so, what is it? 
 
 
4. Outline of the Thesis 
 
To achieve this, each chapter on Thailand’s COINs follows a specific format using 
components of the COIN Pantheon and supporting sections.  For each war, the 
first chapter begins with a background and overview of the conflict in question.  
These sections summarize for the reader how each war played out.  Following that 
is a discussion on the capabilities and intentions of the opposition force.  This 
includes their ideologies and use of violence.  Following that is information on the 
at-risk population – their socio economic plight, their political and geographic 
context, and related information that demonstrates how they were ripe for revolt.  
COIN strategy for each war comes next.  This section describes the end goals the 
Thai government wanted to achieve and how it formulated those goals. 
 
Following that comes a section on how the Thai coordinated their COIN 
campaigns, and trailing that are three sections on the ways and means the Thai 
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used to quell each opposition group – an ongoing saga for the present war.  The 
three sections come from insurgency expert David Kilcullen’s “Three Pillars of 
COIN”: security, politics, and economics.  Discussed here are what security 
measures the Thai took to halt insurgent violence, what political measures the Thai 
took to abate insurgent political angst, and what economic measures the Thai took 
to assuage the at-risk population’s poor economic plight. 
 
Because each chapter is aligned in the same manner, and because each chapter 
answers the same questions for each section of the COIN Pantheon, the 
conclusions that follow make themselves readily apparent.  There is an executive 
summary to cap off this initially seeming complex material to clear the fog of war 
and reveal the core findings of the research.  What follows is a methodical 
comparison and deciphering of each edifice of the COIN Pantheon from each 
COIN that reveals the analyses behind the executive summaries.  In doing so, the 
Thai way of COIN is revealed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE COMMUNIST COIN 
 
 
The rich history of Thailand need not be repeated here.  There are, however, 
historical issues that helped set the stage for insurgency that merit mention.  
These include a societal rank system called sakdi na, Theravada Buddhism, 
Thailand’s administrative clash with outlying ethnicities, and the rise of 
communism. 
 
1. Background – Thai Political History to 1965 
 
In the 1400s, Siamese royalty imposed a class system on its subjects called sakdi 
na.  Literally translated as “field power,” it was a feudal rank system based on 
points and proximity to the throne.  If one’s sakdi na point accumulation was high, 
such as the royal class, one was closer to the royal court and afforded privileges 
such as education, special legal rights, and land.  If one’s points were low, such as 
the peasant class, one had fewer privileges and lived a meager life.  Sakdi na also 
established client-patron relationships throughout the country, which locked lower 
level citizens into the orbits of higher-level citizens.  Sakdi na had long-term 
implications for Thai society and politics; it provided an informal vehicle for upper 
class rule over the lower classes even after its demise in the 1930s.157 
 
Another deep-rooted tenet of Thai society was Theravada Buddhism.  Siam 
adopted it in the 13th Century as the national religion, though it had been in 
country since Ceylonese monks introduced it in the Sixth Century.  Buddhism 
introduced ideas of karma and fate to the country and provided it with a set of 
ethics.  Buddhist monks, collectively known as sangha, held a special place in 
society as sacred advocates of the teachings of the Buddha.  Society helped 
support the sangha with money and alms giving, the donation of food to monks 
each morning.  In return, the monks bestowed on the people blessings, which 
helped earn good karma.  The main point about Buddhism in Thailand is it 
gradually became the national moral compass for not only the people, but the 
government as well.158 
 
By the early 20th Century, Siam had gone through scores of kings who ruled a 
loose expanse of territory through powerful city-states, among them the 13th 
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Century Sukhotai and the late 16th Century Ayutia.  After Ayutia fell in 1767, 
General Maha Kshatriyaseuk assumed the title “Rama I,”  took over the country by 
coup, and united it under the Chakri dynasty in 1736.  In the 1800, Kings Rama IV 
and V went through great diplomatic, military, and domestic administrative lengths 
to consolidate Siam’s borders via European governance systems to stave off 
European colonization.  These included establishing a provincial system complete 
with local rulers who enforced Bangkok’s regulations.  By the 1900s, Siam had 
fended off every attempt to colonize it, the only country in Southeast Asia to do 
so.159   
 
Bangkok’s new administrative initiatives also aimed at reigning in outlying ethnic 
groups such as the Lao-related Issan peoples in the northeast and ethnic Malay 
Muslims in the far south.  Never having been fully consolidated under Bangkok’s 
rule, these groups resisted central government control.  Though sakdi na had 
begun to wither with the government’s new administrative model, it class division 
roots remained.  This had a negative impact on the way some in the government 
treated these outlying peoples.  So while these new policies helped Bangkok 
better manage the country as a sovereign state, they also set the stage for internal 
unrest. 
 
In 1932, Pridi Panomyong and 50 other European-schooled Thai students and 
military officers formed the People’s Party.  A Major Pibun Songkhram was among 
them.  The People’s Party wanted freedom, equality, rule of law, national 
economic polices, and universal access to education.  It forced King Prachatipok 
to adopt a constitutional form of government with reduced royal powers and no 
sakdi na type class divisions.160 
 
Despite these positive demands and ending sakdi na, Pridi, now finance minister, 
was Marxist-leaning, and his ideas for enforcing his economic plan included 
totalitarian tactics.  Conservative forces led by Prime Minister Pya Mano fell out 
with Pridi and accused him of being a communist.161  Such accusations in that era 
were not uncommon as scores of Southeast Asians who studied in France 
adopted communist ideologies.  Many communists advocated the violent 
overthrow of existing governments, and their presence in Thailand unnerved the 
status quo and those opposed to communism. 
 
As a result, Pridi and four cohorts left for Europe, and PM Mano made it a criminal 
offense to be a communist via the Anti-Communist Act of 1933.162  By 1934, an 
investigation had cleared Pridi.  He returned to Thai politics and gained the 
Ministry of Interior portfolio by 1935 and was Foreign Affairs Minister by 1937.163 
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Pibun passed the National Culture Act in 1939.  It consisted of decrees that 
promoted Thai nationalism and “Thai-ness” – the Thai way of living life.  It forced 
all citizens within Thai territory, regardless of religion or ethnicity, to adopt uniform 
cultural practices.  By law, for example, neither Hmong tribes in the north, Issan 
peoples in the northeast, nor ethnic Malay Muslims in the south were allowed to 
wear their traditional garb, and they were required to speak Thai instead of their 
local dialects.  Thai historian Thanet Aphornsuvan wrote that other aspects of the 
act  “required women to wear hats and Western dress, forbade the chewing of 
betel and areca nuts, and instructed the use of forks and spoons as the ‘national 
cutlery’.”164  The far south rejected Pibun’s 1939 National Culture Act in 1939 
because it tampered with deep-rooted Malay Muslim customs such as dress and 
language.  Many southerners thought it meant to erase their culture, and they 
revolted.  While their Lao heritage was not unlike Thai culture, Issan people also 
balked. 
 
In 1941, Pibun collaborated with Japan and did not resist its occupation of 
Thailand during World War II.165  When World War II ended, Thailand successfully 
avoided being carved up by the Allies despite having officially sided with the Axis 
in part by courting America’s favor via M.R. Seni, the WW II-era Thai ambassador 
to Washington.  Bangkok also nullified the Anti-Communist Act of 1933 to appease 
the Soviet Union to gain entry into the United Nations.166 
 
After a short stint by Pridi as prime minister, Pibun returned to power by coup in 
1947.  He adopted an anti-communist stance in part because Thailand was 
surrounded by communist wars, and he and his government wanted none of it.  
The Soviet Union emerged from the ashes of WW II Europe as a Marxist-Leninist 
powerhouse, exporting its ideology around the world by diplomacy, propaganda, 
subterfuge, insurgency, and conventional warfare.  China’s Mao Tse Dong had 
defeated the nationalist government by 1949 and also expressed its intent of 
spreading communism to the world.  In Malaysia, Chin Peng’s rebel communist 
forces were not only engaged in a full-scale guerrilla war, but also heinous acts of 
terrorism against civilians.167  Communist North Korea invaded South Korea in 
1950.  Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap’s communist forces defeated the French 
at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954.  Cambodian communists, the forbearers of the 
Khmer Rouge (KR), fought the French as well.  To Thailand’s west, the communist 
Revolutionary Burma Army was waging insurgency.  Throughout Asia, 
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communists infiltrated social clubs, labor unions, schools, and governments.  Once 
established, they mobilized their ranks into political and subversive action. 
 
Pibun responded by touting himself as the strongest anti-communist in Asia.  He 
increased the size of his military and police and designed hard anti-communist 
domestic policies.  But in a post WW II-era, Pibun did not wield sole authority as 
he used to.  Since 1945, Thailand witnessed the rise of powerful politicians and 
military men such as Royal Thai Army (RTA) Commander Marshal Sarit Tanarat 
and Police General Pao Siyanon.  Pibun shared power with them, and his job and 
many dictators and prime ministers after him would end up in the same position – 
as leaders of the government, but bargaining with and manipulating other power 
brokers in Bangkok to achieve their aims.168 
 
Still, Pibun hammered domestic communists who at the time were predominantly 
ethnic Chinese.  His policies also affected non-communist Chinese.  The Chinese 
were the most effective merchant class in Thailand, and he sought to control their 
influence over the economy and simultaneously curtail both their real and alleged 
communist leanings.  In a crackdown in 1948, police raided Chinese schools, 
clubs, and associations and arrested hundreds.  Pibun also limited the number of 
Chinese entering the country from 10,000 to 200.  In 1952-53 after exposing a 
communist plot to overthrow the government, Thai police arrested more than 250 
Chinese, raided over 150 Chinese businesses, and closed yet more clubs and 
schools.  The legislature passed the Anti-Communist Act of 1952 (aka, the Un-
Thai Activities Act) that made it a crime to not only be a communist and but to 
merely associate with communists.  It gave wide arrest and detention powers to 
the military, police, and local administrative officials to search and seize personnel 
without warrants, and detain suspects for 30 days without charges (180 days if 
approved by the police chief).  Aptly empowered, authorities thereafter arrested 
more people than the Thai police had ever arrested on charges of communist 
subversion.169 
 
Even so, communism gained traction in Issan, and political violence increasingly 
occurred.  The “Kilo 11 incident,” for example, involved the deaths of four 
prominent northeast politicians: Nai Thong-In, Nai Chamlong, and Nai Thawil, and 
Dr. Thongphaeo Chonlaphum.  Far from being local rabble-rousers, Nai Thong-In 
had served as Minister of Industry, and Nai Chamlong Daoruang had been a 
Deputy Commerce Minister.  But they were Pridi supporters, accused of being 
communists, and advocated an autonomous zone for north easterners and their 
unique culture. 
 
Though accounts are sketchy, it appears the four had been arrested on charges of 
sedition, released, and then arrested again on 4 March 1949 after the attempted 
marine-backed Pridi coup the same year.  Police claimed a band of supporters 
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tried to rescue the prisoners by force of arms while being transported to an 
alternate prison, and the captives died in the crossfire.  Their supporters claimed 
nothing of the sort and said they had been executed.  Regardless of the exact 
scenario, the Kilo 11 episode raised Issan’s resentment of the central government 
in Bangkok.  It reinforced north easterners’ angst over the government’s 
centralization polices they felt were diluting their culture while they remained one 
of the poorest regions in the country largely due to dreary agricultural 
conditions.170 
 
The 1950s saw little improvement in the northeast and far south even as the rest 
of Thailand continued to modernize its economy, infrastructure, and politics.  King 
Bhumibol Adulyade (Rama IX) took the throne on 5 May 1950 and slowly began to 
reinstate some of the royal power that had been lost in the 1932 coup.  But King 
Bhumibol would prove neither meddlesome nor tyrannical, and his leadership, aid 
projects, and strategic thinking would greatly benefit Thailand in both peaceful and 
turbulent years to come. 
 
But as the 1950s progressed, two startling events pushed Thailand into a corner 
and set the stage for insurgency.  First, in 1953, the People’s Republic of China 
suddenly announced via radio, the most powerful psychological operations 
(psyops) tool of the era, the establishment of the Thai Autonomous People’s 
Government in Yunnan Province.  It was anti-Bangkok, anti-Nationalist Chinese, 
and anti-American.  In doing so, Beijing had sponsored a Thai shadow 
government outside Thailand, a move that Bangkok regarded as an act of war.  
China also said the Thai Autonomous People’s Government would represent a 
“Greater Thailand,” something Bangkok and a large swathe of the population had 
panged for since the 1940s.  It meant a Thailand with expanded borders and 
greater regional influence than it had at the time.  In doing so, China had adopted 
a popular Thai nationalist sentiment and made it a communist one, a brilliant 
psyops maneuver.171 
 
Second, in 1954, Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh troops crossed into Laos and 
established a Free Laos Government, a communist regime outside Vientiane’s 
purview, yet another act of war.  Bangkok perceived a threat because of Issan’s 
rebellious streak, its communist activists, and its cultural and geographic proximity 
to communist China and North Vietnam.  More ominous, there were 50,000 
Vietnamese loyal to Ho Chi Minh along the Thailand’s side of the Mekong.  In 
short, Thailand faced growing internal communist dissent and was surrounded by 
communist wars of liberation.  And China and Vietnam began to squeeze that 
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perimeter harder through the 1950s and into the 60s.  A communist war of 
liberation would hit Thailand by 1965.172 
 
 
2. Overview of the Communist Insurgency and COIN 
 
1965-67 
 
The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) launched its war to overthrow the 
government and replace it with a Marxist one in August 1965 on “gun-firing day.”  
The government analyzed the regional strategic and domestic situation accurately, 
realized the communists were spreading insurgent wars throughout Southeast 
Asia, and took steps to shore up internal defenses and institute a lucid 
counterinsurgency (COIN) program.  Says Dr. Arun Bhunupong, former diplomat 
for the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA): “At the time, people were alarmed 
by the spread of communism and spoke of the domino theory, and many thought 
the next to fall would be Thailand.”173 
 
In 1965, insurgent violence was mainly in the northeast.  General Prapass 
Charusathiara, Deputy PM, Commander in Chief of the Army and Minister of 
Interior, personally took over the problem.  He knew COIN entailed more than just 
suppression, and solicited the assistance of RTA General Saiyud Kerdphol, a 
student of COIN, to help organize and manage the fight.  From the start, the 
government saw the insurgency as both a security problem and a socio-economic 
problem.  It decided to use kinetic operations to destroy the CPT’s military units 
and development operations to lift the population up from poverty.  Psychological 
operations were the only political schemes the government applied in the early 
stages of the war. 
 
To coordinate the fight, the government established the Communist Suppression 
Operations Command (CSOC), headquartered in Bangkok, with satellite 
headquarters throughout insurgent areas.  Prapass placed Saiyud in charge of 
CSOC.  CSOC supervised RTA, Thai National Police (TNP), development related 
ministries such as the Ministries of Health and Education, and COIN-specific 
agencies such as the Accelerated Rural Development program (ARD).  To 
implement the fight, the government established the Civilian-Police-Military (CPM) 
program, which employed civilians, police, and military forces working together to 
quell the insurgency.174 
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From 1965-67, CPM operations reduced the CPT by about half and killed or 
arrested more than a hundred of its leaders.175  The program was not flawless, 
however.  It suffered from a lack of coordination between its three components at 
times, and the military on occasion used too much force by napalming entire CPT 
sympathetic villages. 
 
By January 1967, the government discovered the use of local people was key to 
defeating the insurgency and developed a new version of the CPM COIN plan, the 
09/10 Plan.  The government began to draft the people into its fight via village 
security teams just as the CPT had drafted the people into its fight.  General 
Saiyud believes had the government stuck to this program and kept its 
momentum, it could have won the war before 1975, but it did not. 176 
 
Instead, the RTA’s Regional Army Commanders felt threatened by General 
Saiyud’s power, and they revolted in 1967.  General Prapass gave into their 
demands and granted them the power to run their own COIN operations as they 
saw fit.  They still used the CSOC name and the CPM concept, but they ran their 
own versions of it, and the war from then until 1977 ran on uncoordinated. 
 
This was unfortunate, because in February 1967, the CPT expanded its violent 
operations in the north and increased its terror operations to panic the RTA.  It 
knew the military would overreact and implement massive sweeps, which were 
unpopular with the population.  That is exactly what happened.  “From that 
moment,” says General Saiyud, “the emphasis shifted toward military operations of 
the Vietnam type.” (General Saiyud refers to the “Vietnam type” as American style 
search and destroy operations using large formations of troops hunting for signs of 
the enemy so it could track down and fight them.)177 
 
In the northeast, the RTA’s Second Army dropped the CPM scheme that had 
covered 200 villages.  In the north, the Third Army used excessive force in many 
cases, which lead to innocent civilian deaths in Nan, Chiang Rai, and Tak 
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provinces.  In the south, RTA Major General Cherm Preutsayachiwa did not see 
the communists as a threat, and he quit COIN operations altogether.178 
 
 
1968-73 
 
The CPT evaded the RTA’s large sweeps and infiltrated more villages after the 
village security teams sloughed off.  The CPT’s clandestine agents increased ties 
to leftist organizations throughout the country and shored up their cell structures to 
tap domestic sources of support instead of relying solely on logistics from China, 
Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.  It established the Supreme Command of the 
People’s Liberation Army of Thailand on 1 January 1969 and increased radio 
propaganda via the Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT) against the 
government and Thai Royal Family. 
 
In May 1969, CSOC convinced the PM to make law a new war plan, the 110/2512 
Plan.  It relied more heavily on harnessing local forces, increased economic 
development, and building trust between villagers and the government.  Corrupt 
officials scammed and extorted the people, and it ruined the people’s faith in the 
central government.  The CPT exploited this injustice to recruit villagers.  But the 
RTA, except for some officers in the Second Army, ignored the 110/2512 Plan.  As 
a result, the CPT infiltrated 35 of Thailand’s then 72 provinces by 1970. 
 
Similar statistics demonstrated an alarming surge of CPT strength.  Armed 
communist propaganda platoons ratcheted up their activities from an average of 
6.4 instances a month in 1966-1969 to 16.4 a month by 1970.  Assassinations of 
villagers who did not cooperate with the CPT increased from 5.6 a month to 11.6 a 
month.  Murder of government officials increased from 3.6 a month to 10 per 
month.179 
 
By 1971, the CPT doubled its strength to 5,000 and recuperated from its earlier 
losses – not that the government had not fought well.  That year, government 
offensives resulted in 1,500 CPT weapons seized, 540 insurgents killed, and 
scores of bases overrun.  Moreover, some 3,000 communists surrendered.180  But 
it was not enough.  The government had been bloodied, too.  The RTA withdrew 
the First Division from the tri-border area in the north as a result of high casualties.  
The RTA’s uncoordinated suppression efforts contributed to its losses. 
 
According to General Saiyud, from 1971 to October 1973, the RTA finally learned 
from its mistake of applying heavy suppression to the insurgency:   “Military sweep 
operations contributed only to the statistics of clashes, killed, and wounded.”181  
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Accordingly, RTA commanders slowly began to apply the CSOC/CPM concept, 
first to CPT areas in Na Kae District, Nakhon Phanom province.  It then followed 
suit in Phetchabun, Loei, and Phitsanulok provinces, and then later in the 
mountains between Udon Thani and Loei provinces.182 
 
 
1973-76 
 
As the RTA refocused its COIN operations, the government lost control of 
domestic politics, which fed the insurgency.  Supreme Commander and PM 
Thanom Kittikachorn and General Prapass controlled all diplomatic, justice, and 
national security ministerial portfolios, and they enforced heavy-handed domestic 
policies such as suspension of due process.  They assumed the power to arrest 
and execute without trial any enemy of the government.  They and several other 
successive administrations banned all political parties in attempts to curb 
communism and quell all dissent, but the policies disenfranchised the population, 
not just communists.  The CPT, then, provided the only political force opposing 
government autocracy.  People who were not communists began to support the 
movement. 
 
As a result, the CPT increased its infiltration of intellectual, labor, and university 
groups.  These people clashed with police on numerous occasions that left scores 
dead and wounded on both sides.  A major student-police clash occurred on 14 
October 1973 in Bangkok, which left many dead and caused the King to intercede 
and force the resignation of the government.  CPT strength increased to 6,500 by 
the end of 1973.183  Because of lacking leadership, the government was unable to 
handle the domestic political and insurgent crisis at the same time.  Thailand’s 
COIN campaign temporarily ground to a halt in 1973.184 
 
The government changed hands between four administrations from October 1973 
to October 1976 when Thailand’s insurgency and domestic turmoil came to a head 
with the Thammasat University massacre.  On 6 October, thousands of students 
and intellectuals, some simply anti-dictator and some pro-CPT, clashed with the 
police and several government sponsored paramilitary groups.  The latter were 
civilians and factions of the government that conspired to counter the CPT in the 
wake of the executive branch’s inability to fight back.  The violence left multitudes 
of dead and wounded – mostly students – the nation was horrified, and some 
3,000 students fled to the jungles to join the CPT, swelling its ranks with 
organizational expertise and anti-government fervor.  Popular support for the 
government wavered.  CPT fighters grew to 14,000.185  Its auxiliary support 
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numbered over 100,000.  With this new injection of manpower and political 
support, the CPT was able to exert direct control over 400 villages and indirect 
control over 6,000 villages, which equated to four million people.186 
 
In 1976, CSOC, now ISOC, which stands for the Internal Security Operations 
Command, upgraded the CPM program with a special village self defense and 
development scheme called Asa-samak Pattana lae Pongkan ton-eng, or Aw Paw 
Paw for short.  Part of the impetus behind the new program was intelligence 
reports saying the CPT would reach a strength that would rival that of the 
government by 1977 or 1978.  It applied to 3,754 villages, and while government 
managerial upheaval kept it from expanding more, it did nevertheless, represent 
an effective program that the government would build upon later on to secure the 
countryside. 
 
 
1977-80 
 
Officers in the Second Army Region began to run CSOC style CPM operations in 
the mid-1970s via the CSOC and CPM model.  It made slow progress separating 
the communists from the population, but it was indeed progress.  This would 
eventually form the basis of Thailand’s victorious COIN strategy, but no one knew 
it yet.  Despite the Second Army’s improvement, the CPT increased its operations 
by 20 percent.  In the south, the government’s effort fell apart.  The Fourth Army 
commander there, “…withdrew from the field for no good reason…,” says General 
Saiyud.187  He blames friction between Bangkok, the governor of Phattalung 
province, and General San.188 
 
Communist forces surrounding Thailand had gained strength, too.  Laos, South 
Vietnam, and Cambodia all fell to Chinese and/or Soviet supported communists in 
1975, but that is where the solidarity ended.  Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 
December 1978 over the latter’s border raids that targeted civilians.  This caused a 
row between Vietnam and China, the two main supporters of the CPT, which 
subsequently caused a split between the Vietnamese and Chinese factions of the 
CPT.  Thailand committed diplomats to take advantage of the divide and lobbied 
Beijing to cut off support for the insurgents.  It worked.  In 1979, the Chinese shut 
down the VOPT, and Vietnam and Laos punished the Chinese faction of the CPT 
by ousting them from their territory.189  These events began the end of foreign 
support for the CPT, which severely injured and isolated the movement. 
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Simply cutting off external support was not enough, however.  There were still 
14,000 CPT fighters and over 100,000 supporters in the field.190  In 1977, RTA 
General Kriangsak Chomanand took over the government by coup.  He initiated 
countrywide democratic reforms that undid many of the autocratic policies of the 
last several regimes, and he offered amnesty to the Thammasat students that had 
joined the CPT after the 1976 massacre.191  Democratic reform relieved pressure 
off the population, and popular political support for the CPT dwindled.192 
 
Not all innovative COIN reforms during this time were political, however.  In 1978, 
RTA General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, Chief of Army Operations, designed a new 
local force unit to out-guerrilla the CPT guerrillas – the Thahan Phran, or literally, 
Soldier Hunters.193  Kriangsak passed the Anti-Communist Act of 1979, which 
gave authorities wide police powers, including warrantless search and seizures 
and detention of insurgent suspects for 480 days.  It gave RTA commanders and 
governors the power to impose curfews, ban demonstrations and meetings, 
monitor phone conversations, and access to businesses’ personnel files.194  Thai 
historians such as S. Bunbongkarn assert Kriangsak began the turnaround that 
eventually defeated the CPT. 
 
 
1980-85 
 
General Prem Tinsulanonda, former head of the Second Army and Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Defense Minister, took over by coup in 1980.195  He placed 
other COIN-minded leaders in positions of power throughout the RTA and forced 
the country’s entire national security complex to accept his plans to defeat the 
CPT, namely the 66/2523 Plan, the “Policy to Win Over Communism,” and the 
65/2525 Plan, the “Plan for Political Offensive.”  Amnesty was a major component, 
but so was focused force application.  These expanded on previous CSOC-CPM 
plans but added the political element of democracy as the main tool to defeat 
communism.  The plan mimicked without apology the CPT political mass 
mobilization strategies.196  Aptly applied and backed by well-run kinetic operations, 
the CPT fell into disarray.197  Famed CPT student leader Seksan Prasertgul and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Ibid., pp. 179-185. 
191 C. Samudavanija, K. Snitwongse, and S. Bunbongkarn, From Armed Suppression to 
Political Offensive (Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies, 
Chulalongkorn University, Aksornsiam Press, 1990), pp. 67-68. 
192 Saiyud, op. cit., pp. 179-185. 
193 Ibid., pp. 179-185. 
194 LePoer, op. cit., see “Internal Security System.” 
195 Official website of General Prem Tinsulanonda, 
<http://www.generalprem.com/ranks.html>, accessed 3 July 2009. 
196 Saiyud, op. cit., pp. 179-185. 
197 Ibid., pp. 179-185. 
	  	   71	  
heralded communist labor leader Therdpoom Chaidee surrendered in October 
1980.198 
 
In January 1981, former deputy of the Thai Socialist Party Khaiseng Suksai, 
surrendered, followed by Thirayuth Boonmee, student leader and leading 
organizer of the communist front organization, the Coordinating Committee for 
Patriotic and Democratic Forces (CCPDF).  In April, authorities captured CPT 
politburo member Damri Ruengsutham at a road checkpoint in the south’s Surat 
Thani province.  The same year, the RTA launched a major offensive against CPT 
strongholds in Khao Kho mountain range.  CPT forces in Petchabun fell in 
defeat.199  CPT fighters shrank to 12,000.200  
 
From March-May 1982, the RTA took over three major CPT base camps.  RTA 
Chief of Operations Major General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh proclaimed all major 
CPT bases destroyed.  Roughly the same time, Secretary General of the CPT, Mit 
Samanan (aka Charoen Wangnarm) died.201 
 
By the end of 1982, there were seven thousand CPT fighters in the field.202  
Widespread defections continued in 1983, and by September, ISOC declared only 
four provinces still had active CPT units.  By 1984, the CPT had dwindled to 1,200 
operators, countrywide.203  In October, ISOC declared victory over the CPT, but 
defections continued into 1984.  By 1986, Prem’s strategies had defeated the 
CPT, and the war ended.204 
 
 
3. The Insurgents – The CPT 
 
CPT Strategy 
 
The CPT declared its 10-point strategy in 1969; four years after it began its 
offensive.205  With the aim to win over the disaffected population, the CPT 
promised to establish a representative form of government based on a CPT-led 
coalition of like-minded groups.  It also sought to bring to justice all those who 
fought against the CPT, ensure equal rights of men and women, embrace labor 
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and education, eject all U.S. influence, and remove the culture of the monarchy.  It 
moreover wanted farmers to own land.206 
 
In addition to stating what CPT stood for, it also took a stand against the presence 
of U.S. forces in Thailand.  The CPT particularly sought to whip up public 
opposition to the 1962 Rusk-Thanat Agreement that Washington and Bangkok 
signed to help the latter fend off communist infiltration from Laos.  Essentially, it 
stated the U.S. guaranteed Thailand’s protection from invasion.207 More, American 
troop presence in Thailand grew as American involvement in Vietnam deepened in 
the mid-1960s.  The U.S. Air Force had aircraft, men, and equipment on Thai 
bases in Udorn, Nakhon Phanom, Ubon, Korat, and U-Tapao to name but a few.  
From there, it flew air support and bombing missions into North and South 
Vietnam.  At the height of the Vietnam War, there were 40,000 U.S. servicemen in 
Thailand.208  The Chinese, North Vietnamese, and CPT saw these forces as a 
threat to their plans in both Vietnam and Thailand, hence the CPT’s harping on 
their exit.209 
 
CPT’s political strategy also included a military strategy borrowed from the 
Chinese communists to fight the government.  Maoist war, also called “People’s 
War,” required mass mobilization of the population to form underground political 
cells and a guerrilla army to weaken the government.  Once the political and 
military strategies could be developed, the guerrilla movement would increasingly 
take on the characteristics of a standing army capable of taking on the state’s 
forces toe-to-toe on the battlefield.  Politics and psyops drove all aspects of this 
process, which started in the countryside and then took the cities.210 
 
On the ground, the CPT made its strategy operational systematically one region at 
the time starting in the north and moving out from there.  Former National 
Intelligence Agency (NIA) Chief Bhumarat Taksadipong says: “The CPT began 
fighting in Issan, Sakhon Nakhon, in the northeast.  It was the poorest region in the 
country, just one day’s drive to the Vietnamese border, and communist philosophy 
attacks the poor.  And there was some sentiment of fighting the government in the 
past.”211  He also says the CPT took to Issan because of its difficult terrain, just as 
Mao proscribed, and branched out from there.  “It has rough mountain ranges and 
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the jungle, so the CPT started in the jungle, and from the jungle to the villages, 
and then later, all over.”212 
 
He continues: “From Issan, the communist then went north, because the 
northerners were the second poorest in Thailand.  The terrain was very suitable for 
communist insurgency.”213  Southern Thailand was next, he says.  Chinese, North 
Vietnamese, and Lao material support poured in from the porous border the 
communists controlled. 
 
In 1967, the CPT expanded on its exploitation of poor minority areas and made 
Thailand’s hill tribes a key part of its strategy.  They were native ethnic people that 
spanned from Burma and Thailand through Laos and into Vietnam.  Thailand’s hill 
tribes consisted of six major tribes.  The most prevalent was the Hmong, also 
called Meo or Miao.  Other tribes were the Mien (aka Yao) and Lahu, Akha, Lisu, 
and Karen.  Collectively, they were 700,000 strong in the 1980s.214 
 
 
CPT Organizational Structure 
 
The CPT’s organization was hierarchical and arranged along standard Leninist 
lines, a strict vertical command structure with power at the top.215  Ex-CPT 
member Gawin Chutima describes this as strictly hierarchical, and all 
communication between units had to be funnelled through higher units, a system 
the CPT called “democratic centralism.”  Democratic centralism called for “iron 
discipline” through four key tenets: 1) the party’s authority is final and supreme, 2) 
the minority must follow the majority, 3) lower ranks must follow the upper ranks, 
4) the Central Committee has power of every unit, every branch, and every person 
in the CPT.216 
 
As for its internal structure, Marks describes a seven-man politburo as running the 
CPT, which gave orders to the lower ranks.  At the second highest level was a 25-
man Central Committee.  It served as a staff to manage military operations, 
building political support, and the like.  Its members moreover served as head of 
Party Provincial Committees.  These oversaw Party District Committees, and 
these oversaw CPT operations at the town and village levels.  Marks notes from 
the district level down, however, the CPT did not follow Bangkok’s organization so 
formally.  It sometimes referred to lower echelons and even provincial areas of 
operations as “zones.”217 
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But there was a formal CPT structure at the bottom of the chain of command.  A 
zone commander managed party committees at the village levels.  Village 
committees consisted of seven-man teams headed by a chairman.  They 
supervised eight committees of as many as 30 people that ran services for the 
CPT such as military affairs, propaganda operations, youth and women’s affairs, 
and labor activities.218 
 
The CPT’s fighting wing had always been the Thai People’s Liberation Army 
(TPLAF), but early in the war, it was not a true standing army.  It was more a 
series of platoons and squads.219  On 1 January 1969, the Chinese took steps to 
change that and established a CPT military "Supreme Command" and began to 
call all fighting units in north and northeast Thailand as the TPLAF.220  As the CPT 
expanded in the 1970s, these small units grew into larger formations. 
 
The CPT had five areas of responsibility (AORs): the northeast, the north, the west 
central, mid south, and far south. Of the five, the north and northeast were the 
most active areas.  They were attached to CPT interior lines of communication to 
Vietnam, Laos, and China and therefore had good sanctuary logistics flow.  They 
also had more CPT members there.221 
 
The CPT had a separate organizational system for student groups.  According to 
Gawin, it, “…succeeded in getting its agents into key positions in student 
organizations, and was able to use journals such as Athipat (of the communist 
National Student Center of Thailand), and Asia magazine to provide guidelines for 
the movement.”222  The CPT’s student leaders did not lead from the battlefront, but 
rather, “…formed part of clandestine groups that discussed and analysed the 
political situation and decided on the action to be taken.”223  In short, student CPT 
members led the student movement from the shadows.  They had a real impact, 
writes Gawin; “It is likely that, without the CPT’s infiltration of the student 
movement, the student activities would not have adopted the extreme, far left 
strategies they did.”224 
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CPT Numbers 
 
By 1968, the government estimated it had as many as 2,500 troops and as many 
as 25,000 auxiliary forces.225  In 1975 the CPT had 8,500 fighters, seemingly a 
small number for a population of 41 million, but three fourths of these were 
situated in the north and northeast, “which magnified their effect,” writes Marks.226 
 
At its height in the years following the 1976 Thammasat University massacre the 
CPT’s ranks swelled to 14,000 with what Marks calls its “rural base” with a 
strength of 20,000, making total membership 34,000.227  But General Saiyud said 
the government’s estimate of auxiliary support in 1968 was 25,000 for 2,500 
fighters, which roughly equates to 10 auxiliary or support personnel for every 
fighter in the field.  If this was accurate, then the CPT might have had 140,000 
auxiliary supporters at its peak, which is possible because it had cells and political 
support throughout the entire country. 
 
 
Recruiting 
 
The CPT used multiple types of recruiting.  Its most prolific was radio propaganda 
via the VOPT.  The CPT preached the evils of Bangkok and the salvation of 
communism and followed with calls to join its ranks.  Armed cadres went from 
village to village toting guns and preaching the benefits of communism and the 
evils of Bangkok’s rule.  In these sessions, its troops both took on volunteers and 
forced people into its ranks. 
 
Bowie says the CPT engaged in surreptitious recruiting, too:  
In the initial process of wooing villagers, the guerrillas appealed to 
economic grievances to mobilize villagers’ opposition to the 
government.  For example, a cadre travelling about the villages 
dressed as a pig merchant might start a conversation about the low 
price of pigs compared to the high price of pig food.228   
She describes this particular type of pitch evolving into a conversation about other 
gripes, such as the government’s lack of care for the villagers and how 
government development projects only benefited the rich, exploited the poor, and 
offered no real aid to villagers.229 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Saiyud, op. cit., p. 37. 
226 Marks, op. cit., p. 84. 
227 Ibid., p. 202. 
228 K. A. Bowie, Rituals of National Loyalty: An Anthropology of the State and the 
Village Scout Movement in Thailand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 
pp. 9, 261-269. 
229 Ibid., pp. 9, 261-269. 
	  	   76	  
The CPT used personal ties for recruiting, too.  Writes Gawin: “A new recruit was 
often a friend or relative of an existing member.”  He continues: “For those who 
were not relatives, the ties were likely to be those of a patron-client 
relationship.”230  The latter refers directly to the sakdi na system that the CPT both 
fought against and exploited to aid their recruitment efforts.231 
 
Recruiting students in urban areas required different methods.  According to 
Gawin, the CPT penetrated university student groups, teacher training institutions, 
high schools, and vocational schools throughout Thailand with spies.  These spies 
controlled the direction of some student groups.  They increased recruiting and 
provided communist political literature on the correct positions to adopt.232  
Government versus student pressure mounted in 1973-76, many student idealists 
gravitated to the rebels;  “[They] were already in search of the CPT before being 
personally contact by a CPT agent,” writes Gawin.233 
 
Student motivations to join the CPT had its roots in the 1973 student democracy 
movement that violently clashed with police.  It was not a pure democracy 
movement, however.  It was also an anti-establishment movement like other 
1960s-70s era student groups in the U.S., and it moreover had decidedly leftist 
and communist tendencies.  Clashes with police and the 6 October 1976 
Thammasat massacre codified the students’ loyalties.  Gawin said there were few 
true Maoists in the student community, however.234 
 
In addition to the campuses, CPT recruitment flourished in the rural areas.  Tyrell 
Haberkorn describes farmers heavily exploited by landowners: “In both the 1950s 
and the 1970s, farmers organized to challenge what they perceived as unjust 
practices which forced them to often give more than half the yearly rice harvest to 
the landlords from whom they rented land.”235   She asserts some landowners 
cheated farmers and ignored their indebtedness.236  The CPT teamed up with 
disaffected farmers to petition the government to pass the 1974 Land Rent Control 
Act, which cut landowner’s share of tenet farmers’ rice crops by a third or more.  
Right wing paramilitaries assassinated scores of alleged communist farmers, 
which made many in the agricultural sector ripe for CPT recruiting.237 
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Another grievance was government corruption.  General Saiyud said: “In 
particular, the abuse of power by some government officials has been the single 
most important factor in alienating people and breeding recruits for communist 
terrorism in Thailand.”238  Corruption in the business sector compounded 
government abuse and further disaffected the population.239   
 
General Prem wrote of the cancer of corruption:   
Of course, we had heard of oppressive practices which officialdom in 
remote areas were prone to.  But to come across it at first hand made 
us intensely conscious of the intimidation, the harassment and 
exploitation, which had become all too routine.  Once we succeeded in 
getting the villagers to talk to us, we learned of extortions, of husbands 
and sons being summarily “put away” at the slightest suspicion or of 
daughters being abducted to satisfy the casual needs of someone or 
another.  In short, officialdom was its own enemy, turning ordinary 
villagers into communist sympathizers determined to avenge the 
wrongs perpetrated.240 
 
Thai culture and COIN expert Jeffrey Race cites a classic corruption case in May 
1967 in Huai Chom Poo village in Thoeng district, Chaing Rai province.  A local 
authority demanded bribe money from Huai Chom Poo village as it began slashing 
and burning a mountain forest to plant crops, an illegal act.  A second authority 
that did not know about the first bribe demanded yet another payment.  Later, a 
group of provincial police went to Huai Chom Poo and demanded a third bribe.  
Fed up, the beleaguered tribesmen ambushed the police.  The next day, the police 
raided Huai Chom Poo with 64 officers who engaged in a two and a half hour 
firefight with villagers.241 
 
 
Training 
 
The CPT trained in Thailand and in Laos, Vietnam, and China.  In Thailand, they 
took over remote and inaccessible areas.242  In the early stages of CPT 
development, according to George K. Tanham, Special Assistant for 
Counterinsurgency at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok in the 1970s, CPT recruits 
learned infantry tactics in Laos and Vietnam such as Long Mu near Hoa Binh.  
Military training courses lasted three to six months, the latter being a typical basic 
training time span.  After finishing, many CPT recruits fought along side the Pathet 
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Lao against the royalist government in order to gain combat experience.243  They 
learned political tactics in China, mostly in Beijing, for two to five months.244 High-
level cadres also trained in China for about the same length of time.245 
 
The main school for political indoctrination was in Beijing.  Gawin quoted a CPT 
leader as saying: “Most of us (the CPT leaders) graduated from the Marxist-
Leninist Institute in Peking [Beijing], so we have been doing what we learned from 
that institute, setting up a form of revolution like the one we saw in China.”246  
High-level cadres trained in China for approximately two to five months.247 
 
 
Logistics and Sanctuary 
 
Logistics from China – the CPT’s main provider – Vietnam and Laos followed the 
same lines of communication trainees followed.  Says Bhumarat: “Issan has a 
border with Laos and Kampuchea, both areas where the communists were very 
active.  It was easy to get supplies and people through their rear lines.”248  RTA 
General Harn Pathai adds: “The Hmong from Laos were fighting in Thailand, too, 
to spread communism, but more in a logistics and transport role than a direct 
combat role.  There was continual infiltration into Thailand via Laos.”249 
 
“With material support from Vietnam coming through Laos and Cambodia, the 
CPT became stronger,” says Bhumarat.250  According to Tanham, Chinese 
weapons shipments to the CPT in the early years of the war were not immense, 
but they greatly increased in the 1971-73 period.251  In 1975-78, the Chinese 
provided approximately 600 tons of logistics and 1,000 tons of rice a year.252  
China, Vietnam, and especially Laos moreover provided sanctuary for the CPT, a 
key insurgency ingredient that allows guerrillas to retreat to safe zones where they 
can rest, recuperate, and reconstitute forces and logistics.253 
 
Gawin writes the CPT’s headquarters was in northern Laos, but he does not say 
exactly where.  “This capital, as Wirat Sakchirapapong, a Socialist Party Central 
Committee member, has stated, …comprised hospitals (at least six) children’s 
schools, the CCPDF office, the research office, training camps, storehouses and 
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other buildings, and could not possibly have existed without enormous help from 
China.”254  Jeffrey Race noted another CPT base in Laos near the Thai border at 
Phu Miang, “…the site of a major communist base camp and training area.  
Infiltration of men would thus be easy southward down the ridgeline connecting 
Phu Miang with the tri-province boundary area.”255  A CIA report claimed there was 
a Chinese cultural school in Laos that kept the CPT linked to the Chinese 
Communist Party.  It focused on reading, writing, and indoctrination.256 
 
 
Indoctrination 
 
CPT indoctrination – the education of its own membership to keep it thinking 
correctly and focused on the revolution – was prolific.  Its main target population, 
the peasants, were poorly educated.  CPT leaders mainly told their subordinates 
to follow the party’s leadership and Mao’s thought.  Writes Gawin, “…the CPT’s 
educational system was narrow and conservative…,” and this kept the movement 
from “…becoming a true Marxist-Leninist party.”  More, even as it told peasants to 
follow Mao’s thought, the CPT itself by and large did not immerse itself in the 
Chinese leader’s teachings.  According to Gawin, “…CPT cadres did not read 
Mao’s works much or even memorize quotations, and if they did they never really 
understood them.” 257 
 
Instead, the CPT had widely distributed booklets that instructed their ranks on how 
the CPT viewed the ruling elite, the government of Thailand, international trade, 
the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the like.258  Gawin acknowledges the CPT violated 
some tenets of Mao in keeping its cadres only partially indoctrinated.  Mao said 
followers should be both “red,” meaning communist, and “expert,” meaning 
politically acute.  The CPT just wanted its cadres red – moral and disciplined.259 
 
CPT indoctrination changed somewhat when the student movement joined its 
ranks.  The communist-minded students increased the effectiveness of the CPT’s 
indoctrination messages and taught “revolutionary morality,” that rebelling for 
justice and equal status for all was congruous with being a true human being.260   
 
 
Propaganda 
 
The CPT delivered its propaganda through four methods: the VOPT, by armed 
propaganda teams, word of mouth, and the written word.  The primary goal of the 
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propaganda effort was to persuade people to see history, economics, politics, and 
outside threats through Marxist eyes.  Communism will not work if the people have 
different ideas about these issues.  Within these issues, the CPT focused on 
government shortcomings.  Marks notes almost all insurgencies exploit the 
grievances that cause people to resent governments.261 
 
This was fertile ground for CPT propagandists.  Many students, workers, and 
farmers felt a high level of angst about the dilapidated and oppressive political-
economic situation.  Issan people, the hill tribes, and Malay Muslims as minorities 
all had cultural, economic, political, and security grievances with Bangkok – 
especially Issan.  Says Bhumarat: “Issan had the seeds for revolution for years 
and years.  It was easy to get them to go against the government.”262   
 
Unless a family was urban, it was likely quite isolated.  Radio connected villages 
all over the region to the rest of the world with news and varying political and 
economic ideas.  The CPT used the VOPT airwaves as a means to propagandize, 
and it was highly effective.263 
 
Some armed propaganda cadres saw the people were their most precious assets, 
and they were dedicated to getting the CPT’s message out to their target 
audiences even at the risk of being ambushed and killed by an RTA patrol.264  
Others behaved more Viet Cong-like, which is fitting because the North 
Vietnamese Army trained many of them.  Writes Tanham: “Early in 1966, the CTs 
[communists terrorists] in the northeast began to conduct armed propaganda 
meetings, which combined propaganda with terror.  On these occasions a guerrilla 
band would appear in a village, intimidate the population by show of arms and 
sometimes violence, and then deliver long lectures on the failures of the RTG and 
the unhappy lives of the people.”265 
 
Word-of-mouth propaganda worked similarly.  They could be rumors of an alleged 
government offensive against the peasant class, conversations in student groups, 
or CPT propagandists disguised as peasants intermingling with locals complaining 
of government policies and heralding communist alternatives.  Word of mouth and 
the VOPT made tactical guerrilla victories – firefights, for example – seem grander 
than they really were.  It served to rally the people to join the winning army.266  As 
for written propaganda, the CPT used propaganda chits – such as for recruiting – 
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and also newspapers such as the student-run, NSCT Athipat, and Asia 
magazine.267 
 
Educational propaganda explained benefits of Mao’s communism and the perils of 
Bangkok’s policies.  This was necessary because most rural people were apolitical 
and wanted to be left alone to farm and live day to day.  But by “educating” such 
persons about the abuse of the rich and the uneven distribution of income, the 
CPT “enlightened” the masses to realities they were previously unaware of.  Made 
aware of wealthy “indifference and hostility” toward the poor, the CPT told the 
peasants that justice existed within the CPT.268  With CPT propaganda, writes 
Saiyud, “…rural people slowly awoke to the realities of their relatively deprived 
existence….”269 
 
Beyond simply pointing out Bangkok’s shortcomings, the CPT offered solutions to 
rural problems.  Tanham writes it offered villagers “…tractors, food, regular 
salaries for guerrillas, and official status within the government.”  For the young, 
the CPT offered “…opportunities for travel and education…”  These were popular 
messages that resonated amongst the depraved sections of society.270  
Realistically, however, the CPT was in no position to grant any of these things, 
and it rarely told the population they came with Maoist strings attached. 
 
Propaganda attacks on the Thai Royal Family were necessary for communism to 
sweep into power.  On 23 September 1977, the CPT launched a direct attack on 
the king, titled, Who is the Father of Thai Medicine?  In it, the CPT said the king 
sent troops to kill students at Thammasat University in October 1976.  By saying 
such, the CPT linked the king with the most heinous government act perpetrated 
on the Thai population in modern times.  Labelling the king as an instigator of the 6 
October violence, the CPT tried to cast the king – often a revered and benevolent 
figure in Thailand – into one of its most loathsome enemies.271 
 
 
Weaponry 
 
For the most part, the CPT relied on light infantry weapons.  In the early days of 
the war, a then young General Harn Pathai – as an army lieutenant – says “They 
did not have very good weapons to fight with when I was [first] there.  They had 
some M-1 carbines, M-3 ‘Grease Guns,’ things like that.”272   In 1969, a CIA report 
cited the first discovery of Chinese supplied AK-47s to the CPT.  With the AK-47s 
came heavier weapons the CPT had been training on in North Vietnam, weapons 
such as rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), 60mm mortars, and M-79 grenade 
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launchers.  Radios, medical supplies, and uniforms came in, too.273  Later, in 1980 
when General Harn was an infantry battalion commander, he says the CPT was 
much better armed:  “The CPT was stronger than when I first fought them.  They 
had better weapons and more people.  They had AK-47s, RPGs, and a lot of 
mines, too.  Lots of mines.”274 
 
 
CPT Operations 
 
The CPT used classic guerrilla tactics in its military operations.  It conducted hit 
and run raids, set up ambushes, burned down buildings, assassinated people, 
used terror to a certain extent, and built elaborate defensive positions on mountain 
bases to repel conventional military attacks by the government.  CPT units used 
the jungle, difficult terrain, and night to their advantage as part of their doctrine.  
“They stayed deep in the jungles,” says General Harn.   
 
In the day, they stayed in the villages.  At night, they fought in the 
jungles. ... The CPT, they did patrols and ambushes. And [they 
deployed] land mines.  They used land mines to place on trails where 
they thought the army would walk.  They mostly targeted soldiers, not 
so much the population.  They did not fight the people because they 
wanted their support.  But if they knew you were helping the Army, 
they’d kill you.275 
 
Harn says despite their lack of heavy weaponry, the CPT had hard and skilled 
fighters.  They did not shy from combat.  “They had more advantage because they 
knew the landscape.  Their fighting skill was good.  Normally, they would have the 
advantage of maneuver because of terrain appreciation.  And for the same 
reasons, they could set up ambushes easily.  When we first began fighting them 
this way, you never knew where they’d hit you.”276  And though the Thai 
government never admitted the CPT had seized certain areas of Thailand, it had 
indeed occupied and mastered various pieces of territory.  As a result, says 
General Harn: “There was some trepidation on behalf of the troops when going 
through CPT prone areas.”277 
 
Tanham writes: “As 1970 unfolded, the CTs turned more and more to armed 
encounters and attacks on communications.  A number of bridges were burned, 
ambushes were laid on the main Sakon Nakhon-Nakhon Phanom highway, and 
the first armored personnel carrier was mined.”278  As an example, Tanham writes: 
“On 28 February 1970, eighty or ninety CTs operating in six groups burned nine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit., pp. 5, 65, 72, 78 
274 Pathai, op. cit. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Tanham, op. cit., p. 56. 
	  	   83	  
bridges, blocked two roads, attacked village protection units, and laid an armed 
ambush against the army, all in one district of Nakhon Phanom.”279 
 
There are multiple cases that prove the CPT’s fighting capabilities.  The CPT 
carried out a campaign of ambushes against the government’s Mae Sot-Umphong 
road building project.  In December 1969, communist forces ambushed a 
roadwork crew in Tak province, killing four and blocking the quick reaction force 
(QRF) sent to rescue them.280  In 1971 at kilometer 47, the CPT ambushed a 
police truck, killing seven.  A photograph of the truck shows a beat up cab 
peppered by bullets, indicating the CPT used overwhelming fire superiority and 
possibly a road mine.281  Such incidents forced the government to abandon the 
road project later that same year.282 
 
On 24 December 1976, an unknown number of Meo CPT ambushed a column of 
17 Border Patrol Police (BPP) on patrol.  They were near their base in Mae Lamao 
village.  The ambushers killed three and sustained no casualties themselves.  The 
operation indicated the Meo knew the route of the BPP, their base camp’s 
location, and had effective exfiltration routes planned.  It was professionally 
planned and executed.283 
 
 
Targeting 
 
The CPT targeted Thai government civilians, military, and police and their 
activities.  Government personnel the CPT aimed at included elected and 
appointed civilian administrators such as governors and village heads.  These 
people usually headed up government security and development programs.  The 
CPT also put development workers on its hit list.  The CPT did not want 
government development projects to be successful because they could sway the 
people to the government’s side.  The CPT launched violence against road 
building projects, social aid centers, and murdered the workers, too.  The CPT 
moreover targeted civilians recruited to help Thai security forces at the village 
level.  These included village defense units, to be discussed later, that provided 
overt and covert intelligence and defense services. 
 
 
4. People – The At-Risk Population 
 
During the communist COIN, the Thai people lived in 73 provinces (now there are 
75) ruled by appointed governors and district administrators.  It was largely an 
agricultural society that Saiyud described as “docile and politically apathetic.”  He 
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moreover said that “master-client” and “tolerant Buddhist” ethics were two of their 
key characteristics.284  In 1966, farming employed 80 percent of the national labor 
force, accounted for 32 percent of GDP, and produced 80 percent of value of 
exported goods.285 
 
As discussed earlier, the Issan in the northeast were among the most susceptible 
to the CPT.  The terrain in that area is both flat and dry, and dotted with forest 
covered hills with maximum elevations of 3,000 feet.  The wet season is not 
enough to sustain effective agriculture.  Droughts in Issan in the 1950s and 1960s 
added to the agony in this rice-growing, overpopulated area.  Its soil was less than 
fertile, and rice was its main product.  Issan at that time was home to one third of 
Thailand’s 40 million people.  Saiyud says substandard communications, inferior 
medical services, and a second rate educational system helped make the 
northeast chronically impoverished.   
 
Its population is closely related to Laos but, as Tanham writes, “…definitely Thai in 
their political and economic allegiance.”286  Handley points out, however, that Thai 
was the third most popular language of Issan in the 1960s, after Lao and Khmer.  
They had their own customs and an independent political streak.  More than 
100,000 Cambodians lived in Issan’s border region, along with 50,000 
Vietnamese.287  These enclaves presented the CPT numerous recruiting 
opportunities.   
 
General Prem wrote of Issan: “Generally, villages were inaccessible.  One day, 
having covered some distance on foot on the way to a village, we came across 
coconut trees. Tired and thirsty, we asked the owner who was standing nearby if 
we could buy some coconuts. He happily brought over the coconuts, [and we] 
asked how much we should pay for the coconuts, he said that he didn’t know 
because he had never sold a coconut in his life.  To me, this showed the extent of 
the neglect.  People were being abandoned to an existence beyond the pale of 
society.”288 
 
While the northeast is flat, the North is mountainous and jungle clad with peaks 
reaching 8,000 feet.  As a result, it has scores of areas accessible only by foot, 
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helicopter, and short landing and takeoff aircraft.  Four major rivers run through the 
north, including the Chao Phya that flows through Bangkok.  Rain is prevalent, and 
the soil is ideal for agriculture.  Lowland farmers – ethnic Thai – grew rice, and 
there was some phosphate mining and teak tree logging.  The road network during 
that time was small as well, and it hindered development work and economic 
expansion.  As many as 500,000 hill people occupied the north’s mountain 
range.289 
 
The two main tribes were the Yao and the Hmong.  The Thai hill tribes had their 
own customs, religions, and were fiercely proud.290  They viewed outsiders with 
suspicion.  The rest of the northern population, some 5.5 million, were Thai and 
occupied the foothills and lowlands.291  The lowland farmers were by no means 
destitute, but government services did not extend to them so readily because of 
geography.  They had no stiff allegiance to a distant central government. 
 
The hill tribes’ relationships with the Thai and the government were bad.  Some 
Thai ridiculed and conned hill people when they took their goods to markets.  
Many Thai saw the tribes as inferior.  Their citizenship status was in limbo for 
decades, and during the 1960s-70s, the Bangkok categorized them as refugees 
because they were nomadic and did not recognize national or internal borders.  In 
the mountainous jungles, borders were not well marked.  Since they were not 
citizens, they could not own land, nor could they have government jobs.  And since 
they lived in what the Thai government considered a royal nature preserve area, 
Jeffrey Race asserts technically, they were illegal squatters.292  The hill tribes lived 
by hunting and gathering and also slash and burn agriculture.  The latter destroyed 
the mountain ecosystem.  They also grew opium, which was illegal.293 
 
The south had two sections, the mid and far south.  The mid-south ran from north 
of Songkhla, to Prachuap Kiri Khan province.  Rice and rubber cultivation, tin 
mining, and fishing were its key industries.  When tin and rubber prices were high, 
the region prospered.  In the 1960s, when such commodities declined, its 
economy faltered.  A rice shortage added to the difficulties.  Tanham notes in the 
1960s-70s, the crime rate was high in this region; Nakhon Si Thammarat province 
had one of the highest murder rates in all of Thailand.294  No one was sure why. 
 
The far south was the third poorest region behind the northeast and north.  It was, 
and still is, 80 percent ethnically Malay Muslim – Thai Buddhists make most of the 
remainder.  Songkhla has a large Chinese population replete with Chinese style 
pagodas in Hat Yai city.  Thai Malay Muslims have their own customs; many prefer 
sharia law to Bangkok’s laws.  Low-level resistance to Bangkok’s rule festered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Tanham, op. cit., p. 7. 
290 Saiyud, op. cit., p. 55. 
291 Tanham, op. cit., pp. 6-8, and Saiyud, op. cit., p. 55. 
292 Race, op. cit., pp. 89-100. 
293 Marks, op. cit., pp. 103-105, and Race, op. cit., p. 106, and Saiyud, op. cit., p. 55. 
294 Tanham, op. cit., p. 9. 
	  	   86	  
there for decades, sometimes boiling over into intense periods of violence.  Like 
the northeast, Bangkok neglected the far south’s welfare for years, and many 
government agencies sent civil servants there as punishment.  Government 
corruption in the far south was high.  Few Thai Malay Muslims held local 
government positions.295 
 
Aside from these three at-risk regions, the rest of the country, that was ethnic Thai 
and Buddhist, became susceptible to rebellion as well by the early to mid-1970s.  
They fell under the rule of an increasingly autocratic government, and a global 
recession had set in.  Wages had fallen, and inflation rose to five percent a month.  
A million Thais were unemployed, and in one case in 1976, 200,000 workers went 
on strike.  The government assumed a dictatorial stance and arrested political 
opposition, no matter how docile, without due process, allegedly executing many.  
With no room for even loyal political opposition, a large swath of central Thai that 
never would have considered rebellion became vulnerable to the CPT.  Student 
protest groups, full of idealism and zeal for confrontation with the police, added to 
the government’s folly.  The more violent students weakened their own political 
position by alienating themselves from the mainstream.  Without a just central 
government, societal weakness resulted.  CPT agents easily stepped into the void 
and infiltrated student groups, intellectuals, laborers, and the like.296 
 
 
5. Thai Communist COIN Strategy 
 
The Thai government changed its communist COIN strategy, informally known as 
“the CPM plan,” at least four times during the war.  This occurred for two reasons: 
CPT progress and government COIN shortcomings.  Communist Thai COIN era 
expert Kanok Wongtrangan writes, “…the CPM Plan was gradually developed 
through learning from the mistakes and experiences of the government in dealing 
with the communist insurgency.”297 
 
Government shortcomings included executive instability.  From 1963-80, Thailand 
went through nine different governments. Each time a new regime came to power, 
it brought with it its political and patronage networks, plus people with different 
socio-economic and military ideas from the last administration.  This impacted all 
Thai government policies.  Six PM changes took place in a mere four years from 
1973-77, critical years in the communist COIN era.298  It is not surprising that there 
is an inverse relationship between the power and effectiveness of the central 
government and the communist resistance.   
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1965 – The CPM Plan 
 
In December 1965, the government developed the Civilian-Police-Military (CPM) 
program to confront the growing communist problem.299  The initial strategy was to 
apply kinetic force to destroy CPT military units and to provide economic 
development via aid projects to uplift impoverished people and improve their 
standard of living.  A side goal of the latter was to win political loyalty.  Communist 
COIN analysts Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Kusuma Snitwongse, and Suchit 
Bunbongkarn argue the 1965 plan leaned too heavily on suppression, specifically 
search and destroy, one of the reasons it languished.  The government did not 
fully understand the CPT’s capabilities and intentions to bleed political support 
from Bangkok.  They also claim a mere five people in the Thai government really 
understood communism.  In 1965, then Chief of Army Intelligence, Prayuth 
Charumanee, asserted he did not understand how to fight the CPT.300  This is 
interesting because the Thai government had been politically fighting and arresting 
communists since at least the 1950s.  Apparently, it never sought to fully 
understand the movement. 
 
 
1967 – The 09/10 Plan 
 
In 1967, the government tweaked its COIN strategy based on results of lackluster 
combat operations against the CPT.  Toward the end of 1966, the RTA and RTAF, 
joining together as the 13th Combined Regiment as a special task force (TF), 
conducted a combined, large scale suppression operation in Na Kae, Nakorn 
Panom province.  It did not net many CPT, and the army’s top brass saw the folly.  
Large-scale suppression operations were ineffective.  Accordingly, it upgraded the 
CPM strategy and rolled out a new plan, the 09/10 Plan.  (The 09/10 Plan signified 
the Buddhist calendar years 2509 and 2510, which translate to 1966 and 1967 on 
the Western calendar.) 
 
The government concluded that the insurgency had successfully taken root 
amongst the people, and they had to reverse this trend and make the people into a 
defensive element of the government’s strategy.  In other words, the CPT used the 
people for its offense, and the government decided to use it as defense, 
something it called “mass mobilization,” which was straight out of the Maoist 
playbook.  The 09/10 Plan mandated village self-defense forces.  This concept 
was essentially the same as the CPM plan, but it formally parsed CPM tasks and 
made them general orders.  It also was a response to the popular backlash 
against heavy suppression. 
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The 09/10 Plan had four main strategies:301 
 
1. To clear the guerrillas from the target areas; 
2. to provide local security; 
3. to stimulate civilian action; and 
4. to initiate short-term development projects for the villagers. 
 
Kanok identifies weaknesses in the plan as poor RTA and TNP coordination and 
too much focus on suppression.302  More, the CPT’s counter strategy of political 
subversion and guerrilla warfare and some terror proved more effective than the 
government’s plan.  The COIN strategy fell short, and CPT ranks grew. 
 
 
1969 – The 110/2512 Plan 
 
The RTA changed its strategy yet again in on 30 May 1969 via the 110/2512 plan.  
Kanok contends several factions evolved within the military to influence strategy, 
1) those who believed in suppression, 2) those who believed development was the 
key to political allegiance, and 3) those who believed in a combination of both.303  
CSOC had plenty of the latter two groups, and they had the biggest influence on 
the 110/2512 Plan.304  The new strategy stated:305 
 
1. By all means, to persuade people from all social strata to have trust 
and faith in the authorities’ work and the government’s administration; 
to win over the peoples’ mind in order to maintain their loyalty to the 
government; 
 
2. To provide security to people, so they can peacefully live and work 
in their village; 
 
3. To formulate a system which will facilitate the peoples’ acquisition of 
adequate knowledge and experience in economic social, political and 
military as well as psychological questions in order to protect their 
families and villages from communist threats, with the support and 
assistance of the government; this is the ‘supreme objective’ of 
communist prevention and suppression; 
 
4. In prevention and suppression, political and psychological, to utilize 
public relations measures as primary instruments and military or 
severe physical suppression or [judicial] measures only when 
necessary. 
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The 1969 strategy marked a significant change from past schemes.  The first tenet 
was political – winning hearts and minds of the population by good governance.   It 
required civil servants and military and police to shed corruption, become more 
professional, and put the people’s needs first.  In doing so, Bangkok admitted it 
had governance problems.  Putting the people’s needs first included paying 
attention to their day-today needs – life at the village level.  General Saiyud said: 
“The question of village security is the foremost problem confronting us today in 
Thailand and it is my belief that basic to this question is the mental attitude of 
villagers toward their future.”306  He stressed the government had to tackle the 
effects of bad harvests, access to schools, and care for infants and the elderly.  
These were core security issues outside the kinetic realm, but just as important as 
destroying the CPT’s military units. 
 
The second new tenet was psyops to win villagers’ minds – to educate them about 
Bangkok’s policies and warn about the perils of communism.  This became the 
government’s “supreme objective,” a turn from the past when the supreme 
objective was the destruction of the enemy’s military units.  The government’s 
psyops included educational sessions and both soft and hard propaganda – gentle 
political spin and outright lies. 
 
The third new strategic aspect made sure the public understood the government’s 
communist COIN across every spectrum, security, political, and economic.  This 
way, it would understand the government’s intentions when its various agencies 
and security forces came to the villages.  It moreover proclaimed the government 
would use political means as its primary COIN weapon and suppression as its 
secondary weapon.  Unfortunately, only a handful of officers, some in the Second 
Army, embraced PM Order 110/2512, and nothing really changed.  Conventional 
suppression tactics continued to be employed widely by the government.307 
 
 
Strategic Reconfiguring – Road to the 66/2523 Plan 
 
This experience in the late 1960s sent various RTA officers and security officials 
back to the drawing board.  They spent the entire 1970s studying the insurgency 
and how to defeat it.  Past strategies were only marginally helpful and coordination 
was nil.  Chief among these were Second Army Commander General Prem, and 
his Chief of Staff, General Harn Leenanond.  The U.S. had some influence, too, 
via its embassy and CIA COIN specialists, many of them British contractors from 
the Malaya campaign. 
 
While General Prem was Second Army Commander (1 October 1974-30 
September 1977), he ran his own COIN program based on the best practices of 
existing strategies and added those of his own and his staff.  As Kanok writes, 
Prem and Harn saw insurgency as  “a consequence of conflict among the people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 Saiyud, op. cit., p. 69. 
307 Samudavanija, Snitwongse, and Bunbongkarn, op. cit., p. 61. 
	  	   90	  
and/or conflict between the people and government officials.  This conflict arises 
from various causes, e.g., exploitation by local influential people, poverty, social 
injustice, corruption, and abuse of power by the authorities.”308  Politics, then, 
became the main weapon in the COIN arsenal.  They called this policy karnmuang 
nam karn taharn, or “politics leads the military.”309  Solving insurgency, Prem and 
Harn figured, took cooperation with the people, improving governance, bettering 
the people’s lives, and providing security from CPT intimidation and violence.  
General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, by 1971 Chief of Army Operations, was also a 
key architect of this strategy.  All three men were proponents of the CPM concept.  
This also increased intelligence flow from the people and heightened the political 
connection between the government and the population.  And despite all the 
political and development strategies, Prem and his lieutenants firmly believed 
suppression was still necessary to physically drive a wedge between the 
insurgents and the people.  They just believed force should not be applied 
haphazardly. 
 
As for Prem, Harn, and Chavalit’s ideas on political issues, they believed in 
widespread psychological operations and PR.  This included educational seminars 
on the perils of communism, and identifying key CPT personnel in the villages and 
singling them out for re-education.  Consolidating all these ideas into a single 
strategy, Prem arrived at, “the villages surrounding the jungle,” which was the 
direct opposite of Mao and the CPT’s, “villages surrounding the cities.”310 
 
Other influential COIN persons included men such as General Saiyud Kerdphol, 
the first Director of Operations and later Chief of Staff of CSOC.311  General 
Saiyud broke down his ideas for COIN into subjective equations.  The variables for 
his “COIN algebra” were: G = government, P = people (“or target villages”), C = 
CPT, and V = victory.312  A failed strategy, Saiyud believed, followed the following 
formula: 
 
G – (C + P) = -V, or the government minus a combination of the communists plus 
the people equals defeat. 
 
A stalemate strategy, he figured was when the government plus a somewhat 
cooperative people minus the communists equalled stalemate, or: 
 
G + -P – C = +-V.313 
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To win, Saiyud wanted a different formula, one where the people and the 
government were in the fight together, or: 
 
PG – C = V.  In this case, the people, supported and empowered by the 
government as a force multiplier, minus the communists equals victory.314 
 
 
1980 – The 66/2523 Plan 
 
In 1978 the RTA concluded at a secret meeting the government was suddenly 
making ground against the CPT.  General Prem and Harn’s CPM program in 
Issan, their political impetus, and focused offensives began to bare fruit.  Villagers 
were cooperating more, and Chai-Anan, Kusuma, and Suchit conclude 1978 – 
under Kriangsak – was the most successful year for the government’s COIN 
campaign.  Part of this was also due to improved intelligence, which resulted in a 
greater understanding of the CPT and the peoples’ motivations for joining it.315 
 
For the new COIN strategy to take effect throughout the entire national security 
structure, it took Prem seizing power in 1980.  When he did, the government 
applied the plan at lightening speed, partly because it was a readymade and 
already in action in Issan.  Prem took over the PM’s position from his ally, 
Kriangsak, on 3 March 1980, and issued Thailand’s final and successful COIN 
strategy on 23 April 1980 as Prime Minister’s Order No. 66/2523, the “Policy to 
Win Over Communism.”316  General Harn was one of its main authors.317  
Paraphrased, the strategy consisted of an overview of Thailand’s strategic 
situation, the government’s objective, its policy, the types of operations to be 
carried out, and the administrative structure of the campaign:318 
 
Overview 
1. The 66/2523 Plan recognized there was an ongoing Cold War with all its 
associated problems such as lacking energy supplies [likely a nod to the 1973 oil 
crisis], and the international military balance between the superpowers.  
Communist war had come to Thailand as a part of such global troubles. 
 
2. The government recognized the CPT had exploited Thailand’s governmental 
troubles as its primary means to sway the population to its side, and that it had 
spread from the jungles to the cities.  It moreover saw weakness in the CPT; that it 
was not sure it could rely on the proletariat for a communist revolution. 
 
3. The government stated it would protect Nation, Religion, and King, the heart of 
Thai domestic, international, and defense policy, which included mass reform to 
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ensure good governance, uphold the welfare of the people, and to instil idealism 
amongst the Thai people that centered on sacrifice for the common good.  The 
military swore to protect the monarchy and to defeat communism, the chief threat 
to national security. 
 
Objective 
The objective of the 66/2523 Plan was:  “To put an end in the shortest possible 
time the communist revolutionary war which is of the utmost significance and 
danger to national security.” 
 
Policy 
The plan stated the government’s COIN policy was to wage a continual political 
campaign against the CPT and its United Front organizations while also using 
force against its armed forces.  The policy also sought to adopt neutrality, a veiled 
gesture toward having been aligned with the U.S. and the political angst it had 
caused the left. 
 
Operations 
The operations section had nine points.  First, the political offensive took 
precedence, which entailed convincing the people the land was theirs, and they 
had a stake in protecting it.  The military’s role was to support all political 
offensives.  Second, war had to be declared on corruption, bad governance, and 
poverty.  Third, rules of conduct were necessary to promote harmony between the 
many classes of Thai people and that everyone had to sacrifice their positions in 
society for the common good – country first, regardless of status.  Fourth, political 
participation of all ranks of society was vital not only for a better society, but also to 
assuage grievances.  Fifth, all democratic movements were welcome and 
encouraged as long as they were not communist organizations in disguise. 
 
Sixth, all elements in the CPM equation were to carry out both armed and political 
campaigns.  Political campaigns had to be uniform across the entire nation – all 
units had to promulgate the same message.  That message was the spread of 
democracy throughout Thailand to insure individual liberties.  (In the long run, 
democracy did not spread as in Western circles, but it spread enough to help 
defeat the CPT.)  Armed operations were to be executed according to the regional 
threat level and in proportion to CPT activities.  The goal of the latter was to, 
“…pressure, cut down, and destroy armed bands on a continuous basis.”  
Seventh, all prisoners of war and defectors were to be treated as, “fellow 
countrymen,” and the government was responsible for integrating them back into 
society. 
 
Eighth, the CPT infrastructure absolutely had to be rooted out of the towns, 
eliminated, and blocked from ever returning.  Organizations had to be vetted to 
insure they were not part of a united front, and no group, surreptitiously or 
otherwise, could be allowed to separate the people from the government and 
create war conditions.  Ninth, the importance of psyops – “information, 
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psychological measure, and public relations” – was paramount in every aspect of 
COIN, and it would be carried out at each phase of every operation against the 
CPT.  A tenth and unlisted strategy was to separate the CPT from its regional 
sponsors, namely China and Vietnam.  Thailand’s main tool in this regard was 
diplomacy, one of its legendary strengths. 
 
 
6. Coordination for the Communist COIN 
 
1965 – CSOC 
 
In 1965, as Bangkok developed its COIN strategy, it also created a coordinating 
agency to manage the COIN, the CSOC.  The government made it legal via the 
1952 Anti-Communist Act and PM Order No. 219/2508.  Prapass was technically 
in charge of CSOC but General Saiyud ran its day-to-day operations as Chief of 
Staff of Operations.319  The Thai saw coordination as crucial.  Marks interviewed 
Saiyud on the subject, who said: “Coordination is the key to winning, but all must 
look at the problem through the same eyes.  You need a common blueprint upon 
which to base the plan.”320 
 
CSOC’s mission was to plan and execute suppression operations and 
development programs against the CPT throughout Thailand.  It had control of not 
only military units placed under it, but police forces as well.  Sometimes, however, 
police, army, and civilian agency headquarters bypassed CSOC and passed their 
own orders to their respective CPM elements in the field.  This worked against 
coordination and muddied COIN operations.321  More, scores of other government 
agencies also ran their own development projects outside of CSOC, and this, too, 
crowded the COIN arena. 
 
CSOC headquartered in Bangkok at the Rose Palace via its Operations and 
Coordination Center, the agency’s “nerve center.”  It had staff sections called 
“committees,” which included intelligence, operations planning, and psychological 
operations groups.  To execute COIN operations, CSOC had multitudes of CPM 
centers in the field supported by intelligence units.322 
 
CSOC placed CPM centers in CPT affected provinces.  Their missions were to 
plan missions to separate the population from the CPT by using CPM strategy and 
assets.  The assets were civilian development personnel, local security forces, the 
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police, and the military.323  CSOC did not micro-manage CPM units in their daily 
routines, however.  Under CSOC, CPM cells designed their own operations.324  It 
was a decentralized command system. 
 
Both provincial governors and Army Regional Commanders ran CPM units at the 
provincial level, a job technically just for the governors, but the RTA was powerful 
and wanted a leadership role.  An RTA general commanded the first CPM unit 
ever deployed, called CPM-1, stationed in Mukdahan.325 
 
More, RTA regional commanders had seniority over the governors, a product of 
the Anti-Communist Act of 1969.  Says Major General Perapong Manakit of the 
National Security Council: “…for example, the Third Army area has 17 governors, 
and its military commander could call all 17 together and get things done.  All army 
areas operated like this.  [CSOC] was clever enough to set up area offices.  The 
governors participated in this system via the MoI [Ministry of Interior], a civilian run 
agency.  But they were all under the Army Area Commanders.”326  Governors, 
however, had both military and police advisors on staff to aid them with security 
issues and civilians to assist them with development programs.327 
 
CSOC had under it five Joint Security Centers (JSCs) at the regional level that 
fused and analyzed intelligence from all Thai intelligence agencies – the joint 
aspect of the JSCs – to feed CSOC planning.328  While the JSCs relied on multiple 
agencies for collection, CSOC did have a special collection and analysis 
intelligence team headed by Somchai Rakwijit.  He sent operatives into rural areas 
undercover to collect information on the state of the at-risk population and their 
susceptibility to the CPT.  They moreover sought information on the capabilities 
and intentions of the CPT.329 
 
At the provincial level under the governors and were the provincial CPMs.  They 
were permanent organs that coordinated CPM actions at district and village levels.  
Under these were temporary units called Communist Suppression Committees 
(CSCs).330 
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CSOC’s troops and police came from existing military and police units.331  If, for 
example, CSOC needed a battalion-sized formation to operate in Issan, it drew 
them from the Second Army because Issan was the Second Army’s AOR.  
Drawing from the police worked similarly.  Civilians in CPM came from two 
sources: government civilians who were expert in niche areas such as from the 
Ministry of Agriculture or Education, from local government bodies such as the 
Department of Local Administration (DoLA), and from the at-risk population itself. 
 
 
The CSOC-CPM Process 
 
CSOC and its CPM units approached villages in a methodical manner.  The village 
was the heart of Thailand’s social structure and the CPT’s chosen battleground.  
“The question of the security and development of the village, therefore, is at the 
heart of any government campaign to defeat the insurgency,” said General 
Saiyud.332 
 
CSOC researched the anthropology of villages and identified five key leaders it 
had to coordinate with.  If it won these trust of these people, then in theory, it could 
win the trust of villages.  They were:333 
 
1. The village headman (phuyai baan): the most popular and respected 
man in village, elected by popular vote. The headman’s main task was to 
mediate village disputes and provide security. (Kamnans, commonly 
referred to as village heads, were tambon/subdistrict chiefs in charge of 
clusters of villages and were appointed by governors.) 
 
2. The religious layman (makkh-thayok): the link between the village and 
the nearby Buddhist monastery (wat).  He organized religious ceremonies 
for the village. 
 
3. The teacher (khru): the smartest person in the village.  He taught village 
children and helped solve problems.  It was highly respected position. 
 
4. The family doctor (mor prajam baan): the village physician.  He used both 
modern and traditional techniques, the latter of which might include magic 
and herbal remedies. 
 
5. The midwife (mor tam-yae): she supervised childbirth and used both 
traditional and modern methods. 
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Identifying Target Areas 
 
CSOC sent CPM units to areas where it thought the CPT was active or areas 
where it might be active in the future.  This required intelligence on the at-risk 
population, CPT activities, and CPT targeting trends.  Only then could CSOC tell if 
CPT infiltration was approaching or had occurred.  Accordingly, CSOC divided at-
risk areas into five categories and had slightly different COIN plans for each type.  
They were:334 
 
1. External critical areas, the CPT’s initial base of operations 
2. Internal critical areas, the CPT’s projected next base of operations 
3. Border populations, or areas of CPT infiltration 
4. The hill tribe population 
5. Other minority groups the CPT might target 
 
For external critical areas, CSOC used the classic CPM model.  It consisted of a 
village security team (VST) of local villagers set up and trained by the TNP.335  
This was different from pre-1965 village defense forces where village outsiders 
constituted some security units.  CSOC wanted to increase it, and “local boys” 
were more likely to fight harder for their own villages, and their inhabitants were 
more than likely to support them. 
 
The village headman was chief of the village defense force, but the police were its 
tactical commanders on operations.  In case a VST needed support, it could rely 
on a host of forces above it, namely troops from a national local reserve force 
called Komg Asa Raksa Dindaen, or Or Sor for short (“Volunteer Defense Corps,” 
VDC), and the police and the army acting as QRFs stationed on nearby strategic 
ground such as crossroads, rail stations, and towns.336 
 
Many rural villages, especially the hill tribes, did not want too much interaction with 
outsiders.  For this reason, they frequently did not want the RTA camped out in or 
next to their villages.  Additionally, the presence of security forces in or next to a 
village was sure to invite an attack by the CPT.  Therefore, the CPM program 
distanced heavy forces from the at-risk villages just enough for there to be a social 
and threat gap between the two, but not too far to neutralize effective QRF 
response times. 
 
This was the optimum CPM model, which went through several iterations.  By 
1969, there were 57 designated external critical areas, 30 in the northeast, 13 in 
the north, seven in the central region, and seven in the mid south.  This amounted 
to 628 villages, 410 in the northeast, 100 in the north, 46 in the central area, and 
72 in the mid south.337 
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For internal critical areas, the government focused on CPT prevention using 
rudimentary security tactics, intelligence, development, and psyops.  The goal was 
to secure villages before the CPT did.  Much of this involved linking with and 
shoring up the capacity of local provincial and district authorities that who saw the 
threat coming in the early days of the war but felt they had been abandoned by 
Bangkok.338 
 
For border populations, military and police, especially the BPP, established 
relationships with villages along the border with Burma, Laos, and Cambodia to 
monitor and curb CPT infiltration.  The government harnessed locals because of 
their intimate knowledge of border town life, habits, terrain, and border crossing 
routes.339  Their operations consisted of patrolling, surveillance, and ambushes.  
The authorities provided the majority of the kinetic element, and the locals 
provided the intelligence and guide element. 
 
The CSOC plan for the hill tribe populations was more complex.  It had three 
stages: 1) development, 2) security, and 3) rehabilitation of CPT infected villages.  
It was broadly akin to the external critical areas approach but with added political 
and socio-economic features specifically designed to appeal to the hill tribes and 
to shape their behavior to Bangkok’s will on halting ecologically unfriendly slash 
and burn agriculture and the like.340  Since hill tribe terrain was hilly and 
mountainous, Bangkok began using the “oil spot strategy” to secure lowland 
villages and then a “loyal ring strategy” in the hills in attempts to surround higher 
elevations where it could.341 
 
Thai COIN operations did not always follow this model, however.  Early in the war, 
there were RTA units that did development work in the villages.  They camped 
next to villages and helped them harvest rice, make small repairs, and protected 
them. 
 
Jealousy and infighting, however, muted CSOC a mere two years after it began.  
Powerful Army Region Commanders saw CSOC siphon off its troops and 
resources for COIN, so they mobilized against it.  They were moreover worried 
General Saiyud would gain too much power at their expense, and they lobbied 
General Prapass to return suppression operations back to them.  In 1967, he 
relented.342  Former intelligence officer Somchai Rakwijit explains it this way:  “The 
army commanders often think that they know the situation in their area better than 
Bangkok.  And the counterinsurgency force deployed in their area was the force 
under their own command, and they didn’t want outsiders to give detailed 
instructions to them about force deployment.  So, Saiyud, as director of the 
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[CSOC] operational center, was at the time a lieutenant general, and the 
commander of the army areas were also lieutenant generals.  They thought they 
had parity, so far as the level of command was concerned.  They wanted Saiyud to 
give advice only, and they wanted to have detailed operational planning control of 
their own areas. Military Commanders were then, and are now, in fact, very 
jealous of control of the force.”343  Thereafter, CSOC’s organizations structure 
remained the same, but its official mission changed to one of COIN advisory.  The 
war ran on uncoordinated and ineffective.344 
 
The Second Anti-Communist Act of 1969 attempted to better coordinate and 
defined government and military responsibilities for the war.  The act created five 
regions, all called CSOC -1, -2, -3, -4, and -5.  Essentially, the RTA lifted the 
CSOC name and applied it to its new command and control structure.  The regions 
aligned somewhat with the Army regions.  The First, Second, and Third Army 
commanders executed CSOC operations in their respective theaters.  Another 
command called the “Fifth Military Circle” commanded CSOC-4 and -5 in the 
south.  The Fifth Military Circle’s command was called CSOC-4/1, headquartered 
in Songkhla province.  Its commander was supposed to report to the Fifth Military 
Circle but instead reported directly to RTA Headquarters in Bangkok, evidence of 
still more internal backbiting.345 
 
 
ISOC 
 
In the 1970s, CSOC began to receive widespread and harsh public criticism for 
heavy suppression operations.  The criticism likely resulted from the public still 
assuming General Saiyud’s CSOC was still in charge of suppression.  
Furthermore, there were legislators who suspected CSOC supported right wing 
paramilitaries attacking students.346  Additionally, Army and Interior Chief General 
Prapass, with his ties to the ousted autocratic PM Thanom, was a lightening rod 
for criticism, and he was also head of CSOC.  To deflect the onslaught, and on the 
advice of General Saiyud, PM Sanya Dharmasakti on 10 May 1974 changed the 
name of CSOC to ISOC, or the Internal Security Operations Command.  Saiyud 
recalls saying simply: “If nobody likes CSOC as a name, why don’t we change 
it?”347  The name change was a light psyop.  It gave the illusion ISOC was a brand 
new agency.348 
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There were a few changes, however; namely the Development and Self Defense 
Volunteer Program.  In Thai, the program was Asa-samak Pattana lae Pongkan 
ton-eng, or Aw Paw Paw for short.  It began in 1976.  The main thrust of Aw Paw 
Paw was to increase administration, development, and security training at the 
village level to make them more self-sufficient and further advance the ownership 
strategy heralded by past programs.349 
 
The Aw Paw Paw Center co-opted personnel from the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Industry, Health, and Education and coupled them with those from the MoI and the 
military for work on training and development projects in the field.  Ministry 
personnel served the center for three or four years.  All these departments had 
been working on development and suppression in the past, but none were ever 
too coordinated.  Aw Paw Paw sought to correct this.350 
 
The Aw Paw Paw program further extended into the villages via village Aw Paw 
Paw Committees.  Per usual, the village headman ran the committee with two 
deputies.  Under him were six sub committees on government, finance, defense, 
development, education and culture, and health.  Villagers elected the heads of 
the sub committees.351 
 
The program had a positive impact.  “Between 1975 and 1985,” says Saiyud, “a 
total of 6,960 villages across the country were set up along the lines of the APP 
program.”  A little over half those were set up between 1975 and 1981.  In the end, 
the APP program covered 52 of Thailand’s then 73 provinces.352 
 
In 1983, the government revamped ISOC via PM Order No. 83/2526 and gave it 
more power.  It said ISOC’s mission was: 
 
1. To command and control the government agencies, civilian-police-
military forces, paramilitary forces and all citizen volunteers in joint 
operations to win over communism. 
 
2. To direct, supervise, monitor and implement the campaign to win 
over communism in accordance with the orders Nos. 66/2523 and 
65/2525. 
 
3. To coordinate with other government al agencies in order to win over 
communism.353 
 
Finally, the government had once again centralized total COIN coordination in 
ISOC from when it sidelined CSOC in 1967.  ISOC took control of COIN via 
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regional ISOC offices and the Army Regional Commanders contributed to CPM 
operations as ordered.354 
 
* * * 
 
In summary, while Thailand certainly created the environment for a communist 
revolution, the CPT was largely a Chinese-North Vietnamese concoction.  
These two powers surreptitiously inserted it into Thailand where it eventually 
threatened to topple the government by force of arms and a prolific political and 
psychological campaign.  Thailand’s initial strategy was good enough to slow, 
but not defeat, the CPT.  Victory demanded sweeping political efforts the 
government was not interested in carrying out until the insightful Kriangsak 
government took over by coup in 1977 – a time when the CPT was close to 
victory and the Vietnamese Army was threatening invasion.  At about the same 
time, Generals Prem, Harn, and their COIN-minded camp began to inundate the 
upper levels of the government and military and revamp the national COIN 
strategy to apply the three pillars while heralding the population as the prize to 
win. Killing the enemy came second. 
 
Coordination, perfect on paper from the beginning of the war but soiled by 
obstinate generals in the field, also improved.  Prem demanded a whole of 
government effort to defeat the CPT and an organization to guide it all.  That 
organization was the longstanding but largely impotent CSOC/ISOC.  Under 
Prem, ISOC gained Mammoth power and successfully guided the war to a 
close. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Three Pillars of COIN Against the CPT 
 
 
This chapter addresses Kilcullen’s “three pillars of COIN” component of the COIN 
Pantheon with regard to fighting the communist insurgency from 1965-85.  The 
first section addresses security measures the Thai took to halt CPT violence.  The 
second section addresses political measures the Thai took to assuage the CPT’s 
political angst, and the third section covers the economic measures the Thai took 
to alleviate the at-risk population’s poor economic plight. 
 
 
1. Thai COIN Security Measures 
 
The Royal Thai Military, all the government’s intelligence services, the TNP, and 
local forces comprised Thailand’s security element for fighting the CPT.  Under the 
most ideal circumstances they all worked together, complementing each other’s 
strengths and shoring up each others weaknesses.  Local forces, the police that 
trained and led them (and in some cases the military), and their military support 
was specifically designed to function as an interdependent command structure.  
When they did not cooperate, COIN not surprisingly was less effective. 
 
Military units active in COIN were the RTA, Royal Thai Navy (RTN) and its Royal 
Thai Marines (RTM), and Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF).  The RTA played the 
dominant role.  The RTAF, with its tactical air support operations, was second in 
the military pecking order, and the RTN and RTM were third.  They had small 
roles, the RTN conducting river and littoral patrols and the RTM inserting infantry 
forces where needed. 
 
The COIN missions of Thailand’s security forces were 1) destruction of CPT 
forces, 2) separation of the CPT from the people, 3) protection of the people, and 
4) population control.  Protection from the CPT was the ultimate security goal as 
Thailand’s COIN matured.  In the beginning, however, it was simply the 
destruction of the CPT. 
 
 
The RTA 
 
The RTA used the basic triangular military structure of armies, divisions, 
regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads.  Each Army Regional 
Command, led by a lieutenant general, had under it an infantry division and two 
“military circles.”  Military circles were sections of Army Regional Commands led 
by major generals.  For example, under the First Army Command were the 1st 
Infantry Division, the First Military Circle, and the Second Military Circle.  Along 
with the First, Second, and Third Armies and the Fifth Military Circle – unique to 
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the south – was a Cavalry Division, and Special Forces (SF).  In 1967, the RTA 
had 141,756 personnel, half of whom were volunteers, and half were conscripts.355 
 
A U.S. advisor’s analysis of RTA operations in the first four years of the war said 
bands of 20-30 CPT easily avoided RTA patrols.  The problem was that there were 
not enough men to patrol and control the countryside.  The RTA was using two 
infantry battalions to control 150 square miles.  Small-scale operations were 
inadequate.  They did not maintain correct pressure on the CPT.356  U.S. advisors 
say they needed 13 battalions to control an area this large in absence of more 
local forces and police; nine battalions for saturation patrolling and security, and 
four for strike and QRF.  Second Army’s commanding general had requested 10 
more battalions in 1968.  RTA operations were of average quality in the early 
years, but later on they improved, especially in the Second Army area of 
responsibility, beginning in 1968.357 
 
Their ability to adopt COIN lessons did, too.  The Second Army forward staff and 
commanding officer in 1968 was thoughtful, intelligent, and had taken steps to win 
the population by treating them fairly, aiding them with development projects and 
restricting artillery and air strikes to confirmed CPT formations only.  U.S. advisors 
reported the morale of Second Army at the time was high, and it had a zeal for 
winning.358 
 
In the north, the RTA had mostly halted its indiscriminate artillery and air strikes by 
1968.  The Third Army had indoctrinated its troops to be respectful and 
considerate of locals, and it improved the RTA’s image.  This resulted in fewer 
CPT recruits and more intelligence on CPT activities from locals.359  These were 
the first improvements in Third Army performance since 1965.360  And more 
vigorous patrols led to more contact with the CPT.361  For example, in a five-month 
period in 1968, there were 81 CPT-government clashes.  The CPT initiated only 
five.  These fights resulted in 56 CPT killed, two RTA killed, 342 prisoners of war, 
and 286 surrendered CPT.362 
 
RTA SF played a significant role in the war in all three army missions, but mostly 
in Direct Action (DA) roles – ambushes, raids, and QRF duty.”363  Harn says SF 
frequently recruited local men such as hunters as guides and translators as they 
negotiated the countryside.  Harn and his men did not speak Issan.  While the 
different Army Regional Commanders mostly recruited men from the areas they 
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operated in, SF was different.  They came from all over Thailand and deployed all 
over Thailand.364 
 
Says a former CPT armed propaganda cadre: “What was the thing that put the 
most pressure on us?  The Army Special Forces.  They used the small unit tactics 
and were very good.  Like on patrol or walking thought the jungle.  We always 
worried about being ambushed.  And when they started shooting, it was very 
heavy.  You could not do anything.”365 
 
Many Thai COIN operations were joint and combined operations.  Operation 
Bunnam was one such operation.  It ran from 10 April - 27 May 1966 in the in the 
Sakon Nakhon-Udorn border area.  It included TNP, a Mobile Reserve Platoon of 
the BPP, the VDC, elements of the 1st Battalion of the 3d Regimental Combat 
Team (RCT), and one company of the 13th RCT from Udorn.  The RTAF provided 
air support with five helicopters, and the U.S. Air Force aided with six.  U.S. 
analysts wrote that through six large clashes, Thai forces captured 44 CPT 
suspects and killed four.  Twenty-three surrendered.366  A similar operation that 
entailed a four-day sweep of Sahat Sakhan district, Kalasin province, found 
evidence of CPT camps but made no enemy contact to speak of.367 
 
 
The Thai National Police 
 
The TNP’s main COIN forces consisted of the Provincial Police, which were 
regular police forces, the BPP, which were light infantry and SWAT combined, and 
Special Branch.  The force was about 40,000 strong in the 1960s.  The TNP had 
three missions during the communist COIN: law enforcement, maintaining law and 
order, and criminal investigation.  At that time, it was under the Ministry of Interior.  
The government used the TNP as its main suppression tool against the CPT until 
open warfare broke out in 1965.  At that time, the military took control of the 
conflict and the police fell under its command.  The police, however, were an 
integral part of COIN operations and received COIN training throughout the war.368 
 
Before the communist COIN, the TNP mostly worked at the district level, but the 
insurgency forced the police to operate at the village level, which changed the way 
the police trained, deployed, and operated.  For example, the war caused the TNP 
to begin to build a target of 1,150 tambon police stations in CPT affected areas.  
The goal was to have 20 police at each station.  In 1976, however, the police 
recruited only 1,300 recruits, not nearly enough manpower to fulfill the new 
scheme, so they staffed the new stations with two to three police and augmented 
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them with the VDC.369  It was a flexible system; in the face of personnel shortages, 
the Thai government could reach into its vast arsenal of local forces.  The main 
drawback, however, was theses forces were not trained as well as active duty 
units. 
 
Because they were scattered throughout the countryside and their job was law and 
order, the police were usually the first to respond to CPT incidents, so they took on 
a SWAT-type role.  And because of the CPM program and its swath of local and 
military forces, the police could usually tap support units to bolster its numbers in 
high threat situations.  For the same reason – their close proximity to the people – 
the TNP was ideally placed to collect intelligence on CPT activities.370 
 
For population control, the TNP conducted spot checks of villagers for evidence of 
CPT membership and support activities.  All Thai citizens of 18 years of age were 
at the time required to have ID cards, and TNP could note their names for 
suspicious activities when necessary, which might have spurred an investigation, 
possibly by Special Branch.  The TNP also set up road checkpoints and searched 
vehicles for evidence of the same and/or illegal smuggling.  Finally, the TNP 
networked with food sellers to provide information on large acquisitions that might 
be destined for CPT units.371 
 
Unfortunately, the TNP suffered from a bad reputation.  Corruption, in part a 
consequence of low pay, was rampant in the TNP, and this maligned the people, 
the ultimate prize in COIN.  The U.S., in its COIN support for Thailand, 
recommended a series of measures to improve the police reputation in 1965, 
which included mass public relations campaigns, radio programs, and mobile 
exhibits.  These measures worked in some cases, and the police units that worked 
with CPM at the village level were generally good.  In 1965, the Director General 
of the Police relieved several corrupt officers in Region 4 after the military 
commander of an MDU complained about them.  These type measures were 
critical to effectively coordinate and execute COIN and show the people the 
government meant well.  Police reputation and its effectiveness increased 
dramatically as the war marched on, but it did not last.372  It seems while the 
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country was on the brink of a communist takeover, the TNP was well motivated to 
perform.  At the end of the war, it went back to its standard operating procedures.  
 
Special Branch was a pivotal tool in the communist COIN.  As part of the Central 
Investigation Bureau, its mission was to collect intelligence on subversive activities 
and counter them.  The government extended Special Branch’s reach to the 
village level in 1963 with the Special Branch’s 7th Division.  U.S. advisors helped 
spur this expansion.  In 1968, there were 33 Special Branch offices throughout 
Thailand, all working on communist COIN operations.  Aside from collecting its 
own intelligence, Special Branch also received information from the PP and BPP 
via JSCs.  It also used intelligence from interrogations of captured CPT personnel 
and their auxiliary support.  Special Branch interviewed prisoners at one of two 
Interrogation Centers founded in 1966 – one in Bangkok, and the other in 
Udorn.373 
 
Special Branch was successful early in the war.  In September 1967 in the 
northeast, it planned and executed a mass arrest of CPT leadership, which also 
resulted in the shutting down of a communist financial network.  The operation 
resulted in highly effective intelligence on the CPT and its activities that increased 
the government’s understanding of insurgent capabilities and intentions.374  
Operations such as this were sensitive, complex, and time consuming because 
they illuminated, day-by-day, week-by-week, and month-by-month, the inner 
workings of CPT cells.  Some such operations took years.  They usually entailed 
one of two types: 1) clandestinely infiltrating agents into the CPT or auxiliary force, 
or 2) silently identifying CPT or auxiliary personnel and then recruiting them as 
informants.  Only when scores of agents had been placed and/or informants 
recruited, and only after their information had been confirmed and processed, 
would Special Branch make arrests. 
 
 
Local Forces 
 
Thailand had a dizzying array of local forces during the communist COIN.  More, 
many old local force program names carried on and overlapped new local force 
program names.  The Thai government was a firm believer in recruiting, training, 
and arming the population to protect itself and also to politically solidify the 
population in the government’s camp.  The security part of the equation was 
obvious.  The political theory was subtler, on paper, at least; once you pick up a 
rifle and join a side, you take a political stand as well.  Mao called it “mobilization 
of the masses.”  Bangkok turned it around on the CPT, calling it the exact same 
thing – co-opting the population via “major mass organization.”  Thailand’s local 
COIN forces totalled over 1.2 million during the war.375  After the war ended, they 
roughly doubled in size to 2,226,000 as part of a follow though program to insure 
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the CPT stayed gone.376  The Thai went through scores of different types of local 
forces through the war and learned the hard way more training and higher pay 
meant more effective local troops.  Different types of local forces included:377 
 
1. Or Sor (VDC), a standing reserve militia developed in the 1950s 
2. Self Defense Volunteer (SDV) program, a 1976 founded aspect of the Aw 
Paw Paw program 
3. Thahan Phran, (“Rangers”) an RTA controlled counter-guerrilla force 
 
The Or Sor began as a reserve paramilitary force run by the Ministry of Interior on 
10 February 1954.378  The CIA sponsored it in the 1950s along with the BPP.379  In 
1968, there were 3,000 VDC.380  It was a security force the Interior Ministry could 
tap for a wide array of security projects.  For COIN, particularly under the 09/10 
Plan, the government used the Or Sor for Joint Security Teams (JSTs).  JSTs 
were lead by two or three police or military personnel and a squad-sized element 
of VDC – nine to 12 men.  Their mission was to prevent CPT incursion into 
villages, and they deployed in CPT prone areas only.  In theory, as the villages 
were cut off from the CPT, military and CPM offensives would break up CPT units.  
VDC troops also filled the ranks of myriad village security programs such as 
Village Protection Units (VPUs).381 
 
 
Self Defense Volunteers 
 
In 1976, ISOC implemented the Aw Paw Paw program, of which the SDVs were a 
part.  SDVs represented the ideal village security force as they took lessons from 
past local forces that had mixed track records such as the VPUs.  Ad hoc units 
faired poorly against the CPT.  Well trained and paid units kept communists out of 
the villages.382 
 
Says General Prem:  
This Self-defense Volunteers Program was later to become the thrust 
of our counter-insurgency campaign in that it served as the 
organizational framework for dialogue and interaction with the villagers 
at grassroots level.  The Program took on life from an initiative of a 
local District Officer whose commitment to his work was total.  He went 
around recruiting local teachers, village leaders or just acquaintances, 
engaging them in discussion on how best to organize and train self-
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defense volunteers to resist the CPT.  We simply amplified on his 
initiative and extended it cover all other villages.383 
As the government proselytized, the program expanded.  “Volunteers began to 
trickle in and we also started to learn who our friends were,” says General Prem.   
Even if there were CPT infiltrators among the volunteers, we would at 
least be able to keep an eye on them, to monitor their movements.  We 
would know where they were and what they did at various times of the 
day and night.  Some would vanish into the jungle at night and return to 
the village in the morning.  In truth, the villagers themselves already 
knew who these so-called “jungle people” were.  It was a question 
gaining their trust and confidence before they were prepared to tell us 
what they knew.384 
While local forces were critical to the success of Thailand’s communist COIN – 
and every COIN, for that matter – they were not without their problems.  Poorly 
motivated and trained fighters did not perform.  Not applying a uniform force to all 
CPM programs had a negative impact, too.  It took 10 years for Bangkok to 
develop a central local force for CPM operations.  Fractured forces moreover 
contributed to inter-service rivalries between the police, MoI civilians, and the 
military.  The TNP, for example, did not like local forces the Army sponsored, so it 
was less likely to support them.  Local forces did not do well when the police and 
military did most of the work, and they got killed when the security forces did not 
back them up. Finding the right balance was difficult, but vital.385 
 
 
Thahan Phran 
 
Marks writes the Thahan Phran had its origins in three issues: 1) the CPM concept 
of mass mobilization against the CPT, 2) the fact that large formations of active 
duty military were called to defend the Thai-Cambodian border where Vietnamese 
forces were poised for invasion, and 3) the idea of fielding a guerrilla force that 
could “out guerrilla the guerrilla.”386 
 
General Chavalit established the Thahan Phran in 1978.  Recruits, writes 
Desmond Ball, were 18-39 years old and ideally from the areas where they would 
deploy to fight the CPT.387  Basic training was 45 days.  Training included light 
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infantry tactics and instruction in modern weaponry.388  Thahan Phran’s motto is 
“Nation, Religion, King, and Citizens,” an adaptation of the national motto 
developed by Rama VI, especially that of the military, that hails “Nation, Religion, 
King.”389 
 
Says John Cole (USA SF RET), former U.S. defense attaché to Thailand during 
the communist COIN: “The Thahan Phran were formed into companies only, no 
battalions or regiments, but there could be as many as six to eight companies in 
one grouping, all run by an active duty army colonel.”390  Initially, SF 
noncommissioned and commissioned officers commanded Thahan Phran units.  
Later, regular RTA officers did.  Regiments of Thahan Phran would form later in 
the war, however.  In 1981, the Than Phran had reached a strength of 13,000 
divided into 160 companies, which, points out Ball, was a bigger force than the 
CPT’s then strength of 12,500 fighters.391 
 
The operational concept behind the Thahan Phran was to deploy in communist 
infested areas from where they came, collect intelligence on CPT personnel and 
activities, and then act on that intelligence by killing and/or capturing CPT 
members.  They sometimes engaged in hunter-killer operations, as did small units 
of the RTA.  In this regard, the government acted as the CPT did when it 
assassinated governors and village heads that were blocking its political and 
military initiatives. 
 
Says Deny Lane, a former U.S. defense attaché to Thailand during the communist 
COIN: “The Thai deployed Thahan Phran deep into communist insurgent areas 
more than regulars.  It was an irregular war, so it needed irregular forces.  
Additionally, if an RTA trooper got killed in a village, he was just a nameless 
trooper to many.  But if it was a Thahan Phran, then it was likely a local boy, and it 
created all sorts of problems, like blood feuds.”392 
 
 
Border Security 
 
Border security was a major aspect of Thailand’s communist COIN.  On the 
borders with Burma and Laos, the Thai used BPP and military units to patrol, 
reconnoiter, and interdict CPT activities.  They had bases and posts in strategic 
terrain from where they would fan out on their missions.  It was the same on the 
Cambodian border until the Vietnamese massed there in 1979, forcing Bangkok to 
man the border with conventional forces as a blocking force. 
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Bilateral security between Malaysia and Thailand increased as threats gathered 
there, which included the CPT, the Malaysian Communist Terrorist Organization 
(CTO), and Malay Muslim insurgent groups.  The CTO was the Malaysian 
government name for the Communist Party of Malaysia’s guerrilla army.  To 
achieve border security, Thailand and Malaysia signed an accord creating the 
General Border Committee (GBC) on 13 March 1965.  It established a bilateral 
working group that spelled out the duties of the group, intelligence coordination, 
the message of psychological operations (which had to be unified), and types of 
kinetic operations that would help seal the border and also reduce CTO forces.  
GBC membership included senior defense, interior, military, and police officials.393  
GBC operations were not continual from 1965 on, however.  They happened in 
spurts for durations up to a year or more, but there were also gaps after big 
operations that netted and/or killed insurgents.  This reduced the GBC’s 
effectiveness. 
 
The GBC carried out three types of military border operations.  The first were 
combined operations, or Thai-Malay forces working together as a single TF to fix 
and destroy CTO forces.  The second type was coordination operations, which 
entailed Thai and Malay forces deploying on their own sides of the border at the 
same time with the same mission objective, and if they overlapped the other’s 
border, they had to report it.  The third type was unilateral operations where the 
Thai and Malaysians operated on their own within their respective borders with no 
coordination with the other force.  All border operations ranged from the small 
squad patrol to larger deployments complete with armored cars, artillery, and air 
support.  A joint intelligence center in Songkhla supported them.394 
 
Border operations were not simply static security missions or beating the bush to 
flush out the enemy.  There was a method the Thai and Malay used, which 
included harnessing intelligence every step of the way.  “Intelligence was very 
important for this type of mission,” says Ahmed.  “Border operations used HUMINT 
[human intelligence], too.”  Intelligence “drove” operations, as they say in the U.S. 
Army – it dictated where, what type, and how many forces would deploy in a given 
area and what type of operation they would conduct.395 
 
Regarding the static security of the border, the Thai and Malaysians left no stone 
unturned when both sides committed to the mission.  “We manned the whole 
border, every couple of hundred meters,” says Ahmed Ghazi, a retired Malaysian 
Army Colonel who used to work on the border as a young lieutenant.  “The mines 
on the border we called the Naga Belt, or ‘dragon belt.’  We used antipersonnel 
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mines.  They were homemade devices.”396  The Malaysians got the idea to use 
mines from the CTO themselves.  Says Colonel Ghazi: “The communist made 
homemade mines out of fertilizer as the explosive compound, tin cans as the 
casing, and nails and other metals as shrapnel.  They used torch light [flashlight] 
batteries as a power source, and they did not last long as a result.  They wrapped 
these devices in tarpaper to make them waterproof, but this device lasted only a 
few months.”397  The Malay military made the same mines, but with commercial 
grade explosives.  Says Ghazi: “We deployed them the same way they did, but 
against the CTs [communist terrorists].  We copied their techniques.”398 
 
 
Intelligence 
 
The key tasks of the Thai Government’s intelligence during the communist COIN 
were two: 1) to identify the CPT’s infrastructure, namely its personnel, and 2) to 
disseminate to paramilitary and military forces precise intelligence that would 
facilitate contact the CPT on favorable government terms.399  There were four 
main Thai intelligence entities in the fight against the CPT.  They were 1) Division 
7 of Special Branch, 2) the TNP, 3), the RTA, and Department of Central 
Intelligence (DCI, later called the NIA).400 
 
To coordinate intelligence collection, collation, processing/analysis, and 
dissemination, the government established Joint Security Centers (JSCs) under 
the CSOC structure.  Special Branch managed the JSCs, but military, police, and 
civilians also staffed them.  JSCs existed at regional levels where needed.  The far 
south had a unique intelligence coordination center, the Combined Intelligence 
Headquarters, staffed by both Malaysian and Thai government personnel. 
 
JSC intelligence flow collected intelligence from CPM teams, police, and Special 
Branch in the villages, then pooled it at the regional JSCs, and then disseminated 
it to the military, provincial CPMs, and CSOC’s JSC.  All these entities used the 
intelligence for operations planning.  The first head of intelligence at CSOC was a 
TNP lieutenant general, but that changed as the organization became more RTA-
centric.401 
 
The Army and its organic G-2 section was also active in the communist COIN.  In 
the early 1960s, however, the Army’s G-2 had but seven staff officers and six field 
intelligence “D Teams.”  D Teams had 12 men each.  Among other things, they 
processed prisoners and captured CPT documents, and they debriefed defectors.  
Army intelligence moreover included photo interpretation, interrogation, and 
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polygraph sections.  The Armed Forces Security Center and the Joint Intelligence 
Agency under the MoD had minor roles in COIN intelligence and were not part of 
the every day intelligence machinery.402 
 
The DCI, perhaps the most secretive Thai intelligence agency, began as the 
Government Affairs Collation Department in 1954.  It changed its name a few 
years later to the DCI.  It was Thailand’s main intelligence and counterintelligence 
agency, and it coordinated all other intelligence agencies.  The National 
Intelligence Act of 1985 changed the DCI internally and also changed its name to 
the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) the same year.  Throughout its history, the 
organization’s four main missions have been foreign intelligence, domestic 
intelligence and security, signal intelligence, and protective security. 
 
Sources of information for all intelligence entities included village heads, teachers, 
development workers, and rank-and-file rural people.  The village defense teams, 
however, were plugged into the heart of the village and proved invaluable sources 
of information.  They were lifetime members of the villages, as were their families 
and friends.  They were, in effect, a de facto informant network the government 
simply laid the village defense force scheme on top of.  These people had access 
to village gossip and internal affairs that police and other agencies could not 
access because, as a CIA report describes, they were “outsiders.”403 
 
While most government intelligence units stumbled to find their way early in the 
war, Somchai Rakwijit’s group was effective from the very beginning.  He 
advocated from the start for a greater emphasis on intelligence, not just to 
ascertain the CPT’s capabilities and intentions, but also to find out the intentions 
and living situation of the at-risk population.  Says Somchai of the standing 
intelligence entities: “They were very much concerned about the communist 
planning, military planning, and their previous actions of how they took control of 
certain areas, but they didn’t give much thought to trying to understand the 
communist propaganda appeals, how they infiltrated the villages, and the 
indoctrination of the villagers.”404 
 
Somchai lobbied Field Marshal Prapass to set up the organization in 1965.  It 
lasted until 1983.  “I think it was quite effective,” says Somchai.405  His unit 
received U.S. funding for the first two and a half years.  Afterward, the Thai 
government provided financing.  He went on the first several missions himself by 
wandering into villages alone, which was extremely risky.  Once accepted, he lived 
there for six months.  He collected information on the villagers’ lives, what they did, 
what their political beliefs were, why they might or might not link with the 
insurgents, what their attitudes toward communism were, etc. “We were more 
interested in these things,” says Somchai, “understanding their ideological appeal 
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and [the CPT] approach to the people, the way they were organized, and how they 
indoctrinated, and how they motivated the people to fight for their cause.”406  
Somchai’s cover was a book author covering village life in rural Thailand.  His 
preparatory studies told him villagers wanted outsiders to know about their lives, 
so he adopted an approach that fit their desires.407 
 
Toward the late 1970s, the government had achieved intelligence domination.  
Military intelligence had improved, and the RTA had a clearer idea of where the 
CPT was based, what its capabilities were, and its month-to-month intentions.  
This strengthened government decisions making, situational awareness, and 
operational effectiveness.  Bhumarat says: “We got tired of arresting these people.  
We’d identify them, and then I’d talk to them instead of arresting them.  I would go 
to them and say: ‘I know you are waiting for your contact to meet you, but he’s not 
going to make it.  We captured him earlier.  But I’m not going to arrest you; let’s 
talk.’  We’d try to convince them: ‘work with us; you must realize what is right and 
what is wrong’.”408  It hastened the destruction of CPT forces in the field.409 
 
 
2. Political COIN Measures 
 
Politics played a major role in Thailand’s communist COIN.  In fact, it played the 
central role, but it did not happen at the beginning.  It took the government from 
1965 until the mid to late 1970s to develop a winning political COIN formula.  
Overall, Thailand used six political tools to fight the CPT: psyops, military Civil 
Affairs (CA), democratic reform, the Village Scout program, amnesty, and 
diplomacy.410 
 
 
Psyops 
 
The Thai government was at first resistant to using psyops and educational 
programs in the beginning of the war, primarily because it did not widely 
understand the CPT and how to best counter it.  In the beginning of the war, the 
RTA had but a single psyops company, and by 1969 had plans for two such 
battalions in the post-1970 period.411  Upon gaining a deeper understanding of the 
CPT and its methods, and with American urging, the government eventually used 
psyops at every turn, and it became a mainstay of Thai COIN from then on.412 
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The government must have realized in 1969, however, the critical nature of psyops 
in COIN.  This is evident because of the preeminence of psyops in the 110/2512 
Plan.  In it, General Harn Pongsithanonda said: “In the prevention and suppression 
(of communism), political measures and psychological operations and public 
relations are to be used principally.”413 
 
The purpose of psyops was two-fold: 1) to weaken and demoralize the CPT, and 
2) to sway the population away from the CPT to the government’s side.  CSOC 
had the most active psyop program.  Other organizations carrying out psyops 
included the National Information Psychological Operations Organization (NIPSO), 
the Public Relations Department, the Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) 
program, the Community Development Department, the TNP, and psyops units 
organic to the RTA.414 
 
CSOC first communist psyops operations were done using leaflets and radio 
where most Thai got their news.  Almost 90 percent of homes in Thailand had 
radios during the war, and nearly 70 percent of rural homes had them.  They were 
a powerful form of media, especially before the proliferation of television.415 
 
As the war progressed, CSOC formed two psyops teams:  Modular Audio-Visual 
Units (MAVUs) and Mobile Information Service Teams (MISTs).  Army psyops 
teams formed and led the MAVUs in CPM target areas and were an integral part 
of harnessing civilians in the fight against the CPT.  The MoI ran the MISTs 
through the governors and subordinate civilian administrators.416 
 
MAVUs and MISTs went from village to village, preaching the perils of communism 
and the merits of the government, how Bangkok’s governance was improving, and 
how it wanted to better the lives of the people.  They coordinated their visits with 
village headmen, usually the village radio owner and main source of information 
on the outside world for the people.  MAVUs and MISTs gave lectures, passed out 
literature, and showed movies, which was novel to many in the countryside who 
had never seen such technology.  Some of the lectures featured surrendered CPT, 
and as post 1975, bedraggled refugees chased out of Cambodia by the KR.  
These type meetings offered villagers an alternative and scary version of 
communism compared the saintly and just version provided by the CPT. 
 
Aside from CSOC, the Second Army’s Village Voice psyops teams had success 
with their lectures, movies, and pamphlets in combination with passing out 
medicine.  In the south, the military used the same concept but called the teams 
Santi Nimit (“Peace Teams.”)  Fielded in 1980, they consisted of 12-15 people, 
three or four of who were armed RTA psyops personnel.  They supervised the 
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rest; paid volunteers, including women, who went from village to village distributing 
psyops and PR via entertainment, songs, and skits.417  
 
Another successful psyop program was Santi Suk (“Peace and Happiness”).  An 
MoI program, it used village informants to identify CPT members inside the village.  
Once identified, the government would re-educate these people.  Re-education 
included taking the captured personnel on tours of towns to prove CPT 
indoctrination wrong.  Once re-educated, the government re-inserted these 
persons back into their villages to get them to convince other CPT to surrender.418 
 
 
Civil Affairs 
 
Though CA entails both political and economic operations to meet its goal of 
gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the people, it is categorized simply as a political 
means.  For Thailand’s communist COIN, CA meant military and civilian personnel 
working together to provide better governance, development, and training to 
improve the lives of the people.  In effect, Bangkok had to nation-build in areas it 
had neglected for decades.  General Saiyud described swaths of the country as, 
“…a village environment totally lacking in self government.”419 
 
According to the CIA, “The Civil Affairs section of CSOC was charged with 
coordinating the activities of the ministries, departments, and bureaus concerned 
with administration, development, public relations, education, local security, and 
other civil matters.”420  Early on, CSOC had difficulty coordinating all the CA-
related government agencies to focus their energies in the field because it had to 
reach out to the so many ministries such as Education, Agriculture, and Interior, 
for example, and persuade them to cooperate in a COIN mission.  Unfortunately, 
they did not, which ran counter to the core of the 09/10 Plan.  General Prapass, as 
deputy PM, then ordered the DoLA – a provincial administrative organ of the MoI – 
along with staff from the Ministries of Education, National Development, 
Agriculture, and Interior to set up offices in the CA section at CSOC.  Afterward, 
CSOC’s CA guided all these agencies plus the governors in all CA related 
activities.421 
 
When Prem took over as prime minister, he brought using politics as the main 
weapon of COIN to the RTA, which Somchai Rakwijit translated into the army’s 
first ever Directorate of CA in January 1982.  The Thai called it the “J-5,” which in 
U.S. military nomenclature means Plans and Policy and includes liaison with 
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foreign forces.422  The Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army’s CA unit was also 
commander of ISOC’s CA center.423  From then on, ISOC and RTA CA were, in 
effect, the same. 
 
The mission of CA from then on was not merely coordinating development; it 
entailed a combination of development, psyops – to include educational seminars 
all over the country on democracy, how the government was waging COIN, what 
the government was doing for the people, and what the people could do for the 
country.  CA was also responsible for removing corrupt officials from the field.  
Saiyud thought it more important than development programs:  “I am thus 
convinced that despite the prodigious sums of money being allocated for economic 
development, political stability is only likely to come about when people are 
assured that social injustices are being corrected.”424  CA moreover took the job of 
organizing and coordinating most local forces.  This was one of the biggest COIN 
portfolios in the government.  Training government personnel and even 
businessmen on democratic ideals became a CA task under Prem, too.425 
 
 
The Village Scouts 
 
BPP Major General Somkhuan Harikul founded the Village Scout program in 1970.  
The Thai name for the scouts was Luk Sua Chaoban, or “Village Tiger Cubs.”  The 
purpose of the program was three fold: 1) to provide intelligence on CPT infiltration 
of villages, 2) to build citizenship consensus throughout Thailand to mend internal 
division, and 3) to build a political movement counter to the CPT.426 
 
General Somkhuan developed the idea after his troops suffering badly from a 17-
day CPT offensive against the BPP in December 1968 in Loei province.  He 
realized Thailand had descended into civil war, and he sought a political solution.  
Since he was also a major proponent of the Boy Scouts and had served in its 
leadership, he thought a similar program might help curb the insurgency.  More, 
the BPP promoted the Boy Scout program wherever it deployed, so creating an 
anti-communist scouting movement for the whole population was well within its 
expertise.427 
 
The Village Scouts began in select villages as three-person cells.  From there, 
they proselytized the values of the organization and recruited more members.  
This was one of the tactics the CPT used to infiltrate and take over villages with 
communist rhetoric.  Adult men and women joined the Scouts, and bylaws 
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required a man and a woman head each group as either president or vice 
president.428  They took classes on citizenship, Thai history, personal 
responsibility, and held campfire style banquets to codify the organization’s unity.  
The Village Scouts’ royal association gave it high prestige.  His Majesty the King 
ordained the scarves the Scouts wore, which many saw as nearly sacred.429  The 
end results were a five million strong, pro-government, pro-Thai Royal Family 
movement that was vehemently anti-communist.430 
 
The Village Scouts effectively blocked the CPT from recruiting a fifth of Thailand’s 
adult population.  And these people influenced others against the CPT as well.  As 
a political blocking force against the CPT, the Village Scouts was a brilliant idea.  
Says Bhumarat, “At that time, the Village Scouts worked very well because people 
could see the threat to our national security, and they played the role of bringing 
people from the communist side to the government.  And they did psyops, too.  
And they were a force to support the monarchy.”431 
 
 
Amnesty 
 
Amnesty began under CSOC in the 1960s as the National Open Arms and 
Rehabilitation Program.  It took in surrendered and captured CPT, re-educated 
them, and put them in job programs to integrate them back into society.432  As the 
government took a more political tact with the communist COIN in the late 1970s, 
it called its rehabilitation program Karunthep and referred to ex-CPT as 
“Cooperators in National Development.”  The government gave them housing 
assistance and land in some cases.433  Says Denny Lane, “The government also 
gave land to surrendering CPT, much to the chagrin of many army personnel who 
were promised land and did not receive it.   So for the communist, it was a good 
program.”434  The government also co-opted many surrendering communists into 
running NGO projects.435 
 
The concept of offering amnesty to enemies was in part rooted in the Thai belief 
system.  Jeffrey Race says, “It boils down to religion, which is a basic building 
block of any society.  It dictates what is wrong, what is right, what is to be 
rewarded, and what is to be punished.”436  Theravada Buddhism was the core 
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belief system of the Thai, and it was one of the themes that made amnesty 
possible.  Lane adds, “This is unique.  It had to do with the Buddhist idea of 
detachment, compassion, and recognizing the moral capacity of the other 
person.”437  The Thai did not believe they had to kill all their enemies, nor should 
they jail them indefinitely. 
 
The fact that the CPT’s terror operations were few also enabled Bangkok to adopt 
an amnesty policy.  Simply put, says Major General Perapong Manakit of the Thai 
National Security Council, “The CPT did not harm many villagers.”438  Despite 
assassinations of aid workers, governors and other such officials, most CPT 
violence was aimed at Thai government security personnel or local forces and 
their leaders, or “force on force” violence. 
 
A trickle of CPT sought amnesty in the 1960s and mid-1970s, but it increased 
dramatically in the late 1970s and 1980s.  Aside from ushering in a new 
constitution, PM Kriangsak offered blanket amnesty for all students and 
intellectuals who fled to the jungles in 1978, some 3,000 people. 
 
General Prem’s 66/2523 Plan in 1980 increased the impact of the amnesty 
strategy by better publicizing it.  Some 2,000 people surrendered in the first 10 
months of the 1978 amnesty announcement under Kriangsak.  The more the 
government publicized scenes of CPT returning from the field being greeted as 
citizens, the more insurgents surrendered.  The number of amnesty seekers tripled 
in 1979.  High profile CPT amnesty seekers added to the bonanza.  The press had 
a field day when high profile student CPT leader Thirayuth Bunmee who returned 
home after five years in the jungle.  That publicity triggered more surrenders.439  In 
May 1982, 1,500 CPT and their auxiliary surrendered in Loei.  In August, 7,400 hill 
tribesmen and their entire families surrendered.  In December, 216 CPT 
surrendered in Yasothon Loeng.  In January 1983, 422 CPT surrendered in the 
northeast in two provinces, Nakhon Phanom, and Udon Thani.  In November, the 
surrenders continued with 664 CPT coming in, again with their auxiliary support.  
This continued into 1984 and beyond until the CPT had withered as a threat.440 
 
 
Diplomacy 
 
The diplomatic prowess of the Thai is legendary, and the government used it with 
great success in their communist COIN.  The Thai government aimed its main 
diplomatic offensive at halting Chinese support for the CPT by exploiting rift 
between the Beijing and Hanoi.  The diplomatic offensive developed because of a 
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rift occurred between China and Vietnam.  The relationship between Hanoi and 
Beijing fell apart in the late 1960s as Hanoi courted Moscow, Beijing’s enemy at 
the time. 
 
But it was easier said than done.  Bangkok and Beijing did not have diplomatic 
relations at the time, so Thailand used Chinese spies to contact Peking to try to 
open a dialogue. “We had agents, communist agents, inside their movement [the 
CPT],” Bhumarat says.  “See, the Chinese collected intelligence in Thailand by 
recruiting local Chinese businessmen.  The businessmen then sent the information 
to their case officers in Hong Kong, who then sent the information to Beijing.”441  
Thai intelligence had identified scores of these agents, and it decided to use them 
to get their diplomatic request to Beijing. 
 
Once the Thai made their pitch, the Chinese accepted.  Bhumarat describes the 
meeting this way:  “Later, PM Kukrit went to Beijing [June 1975], and Mao treated 
him like he was a son.  Our PM was very smart.  He told the Chinese, ‘we love 
Mao.’  Mao enjoyed talking with him very much.”442  The visit proved fruitful for 
both sides.  Kukrit and Premier Chou En-lai signed a joint communiqué 
announcing diplomatic relations between Bangkok and Peking.  This set the stage 
for future empowerment of Thailand when it would need China’s help the most.443  
While Mao died on 9 September 1976, this was the first of many secret Thai visits 
to China to persuade Beijing of Thailand’s goals. 
 
Thailand increased its diplomatic efforts with China as the situation Southeast Asia 
continued to deteriorate.  Pol Pot’s terrorist expeditions into Vietnam throughout 
1977 triggered Hanoi’s invasion of Cambodia in November 1978.  That, in turn, 
triggered Beijing’s invasion of the northern portion of Vietnam on 17 February 
1979.  Undeterred, Hanoi pressed its attack into Cambodia all the way to the Thai 
border where it massed some 10 battalions.444 
 
The Thai had communications intelligence saying Vietnamese forces kept asking 
Hanoi for permission to invade Thailand.445  As the Vietnamese massed their 
forces on the Thai border, PM Kriangsak, who had assumed power in 1977, 
summoned General Serm Na Nakorn, the Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai 
Armed Forces.  Bhumarat says Kriangsak asked him, “ ‘What shall we do?  If they 
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send troops to Thailand, can we fight them, and how long can we fight’?  Serm told 
the PM, ‘Seven days, sir.’  And he said, ‘Seven days for what?’  And Serm replied, 
‘We can hold them for seven days, and that’s it.’  So the PM said, ‘Pack.  We are 
going to Beijing.  If we can talk to them, they may help us’.”446 
 
Kriangsak went to Beijing in March 1978 and, like Kukrit before him, he made his 
pitch.447  However, following Mao’s death in 1976, the Thai had to deal with a new 
Chinese leader, Hua Guofeng.  Kriangsak’s main request was that Beijing stop 
supporting the CPT.  His secondary request was that China maintain its troop 
presence on the Vietnamese border.  “So we asked them to please keep strategic 
forces in the northern part of Vietnam to keep Vietnamese forces occupied, 
because if they moved near to us, we’d be in trouble,” says Bhumarat.448 
 
In time, Thailand got what it wanted – Chinese intimidation of Vietnam over its 
overt threat to Thailand and a gradual cut off of support for the CPT.449  The 
China-based VOPT went off the air in 1979, and logistics for CPT bases in Laos 
dried up.  China stopped supplying them, and the Laotians could not do it 
themselves.  Threatened by China, the Vietnamese backed off their support for the 
CPT, too. 
 
China wanted something in return, however: aid for Cambodian insurgent groups 
fighting the Vietnamese, which the Thai were happy to provide.  As long as the 
Vietnamese were embroiled in an insurgency in Cambodia, and as long as China 
kept up its intimidation, the Vietnamese forces in Cambodia were less likely to 
widen the war by attacking Thailand.450 
 
Thailand supported several Cambodian insurgent groups; among them were 
Khmer People's National Liberation Front, the army of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, 
and bloody KR.451  Bangkok knew supporting the KR was taboo, but Vietnam had 
supported CPT rebels inside Thailand since before 1965, which had resulted in the 
deaths of thousands of Thai.  “We knew the Khmer Rouge was not popular,” says 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 Ibid. and V. Chinvarakorn and S. Janchitfah, columnists for the Bangkok Post, in 
“The Long Road Ahead,” explains it differently – as Kukrit fearing a Vietnamese 
invasion of Thailand in 1975, but Vietnam did not invade Cambodia until 1978.  The 
story these journalists tell and Bhumarat’s are similar, however: 
<http://www.thaiworld.org/en/thailand_monitor/answer.php?question_id=263>. 
447 C. Samudavanija and S. Paribatra, op. cit., p. 200. 
448 Bhumarat, 1 February 2008, op. cit. 
449 Ibid. 
450 Saiyud, op. cit., p. 182. 
451 “Cambodian Rebels Fight Vietnamese at Camp,” in UPI, 7 January 1985, available 
on 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01E1D71F38F934A35752C0A963
948260>, and B. Crossette, “3 Cambodian Rebel Forces Unite Over Vietnam Talks,” 
in The New York Times, 2 July 1988, available on 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE1D61F3CF931A35754C0A96
E948260>. 
	  	   120	  
Bhumarat, “but the Khmer Rouge was a good boxer.  How can we ignore them?  
So we had to exploit them to fight against the Vietnamese, and years later, we 
would have to pay the diplomatic price, and our image would suffer for supporting 
them, but at the time, it was the thing to do.”452 
 
 
Democratic Reform at the National Level 
 
Democratic reform had a major impact on the CPT and the population it was trying 
to co-opt, so much so that it caused General Chavalit to remark, “We can say that 
the real reason behind the halt in the armed struggle was merely the expansion of 
individual liberty.”453  There was no single democratic program, however, that 
forced the issue.  It was instead a strategic movement of scores of laws, decrees, 
and programs that removed autocratic laws from the books and replaced them 
with more democratic ideals.  Spelled from government autocracy, the people 
were less inclined to support the CPT, which falsely heralded democracy as one of 
its goals. 
 
When General Thanom took over by coup on 17 November 1971, he scrapped the 
1968 constitution and declared martial law.  His government also banned all 
political parties, curtailed freedom of the press, and discarded due process legal 
rights for suspected opponents of the regime.  This led to unrest that strengthened 
the CPT’s hand. 
 
Thanom assumed command of the PM, Supreme Commander, and Foreign 
Minister portfolios.  His brother-in-law, Prapass, took over the deputy PM, Interior, 
Police Chief, Deputy Supreme Commander, RTA Commander, and CSOC 
portfolios.   Thanom’s son, Narong, held optimum Army posts as a favored 
colonel.  Opponents, which included students and regular Thai citizens fearful of 
their rights, called these leaders, “The Three Tyrants.”  The civilian political elite 
joined students and workers in opposing Thanom’s apparent aim to perpetuate a 
political dynasty through his son, Narong, whose rise the military officer corps 
particularly resented. 
 
According to Paul Handley, corruption during the Thanom government ran 
rampant, and the economy, beset by the global recession of the early 1970s, 
declined.  Between 1971-73, some 180,000 engaged in hundreds of strikes, and a 
meager rice harvest led to shortages and long lines in Bangkok.  In the face of 
internal government opposition, Thanom abolished the election process for the 
National Assembly and appointed all 299 members in 1972.  The abuse of power 
gave rise to the 14 October student protest movement, the deaths of 70 student 
protestors, and an overall national dissatisfaction with the government.  The king, 
primarily urged by the students, stepped in and pressured Thanom to give up 
power. 
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Successive governments were either paralyzed by lack of consensus or similarly 
autocratic.  The Thanin government that took over in 1976 via coup, for example, 
and threw out the 1974 constitution, dissolved parliament, banned all political 
parties, increased press censorship, harangued unions – even ones not 
penetrated by the CPT – and again placed the country under martial law.  The 
government arrested some 8,000 people suspected of communist activities in the 
first three months of power.  Thanin also assumed the power to execute without 
trial anyone deemed a national security risk.454 
 
Thanin’s government moreover refused to address pressing economic problems, 
further leaving the population to suffer.  Inflation grew 13 percent under him, and 
he did nothing to assuage it.  Thanin ignored labor groups’ requests for a higher 
minimum wage, and strike breaking caused a passive “go slow” industrial rebellion 
that hurt national output.  Forty percent of 1976 college graduates were jobless.  
One million farmers hurt by poor growing conditions struggled to make ends meet, 
and Thanin lifted not a finger to help.  His neglect further drove a wedge between 
the autocratic government and the people.455 
 
Thanin fell in a coup on 11 November 1977 and the successor Kriangsak 
government reversed past administrations’ dictatorial practices.  The removal of 
draconian laws helped to restore public faith in government, thereby denying the 
CPT a pool of large recruits and sympathizers.  Kriangsak enacted a law in 1978 
releasing the “Bangkok 18,” students and labor organizers charged with instigating 
the Thamassat University massacre.  He reduced the number of provinces under 
martial law and narrowed anti-communist laws so they would net only communists 
and not all those who longed for political change.456  For the government at large, 
Kriangsak paved the way for the return to a constitutional government by 1978 and 
then parliament by 1979.457  He raised the minimum wage in Bangkok in 1978 and 
1979.  He brought back some press freedoms and released 12,000 prisoners, with 
full pardons, detained since 1976 as “dangers to society.”458 
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Nevertheless, the coups kept coming.  The next was Prem, who took over from 
Kriangsak.  The catalyst was supposedly the death of a Thai princess in the far 
south.  Her helicopter crashed, or Thai Malay Muslim rebels shot it down; Thai 
sources differ on the exact details.  Regardless, Prem expanded his predecessor’s 
reforms via the 66/2523 and 65/2525 plans, the latter called “Plan for Political 
Offensive Plan.  It not only called for the defeat of the CPT, but also spreading 
democracy throughout Thailand.  The RTA and ISOC’s CA programs took the lead 
in these efforts. 
 
 
3. Economic COIN Programs 
 
Thailand had too many COIN development programs to count.  The main impetus 
behind this phenomenon was King Bhumibol.  One of his key polices was to 
develop the poor areas of Thailand through royal development projects, and he 
urged all government agencies to do the same, and they did so enthusiastically.  
There were, however, specific development agencies set up to assuage citizens’ 
grievances as a way of combating the CPT.  Many operated with the CPM 
program as a direct result of the 09/10 Plan.459  The main development programs 
for the communist COIN were royal projects, government agency projects, and 
RTA CA. 
 
“Why did we use development projects to help fight the CPT?” asks General Harn 
Pathai.  “Because the communists told people that the government made them 
poor, and that the government walked on the people.  The CPT brainwashed 
them, so we went in and took that away from the communists.  We showed the 
villagers that this was not true.  We proved it to them with our work.”460  Adds 
General Perapong Manakit, “Our goal [with development] was to help them and 
give everything to them and win their loyalty; it was used as means to fight 
communists.”461 
 
 
Royal Projects 
 
There were two kinds of royal projects during the communist COIN: official 
programs, and suggested programs.  This trend continued after the war.  Official 
programs were standing projects the royal family ran year round.  Suggested 
projects were those King Bhumibol recommended government agencies to 
undertake.  When the king toured the countryside, for example, he might suggest 
to a government minister travelling with him that his or her agency set up a potable 
water project in a particular village that needed it.  The agency in question then set 
up the project with royal guidance and technical support, but mostly with its own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 Saiyud, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
460 Pathai, op. cit. 
461 Perapong, op. cit. 
	  	   123	  
funding.  But it had the very real honor of running a royal project, which brought 
high esteem to the project manager and the agency. 
 
Such undertakings were critical to the royal family.  King Bhumibol and Queen 
Sirikit followed the war closely and knew failure would bring their demise as it had 
the royals in Laos and Cambodia.  Both also had a demonstrated real affection for 
their subjects, which were reciprocated in a way that helps explain why Thailand 
today remains one of the few monarchies in Asia.  The king spent considerable 
time touring all the country’s provinces himself, informally meeting his subjects and 
assessing their plight first hand.  Even before the war in 1955, King Bhumibol 
spent 55 days touring Issan, meeting with locals, listening to their needs.  The trip 
spurred much of his charity work.462 
 
One of the most notable official royal development projects that helped farmers 
was the Royal Irrigation Department.  Rainfall was not always sufficient for 
farmers’ crops, and irrigation became a major agricultural sector issue.  As the 
communist COIN pressed forward and many farmers joined the CPT, the king had 
more than 200 dams built in the northeast, six of them large ones.  Some of them 
suffered from engineering defects, which impacted efforts to deliver water to 
parched Issan where the CPT thrived.  Royal irrigation projects were more 
successful in the Mae Nam Mae Klong Basin, where the king brought water to 
175,000 hectares, a wide area.  His dams in this region allowed many farmers 
over 250,000 hectares to “double crop,” or produce two crops on the same piece 
of land in a single year.  In the south on the east coast, the king’s projects brought 
water to about 25 percent of arable land in the 75,000 hectares with another 
52,000 for the Pattani basin.  There were 500,000 hectares available in the far 
south for irrigation at the time.463  
 
Another was the Royal Hilltribe Development Project in the north that began in 
1969.  It was designed to better the lives of the hill tribes and reduce the friction 
with the government.  “[King Bhumibol] went in and helped them, and his efforts 
were more like philanthropy,” says Dr. Amara Pongsapich, head of the Rotary 
Club’s Chulalongkorn branch.  “His first trips into the mountains mostly involved 
giving medicine and basic staples to the Meo.”464  It was a chance for the King to 
establish relations with them and gain their trust.  “Then the second phase would 
include anti-narcotics programs and encouraging them to stop growing opium and 
instead grow fruits and things like that,” says Amara.465  The Royal Hilltribe 
Development Project specifically encouraged coffee, chrysanthemums, apples, 
peaches, strawberries, apricots, and lychees as opium crop substitution and 
brought in specialists to teach the tribes how to grow them.466 
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Government Development Projects 
 
The most prominent COIN development agency during the communist COIN was 
the Accelerated Rural Development Program (ARD).  In 1966, the PM’s Budget 
Bureau annexed it because its leader, Prasong Sukhum, was a founder of the 
COIN development strategy.  He was Deputy Minister of Commerce and 
Transportation in the late 1970s, accounting for ARD’s emphasis on road building.  
In 1972, the MoI took ARD back.  ARD’s Committee for Coordination or ARD in 
Bangkok made its policy, and it mostly deployed in COPT prone areas.  The RTA 
and local forces provided security for ARD staff and other development projects for 
that matter.467 
 
ARD provided the expertise, personnel, and finances for its many road projects, as 
well as efforts to deploy Mobile Medical Teams (MMTs), a District Farmer Group 
Program, a youth program, a drinkable water program, and a psyops program to 
demonstrate to the population ARD’s capacity to help.  The Ministry of Public 
Health helped staff the MMTs.  ARD began under the MoI’s DOLA and the 
CSC.468 
 
The road-building aspect was important to the government’s COIN strategy 
because it gave the government easier means to reach people in remote areas 
where insurgents operated.  There were also economic benefits of extending the 
road network.  The government worked to integrate rural farmers with the rest of 
the country so that they could more easily market their goods.  In its early years, 
ARD built 2,000 kilometers of all-weather roads, small feeder roads, dams, wells, 
storage ponds, and the like.  It additionally organized 30 youth groups, made the 
U.S. dollar equivalent of $2 million in loans through special credit entities, and 
showed a hundred films a month in at-risk areas.469 
 
The Community Development (CD) Department began development projects in 
1962 before the war but became a COIN entity in 1965.  Unlike ARD, the CD did 
not do development for the villagers; it helped the villagers with their own 
development.  Tanham writes its main goals were to, “…facilitate communications 
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between the government and the rural population, to improve the peasants’ 
economic status, and to help develop local leadership.”470  CD trained its staff to 
enter villages to find out what development projects they needed.  They moreover 
organized village committees to vote yes or no on the projects to spur leadership 
and political awareness.  Once approved, CD and village staff then organized the 
projects and carried them out.  The projects were small and included miniature 
dams, canals, and markets.  Tanham writes the CD was a novel idea because the 
Thai were “strongly individualistic” and were not accustomed to community 
programs unless they dealt with helping monks, agricultural tasks like harvesting, 
or helping a neighbor build a house.  Still, the CD program expanded with the war 
and had a record of success.471 
 
Government expenditures for its development programs increased as the war 
continued, indicating the confidence the Thai had in their COIN development 
strategy.  In 1967, the government spent $21.6 million on development programs.  
U.S. aid contributed $19.7 million.  In 1968, Bangkok spent $26.7 million, the U.S., 
$17.1.  In 1969, government expenditures rose dramatically to $51 million, and 
U.S. funding dropped off to $16.6 million as the Thai government increasingly took 
more responsibility for its programs as was planned.472  And all programs 
expanded as a result of the increase funding.  ARD, for example, eventually grew 
to a staff of 250 and operated in 24 provinces. 
 
Other ministries that ran COIN development programs included the Ministry of 
Public Health’s potable water and protein development projects to improve the 
nutrition of villagers.  The Ministry of Education (MoE) ran Mobile Trade Training 
units to better their business and marketing prowess.  The Ministry of National 
Development ran labor-intensive construction projects.473 
 
 
RTA CA 
 
The RTA had development programs of its own, which ultimately fell under its CA 
division.  The RTA’s interest resulted from it being the most powerful COIN entity 
in the government, and it understood the poverty-CPT nexus.  “Development 
spurred the J-5,” says General Perapong, “something we never had before.  It 
means political, development, and social programs.  So long as you accept the 
cause of the war is poor people and lack of development, or bad economics, then 
this is meaningful.”474 
 
General Prem says of RTA development projects:  
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By far the more formidable task was how to tackle the widespread 
poverty, which we saw as the root cause of insurgency and indeed all 
social ills.  The Second Army Region, despite being the unified 
command of military and civilian resources in the Northeast, had its 
obvious limitations.  We had to do the best we could.  We started by 
identifying three main areas in which we could be of help to the 
villagers: means of subsistence, schooling and health care.  In all these 
areas, the aim was to ‘help them help themselves’.475   
So the RTA, in this case the Second Army, dedicated considerable resources to 
dissecting the poverty problem; it researched on its own in the field and came up 
with subsequent solutions and provided the resources.  This went on in Issan from 
1974-77.  From then on, RTA development of poor areas, not just insurgent-prone 
areas, became a long-standing tradition. 
 
General Prem recounts the development projects were not easy to implement.  
“We simply did not have enough budgets to give handouts, nor did we have 
enough manpower to carry out the work on that scale,” he says.  “If money was 
given out, it was for seeds, farming tools, poultry stocks or fish stocks for the 
ponds.”476  The RTA’s many small projects immediately impacted villagers’ lives. 
The effect was like that of a blanket of help cast over a third of the population.  It 
was a powerful strategy. 
 
The army benefited greatly from local volunteers.  Says General Prem: 
“Volunteers in each locality served as manpower; once trained, they were put to 
work applying and extending their newly acquired skills, be it in teaching or in 
rudimentary medical knowledge. The response we had from the volunteers, all of 
whom worked without pay or personal gain, went beyond anything I had expected 
or indeed had any right to expect.”477  There was a groundswell of support for 
these economic projects everyone understood was ultimately aimed at shoring up 
the well being of the population to counter keep it from the CPT.  This indicates a 
“whole of country” approach to COIN, especially the fact the volunteers pitched in.  
This does not mean the whole country aided the COIN in this manner, but it does 
signify the “whole of country” concept was there, and that certain parts of the 
nation participated with rigor. 
 
“I did some development, too,” says General Harn Pathai.  “We provided land and 
built houses…a rai of land [to each settler].  Lots of people [in CPT areas] got a 
half rai of land.  And we gave money, too, and let them buy wood, and had them 
build their own houses.  These were royal projects.  We won because of these 
royal projects in his area.”478  Here, General Harn describes a combined royal and 
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army project where the army had cash on hand, called “flash cash” in Special 
Operations vernacular, to dole out for unique projects.  It represents how much 
flexibility and development know-how the RTA had in COIN. 
 
One of many private development projects was the Association for the Relief of 
Communist Victims (ARVC).  ARVC got financing from private companies.  Its 
main task was to provide educational supplies to hill tribes in Nan and Chiang Rai 
provinces.  ARVAC also tried to convince hill tribes to stay on their ancestral lands 
to avoid creating refugee problems.  “In doing so,” says Saiyud, the ARCV has 
significantly lightened the burden shouldered by the government in those 
areas.”479 
 
There were many instances where the military and private development societies 
worked together.  For example, General Saiyud worked with the Mitrapap 
(“Friendship”) program, which put on skydiving exhibitions to raise money for 
school construction.  He also worked for the Rotary Club of Thailand, an 
international service society that helps the poor and disadvantaged.480  Founded 
on 17 September 1930, the first Rotary Club in Thailand began under the sanction 
of Prince Purachatra Jayakar (1882-1936) after being introduced to the idea by 
Canadian Rotarian James W. Davidson.  King Bhumibol became its patron in 
1955.  By 1980, Thailand had 48 Rotary Clubs.481  Saiyud helped develop Rotary 
projects in the north to help tribes with getting their goods to market, medical aid, 
and education.482 
 
Rotary also worked with monks to achieve its goals.  Says Dr. Amara: “For 
example, with the Buddhist monks, we had three programs: one working with hill 
tribes, one with the lowland people.  We invited monks, trained them, asked them 
to be the development people.  For the lowlands, mostly the northeast, they sent 
out the monks and went out on caravans into the villages.”483 
 
The results of the government’s development projects were mixed.  There is a 
range of data that suggests that development did nothing to assuage villagers’ 
CPT sympathies.  Marks writes: “…a Cornell University report confirmed a 
phenomenon which had already been observed by some American officials:  
namely, that there appeared to be a strong association between rate of structural 
growth and incidence of insurgent activities!”484  Mark’s own analyses of the ARD 
program indicate little progress.  Regarding improving living standards, he writes 
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the ARD had “no overall impact” and only a few individuals were able to benefit 
from “market mechanisms.”  In other cases, Marks observed many villagers came 
to rely too much on government initiatives instead of helping themselves, ironic 
because the very goal of the CD program was village self reliance.  He moreover 
writes the ARD had little success in passing on technical know-how to villagers, 
and the improved communication between the villagers and the government was 
marginal.485 
 
Tactical problems with development resulted from some projects being too 
sophisticated or beyond the capabilities of uneducated villagers.  In one case cited 
by Saiyud, a development team brought a water pump to a village they could use 
at their well, but they preferred using a bucket on a string, so the pump went 
unused and rusted.  In other cases, some rural people felt insulted or embarrassed 
to have urban government personnel try to modernize them.  Says Saiyud, “They 
felt change was being forced upon them.  Usually, they begin to want it only when 
they have seen it with their own eyes somewhere else first.”486 
 
Other critics say some villagers did not like development projects because they 
believed the government was essentially trying to buy their loyalty and forcing 
them to take sides in an armed conflict, opening them up to possible retaliation 
from CPT.  “Some were not happy,” says Dr. Amara, “because they knew that 
there was some influence swaying here with some of these projects.”487 
 
Ultimately, however, despite seeing many communist COIN programs as akin to 
political buyoff, Dr. Amara says, “They did help, but I saw it as a very political 
issue.  It did help improve the lives of the Issan people, and it did bring them to the 
government side.  At the very least it kept many of them from joining the 
communist party.  Follow through was not very clear, but these areas are very 
accessible today, so it’s not like they’ve been abandoned.”488 
 
Others say development did help defeat the CPT.  General Saiyud in 1969 noticed 
while excessive force surely turned villages against the government, development 
projects, at the very least, kept rural people from sliding further into poverty, a key 
government goal.  In other cases, he says development certainly won many 
villages over to the government’s side.489  Says Saiyud, “These multi-faceted 
[development] efforts have resulted in a full range of government-to-people 
relations; and, as elsewhere, some have been good, while others have been, 
frankly, bad.  Misunderstandings between officials and hill tribe leaders have, on 
occasion, led to gunfire,” sparked by real and/or imagined “government 
perpetrated inequity.”490 
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Former communists say development did, in fact, help COIN efforts.  Ex- CPT 
Srisompob Jitpiromsri says, “We did not worry too much about them [development 
workers] or the development projects.  But they did help Bangkok in the end to 
bring the people to their side.”491 
 
Denny Lane toured southern provinces during the war years and witnessed good 
progress.  “Regarding development,” says Lane, “go to Nan province.  The road 
network the government built there was incredible.  And it allowed the villagers to 
readily get their goods and food to market.  And lots of road construction 
personnel were killed building those roads; as in a staggering number.”492  It 
numbered in the thousands. 
 
Lane does not believe development projects had an immediate decisive impact, 
but he certainly believes they helped.  “One day, I visited a southern CPT area of 
Malay Muslims.  It was night.  The village head met me, and we spoke about the 
insurgents.  The village head pointed to the next village over in the hills and said, 
‘See there?  They have electricity,’ pointing to the lights.  He knew he’d get 
electricity next.  Then he said, ‘last night, I told the communist insurgents that only 
an established government could give me and my village electricity and the paved 
road the government had recently put in, and you cannot.’  And it counted,” said 
Lane.  “It meant something.”493 
 
 
* * * 
 
In summary, regarding the three pillars, the Thai wrestled with their use of force 
against the CPT until achieving the right approach in 1977-80.  Interestingly, while 
Thai COIN experts knew the right approach in 1965, senior officers in the field did 
not, or ignored it, and their abuse of force angered the population, thereby 
expanding the CPT’s ranks.  The police also failed early on to learn about the 
enemy they were arresting en mass until the movement had grown to a size 
beyond their control.  When the Prem COIN-minded camp rose to power they 
applied highly focused force against the CPT – physically separating them from 
citizens and destroying its ability to fight – to great success.  These victories were 
enabled by intelligence. 
 
In tandem, the Thai also eventually realized politically marginalizing the enemy 
was more important than physically destroying the enemy.  Part of this equation 
entailed a flood of psychological operations and also politically uplifting the 
disaffected population with “surged democracy.”  This drew off membership from 
the CPT and curbed its recruiting efforts.  Masterful diplomacy rounded out 
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Thailand’s political attack and isolated the CPT from its regional sponsors, leaving 
it ripe for a knockdown. 
 
Underlying all this was Thailand’s economic aid to the disaffected.  The at-risk 
population was indeed impoverished, and Thailand physically reversed this with 
village level and enterprise projects.  The rewards of these programs were not 
decisive.  Instead, they slowly eroded the CPT’s propaganda that claimed the 
government cared not for the people.  This latter phenomenon demonstrated 
economic programs had not only tangible but political implications as well.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE 1980S-90S 
THAI MALAY MUSLIM INSURGENCY AND COIN 
 
 
 
1. Background of the 1980s-90s Thai Malay Muslim Insurgency and COIN 
 
The history of how Thailand acquired its southern border provinces is well told by 
modern historians.  Suffice to say the region was a Hindu-Buddhist nation named 
Langasuka that adopted Islam in the 1500s and the name Patani, spelled with a 
single “t” at the time.  Ethnic Malays have populated the area for centuries.  Patani 
was a reluctant vassal state of Siam, leading to sporadic clashes between the two.   
Patani also fought multiple civil wars by competing raja rulers who courted Siam to 
gain power over their rivals.  This kept Patani in Siam’s orbit for centuries.  Legend 
says Patani was a lush agricultural state, prosperous, and the cradle of Islam in 
Southeast Asia.  Though the area had busy trading ports and Islamic centers of 
learning, there is little factual evidence to support the notions of widespread 
prosperity and that Islam in Southeast Asia began there.  Other than lore and 
scant reporting by travellers such as 16th Century Portuguese historian Tome 
Pires, there is little recorded history of Patani, especially in comparison to the 
historical records of Thailand and Malaysia.494 
 
In modern times, however, Pattani, spelled with two “ts” in the 20th Century, 
resisted Bangkok’s rule following its annexation in 1902.  “The separatists’ idea 
had been there all along,” says former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai.  “Some 
separatists came from the families and political power cliques that lost power when 
Thailand annexed the area.  They lost their controlling interests.”495  Adds 
Bhumarat, “The idea of separatism began big in the 1940s.  But the movement did 
not have a lot of backing.  It was not the intellectuals.  It was the Muslim 
politicians.  And at that time, it was not the idea of pure separatism.  It was to 
establish the Muslim minority identity issue, not quite full-blown separatism.”496 
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In the mid 1970s, the insurgency gained political momentum following the Pattani 
Demonstration of 1975.  Up to 100,000 Thai Malay Muslims protested the killings 
by Royal Thai Marines of five villagers in Narathiwat alleged to be insurgents.  
Crowds gathered in front of Pattani’s Central Mosque and Provincial Hall at 
different times from 11 December 1975 to 4 January 1976.497 
 
The insurgent group PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organization) was the 
protest’s key organizer.  It staged highly emotional readings from the Koran and 
calls to the Prophet Muhammad.  “Every Muslim present was engulfed with 
emotions, sympathy for the victims and full of hatred,” writes Surin Pitsuwan, 
former Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a Muslim.498  
 
The protest was timed to coincide with Muslim holidays when religious fervor runs 
high.  PULO waited until 11 December – 12 days after the killings – to hold the 
protests because, asserts Surin, the 11th was three days from the most important 
Muslim holiday, Raja Hajji (Id al Adha in most Islamic countries – Raja Hajji is 
Malay) the end of the haj, the pilgrimage to Mecca.  The largest protest came on 
the actual day of Raja Hajji.  Surin notes the holiday also marked the intended 
sacrifice of Abraham’s son, Ishmael, as commanded by God.  “In such an 
emotion-filled period,” writes Surin, “religious and ethnic consciousness was easily 
transformed into political solidarity.”499 
 
On 13 December, someone in a government building hurled a grenade or two onto 
the speaker’s stage, killing as many as 18 and injuring 40.  In the middle of the 
carnage, someone made the call to prayer and recited the Islamic profession of 
faith, the Shahada: “There is no God but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger 
of God.”500  Incensed, the crowd blamed the government and issued a five-point 
demand, namely a full investigation of the killings of the Narathiwat five and the 
withdrawal of all military forces from the south.  The government moved the RTM 
unit in question from the area of contention, launched an investigation, and did not 
penalize any civil servant who left work to join the protests.  Thai researcher 
Panomporn Anurugsa notes the protest empowered Thai Malay Muslims who then 
began to distance themselves from Thai Buddhists, labelling them lackeys of the 
government.  The violence and its aftermath drove a wedge between the two 
groups.501 
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Wan Kadir Che Wan, former separatist leader of the umbrella group Bersatu, 
writes: “Some separatist leaders interpreted this demonstration as an expression 
of Muslim anger towards Thai-Buddhists.  They believed that this anger could be 
manipulated and directed ‘correctly’ to support the struggle.”502  He also writes 
insurgent leaders saw the demonstration as a sign popular support “was always 
potentially present.”503 
 
The demonstration was a wakeup call for the government.  Bangkok came to the 
sudden realization the insurgents had real political power.  On the heels of the 
chaos, the far south constituency rejected all previous Buddhist parliamentary 
representatives and instead elected all Thai Malay Muslim candidates to the 
National Assembly.504 
 
By 1979, four years later, the southern insurgency had grown to 84 rebel groups 
with 1,500 fighters, not including auxiliary support.  Not all 84 were significant 
threats to the state, however, and none were pure in their separatist ideology.  
Most used rebellion as a cover for their criminal empires specializing in extortion 
and kidnap and ransom (K&R) schemes, which is one reason why the south’s 
rebellion was never popular with a majority of the local population.  The southern 
insurgency was kept local and never achieved the organization, depth, and 
breadth the CPT did.   
 
The most active groups in the 1970s were the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan 
Patani (BNPP), the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN, “National Revolutionary 
Front”), and PULO.505  Their combined attack tempo amounted to a handful of 
operations each month, sometimes weekly during a campaign, but this was rare.  
Their violence increased in the late 1970s for several reasons, in part inspired by 
the Iranian revolution that sparked a worldwide radical Islamic revival, and in part 
because Bangkok was preoccupied with the CPT.  From October 1976-December 
1981, there were 127 major acts of insurgent violence that resulted in 300 
wounded and 200 killed, most of it by PULO.506 
 
Some of their biggest attacks in the 1970s included the 6 June 1977 bombing of 
the Sungei Golok-Bangkok express train in Yala; the 22 September 1977 bombing 
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of a royal ceremony for Village Scouts and private Islamic school principals in 
Yala, and; and the 1 April 1978 bombing of the Hua Lampong Railway Station in 
Bangkok.507 
 
To stop the insurgency, Bangkok applied security, political, and economic 
programs.  It began many of these in the 1960s and continued them in the 1970s.  
None were coordinated, however, and the insurgency continued relatively 
unfettered.  The government attempted to coordinate political and economic 
operations via the Yala-based Coordination Center (CC), but competition with the 
southern DoLA, which was powerful, made it ineffective.  Moreover, the CC was 
not synchronized with military operations. 
 
Security programs during this time period consisted mostly of temporary surge and 
mass arrest operations.  None were successful in bringing peace to the area, and 
some were reportedly cruel, but they did succeed in destroying the military 
capabilities of the largest insurgency group of the 1970s, the BNPP.  Politically, 
the BNPP never regained its status, partially due to the loss of its leader, Tengku 
Yala Nasae, in 1977, and the loss of support from Malaysia’s Parti Islam (PI).  The 
PI lost elections and was unable to help its protégés in Pattani.508 
 
Regarding political COIN initiatives in the 1960s-70s, the government’s master 
political strategy for the south was integration.  Detractors called it assimilation or 
resocialization.  Integration entailed bringing Thai Malay Muslims into the state’s 
society via programs that penetrated their isolation.  The goal was to make them 
productive and employable citizens who accepted a pluralistic society.  Critics said 
Bangkok aimed to destroy Malay Muslim culture.509 
 
Bangkok’s primary integration instrument was education.  The biggest educational 
program was pondok reform.510  Pondoks were private religious schools for high 
school level students.  They had been in the south for decades but increased post 
WW II.  They taught the Koran, Islamic culture, and little else.  Enrollment was 
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free.  There were no tests, no standardized system of learning, and no vocational 
or secular subjects taught such as math and history.511  Moreover, the government 
discovered some pondok teachers were fostering rebellion amongst their students.  
Bangkok sought to recast pondoks to include secular subjects and produce 
learned citizens open to the rest of the country.512  By 1966, Bangkok had 
designed the Private Schools Teaching Islam program (PSTI) that imposed 
minimum MoE learning standards and a government curriculum on pondoks that 
included some secular subjects.  They could still teach Islam.513 
 
A 1968 government survey of the government’s educational reform indicated a 
majority of parents – 53 percent – saw the changes as positive and a chance for 
their children to achieve and progress.  Pondok teachers, however – generally 
believed to be Islamic conservatives – rejected the program by 95 percent.  They 
asserted the changes were designed to “make [young Malays] deny their ethnic 
and religious background,” and destroy what they thought was Islamic purity.514  It 
created divisions between religious leaders with power to lose and everyday 
southerners trying to improve their lot in life.  As the insurgency progressed from 
the 1970s into the 80s, it began to develop along these religious fracture lines. 
 
Other political COIN programs the government listed in the 1978 National Security 
Policy included teaching Thai Malay Muslim students Thai history and Thai and 
English (a required foreign language).  It also extended the minimum time Thai 
Malay Muslims spent in high school, and offered to them university quotas and 
scholarships.515  Language control for the southern border population was another 
political COIN program.  Bangkok banned Malay language newspapers and put 
televisions in village headmen’s homes to sway the population to watch Thai 
news, entertainment, and government policy programs.516 
 
These applications aimed to reduce cultural isolation and shape a productive, 
employable population, including recruiting quota and scholarship university 
students into government service.  Thai south researcher Ornanong Noiwong 
asserts the language program was partially successful.  In the present day, 
publicly educated Thai Malay Muslims speak Thai at school and at home, and 
speaking Thai has become fashionable amongst the region’s youth.  Thai 
language abilities reflect education and even high status for many families.517  
Ornanaong writes the media programs helped convince many Thai Malay Muslims 
they were Thai citizens and part of society.518  Regional employment rose in the 
1990s, and many Thai Malay Muslims entered civil service. 
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Conservative Muslims, however, rejected the language programs outright.  The 
government admitted in 1979, “the Thai Muslims hold that their custom and 
tradition is part of their religious life, and they tend to refuse anything out of their 
own realm, thinking that it would be religiously wrong.”519  The government also 
understood some Thai Malay Muslims believed studying Thai was religiously faux 
pas – that Malay and Arabic were the only acceptable languages.520 
 
Not all political COIN policies fared well, however.  Many failed.  Says Somchai 
Rakwijit, “The government did not adjust its administrators to the culture of the 
Muslim people of the southern most provinces.  The officials have long been 
looking down on those people.  They don’t have enough cultural understanding 
and langue to communicate with them.”521  This type of defect caused many Thai 
Malay Muslims to believe the government saw them as second-class citizens, a 
problem that festered for decades. 
 
COIN economic development programs in the 1960s-70s were in some cases 
identical to those of the communist COIN.522  These were road building projects, 
agriculture improvement, infrastructure building, and village improvement projects.  
And the far south needed it, too.  Writes Ornanong: “The 1975-76 socioeconomic 
survey shows that poverty in rural areas of the Muslim provinces approximated, 
and in some cases exceeded, the poverty of northeast Thailand.”523  The latter has 
always been the poorest section of the country. 
 
There were also ARD and MDU projects, and agricultural programs for rubber, 
coffee, fisheries, and the like.  The results were mixed.  Coffee never took, but 
rubber became the south’s biggest industry.  These helped lift many farmers from 
abject poverty, but little else.  Bad civil servants, poorly designed programs, a lack 
of follow through, and Thai Malay Muslims unmotivated and untrained to drive 
businesses forward kept them from reaching their potential.  Programs that helped 
local fishermen buy motors and modern nets achieved meager results in the face 
of large fishing companies with their massive vessels and catchall nets that 
Bangkok allowed into the area.  In some cases, locals resented Bangkok turning 
their traditional subsistence economy – their culture – into a cash economy.524 
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When Kriangsak seized power in 1977 and implemented national political and 
COIN reform against the CPT, he and his cabinet also issued strategy 
modifications for the far south’s COIN.  This included a 24 January 1978 six-point 
policy for the south.525  “This new policy,” says Chuan Leekpai, “was written 
officially in 1978.  It was considered to be the manual or guidance for any policy 
implementation for the five provinces for the first time.”526 
 
The new strategy was:527 
 
1. To teach Thai Malay Muslims, particularly youngsters, to be proficient in 
the Thai language. 
2. To foster trust between Thai Malays Muslims and the government. 
3. To improve the standard of living in the far south. 
4. To eliminate terrorist and separatist threats endangering the southern 
people, the territorial integrity of Thailand, and the King. 
5. To persuade Muslim countries that Thai Malay Muslims are not being 
repressed and to halt supporting their insurgent and terrorist activities. 
 
Kriangsak also established guidelines for civil servants in the far south.  They had 
to be well trained and high caliber – not rejects from other provinces.  They had to 
speak Malay, be Muslims, or at least be well versed in Thai Malay Muslim culture, 
and they had to have good reputations.528 
 
Kriangsak moreover brought in Thai Malay Muslims to key government posts.  He 
made members of the National Council for Islamic Affairs consultants for the MoI.  
He made members of Provincial Councils for Islamic Affairs consultants for 
provincial authorities.529  As with the communist COIN, Kriangsak set the stage for 
Prem and his lieutenants to make badly needed upgrades to the COIN campaign 
in the far south.  Despite Kriangsak’s reform efforts, however, insurgent violence 
increased in the late 1970s and continued unabated into the early 1980s. 
 
 
2. Overview of the 1980s-90s Malay Muslim COIN 
 
1980-83 
 
In 1980, when Prem took over as PM, he applied communist COIN strategies and 
programs to the Thai Malay Muslim insurgency.  His able lieutenant, General 
Harn, who had taken over as Fourth Army Commander (1 October 1981-30 
October 1983), tailored them to fit the far south to great effect via the Tai Rom Yen 
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Plan (“Cool Shade in the South”), which was rooted in the 66/2523 Plan.  Prem 
also established two coordination centers to carry out the COIN, Civil-Police-
Military unit 43 (CPM-43), and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative 
Center (SB-PAC.)  CPM-43 was in charge of suppression.  SB-PAC was in charge 
of political and economic development.  They would be the mainstays of 
Bangkok’s southern COIN for decades to come. 
 
Their impact was immediate, and insurgents responded with a rash of violence not 
only in the south, but in Bangkok as well where PULO bombed five targets in 
1980.  These included a movie theater, a bus, rail stations, and a bus terminal.  In 
the south, it set up roadblocks and murdered highway drivers and passengers, 
assassinated government employees and civilians, set fire to schools, and 
bombed buildings. 
 
Regardless, CPM-43’s focused kinetic operations severely reduced the military 
capabilities of all insurgent groups early in the war, which broke them up into 
smaller cells.  This also made them more difficult to detect.530  Generous amnesty 
programs contributed to these successes; 450 Thai Malay Muslim insurgents 
surrendered from 1982-83.  Orders from the PM for government personnel to treat 
Thai Malay Muslims with respect along General Kriangsak’s policies had a 
significant political impact.  The RTA and the king’s development projects signaled 
to Thai Malay Muslims the government cared for them, thereby wining much of the 
population over politically.  They also provided direct aid to impoverished peoples, 
which improved their standards of living. 
 
 
1984-88 
 
By 1984, the BRN Ulama faction, led by Haji Abdul Garim bin Hassan, urged the 
southern insurgency at large to cease and desist its guerrilla war against the state 
and seek a political resolution.531  Hundreds complied, and the movement fizzled.  
Evidence indicates Bangkok diplomatically courted Saudi Arabia to shut down 
PULO’s main base in Mecca, which severely injured its operational support 
regimen. 
 
The insurgency did not die, however.  True, political-minded insurgents 
compromised with the government, in part because Bangkok began to 
acknowledge their culture, provided more development, and widened access to 
politics.  But the fierce Pattani nationalists, ultra-conservative Muslims, and a small 
but growing crop of extremist Muslims thought otherwise.532 
 
It was not so easy for these extremists, however, because the government’s 
integration programs via the SB-PAC continued to bear fruit politically and 
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economically.  Swathes of the population reacted positively to these programs, 
which lessened resistance to the state and shrank the insurgents’ auxiliary force.  
The SB-PAC’s full spectrum of large and small development projects greatly 
contributed to this trend, as did its interaction with Thai Malay Muslim leadership 
and rank-and-file villagers on a daily basis.  As a result, locals held the 
organization in high esteem, which showed increased trust in Bangkok.  The SB-
PAC directly increased the legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of Thai 
Malay Muslims. 
 
Meanwhile, CPM-43 continued its kinetic operations, and the government added to 
this a new amnesty program in October 1987, Muslim Santi (“Muslim Peace.”)  It 
was more or less the same as the communist amnesty program but repackaged 
via PR to ensure insurgents understood they could surrender without penalty, so 
long as they had not committed acts of terror.  As a result, 641 insurgents laid 
down their arms and swore allegiance to Thailand by January 1988.533  This 
means from 1980, over a thousand insurgents applied for amnesty, effectively de-
fanging about half the movement. 
 
 
1989-95 
 
PM Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-91) took over as PM after Prem left office and 
distanced himself from RTA COIN advisors.  Instead, he relied on his own civilian 
advisers for COIN advice.  While this did not kill COIN progress in the far south, it 
did not advance it, either.  The RTA, Thailand’s traditional COIN leader, lost 
significant power to Chatichai’s civilian clique.  But because of COIN progress in 
the 1980s, RTA Commander General Chavalit of communist COIN fame estimated 
in 1990 the southern COIN would end with the defeat of the insurgents in two 
years – by 1992.534  This did not happen, however.  The insurgency again 
reorganized into small cells as it did when subjected to Prem and Harn’s 
offensives.  A splinter group broke off from PULO in 1993, for example, and 
formed New PULO.  It carried out a multitude of bombings, assassinations, and 
extortion schemes for several years. 
 
A savvy Chuan Leekpai became PM in 1992 (1992-1995; 1997-2001) and brought 
with him a vast array of knowledge of economic development programs, security 
issues, and local politics – all from having served as Minister of Justice, 
Commerce, Agriculture and Co-operatives, Education, Public Health, and Deputy 
PM.  It provided him a wealth of knowledge to continue to prosecute COIN.535  
Under him was the able General Kitti Ratanachaya, Commander of the Fourth 
Army (1 April 1991-30 September 1994), who had studied the far south and 
served there his entire career.  During his tenure, he contributed to the demise of 
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the southern insurgency to the point it nearly ran out of manpower.  He believed as 
Prem and Harn did – that although kinetic operations were highly necessary, they 
must be conducted in tandem with politics and development.  He ran aggressive 
but focused security operations.  After insurgents ambushed soldiers in Yala on 17 
August 1993, killing two, General Kitti told the press: “We will not stop until the last 
man is killed,” and he backed it up with RTA search and destroy teams with 
helicopter gunship support.536  But he also personally interacted with the local 
population and its Muslim leaders as much as possible.  Kitti moreover began 
direct negotiations with insurgent commanders hiding in the Middle East, 
spearheaded by his efficient and longtime subordinate Colonel Akanit Munsewat 
(now a General).  General Kitti developed an avant-garde amnesty program for the 
southern rebels that included work programs to give jobs to the poor, but it was not 
fully implemented at the time because of political constraints.  By the end of the 
decade, however, government leaders adopted his ideas to great effect. 
 
While Kitti’s operations continued to erode insurgent operations, rebels were still 
on occasion able to carry out violent campaigns.  For example, from August 1993 
to April 1994, insurgents executed 49 acts of arson, five train bombings, and two 
major light infantry operations – miniscule compared to CPT operations, but 
destructive for the far south.537  There was a rash of shootings and kidnappings as 
well. 
 
Still, Kitti’s and the SB-PAC’s programs sapped so many fighters from PULO and 
BRN that the diehards had to join forces and form a new group partially made up 
of drug dealers and addicts.  Their light infantry prowess was generally gone, 
however.  General Kitti told the press, “They really can’t fight against the military.  
All they can do is sabotage.”538 
 
For example, in January 1994, disenfranchised members of PULO and BRN 
formed a temporary group, Tantra Jihad Islam (TJI), and attacked a police station.  
Later in April, it burned tires on 14 bridges across the south.  While not discounting 
TJI’s violence, it was not at all able to threaten Thailand’s national security, nor did 
it have noteworthy popular backing.  It was more of an angry violent gang than an 
insurgent group.539 
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1996-98 
 
In 1996, Deputy Permanent Secretary for Interior Paitoon Bunyawat took over 
security duties in the southern border provinces from the Fourth Army.540  The 
RTA was still involved in operations, but the civilian leadership had 
commandeered its traditional and lofty authority.  There had always been rivalry 
between the Fourth Army and the SB-PAC, but most of the time, they worked 
closely together.  Unfortunately, the RTA lost some of its intelligence capabilities in 
the process, which compromised its ability to monitor and thwart insurgent 
violence.541  Coordination also suffered. 
 
Insurgent attacks increased gradually in 1996 to the point it scared investors away 
from a proposed regional trade bloc – the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth 
Triangle – which was supposed to be centered in, and bring new wealth to, 
Thailand’s far south.  Accordingly, on 18 January 1997, PM Chavalit (25 
November 1996-8 November 1997) announced an increase in troops and 
spending for the southern COIN.  Increases came from the disbanding counter-
communist ISOC units in other parts of the country and deploying them in the 
south.542 
 
But because of the MoI’s earlier takeover in security affairs, the RTA’s intelligence 
network was unable to see the pending attack by Bersatu, a new insurgent group 
that unified the fractured and generally ineffectual insurgent organizations that had 
been so powerful in the 1970s-80s.  This included PULO, New PULO, the BRN, 
the GMIP, and others.  The group’s official name was “The United Front for the 
Independence of Pattani.”  Under it, the southern insurgency was unified under a 
single command for the first time.  Its operations were punishing.  Bersatu began 
striking a multitude of targets in spring 1997 in what were likely probing attacks to 
test the reaction of Thai security forces.  In July, it began its Falling Leaves 
campaign of terror against civilians and security forces.543 
 
In its opening attacks, Bersatu operatives threw grenades at people and planted 
dynamite at public utilities and infrastructure such as a railroad bridge in 
Narathiwat.  Its operatives bombed transport, government and civilian buildings, 
and infrastructure.  They burned schools and houses and assassinated scores of 
people.  The campaign killed and injured multitudes.  Authorities assumed it was 
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factions of old insurgent groups such as BRN, PULO, New PULO, and the GMIP.  
They did not realize the violence was the work of a single front.544 
 
By November 1997, Chavalit had resigned in the wake of the Asian Economic 
Crisis, and Chuan Leekpai once again took over as PM.  Alarmed at Bersatu’s 
mass violence, Chuan, the MoI, and RTA cooperated to restore order to the south 
and crush the insurgency once and for all.  Military and government intelligence 
agencies published a report for the PM that analyzed the state of the insurgency 
as of January 1998. 
 
It stated violence increased when PM Chuan Leekpai took over, but it did not 
blame his administration.  It is possible the insurgents were attempting to test 
Chuan, or it could have been coincidental timing as General Chavalit resigned.  
The report also criticized local police for not having arrested more insurgents, 
which impacted the public’s confidence in the government’s ability to provide 
security.  Loss of confidence in the government meant, at the very least, an 
empowered insurgency.  At the worst, it meant more support, forced or voluntary, 
for insurgents. 
 
Other than these criticisms, the intelligence report listed six reasons for the rebel 
violence.  First, local politics created instability:  “The fact is that community 
leaders and local leaders each turn to a political party for protection and as a 
means to build up their clout because they do not trust the state authorities.  At the 
same time, political parties are looking to the state authorities to help secure their 
political base and victory in the elections.  This results in conflicts of interest.”545 
 
Second, insurgents had increased the effectiveness of their anti-state propaganda.  
A large portion of the far south, especially rural people, believed the negative 
things Bersatu said about the government.  Third, separatist leaders hiding in their 
Malaysian sanctuaries were still in full command of their troops, personnel, 
intelligence, and logistics networks in Thailand, even though their personnel pool 
had decreased. 
 
Fourth, some Thai Malay Muslim politicians neglected local affairs in pursuit of 
national-level politics.  Ignoring local issues made the people feel isolated and 
unworthy and provided a vacuum for insurgents to fill.  Fifth, the people of the far 
south still did not fully trust state security officials.  Some security personnel 
engaged in local corruption such as petty bribery, and others were involved in 
organized crime and possibly disappearances of innocent suspects. 
 
Sixth, drug trafficking and use became rampant.  In fact, the latter two issues were 
combined; many Thai Malay Muslims believed non-Malay Muslims were trafficking 
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illegal drugs into the south to destroy Islam.546  Drug crime further destabilized 
southern border society and created fractures that insurgents exploited.  It gave 
the rebels drug dealers and users to deploy as fighters for the Falling Leaves 
campaign. 
 
The government’s response to the Falling Leaves campaign was the Pitak Tai 
Plan (“Safegarding the South”).  It called for the destruction of insurgent military 
forces and coaxing their members from the shadows and back into Thai society 
with a new and improved amnesty program.  The government used psyops to tell 
the population the military had not deployed to massacre Muslims, and repentant 
insurgents would be pardoned.  Government psyops also let southerners know it 
would decisively hunt down and destroy unrepentant insurgents with a surge of 
RTA, Thahan Phran, and TNP. 
 
Key to Pitak Tai, however, was cooperation from Malaysia in shutting down cross-
border insurgent sanctuaries, something Bangkok had sought for decades.  It 
finally got it in January 1998 as Malaysian Special Branch swept up several 
Bersatu cells on its own soil ranging from KAL to Kelantan.  By the end of 1998, 
the vast majority of the insurgent groups had been defeated with only a handful of 
isolated members left, their always-tenuous sway with the population gone, their 
infrastructure destroyed. 
 
 
3. The Thai Malay Muslim Insurgents of the 1980s-90s 
 
Parliament published a report in 1978 announcing Thai Malay Muslim separatists 
had overtaken the CPT as the most dangerous threat in the far south.547  While 
there were many different southern rebel groups, they followed similar or identical 
lines of operation and comparable organizational structures.548  The main 
organizations were PULO and its offshoots such as New PULO, BRN and its 
splinter groups, the GMIP, and Bersatu.549  Other small but active organizations 
included Black December and Sabilillah. 
 
 
Strategy 
 
Being both criminal and separatist organizations, Thai Malay Muslim groups had 
two broad strategies.  The first was to use crime to earn money.  The second was 
to either separate from Thailand or gain some kind of autonomy.  When they were 
not involved in K&R and extortion schemes, they tried to co-opt as much of the 
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southern population as possible by outright threats of violence or by appeals to 
nationalism, race, and Islam.550 
 
Despite the number of disparate groups at work in the south, no one group could 
claim to represent the interests or aspirations of the whole southern population.  
Says Dr. Arun, “We know that they were not ordinary criminals.  They had political 
motives as well.  But did they represent the whole people?  We don’t believe so.”  
He adds, “PULO and like groups, they emphasized more on nationalism.  The 
BRN was radical revolutionary – leftist.  The GMIP had religious motivations.  
Other groups had different motivations, so who could speak on behalf of the 
people living in the south?”551 
 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
The main Thai Malay Muslim insurgent groups of the 1980s-90s – PULO and BRN 
– had three organizational levels (some of this is also based on the defeated 
BMPP.)  They had headquarters elements in Malaysia that organized and ran their 
movements (personnel, intelligence, strategic planning, training, logistics), 
operational commands in the provinces, and foreign affairs elements in countries 
overseas to secure material and political support.552 
 
The staffs of the insurgent groups were mostly Middle East-educated religious 
leaders with a clear Islamic bent.  Of the 13 leaders of the BNPP, for example, one 
was a secular teacher, one was a lawyer, and all others were religious teachers.  
Writes Wan, the religious elite was the insurgency’s “…stronghold of cultural 
resistance.”553 
 
Factionalism plagued the Thai Malay Muslim groups, however.  They were never 
able to stay united for very long.  Says Police Major General Tritot Ronnaritivichai, 
Deputy Commissioner of Thailand’s Special Branch, “Before, in the 1980s and 
1990s, BRN, PULO, Bersatu, and New PULO; they all fought to be the leader of 
the region, but they could not unite.”554  Wan claims this was due to ideological and 
class differences.  Groups such as the BNPP were conservative Islamic, the BRN 
was socialist Islamic, and PULO was everything to everyone – nationalistic to 
politicos, conservative Islamic to those recruited in Mecca on the haj, and a 
criminal syndicate to gangsters looking for a group to attach themselves to.555 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 I. A. Mansurnoor, “Muslims in Modern Southeast Asia: Radicalism in Historical 
Perspectives” in Taiwan Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005, pp. 
3-54, available on <http://www.cseas.ncnu.edu.tw/journal/v02_no2/pp3-54.pdf/>. 
551 Arun, op. cit. 
552 Che Man, op. cit., pp. 102-103. 
553 Ibid., p. 134. 
554 Police Major General Tritot Ronnaritivichai, Deputy Commissioner, Special Branch, 
interview by author, 13 March 2008, Police Headquarters, Bangkok, Thailand. 
555 Che Man, op. cit., p. 106.  
	  	   145	  
 
The various groups were also divided internally.  From 1980-84, the top two 
leaders of the BRN argued over “several issues,” none of which Wan describes in 
his book on the insurgents, but they forced a split into three factions.  The most 
powerful was the BRN-Coordinate, or BRN-C.  PULO also split in 1981 over the 
inclusion of gangsters in its ranks, and it split again in the early-mid 1990s forming 
the offshoot, New PULO.556  Dr. Arun says infighting amongst the various factions 
was terrible.  “As a matter of fact, they fought amongst themselves.  They tried to 
gain support from the people to go along with their ideology but were 
unsuccessful.”557  Adds Bhumarat, “The movements did not have a lot of 
backing.”558  Lack of popular support was a key reason in their failure in the 1980s-
90s. 
 
 
Numbers 
 
The number of insurgents and their auxiliary support in the 1980s-90s is difficult to 
discern because of the high number of disparate groups.  PULO, the largest group 
of the time, claimed 20,000 members.  Andrew Tian Huat Tan, a Singaporean 
expert on Southeast Asian terror groups, says it had 1,000 fighters.559  The BRN 
and its supporters might have been half the size of PULO at its height, and the 
GMIP and others never had more than company-sized units active at any time.  
None of them had standing field units like the CPT, though PULO had unit 
designations. 
 
A broad estimate of total insurgent operators in the far south at their peak is 
approximately 2,000.  Auxiliary supporters might have numbered 50,000, and 
people who could be mobilized for public protests might have numbered 100,000, 
as indicated by political protests such as the Pattani Demonstration of 1975.  
Passive support might have been much higher, as in several hundred thousand.  
These rough figures also come from the fact that the southern insurgent 
movements have always been there, indicating a long-running undercurrent of 
popular support.  At the same time, they are not decisive numbers because the 
insurgents have never successfully inspired the whole population.  In the 1980s, 
for example, southern Thai terror expert M. Ladd Thomas estimated a mere 10 
percent of the population of the far south supported the insurgents, 10 percent 
favored the Thai government, and 80 percent were neutral.560 
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Recruiting 
 
Insurgent groups tightly controlled recruitment to keep out government infiltrators 
and people who were not sufficiently Islamic.  Field commanders and insurgent-
related imams identified potential recruits in the provinces and submitted their 
names for approval to their respective headquarters in Malaysia.  If the latter 
approved the names, a field agent made the pitch to the recruit to join the 
movement.561 
 
Insurgents used their overseas bases to recruit, too.  PULO’s base in Mecca 
provided an advantage in recruiting; insurgents used the haj as a forum to bring 
Thai Malay Muslims to their cause.  It became such an issue that in the 1970s, the 
Thai consulate in Jeddah beefed up its intelligence capabilities to monitor 
insurgent activities.  The government also increased its pre-trip briefings for 
Muslims making the haj, some of which the government funded.562  They warned 
pilgrims not to associate with insurgents while on their holy trek. 
 
Writes Wan: “the fronts successfully mobilized Patani students and workers in 
foreign lands, particularly in Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.  These 
Patani Malays abroad played a significant role in establishing contacts with the 
authorities and political parties of other countries.  They were anxious to be 
recognized by Muslim countries as fighting in the cause of Islam and preserving 
the Muslim ummah…”563  The ummah refers to the global Muslim community, 
which some view as one huge family, or indeed a community at least as important 
as national belonging.  Harnessing the ummah for material and political support 
was critical for the insurgency in southern Thailand. 
 
Both real and perceived grievances fueled recruiting.  Many Thai government 
authorities looked down on Thai Malay Muslims as second-class citizens, referring 
to them as khek, or “guests.”  Thai political scientists say it is a demeaning racial 
slur.564  Khek embodied the ill treatment of Malays, which drove many to support 
the insurgency for cultural security. 
 
Lack of political voice was another grievance.  Until the Pattani Demonstration of 
1975, few Thai Malay Muslims had served in parliament – even though they could 
run for office – and scores of them had no way to proffer their political needs such 
as greater local autonomy and complaints about rampant government corruption.  
The insurgency gave some of them their political voice. 
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Conservative and radical Islam created an “us vs. them” mentality that bolstered 
recruiting, too.  Radicals saw Bangkok as an infidel regime that unjustly ruled over 
them, forbidding sharia law, ignoring the Koran, and dismissing the Hadith.  
Muslims susceptible to this indoctrination lashed out.  “We arrested a Chinese 
Muslim convert in ’92 or ’93,” says Bhumarat.  “We asked, ‘why are you so 
militant?  You were not bred into it.’  His reply, ‘I must do something big to impress 
my Muslim friends, to prove I am a good Muslim’.”565 
 
Conservative and radical Islam became a global threat in the 1970s when Iran’s 
radical Ayatollah Khomeini spread firebrand Shia Islam throughout the world, 
including to Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, and Malaysia.  Panomporn writes 
of the phenomenon: “The most immediate concern of the Thai government [in the 
late 70s] is the fundamentalist Islamic movement in Malaysia, which is now 
pressing for daily prayers at the mosques.  They distribute pamphlet copies of a 
speech, translated into Malay, by Khomeini.”566   
 
Saudi Arabia, worried about Iran’s influence, countered with spreading ultra-
orthodox Wahhabi Islam around the world.  It proliferated more so than Khomeini’s 
brand and wound up in Thailand.567  The latter was a direct factor in the birth of the 
da-wah movement in southern Thailand.  The da-wah movement entailed roving 
conservative and radical imams preaching Wahhabi-like Islam and anti-
government messages. 
 
 
Training 
 
Insurgents trained in southern Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Middle East.  
Training in Thailand was sporadic, informal, and happened in remote areas.  
Middle Eastern training through the 1970s-90s took place in Saudi Arabia, Libya, 
Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.568  It is obvious from insurgent operations they 
trained in light infantry tactics such as raids and ambushes.  They also schooled in 
assassinations, bomb making and intelligence.  Their endurance and flexibility also 
suggests training in clandestine intelligence operations – such as covert 
communications, surveillance, and vulnerability assessments – on people they 
targeted for assassination and buildings they wanted to bomb. 
 
Some groups conducted political training in Malaysia and probably the Middle 
East.  Senior Islamic teachers ran such courses, which trained 10-15 recruits for 
up to three weeks.  Trainees learned about the insurgency’s goals, philosophies, 
and operations.  Many recruits served as auxiliary support upon reinserting back 
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into Thailand.  These agents aided in recruiting, carried out intelligence collection, 
and served as messengers.569  Some morphed into full-fledged fighters. 
 
 
Logistics and Sanctuary 
 
While some insurgents operated and lived in Thailand permanently, others 
conducted strikes in Thailand and fled back across the border to Malaysia.  More, 
cross border traffic was vital for insurgent leaders to occasionally supervise field 
operations.  Logistics, food, weapons, ammunition, explosives, documents, 
intelligence, and a largely supportive population – all the things that make an army 
work – waited across the border in Malaysia.570  “Patani people,” as Wan Kadir 
calls them, living there (and in other countries) made these things possible.571  
Northern Malay citizens and possibly local government personnel seemed largely 
supportive of the insurgency, too.  Otherwise, they would not have provided 
sanctuary. 
 
Making things easier, many insurgents had dual citizenship making border 
crossings simple because they did not raise red flags with border officials.  
According to Panomporn, “The separatists always have dual citizenship – Thai 
and Malaysian.  This dual citizenship is a result of the 1960s when the Chairman 
of the Patani Islam Parti granted Malaysian nationality to people who resided in 
Malaysian territory for three years.”572  This provides more evidence local 
Malaysian government and/or politicians supported Thai rebels.  It never appeared 
to be KAL’s policy, however. 
 
Overseas sanctuary was pivotal to the insurgents.  The BRN had assets in Syria, 
PULO in Saudi Arabia, and most groups had links to enablers in Egypt.  PULO’s 
base in Mecca was quite large and facilitated links to Middle Eastern political 
parties and offices in other countries such as Iran. 
 
Funding was a major aspect of insurgent logistics.  “The separatists in the higher 
echelons like PULO and BRN, most of them were concerned with criminal 
pursuits, such as kidnap and ransom, drug running, extortion, things like that,” 
says Chuan.573  In 1998 in Narathiwat, for example, Thahan Phran clashed with a 
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group BRN and shot dead one of its members who had on his person extortion 
letters written in Thai and Jawi with the BRN letterhead.574  Jawi is Malay written in 
Arabic and in common use in the far south. 
 
Aside from criminal rackets, insurgent groups received funds from local, regional, 
and international donations, mostly from Arabic and Muslim countries.575  For the 
BNPP, for example, members with jobs were required to donate between .40 
cents and $40.00 USD monthly, according to their abilities.  Nonmembers of the 
groups who supported their causes gave, too, as did thousands of Malay Muslims 
living in the Middle East.  Members in southern Thailand also provided food to 
guerrillas that temporarily massed in the field for attack or escape and evasion 
operations.576 
 
Wan asserts the biggest source of funding were Arabic and Muslim charities.  
Charitable giving, or zakat, is one of the Five Pillars of Islam and a requirement of 
all Muslims.  Insurgents exploited this zakat requirement to fund violence.  For 
example, Sheik Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz, President of Saudi Arabia’s Department of 
Scholarly Research and Religious Ruling, issued a fatawa saying the BNPP 
qualified for donations.  The Muslim World League donated to the BNPP, and the 
Islamic Development Bank through the Islamic Solidarity Fund is alleged to have 
contributed, too.  The Kuwaiti government’s Welfare Department, and the Islamic 
Call Society, also in Kuwait, was the BNPP’s biggest donators.577 
 
 
Indoctrination 
 
Insurgent indoctrination mostly entailed highlighting Thai Malay Muslim 
grievances, both real and perceived, to its members.  The da-wah movement was 
both an indoctrination and a propaganda tool.  Da-wah imams constantly 
reinforced the conservative or radical Islamic message and anti-state sentiments 
in the villages, which kept both fighters and auxiliary support aligned. 
 
Some groups used Islamic lectures in classroom setting for indoctrination.578  One 
of the BNPP’s for new recruits included Koran VIII: 60:  “Against them make ready 
your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror 
into (the hearts of) the enemies, of God and your enemies, and others besides, 
whom ye may not know, but whom God doth know.  Whatever ye shall spend in 
the Cause of God, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated 
unjustly.”579  This stanza made terrorism ok, and by fusing rebellion and Islam 
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together, insurgent leaders locked in many members, insulating them from 
compromise. 
 
 
Propaganda 
 
Propaganda was a major aspect of southern insurgents’ modus operandi.  PULO 
was the biggest prognosticator of propaganda.  Its founder wrote that southerners 
freeing themselves from the “Thai imperialist” was “a matter of life and death for 
the Patani people in every level at all times.”580  This message aimed to separate 
the government from the people via an “us vs. them” sentiment.  It moreover told 
its audience they would die at the hands of the Thai unless they joined the 
movement, thereby using fear to increase its membership.  While that fear was not 
without some genuine roots – Bangkok was at war with the insurgents – the 
government was not trying to kill all Thai Malay Muslims.  Thai racism, 
discrimination, and combat, however, combined to create popular uncertainty that 
PULO turned into fear with a little prodding. 
 
In order to secure overseas material and political support, insurgent groups 
propagandized international Islamic organizations and their publications to 
broadcast the lie that Bangkok aimed to exterminate Muslims.581  They moreover 
used scare tactics to combat government political and psyops schemes such as 
amnesty.  In 1998, for example, at the height of the government’s amnesty 
program in the far south, Malaysia-based insurgents spread rumors the 
government was really arresting those who turned themselves in, “spreading 
concern and confusion among the Thai communities,” writes Dr. Chaiwat Satha-
Anand, professor at Thammasat University.582  Threat propaganda was also 
common.  Sometimes, groups such as PULO would leave revenge notes at 
murder scenes to intimidate security and medical officials, and also to scare the 
public.583 
 
Thai Malay Muslim insurgents networked extensively with international Muslim 
organizations. The BNPP in 1974 lobbied the Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, a branch of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), to support 
Malay Muslim separatism and to get Arabic and Muslim nations to levy an oil 
embargo against Thailand.584  PULO in 1980-81 lobbied support at the Islamic 
Summit Conference.  Insurgents scored success with the OIC in September 1984 
in Perth, Australia, when the OIC’s Seminar on Muslim Minorities stated the 
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organization should give full “moral and financial support” to safeguard Malay 
Muslim culture in Thailand and improve their economic situation.585 
 
 
Weaponry 
 
Thai Malay Muslim insurgent groups mostly used pistols, rifles, and commercial 
and homemade explosives.  They acquired them by smuggling or by taking them 
off dead security officials.  Says General Kitti, “The enemy’s weapons were 
machine guns and assault rifles, but not too many.  M-16s were hard for them to 
get.  But they had some M-16s and AK-47s.”586  There were a few odd cases 
where the BRN or New PULO used land mines and rocket propelled grenades 
(RPGs), but these were not the norm.  They also used hand grenades and 
dynamite.587 
 
 
Operations 
 
Southern insurgent operations were mostly sabotage, crime, assassination, and 
scattered light infantry operations.  Insurgents acted singly and in groups, and they 
operated out of comps in the countryside, too.  While they did mix with the 
population in the villages, it was not their main modus operandi.  They committed 
acts of arson against schools in protest of secular programs and what they saw as 
state control.  In August 1993, for example, insurgents set fire to at least 30 
schools simultaneously.588 
 
Insurgents occasionally launched campaigns such as the Falling Leaves operation 
that lasted half of 1997.  The Bangkok Post described one July operation as swift, 
well coordinated, and effectively executed:   
 
Regional Police Bureau 9 reports show the terrorists have been at 
work in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.  Terrorists have been using a 
greater degree of violence, homemade grenades and large amounts of 
dynamite to destroy public utilities, including a rail bridge in 
Narathiwat's Ra-ngae district. The terrorists have managed to carry out 
their activities and slip through police cordons because relatives and 
supporters have been supplying them with information about the 
movement of officials.589   
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This particular operation highlighted that the southern rebels did not just excel in 
violence; they also were expert at building and maintaining support networks that 
allowed them to organize, gather logistics, collect intelligence, plan, execute 
operations, and escape government dragnets. 
 
In the mid 1990s, General Kitti writes insurgents developed particular methods for 
countering government COIN initiatives.  Most entailed infiltrating insurgent-
minded personnel into leadership positions throughout four southern provinces.  
These included:590 
 
1. Winning enough popular support to get their representatives elected to 
positions at the local, parliamentary, and ministerial positions 
2. Inserting intelligence agents into state bodies 
3. Maintaining dual nationality to evade capture 
4. Placing their people into as many Muslim leadership positions as 
possible to preach separatism 
5. Eliminating Muslim leaders who do not subscribe to separatist ideology 
6. Using mosques for secret planning sessions 
7. Extorting money from Thai Buddhists and Chinese 
8. Transferring businesses from Thai Buddhists and Chinese to Muslims 
9. Using Malay instead of Thai in the villages 
 
 
Targeting 
 
Southern border insurgents had categories of people they sought to kill and 
venues they wanted to destroy.  The overall goal of their targeting was twofold:  1) 
to kill and/or terrify as many Thai Buddhists as possible to force their exodus from 
southern Thailand, and 2) to obliterate as much of the government structure as 
possible – people and buildings – to create a vacuum of chaos that the insurgents 
would then fill with their own government.  The CPT, and every terrorist and 
insurgent group in history, for that matter, follows a similar targeting policy.  Thai 
Malay Muslim insurgents, however, included civilians in their targeting much more 
than did the CPT, giving them a more prevalent terrorist edge.  Kidnapping 
teachers and civilians for ransom and bombing markets and popular areas all 
purposefully targeted civilians.  They also tried to kill the king and queen in a 
September 1977 bombing. 
 
 
Personnel 
 
While religious leaders and relatives of the old Pattani ruling class lead post-World 
War II separatist groups, the 1970s saw the beginning of a more ideologically 
oriented and violent leadership led by a younger generation that was academically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
590 Thailand’s Southern Insurgency, pp. 115-116. 
	  	   153	  
accomplished with high organizational capabilities.591  This increased into the 
1980s-90s.  Bangkok said in a special report on the insurgency this made the new 
leadership more dangerous.592  Insurgent leaders in many organizations such as 
PULO and BNPP tended to be university graduates.  Field operators were usually 
villagers of all types; local religious leaders, teens recruited from pondoks, and 
young men from all segments of society.  General Kitti asserts insurgents focused 
most of their energies on indoctrinating the far south’s youth into harboring 
separatist ideals so the movement would have longevity.593 
 
 
Insurgent groups 
 
Scores of historians, political scientists, security professionals, and insurgents 
have written about the southern insurgent groups.  Their histories need not be 
repeated here.  Certain details on their activities are necessary, however, to help 
reveal the scope of the rebellion. 
 
 
BNPP 
 
The oldest of the post WW II southern insurgents groups, the BNPP began in 
1959.  Tengku Mahyiddin founded it.594  Originally an ex-raja-driven political 
movement, in 1981, the BNPP’s constitution stated: “The basic political ideology of 
the BNPP is based on al-Qur’an, al-Hadith and other sources of Islamic law.”595  
After that, its international connections reflected its religious philosophy: Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Malaysia.596  It had a headquarters in Mecca.597  “In 
fact,” writes Angelo Carlo Valsesia, “the BNPP network maintained relations with 
external subjects such as the Al-Azhar University in Cairo where they established 
a centre for advocacy and fund raising, as well as with the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).”598  It 
also funneled southern Thai youth into the University of King Abdul Aziz in Jedda, 
Saudi Arabia.  It had a headquarters in Kelantan, Malaysia as well, and had good 
relations with conservative Islamic parties in Malaysia such as the Parti Islam.599  
In 1986, the BNPP changed its name to the Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani 
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(BIPP) (“Islamic Liberation Front of Pattani”) to reflect its more staunch Islamic 
leanings.600 
 
 
PULO 
 
PULO formed in 1968 in India at Aligarh Muslim University in Aligarah, a city in 
Uttar Pradesh, a state in central northeast India.  Tengku Bria Kotanila, aka Kabir 
Abdul Rahman, a political science student from Pattani, founded it.  PULO found 
inspiration for its name in the PLO.601 
 
PULO organized around secular principles.  Its rally cry was “national secularism.”  
PULO did not shun Islam, however.  On the contrary, evidence demonstrates 
PULO was never a wholly secular movement.  Tangku kept Islam in his movement 
by calling for the establishment of a Muslim state.  He proclaimed, “With all our 
might, the people, of Patani will try and will continue to fight for the freedom of 
Patani and the emergence of an Islamic Republic.”602 
 
PULO’s prime recruiting ground and early 1980s headquarters was Mecca, the 
holy Muslim city.  Thai Malay Muslims visited and/or lived there to be close to God, 
not for business or tourism, thereby illustrating the religious side of PULO.603  
PULO’s constitution states its ideology is anchored in Islam, nation, and 
humanitarianism.604  More evidence comes from a PULO fighter’s diary; he 
claimed he helped murder Muslims that were not Islamic enough.  This latter type 
of killing meant PULO had takfir tendencies, or a Muslim killing a Muslim, which is 
illegal under mainstream Islamic law.605 
 
PULO had a strong overseas network.  It had training headquarters in Damascus, 
Syria and in northern Malaysia.  Its operational command was in Tumpat, a city on 
the east coast of Malaysia northeast of Kota Baru – just south of Tak Bai, 
Narathiwat.606  So strong was the Malaysian network, in January 1994, the 
Consul-General of Kota Baru, Malaysia, indicated Thai Malay Muslims were 
joining PULO to get its membership cards.  PULO membership cards gave Thai 
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Malay Muslims work privileges in Malaysia.  This signified at least some northern 
Malaysian government officials recognized the card as legitimate.607 
 
PULO was adept at gathering international Islamic support.  Tengku successfully 
lobbied Syria and Libya for economic aid, and he also garnered Arabic Muslim 
political support.  He traveled throughout Muslim countries making his case, even 
in West Africa.  In January 1980, at the Islamic Summit Conference in Mecca and 
Taif, PULO published “Pattani Plea for Muslim Help” in the April 1981 issue of The 
Journal of the Muslim World League.  The article was republished elsewhere, and 
PULO received international aid as a result.608 
 
 
New PULO 
 
New PULO formed between 1993 and 1995 – dates vary – as a result of rifts in 
PULO’s leadership.609  Thai officials believe it received funding from Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and Pakistan.610  New PULO was dedicated to violence.  In one of its 
earliest operations in August 1993, it set fire to 30 or more schools in Yala, 
Pattani, and Narathiwat.611  Working along side the BRN in April 1997, it killed four 
rubber tappers in Betong, Narathiwat.612  In February 1998, captured PULO 
insurgent Abdulharem Dorloh said to the press New PULO was continuing is 
violent operations while PULO had opted not to: “Haji Da-oh [of New PULO] still 
wants to use sabotage acts in his fight against the government while Haji Sama-
aer [of PULO] disagrees with the strategy.”613 
 
 
BRN (National Liberation Front) 
 
Also known as the Liberation Front of the Republic of Patani (LFRP), the BRN 
formed on 13 March 1960.  Other researchers say 1968.  The BRN was socialist 
and loosely aligned with the Communist Party of Malaysia and the CPT.  For this 
reason, many imams shunned it.  Its nexus with Islam came from Moammar 
Kadafi’s Libyan brand of Arabic nationalism-socialism.  The BRN associated with 
what Wan Kadir writes were “liberal” Muslim countries such as Syria, Libya, and 
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Algeria.614  Despite its political roots, its first leader was ex-pondok teacher Karim 
Hajj Hassan.  As a result, the BRN was exceptionally effective at recruiting pondok 
students.615 
 
The BRN built an effective fighting force that carried out multiple bombings and 
kidnappings.  One of its more memorable operations was the 7 March 1980 attack 
on Yala town using six time bombs that wounded seven.616  In 1994, the BRN 
formed a “Muslim Commando Unit,” but not of fighters.  Government COIN 
operations had taken their toll, and BRN began to place more emphasis on 
political and religious psyops than kinetic operations.  This is what the BNPP did in 
the 1980s when it failed militarily to achieve its goals.617  The BRN did not wholly 
cease its operations, however, and launched a slew of attacks in 1994.618  In 
November 1997, it conducted joint bombing operations with New PULO targeting 
military, police, and local government targets to avenge the death of BRN leader 
Arlee Torbala by police in Narathiwat.619  This seemed to be separate from the 
Falling Leaves campaign. 
 
 
BRN-C 
 
Beginning in the 1970s, the BRN divided into three factions.  The first breakaway 
group was the BRN-Coordinate (BRN-C), which formed in 1979.  The other two 
were the BRN-Congress, which formed 10 April 1984, and BRN-Uran or BRN-
Ulama, which also formed in 1984.  Sources vary on which one was the strongest 
– some say the Coordinate, others, the Congress.620  Thai insurgency and expert 
Zachary Abuza asserts the BRN-C sought public support in the mosques for its 
program of separatism and Islam.  He describes the group as “distinctly Islamist.”  
They also formed a youth group, Pemuda (“Youth”), in 1992.621  In 1996, its main 
operations were extortion rackets taking protection fees from rubber tree plantation 
owners planters in Rangae district, Narathiwat.622 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614 Thailand’s Southern Insurgency, p. 45, and Che Man, op. cit., p. 106, and “Amin 
urged to return from exile,” in Bangkok Post, 9 March 1998. 
615 Che Man, op. cit., p. 108. 
616 Satha-Anand, op. cit., pp. 10-12. 
617 University of Maryland, op. cit. 
618 Ibid. 
619 “Security beefed up in South after bomb attacks,” in Bangkok Post, 12 November 
1997. 
620 Thailand’s Southern Insurgency, p. 46. 
621 Ibid., p. 46, and Z. Abuza, “A Breakdown of Southern Thailand's Insurgent Groups,” 
in Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 4 Issue: 17, Jamestown Foundation, 8 September 
2006, available on 
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=893>. 
622 “3 armed separatist leaders surrender to Yala police,” in Bangkok Post, 24 February 
1998. 
	  	   157	  
GMIP  
 
Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (“Pattani Islamic Holy Warriors Movement”) 
formed in 1989 from disgruntled members of the BIPP and a small group called 
Gerakan Mujahideen Patani.  Some analysts assert it was more of a criminal 
organization than a separatist one.  Others differ and describe it as a political 
organizer based in Malaysia with more than 1,000 members.  The latter also say it 
had an active sabotage movement that engaged in mayhem and extortion.  Most 
analysts agree the GMIP had in its leadership Afghan war veterans.  It is alleged 
to have trafficked weapons for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines 
and the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia.623 
 
 
Black December 1902 
 
Black December 1902 was a small group little written about except for its 
assassination attempt via bomb – with the help of PULO – on the king and queen 
on 22 September 1977 in Yala, its main area of operations.  Its name came from 
the month and year Thailand and the British (who then controlled Malaysia) 
agreed on their common border partition, which officially annexed Patani into 
Thailand proper.  Authorities in the 1970s believed the group began operations in 
January 1975 after announcing its presence via hundreds of propaganda leaflets.  
Shortly thereafter, it allegedly shot three Buddhist hunters in Yala and stabbed to 
death and then beheaded a postmaster at his Yala home.624  Other than that, 
Black September 1902 claimed to have bombed numerous targets in 1977-78 in 
the south. 
 
 
Sabilillah 
 
Sabilillah (“The Path of God”) formed during the Pattani Demonstration in 1975 
where it handed out propaganda leaflets.  It was responsible for the bombing of 
the Sungai Kolok-Bangkok express rail line on 4 June 1977.  It also bombed the 
Hat Yai rail station in October 1978.625  In a more daring operation, Sabilillah 
bombed Don Muang Airport in Bangkok on 4 June 1977  (Panomporn, pp. 428, 
writes this was July 1977.)  In an interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review 
in 1980, the governor of Narathiwat said he “reluctantly respected” Sabilillah.  It 
was the only insurgent group that concentrated on urban operations.626 
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Bersatu 
 
Bersatu was an umbrella organization that brought together PULO, New PULO, 
GMP, and BRN.627  It had its origins on 31 August 1989 when Wan Kadir Che Man 
sponsored a meeting in Malaysia called “the gathering of the fighters for Pattani” 
and formed the “Payong Organization,” an umbrella insurgent group that sought to 
unite all Malay Muslim insurgent groups.  It was unable to unite all groups at that 
time.  Its formal name was Majelis Permesyuaratan Rakyat Melayu Patani, 
(MPRMP) (“Patani Malay People’s Consultative Council.”)  In 1991, it changed its 
name to “The United Front for the Independence of Pattani” or Bersatu (“United”) 
for short.  Wan knew personally many insurgent leaders from their school days 
together in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, particularly the BNPP’s Badi Hamdan.628  He 
moreover had international Islamic connections, particularly with the Muslim World 
League, that funded his research and book on the insurgency.  His research 
included travel to Saudi Arabia and Malaysia in 1986.629 
 
In 1997, Bersatu successfully united the far south’s insurgent groups and declared 
jihad against the state.630  That launched the Falling Leaves campaign.  It mostly 
targeted Thai government personnel, including local administrators, police, and 
teachers with bombings, arson, and assassinations.631  Because of effective 
government COIN operations, Bersatu was short on manpower, so it recruited 
drug dealers and addicts to carry out most of its attacks.  They crossed into 
Malaysia, met with insurgent leaders for operational orders, and then crossed back 
into Thailand to carry them out.  Bersatu paid its new fighters 5,000 baht each.  
The campaign spanned through Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat.632  It included six 
bombing operations, at least two ambushes, four grenade attacks, scores of 
assassinations, and at least one major raid.633 
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4. People – The At-Risk Population 
 
In the 1980s-90s, the population in the far south was, and still is, ethnically and 
religiously different from the rest of Thailand.  About 3.5 percent of Thailand is 
Muslim, or 2.1 million people.  The total population is 64 million and 
overwhelmingly Theravada Buddhist.  There are 27,000 Buddhist temples in 
Thailand and 3,000 mosques – 70 percent of which are in the far south.634  
Seventy-five to 80 percent of the far southern population is Malay Muslim.635  Most 
of these are Sunnis and follow the Shafi’i sect.636  They commonly speak Malay 
and Thai, but more rural people speak Malay.  The latter also use Jawi as written 
script more than Thai.  This is not so in towns. 
 
The rest of the southern population is Thai or Chinese and Buddhist.  The far 
south’s population historically has been divided in its loyalty to the Thai state.  
While loyalists outnumber those who are not, rebellion is indeed a part of the 
region’s social fabric and history.  And loyalty in the far south does not necessarily 
mean dedication to Nation, Religion, and King.  For some, it means loyalty out of 
convenience by a population with nowhere else to go.  
 
The far south began as what Thai Malay Muslim expert Michael Gilquin says was 
an “inward-looking, rural society” based on subsistence farming and fishing.637  In 
the 1980s, as in the present, agriculture was the main economic sector of the far 
south, specifically rubber (23.4%), rice (9.2 %), fruit (3.1 %), coconuts (1.9), palm 
oil (NA), and fishing (NA).638  These sectors provide 45 percent of the region’s 
jobs.  The import-export sector employs 15 percent of the population, tourism 13 
percent, and miscellaneous industries account for the remainder.  In the 1980s, 
there was a growing industrial sector that included food processing, wood mills, 
and the like.639 
 
Far south cultural expert Andrew Cornish argues there was an understudied 
division between rural and town populations in the far south.  Rural populations at 
the time of his research, the mid-1980s-90s, far outnumbered those who lived in 
urban areas.  He notes in 1986, for example, Yala and Betong, the two biggest 
towns in Yala province, accounted for only 26 percent of the population.  Yet those 
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in cities looked down upon villagers.  Rural people were embarrassed to wear their 
“country” clothing to town; they would even make fun of each other over their 
inability to navigate cities and tend to town business.  People in towns were more 
apt to speak Thai to show their sophistication.  It was a definite societal divide that 
caused social friction.  Conservative Muslims, asserts Cornish, provided a social 
shelter from that friction, as it transcended the gap.640 
 
Thai Malay Muslims in the far south herald their identity and see themselves as 
unique.  Malays all over Southeast Asia behave similarly, and in Thailand, the fact 
that they are a dense minority surrounded by a culture much different from theirs 
elevates this sentiment.  “They cherish their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness,” 
writes Omar Farouk Bajunid, a specialist on Thai Malay Muslims.641  Gilquin, adds, 
“It is revealing that the term for converting to Islam in the local language, masok 
melayu, literally means, ‘to become Malay’.”642  So to a Malay Muslim, it is not 
simply an ethnicity or religious issue, it is a merging of the two that has created, in 
their perception, an essence that has deep cultural and historical roots. 
 
Thai researchers Utai and Lertchai write the mosque and the pondok are two of 
the most important institutions to the faithful.  They claim the pondok is the oldest 
learning institution in the far south and preserves their culture more than any other 
entity.  Historians trace the first pondok to 1624 in Talomanok village in 
Narathiwat.  Likewise, the imam and pondok teacher, the toguru or ustaz, are two 
of the most influential people in society.  They provide wisdom, knowledge, and 
guidance in all manners of life – spiritual, material, and political.643  Perhaps a third 
of the far south’s population adheres to conservative or ultra-conservative Islam, 
but this is only an estimate. 
 
Thai Malay Muslims believe in what Gilquin calls a “culture of prestige” where 
“notability seems a permanent quest.”644   It includes specialized hobbies such as 
top spinning, kite flying, and raising songbirds – all of which entail competitions.  
Koran reading competitions are common, too.  The culture overall holds Islamic 
study and the medical field in high esteem.645  Despite seeing themselves as 
culturally unique, Gilquin notes, “…there is a desire to exist as social, economic, 
cultural, and political participants in the Thai framework.”646  So while they are 
different, rebellion is not necessarily their culture, but insurgents have certainly 
tried to make it so.647 
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Crime and violence is a part of the far south’s culture, too.  Historically, Malay 
Muslims have been hardy survivors in a tough, less-than-friendly agricultural 
environment.  Duncan McCargo writes theft, a readiness to fight, and an 
argumentative nature characterize the region’s arduous side.648  He also says 
these rough and tumble attributes coupled with a high level of crime and 
insurgency characterize not only the population, but their politics as well.649  K&R 
schemes, smuggling, and extortion by criminal gangs are common.  Organized 
crime heads called chao pho in Thai (“godfather”) were particularly prevalent in the 
1980s.650  Gilquin notes while Islam forbids gambling, Thai Malay Muslim culture 
has a “clandestine betting” penchant for animal fights with roosters, buffalos, and 
fish.651 
 
Muslims in other parts of Thailand – Bangkok, Chachoengsao (east southeast of 
Bangkok), Ayutthaya, Chiang Rai, and Chaing Mai live in harmony with Thailand 
and do not isolate themselves from the rest of the country.652  Malay Muslims are 
different.  Bajunid writes they have historically been resistant to assimilation into 
Thai society.653  This is different from them wanting to exist within the Thai 
framework as their own unique culture; but the two sentiments – wanting to exist 
within the framework while simultaneously striving to be uniquely Malay Muslim – 
are not always synonymous.  Citing cultural dogma, some Thai Malay Muslims put 
Islam before state laws, which causes friction with Bangkok. 
 
Despite their adherence to Islam, Malay Muslims in southern Thailand have little 
knowledge of the Koran.  Their knowledge of Arabic, the holy language of Islam, is 
scant, which hinders deeper understanding of the religion.  Most locals learned 
Islam by word of mouth.654 
 
Gilquin asserts the traditional Thai Malay Muslim method of learning Islam is a 
poor substitute for learning critical thinking.  Islamic students in the border 
provinces traditionally memorized Koran verses by reciting them over and over 
again in Arabic without fully understanding the language.  He writes, “This way of 
studying Islam was based on assimilating unchallengeable norms, rather than true 
acquisition of theological knowledge.  Rationality and logic, though central to 
classic Muslim thought, were annihilated in rigid reading of texts which did not 
provide a means of facing a changing world.”655 
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Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand have traditionally not been big business 
owners.  They were more often the labor pool for Thai and Chinese businesses.  
During economic down times, they found work across the border in north Malaysia 
by the thousands.  Many have dual citizenship in both counties, and their families 
are scattered on both sides of the border.656 
 
Gilquin also asserts many Thai Malay Muslims compound their unique view of 
themselves with a “nostalgic” and “embellished” history, not because it is 
irrelevant, but because it is largely undocumented and oral.  Some Thai Malay 
Muslims, however, are fiercely protective of their version of their own history, 
which is replete with glorious economic, political, and military feats and also 
extreme cruelty at the hands of Siam.  The extreme version feeds separatist 
sentiments and anti-Thai fervor.  It clashes with Thai versions of the far south’s 
history, which has been dismissive and damaging to Thai-Malay Muslim 
relations.657 
 
Since WW II, and especially in the 1990s, Gilquin says conservative Islam in the 
far south has clashed with traditional customs, such as women wearing black 
head-to-toe and face-covering niqab.  It represented an ultra orthodox treatment of 
women and other strict Islamic interpretations.  Hijab is the usual female Muslim 
garb in the border provinces.  Hijab suggests faith in mainstream Islam without 
radical tendencies.658  Of the increase in radical Islam, Gilquin warned in the early 
2000s, “the development of these micro-societies, which seek a model in a 
mythical past having little in common with Southeast Asian society, need to be 
watched.”659 
 
 
5. The Thai Malay Muslim 1980s-90s COIN Strategy 
 
The Tai Rom Yen Plan 
 
The Tai RomYen Plan was the COIN plan for the far southern border provinces 
under Prem.  General Harn produced it on 2 October 1981 as Fourth Army Order 
No. 751/2524 and was in charge of its execution.660  The plan was remarkably 
similar to the 66/2523 Plan but tailored to fit the nuances of the far south.661  “The 
strategy was to use development coupled with security; it was our Cold War 
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strategy,” says Major General Perapong Manakit.662  The overall goal was to 
eliminate the terror and insurgent groups operating there, including the CPT, the 
Communist Party of Malaysia, and Thai Malay Muslim rebels.663  The plan 
stated:664 
 
1. To secure the lives and properties of all the people regardless 
ethnicity and religion.  Both Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims will be 
protected by government forces from the threat of communist 
insurgents, terrorist movements, Malaya communist terrorists and 
various influential persons. 
 
2. To establish security on the Thai-Malaysian border area in order to 
revitalize the economy of the border provinces and to upgrade good 
relationship between Thailand and Malaysia. 
 
3. To eliminate by peaceful means dictatorial, influential, and shady 
power, which dominate the region, in order to ensure that all the people 
enjoy their right, freedom, and equality be it political, economic, or 
social, under a constitutional monarchy. 
 
4. To establish good relationship and to manage conflicts between the 
authorities and the people. 
 
It was the first comprehensive, coordinated, and long-term strategy the 
government ever applied to the south.  And since it was derived from the 
communist COIN strategy and the war had been going on for some time, the 
government did not have to generate a new COIN doctrine and re-learn about the 
southern border problem.665  The ingredients for action were all there. 
 
There was a key difference from communist COIN approach, however; the 
inclusion of the government’s 1960s-70s integration policies, which continued 
under Tai Rom Yen.  Even when General Harn left his command in 1985, 
commanders that followed adhered to his strategic premise.666  Chuan Leekpai 
notes the southern COIN strategies were designed so successive governments 
would not have to significantly redesign their approaches to the insurgency, 
though changes did occur.667 
 
Tai Rom Yen differed substantially from past Thai Malay Muslim COIN policies.  
First, past COIN plans were temporary suppression, political integration, or 
development programs.  None were permanent, and few included multiple COIN 
pillars all at once.  The Tai Rom Yen scheme did.  Second, the new plan included 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
662 Perapong, op. cit. 
663 Noiwong, op. cit., pp. 420-425 and Wongtrangan, op. cit., p. 24. 
664 Wongtrangan, op. cit., p. 25. 
665 Noiwong, op. cit., pp. 420-425. 
666 Cole, op. cit. 
667 Chuan, op. cit. 
	  	   164	  
a border security campaign.  Insurgents for years had free reign to seek sanctuary 
on either side of the Thai-Malay boundary.  It was a key enabler of insurgent 
violence.668 
 
Amnesty was absent from Tai Rom Yen, but the 66/2523 Plan applied nationwide, 
so General Harn did not include it in his plan for the far south.  Additionally, 
amnesty was not alien in the southern war.  Thai Malay Muslim insurgents had 
previously surrendered in the 1970s, and they continued to do so in the 1980s-
90s.  Amnesty in the south was not so widely bestowed, however.  The 
government did not give it to terrorists, but it did to their auxiliary support and low-
level fighters.  Says Dr. Arun, “So our policy at that time was to treat the various 
organizations [insurgents] as criminals instead of political groups.  Their tactics at 
the time were criminal – extortion, kidnapping, and arson.”669 
 
General Akanit adds:  
 
Look, PULO and the others might have been insurgent groups aiming 
for independence, or whatever they thought that was, but they also 
excelled in extortion, organized crime, and killing civilians with 
bombings.  So during that time, we fought PULO and the other 
insurgents by using the criminal law.  With the communists, we used 
the anti-communist law.  With [that], we had the authority to grant 
amnesty.  But it was criminal law for the southern insurgents.  They 
murdered civilians.670 
 
Neither did Tai Rom Yen discuss diplomacy with Middle Eastern countries or 
cooperation with Malaysia beyond border operations.  “At that time,” Says Dr. 
Arun, “you know, we used intelligence, patience, and an internal policy to handle 
the matter.  Without looking far to other countries, even to Malaysia, when their 
connection was by blood and ethnicity.”671  Diplomacy would play a major COIN 
role in the 1990s, however. 
 
Integration strategies from the 1970s remained, but they were the Kriangsak type 
– gentle.  The goal of integration was in the 1980s-90s the same as it was in the 
1970s: to shape a Thai Malay Muslim population that was moderate and friendly to 
the government and other races and religions to drown out the conservative and 
hostile section of the southern border community.  To shape the population, the 
government, through new coordination programs and allied with the moderates, 
sought to co-opt the neutrals.  It also aimed to educate the region’s youth in 
secular-Muslim programs to make them less gullible to radicals.  “This [was] one of 
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the most important strategies of the Army and the Thai government in 
contemporary integration,” writes Panomporn.672 
 
General Kitti, Fourth Army commander in the early 1990s, added to the state’s 
COIN strategy.  While he kept to the basics of Tai Rom Yen, General Kitti added 
several tenets, including amnesty and diplomacy with insurgents living overseas.  
He moreover engaged Malaysia regarding help with investigations and 
suppression, something that paid massive dividends years later. 
 
Regarding diplomacy with the insurgent leaders, General Kitti says, “When I was 
the Fourth Army Area Commander, I thought we should solve the problem with the 
separatists by the peaceful means, not military means, so I contacted the leaders 
of PULO and BRN.  They lived abroad, some in the Middle East, some in 
Malaysia.  So I sent my aid, then Colonel Akanit, to meet with them in Egypt.”673  
His goal, at the very least, was to convince them to stop fighting. 
 
He also offered them and other insurgent leaders amnesty via an upgrade to the 
existing Phu Ruom Pattana Chat amnesty program.  Kitti’s upgrade such was the 
Krong Kahn Thai Muslim Keh Ban Hah Thai Muslim program, which means, “Thai 
Muslim Must Solve the Problem Himself.”674 The Fourth Army funded it, and CPM-
43 managed it.  The plan allowed insurgents to surrender so long as they joined 
government development programs to improve the plight of the nation’s poor.  
General Kitti thought it was a good way for insurgents to put their energies into 
changing the south, but not by violence.  The programs worked but never had the 
chance to fully develop because Bangkok transferred Kitti out of the south.  Years 
later, however, the government adapted near identical programs to help defeat the 
guerrillas.675 
 
 
Economic Strategy 
 
Another alteration of the southern COIN strategy in the 1980s-90s was to prioritize 
economic development.  In the 1980s, economic programs kept the southern 
border population from falling deeper into poverty, but they were still the third 
poorest people in Thailand, which exacerbated the insurgency.  To fix this, the 
government in 1994 injected massive funds into industrial, strategic development, 
and business projects.  As a result, the government changed its COIN strategy 
that year to reflect its success to “economic leads, public relations follows, peace 
and order supports.”676  It was essentially an alteration of the mix of the three 
pillars. 
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The Pitak Tai Plan 
 
In 1998, because of the Falling Leaves offensive by Bersatu, the government drew 
up a new strategy, Pitak Tai.  One of its main drivers was PM Chuan Leekpai, and 
it is evident some of the ideas for it came from General Kitti and his Krong Kahn 
Thai Muslim Keh Ban Hah Thai Muslim program.  Pitak Tai was also rooted in 
General Prem’s and Harn’s 1980s-era COIN strategies.  Operations began in 
January 1998, but official sanctioning of the strategy did not occur until July 1998 
via PM Order No. 127/2541. 
 
Pitak Tai had a force component and two political components; amnesty and 
diplomacy.  Like the communist COIN, amnesty allowed insurgents back into 
society, but with conditions.  The government used hard-hitting kinetic operations, 
however, to scare insurgents into making a choice between fighting and dying or 
accepting the government’s generous rehabilitation program.  Regarding 
diplomacy, the main thrust aimed at getting Malaysia to go beyond border security 
cooperation and actually identify and arrest Thai Malay Muslim insurgents hiding in 
Malaysia.  It was a major change in policy – something General Kitti tried to do but 
was stifled for reasons unknown. 
 
Special Branch Commissioner Somkiat Phuangsup was the main architect of the 
amnesty program under Pitak Tai.677  Commissioner Somkiat spent but a year as 
chief of Special Branch that began in mid-1997.  He was not a southern 
insurgency expert like Kitti and Akanit.  Nor did he have the intricate understanding 
of southern political and security issues like Chuan.  Somkiat was a police crime 
fighter for 34 years and had spent significant time in Bangkok.  One of his 
colleagues said of him to the press: “Mention his name and every hired gunman 
felt a chill down his spine.”678  When he took the Special Branch position, he 
brought his dedication and long experience in investigative skills to the fore, key in 
identifying, locating, and then neutralizing insurgent leaders and their networks.679 
 
 
6. Coordination for the Thai Malay Muslim 1980s-90s COIN 
 
With Kriangsak and Prem, COIN coordination became doctrine, not only for the 
communist COIN, but also for the war in the far south.  “According to the Army,” 
writes Panomporn, “integration of this area in the 80s must be unified and 
systematized for security purposes.”680  Up to that point, political, economic, and 
security affairs had been uncoordinated and done piecemeal in the far south; 
witness the scattered kinetic operations in the 1960s-70s that occurred amidst 
free-floating political and economic projects.  The chain of command was muddled 
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and ineffectual.  Thai leaders of the 1980s realized this, and they also knew from 
their own experiences with the communist COIN discombobulated agencies and a 
divided government hindered operations and allowed the enemy to strengthen its 
ranks.  Kriangsak and Prem’s coordination efforts proved a united front of security, 
politics, and development was far more effective.  In the south, the government 
used ISOC and CPM-43 to coordinate and execute the security front and the SB-
PAC to coordinate and execute the political and economic fronts. 
 
 
ISOC and CPM-43 
 
ISOC and the CPM concept proved successful in the communist COIN, so there 
was no need to reinvent the wheel for the far south’s COIN.  Prem made CPM-43 
official via PM’s order No. 8/2524, on 20 January 1981.681  The security chain of 
command for the Thai Malay Muslim COIN was the same as the communist COIN 
accept for the injection of the Fourth Army into the mix.  The PM was in command 
of all COIN efforts.  The NSC served as a security advisory board and policy 
maker.682  ISOC, specifically ISOC 4, served as the regional coordinator, and 
CPM-43 was the on-the-ground implementer.  (ISOC 1, 2, 3, and 4 coordinated 
national security affairs in Army Regional Commands 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively.)  
The Fourth Army had major influence at all levels.  Says General Kitti, “The Fourth 
Army commanded the Army and police under CPM-43.  The PM let the Fourth 
Army solve the problems – the government made the policy – but the Fourth Army 
ran the projects the planning, devised how to fight, figured out the tactics.  It 
executed operations, got in touch with the people and, eventually, the rebels.”683 
 
Early in the war, General Kitti was the Fifth Division Commander of the Fourth 
Army.  There were 10,000 soldiers in a division.  He says, “We had the 
responsibility to deal with this problem in the south, but only some of my unit, not 
the entire Fifth Division.”684  This was in accordance with Prem’s policy of using 
force, but not too much.  Other units assigned to CPM-43 included 800 Marines 
and 900 Thahan Phran of the 41st and 43d Regiments.685  Standard units of the 
police and BPP of the TNP’ Region 9, the latter’s police command for the entire 
south, also participated. 
 
“The functions of the combined force, or CPM-43, were many,” says Chuan.  
“First, it gathered intelligence about the insurgency.  Second, it engaged in 
prevention of insurgent attacks, which was like physical security.  Third, it carried 
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out suppression operations of insurgents, which was actively seeking out and 
engaging insurgents through military operations.”686 
 
The RTA largely took responsibility for security of rural and mountainous areas 
where guerrillas might coagulate, and the TNP took responsibility for security for 
more populated areas, the plateaus and towns.  The RTA mostly operated at the 
tambon level with rifle companies where they could send QRFs to aid CPM forces 
and react to intelligence concerning insurgents on the move.  This is where the 
RTA identified, fixed, and fought guerrillas with ambushes, raids, and pursuits.687 
 
There were exceptions, however, and the Thai stayed flexible regarding 
deployments.  Sometimes, this would result in a seesaw effect with insurgents.  
When the RTA conducted operations in the mountains, it sometimes forced 
insurgents into the plains and towns for sanctuary.  They also occasionally used 
these times to stage attacks in areas where the RTA was not.688  This was a 
natural guerrilla reaction, however, to government operations that were not entirely 
seamless. 
 
A side project of CPM-43 was the Land Resettlement Project.  It took Thai 
Buddhist volunteers from other parts of Thailand and provided them farmland on 
the Thai-Malay border.  The farmers not only tilled their plots, they collected 
intelligence and provided security, too.  The government trained and organized 
them.  There is no outward evidence the program was successful, however.  
Insurgents penetrated the border at will, and puritanical Thai Malay Muslims 
protested the program as an effort to dilute their race.689 
 
 
The SB-PAC 
 
In September 1980 at the Senanarong RTA base in Songkhla, top government 
officials discussed the pros and cons of establishing a new administrative center 
for the far south that would focus on political, cultural, economic, and development 
issues.  The old one did not work, allowing the insurgency to increase its intensity.  
They decided to create a new agency that would have more clout and competence 
than the old Coordination Center.690  That agency was the Southern Border 
Provinces Administrative Center (SB-PAC).  The Thai nicknamed it “Saw Aw Paw 
Taw.”691 
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The PM sanctioned the SB-PAC with the same order that established CPM-43, 
No. 8/2524.692  The SB-PAC began operations in Yala in the old Coordination 
Center building in on 23 March 1981 (unofficial SB-PAC documents say it began 
operations in February 1981.693)  SB-PAC’s main job was to administer Civil 
Affairs policy, help the military maintain law and order, and restore peace to the 
area.694  An official SP-PAC history states: “Since its establishment in 1981, A.D., 
SBPAC had carried out various tasks mainly concerning psychological activities to 
win the heart[s] of the citizen[s] of the 5 southern border provinces and enhance 
mutual understanding between government officials and the general public of the 
era.”695 
 
Chuan describes the SB-PAC this way:  
 
The function of SB-PAC was to command and supervise government 
agencies in the area as they carried out tasks to improve the plight of 
the southerners.  It worked with the military to transfer corrupt officials 
out of the south and focused on improving the effectiveness of local 
officials and the local government apparatus.  It moreover drew up 
plans for development and followed up and evaluated those projects. It 
had a local advisory board to aid it in its planning and decision-making.  
And it also did other jobs assigned by Fourth Army Commander.696   
 
The SB-PAC had 175 civil servants in 1981, 132 of which came from the MoI.697  It 
added more personnel as needed. 
 
The SB-PAC’s chain of command was clear and concise.  It was an MoI 
organization, which meant MoI management of operations and budget.  PM Prem 
directly supervised it, however.698  This latter arrangement signified the 
government’s desire to circumvent the inadequate DoLA that had done so poorly 
run the old Coordination Center.699  Since the Fourth Army Commander was in 
charge of all COIN operation in the far south, he was also above the head of the 
SB-PAC in the chain of command, though such commanders rarely, if ever, micro-
managed it.700  For the most part, the RTA let the SB-PAC run its own affairs. 
 
The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) was also in the 
SB-PAC chain of command.  The NESDB was an agency on par with the lofty 
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NSC, and it planned the SB-PAC’s economic and social projects on a strategic 
level.  The Office of the Secretary of the Royal Initiatives Projects (RIP) also had a 
hand in making development policy for the far south, but royal projects were not 
under the purview of the SB-PAC.  They fell under the Thai Royal Family.701 
 
Tasking 
 
The SB-PAC had five areas it sought to improve: social, political, foreign relations 
with Muslim countries, economic development, and security.702  Within these, it 
had seven main responsibilities.  They were:703 
 
1. To supervise all government agencies working on political, cultural, and 
economic projects in the southern border provinces 
2. To manage all SB-PAC projects 
3. To identify corrupt or inept government officials working in the far south 
and turn their names and transgressions over to the Fourth Army 
commander for their removal from office 
4. To help develop the capabilities of the government personnel to make 
them better civil servants, especially with regard to recognizing the 
culture of the southern border provinces 
5. To insure all SB-PAC projects are coordinated with the appropriate 
agencies and CPM-43 and to collect and analyze information of such 
projects to monitor their progress and effectiveness 
6. To assign from the local community advisors to SB-PAC to insure 
projects are carried out according to local needs and customs 
7. To execute the orders of the Fourth Army Commander 
 
To this, the government added seven objectives for SB-PAC.  Many were 
multifaceted and repetitive of SB-PAC’s seven main responsibilities:704 
 
1. To promote the Thai language, to improve understanding between the 
government and people, and to improve the locals’ quality of life 
2. Increase “cross cultural contact” between Malay Muslims with persons of 
other religions and races throughout Thailand 
3. Consult with local Muslim leaders in all aspects of SB-PAC work 
4. Coordination of all government administrative bodies in the border 
provinces 
5. Demonstrate to foreign Muslim countries the situation in the far south and 
secure their help in cutting off outside aid to insurgents 
6. Upgrade social and economic projects to increase the standard of living 
of people in the southern border provinces 
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7. Protect locals from terrorism 
 
While the central government made broad policy, the SB-PAC had the power and 
the responsibility to plan and carry out projects in the field and deal directly with 
Islamic leaders by appointing local advisors, which was one of its strong points.705  
Chuan explains, “The government, no matter the level, got information from local 
business leaders for plans and projects that were necessary to enhance the south, 
so these were always reasonable projects.”706  So there was considerable 
consultation with locals concerning SB-PAC projects, which meant the 
organization was, in fact, more than a simple executor of Bangkok’s plans.  The 
SB-PAC planned and made local policy, too. 
 
More than this, the government meant the SB-PAC to be the continual torchbearer 
of a specific southern border COIN policy despite changes that might occur in the 
central government.  Says Chuan:  
 
Together with the policies created and following amendments, the SB-
PAC was used to guide policy implementation in the area despite 
government changes in Bangkok.  So new governments at the national 
level relied on the SB-PAC to help maintain stability in the south.  We 
can say that through this national security policy, it helped various 
agencies execute their policies with continuity, and it helped resolve 
the problems effectively.707 
 
 
Organization 
 
The SB-PAC’s organization was purely functional.  It began with eight divisions, 
but in 1981-82, the government changed its structure to seven.  They were:708 
 
1. Planning and projects 
2. Information 
3. Registration 
4. Personnel 
5. Education and Religious 
6. Psychological Operations and Public Relations 
7. Research and Evaluation 
 
The cabinet, at the behest of the Fourth Army Commander, assigned four special 
committees to SB-PAC that focused on political integration.  They were:709 
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1. Advisory 
2. Psychological Operations 
3. Master Plan (for establishing security on the border) 
4. Educational Improvement 
 
These were political, cultural, and social means the Fourth Army Commander saw 
as pivotal to pacifying the far south.  Additionally, he had sway over who headed 
and served on these committees.  The Fourth Army’s chief representative to the 
SB-PAC headed Psychological Operations, for example.  CPM-43’s commander 
headed the Master Plan Committee.  Not all were headed by the military, however; 
Vice Rector of Prince of Songkhla University headed Education Improvement.710  
These committees were designed to work closely with the local population, a 
major switch from the way the Coordination Center used to work with little input 
from Malay Muslims.  As a result, the SB-PAC earned the respect of many 
southerners.  It had an excellent reputation as a problem solver and became a 
positive force to improve the region.711 
 
Despite the friction, this chain of command worked well until the end of General 
Kitti’s tenure as Fourth Army Commander in 1994.  At around that time – sources 
do not say exactly when – the RTA ceded significant power to SB-PAC and the 
MoI.  By at least 1996, the government placed Deputy Permanent Secretary for 
Interior Paitoon Bunyawat in charge of security in the far south.712  This included 
intelligence and command and control of COIN operations.  Pushing the RTA 
aside meant pushing its assets aside, including its robust intelligence network.  As 
a result, the government lost part of its ability to “see” what was going on in the 
insurgency zone.713 
 
It is unclear what caused the change in coordination authority.  It might have been 
because successful suppression operations made the SB-PAC and MoI believe 
there was no need for a heavy military presence.  It also might have been pure 
power politics such as when the Army Region Commanders took power from 
CSOC in 1967; SB-PAC might have lobbied for the army’s dismissal.  If so, the 
mild ISOC-SB-PAC friction finally manifested itself into a chain of command 
shake-up.  Whatever the cause, it resulted in less Army-SB-PAC coordination, and 
the insurgents eventually exploited it with their 1997 Falling Leaves campaign.  
This included preparation for that campaign that likely extended back to at least 
1996. 
 
In May 1997, then Army Commander-in-Chief General Chettha Thanajaro saw 
troubled waters ahead.  He said security command and control changes in the 
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mid-1990s had resulted in “coordination problems among local officials,” but did 
not elaborate further.  He also said, however, he had ordered the Fourth Army to 
cooperate with the civil service regardless of who was in charge of what.714  The 
implication was the Army was less inclined to fully pitch in since the SB-PAC took 
command. 
 
By spring 1997, however, it was too late for the two sides to cooperate.  Bersatu’s 
violent campaign had begun.  Other government leaders realized the folly of the 
civil-military breakdown in the midst of the Falling Leaves mayhem.  Interior 
Minister Sanan Kachornprasart said in December 1997 the SB-PAC did not have 
the funds to effectively operate security programs, and the various intelligence 
agencies involved in the far south were not integrated and ineffectual as a result.  
He also contemplated shutting down the SB-PAC because of the morass.715  It 
appears the governors and the SB-PAC did not have the expertise to run COIN 
operations without RTA assistance. 
 
Adding to these issues, however, was the fact the insurgents had hired teen drug 
addicts and dealers to carry out the Falling Leaves missions, and their parents, 
who were frequently forthcoming with intelligence on adult fighters, were hard 
pressed to turn in their children.  As such, and with the RTA’s intelligence 
apparatus largely out of the picture as a result of infighting with the SB-PAC, the 
up-and-coming offensive went undetected.716 
 
When the Falling Leaves campaign peaked, it prompted major coordination 
changes.  Many government ministers saw the SB-PAC as having failed to detect 
and prevent the operation.  Deputy Interior Minister Chamni Sakdiset on 23 
December 1997 suggested moving all far southern national security issues to the 
cabinet level, which would have cut out the SB-PAC, CPM-43, and the Fourth 
Army from decision making.  Minister Chamni said the problems were beyond the 
problem-solving abilities of the SB-PAC, especially since smuggling and drug use 
had increased as well.  He said the SB-PAC needed to be restructured as a 
coordinator between the TNP and RTA, and talks with KAL were necessary to 
assuage southern border insurgent violence and crime.717  Quite obviously, this 
meant the fragile relationship between the army and police had also fallen into 
disarray, and the security situation on the ground had suffered.718  While Chamni’s 
changes did not occur, they reflected the central government’s frustration with the 
south’s coordination breakdown. 
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Instead of drastic changes in the wake of the Falling Leaves campaign, Bangkok 
instead shifted portfolios within the existing coordination structure.  The SB-PAC 
went back to political and economic affairs and also took on a new psyops task – 
educating the locals on the perils of insurgent groups, their propaganda, and how 
to avoid becoming mixed up with them.  Bangkok put the Fourth Army and its 
CPM-43 back in charge of all intelligence and force application.  ISOC retained its 
coordinating and resource-providing role.719  Government consultants were mixed 
on the return of the military to the south in such full force.  General Kitti supported 
it and also supported PM Chuan in his decision to increase the military presence.  
But he also reminded the government to follow through on post operational 
security measures to insure insurgents and criminals did not melt away only to 
reconstitute and return.  Surin Pitsuan was against the return of the military and 
lobbied for restraint.720 
 
Interior Minister Sanan Kachornprasart agreed with bringing back the Fourth Army, 
which was unusual, because it usurped authority from his portfolio.  He was a 
former military man, however, and it seems likely his main goal was to solve the 
problem and not to cling to power at the expense of the country like some Thai 
officials.  Sanan put the mission first.  “I would like the military to take over the 
task,” he said to the press in December 1997, “with the southern military chief 
being in overall commander.  Provincial governors would receive orders from the 
military.”721  It was a complete turnaround from his previous policy, but the most 
practical decision. 
 
At the same time, the government removed governors, senior police, and top 
military officers from their posts and replaced them as well.  Incompetence and 
corruption had set in, and narcotics trafficking had risen.  Police in Sungai Kolok, 
for example, were caught taking five million baht a month in bribes to ignore drug 
smuggling.722  These were sad signs the gains made under Harn and Kitti 
regarding improving government legitimacy had not taken root. 
 
As for the coordination reshuffle, directly afterward, SB-PAC Governor Palakorn 
Suwannarat had a meeting with the TNP chiefs from Region 9 – all the police 
chiefs in the south – and liaisons from the Fourth Army to re-coordinate the SB-
PAC-ISOC/Fourth Army relationship and put the southern COIN back on track.  A 
major part of this included the SB-PAC’s leading role in the amnesty program 
specified in Pitak Tai.723  After the official PM sanction of Pitak Tai in July 1998, 
Fourth Army Commander Lieutenant General Preecha Suwannasri said his forces 
would remain in the far south to execute kinetic and psychological operations for 
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as long as it took to destroy insurgent forces that wanted to fight and help those 
who wanted to surrender.724 
 
 
* * * 
 
The multitude of insurgent groups in the Thai far south in the 1980s-90s was 
part separatist and part criminal.  With the exception of a small but growing 
cadre of radical Islamists, the insurgents had no grand designs on society.  
Their fractured nature meant a majority of the population were not behind the 
movement.  Additionally, the insurgents’ propensity for terrorism further 
alienated the population from the rebels.  However, Thailand’s penchant for 
mistreating its outlying populations – especially this one that was neither Thai 
nor Buddhist – guaranteed the insurgents a marginal active base of support, and 
passively, a larger one. 
 
Accordingly, Thailand adopted a COIN strategy to change its politico-economic 
approach toward the population, shape the population itself, and isolate 
insurgents from the population.  The end goal was to integrate the south with the 
rest of Thailand while recognizing its unique culture.  The broad tenets of the 
strategy came from the government’s anti-communist COIN.  Specific tents 
came from Bangkok’s efforts to work with a proud Malay Muslim people that 
heralded their culture as sacrosanct. 
 
Lessons about what hindered the communist COIN resulted in a tight 
coordination effort.  This included two commands; one to prosecute security 
operations, and the other to carry out political-economic action.  They were the 
CPM-43 for the former, and the SB-PAC for the latter.  This arrangement forced 
security, political, and economic cooperation by relevant parties, or at least as 
much as possible in government “turf sensitive” Thailand. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The Three Pillars of COIN  
Against the Thai Malay Muslim 1980s-90s Insurgency 
 
 
This chapter addresses Kilcullen’s “three pillars of COIN” against the Malay 
Muslim insurgency in the 80s-90s.  The first section discusses security measures 
to halt insurgent violence.  The second discusses political ways and means.   The 
third addresses economic activities used to assuage the far south’s poverty. 
 
 
1. Thai COIN Security Measures 
 
The security effort for the Thai Malay Muslim COIN mirrored that of the communist 
COIN, but it was not nearly as large or complex.  The threat area and insurgent 
operational tempo were not as significant as that of the CPT.  Geographically, the 
security effort in the far south focused on the four southernmost border provinces: 
Songkhla, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Insurgents staged sporadic attacks 
ranging from a few a months to sustained campaigns such as the Falling Leaves 
operation were there were at least 48 significant attacks in six months.  
Accordingly, using all of Thailand’s military and police was not necessary, but 
using all its capabilities was.  Security operations resulted in more than a thousand 
insurgents arrested and/or killed, and they helped pressure hundreds more to 
request amnesty.725  
 
 
RTA 
 
RTA forces used in the Thai Malay Muslim COIN consisted of the Fourth Army 
because it was responsible for all security operations in the south.  The main units 
used were the Fourth Army’s 5th Infantry and 4th Development Divisions, Special 
Forces units from Lop Buri, the RTM who were traditionally stationed in 
Narathiwat, and RTAF units that provided tactical air support, transport, and 
logistics.  They all operated under the CPM-43 banner, however, so the term 
“CPM” did not only mean village security teams backed by the police and military.  
CPM encompassed all security duties.  Says Chuan, “It was the main implementer 
of security.  It patrolled the border, and provided security for development 
projects.”726 
 
While the RTA fought mostly a light infantry war against the insurgents, it did use 
technology to its advantage.  “In the present war in the in the south, we have 
helicopters, but only for logistics, not tactical attack,” says General Kitti.  “But we 
had them back when I was in command.  We had gunships [Bell UH-1 
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helicopters], so when platoons made contact, we had fire support.  We did not use 
artillery...”727  For observation and reconnaissance aircraft, the Thai mostly used L-
19s, or Cessna 305 “Bird Dogs.”728  
 
Military operations consisted of the same type of operations from the communist 
COIN – patrols, ambushes, sweeps, and supporting local forces with QRF.  These 
were to keep pressure on insurgent forces and to destroy them when possible.  
Aggressive operations based on actionable intelligence in the 1980s severely 
damaged insurgent groups and forced them to break up into smaller bands.  
General Kitti continued this trend in the early 1990s to the point the main guerrilla 
units, PULO and BRN, suffered from a shortage of manpower.  As a result, 
insurgent capabilities waned.729  Thai security operations were successful. 
 
 
COIN Operations in the Field 
 
Some operations resulted in kills, and some did not; most often, they did not, as is 
typical for insurgencies light on manpower.  A typical successful COIN mission 
happened on 29 September 1994.  RTA forces on patrol engaged in a firefight with 
the BRN and killed three.730  Another happened in April 1997 when a patrol on a 
sweep hunting for specific insurgents identified and killed BRN Zone 2 leader Ariya 
Tohbala and his top three aids in Narathiwat.  Major General Wanchai Kanprapha, 
CPM-43 commander, said intelligence from locals was a major reason for the 
operation’s success.731  There were no pitched battles, no Khao Kho type 
operations as in the communist COIN, just light infantry missions that whittled 
away at insurgent forces over time and decreased their abilities to move and 
communicate. 
 
General Kitti says: “We tracked all the time the armed groups.  We sent platoon-
sized formations to fight them all the time.  So we fought them hard and forced 
them into Malaysia…pushed them into Malaysia.  We used small unit tactics.  
There were no battalion-sized operations.  We sent the troops – rifle companies – 
to stay in the tambon in area of operations...”732 
 
Large operations were necessary to respond to large insurgent campaigns.  Pitak 
Tai, for example, required planning in 1997 for deployments in 1998, as did the 
build-up of forces, which included 700 newly ordained police.  On the ground, the 
RTA sought to engage and destroy insurgent forces, but it did so with the 
minimum forces required, adhering to the principles of Tai Rom Yen.  The RTA 
moreover launched a psyops campaign alongside the surge to inform the 
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population of the broad goals of the operations so insurgents would not spread 
rumors the RTA was coming to kill all Muslims and cause the propaganda-
susceptible population to panic.  The campaign also included a significant amnesty 
program.733 
 
Village security operations under CPM-43 in the Malay Muslim COIN were nearly 
identical as those used in Issan during the communist COIN.734  There were VSTs, 
with the sub-district village head or Kamnan as chief (higher than an individual 
village head), and police or BPP there to provide tactical leadership.  In some 
cases, TNP village security personnel spent less time in the villages and instead 
coordinated with village heads, which weakened the system.  But this was not by 
design. 
 
Regardless, larger police forces nearby provided reinforcements, and the military 
provided QRF.  The government put special emphasis on working with locals at 
every chance because it wanted to demonstrate its good intentions and establish 
trust.  “Regarding security forces,” says Chuan, “defense volunteers, the military, 
the police; they all worked at the village level.  CPM-43 always worked in rural 
communities, it always had contact with village heads and district heads; it was 
always involved at the community level.”735 
 
Bhumarat says of the CPM-43 program, “Under Prem, the CPM worked very well.  
It had Thahan Phran, village militias; we recruited people from the villages.  They 
provided access to the villages and good information.  At that time, they played a 
major role in maintaining peace and order and by suppressing the separatist 
movement.”736 
 
 
TNP 
 
Police Region 9 was responsible for maintaining law and order in the southern 
provinces.  The TNP, including its BPP, patrolled the cities and rural areas to 
pressure insurgents.  They also investigated crimes, arrested suspects, and 
staffed some village security units.  Seemingly simple, police participation in the 
southern COIN was key to demonstrating to the population the government 
system was based on law and order and not the work of a dictatorial regime.  
Therefore, the government usually had the police and not the army arrest 
suspected insurgents and process them into the justice system.  The army could 
detain and question suspects, however.  Unfortunately, the southern population 
held the police in sharp disdain over rampant corruption, and this hurt government 
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legitimacy and fostered support for insurgents.  Police misbehavior created 
insurgents as well; it demonstrated to locals the government was out to use them, 
and it isolated them from the rest of society.  And while there were Thai Malay 
Muslim police, most were Thai Buddhists, and the language barrier kept them from 
interacting more with ethnic Malays, especially at the village level. 
 
RTA General Perapong adds the police were not particularly suited for COIN work.  
“In the 1980s-90s,” he says, “the military operations in the south were small.  With 
the police, they follow the standard ‘bad guy vs. good guy’ scenario; they see a 
bad guy in the south, they arrest and jail him; but you can’t fight an insurgency 
only like this.”737  Perapong says they needed to investigate more and start case 
files on all insurgents and all their connections, but did not. 
 
This does not mean all police were corrupt and ineffective in their COIN mission.  
On the contrary, scores of dedicated police died in the line of duty while protecting 
the southern border population.  Police Chief General Pracha Promnok had the 
confidence of PM Chuan and briefed him on the southern insurgency as did with 
other top officials.  If General Pracha had not been effective, the no-nonsense 
Chuan would not have received his briefs.738  Police also successfully identified 
and arrested multitudes of insurgents.  In fact, without the TNP, the Malay Muslim 
COIN of the 1980s-90s would not have been defeated.  Corruption, however, 
blunted its efforts. 
 
Nevertheless, the TNP was constantly on the prowl, a continual process of crime 
scene processing, interviewing, intelligence collection, and case building for 
arrests.  In September 1993, for example, police arrested senior PULO leader Da-
o Krongpinang who was responsible for a string of attacks that year.739  On 29 
December 1997, police arrested five suspect insurgents the same day a bomb 
detonated at Betong Weera Ratprasarn School in Yala, killing two and injuring 13.  
The five, who confessed to working for PULO leader Hayee Da-oh Thanam based 
in Malaysia, were responsible for a series of bomb blasts and at least one grenade 
attack.740  Operations such as these not only chipped away at insurgent 
manpower; they frequently produced intelligence on the rebel organizations, which 
fed more arrests and kinetic operations by the military. 
 
The TNP worked with the SB-PAC on anti-drug campaigns, too, especially in 
1997.  SB-PAC-police cooperation detained 3,109 drug users and dealers and 
confiscated 2 kilograms (kgs) of opium, 201 kgs of heroin, and 512 kgs of 
marijuana that year.  Hat Yai was the far south’s central drug market with 
distribution centers in Trang, Satun, Yala, and Narathiwat.  Fishermen in Pattani 
used drugs heavily, and scores of boat captains were traffickers.  Drug trafficking 
into Malaysia had clogged produce transport lines because of increased scrutiny 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
737 Perapong, op. cit. 
738 “Another policeman shot dead.”  
739 University of Maryland, op. cit. 
740 “Bomb Blast at School Fair Kills Two, Injures 13 in Yala.”  
	  	   180	  
by Malaysian customs agents.  Fruit sellers’ incomes suffered as a result.  
Authorities identified local and regional government leaders and persons of 
influence in the drug trade as well.741  It is no wonder, then, when Bersatu fell short 
of manpower for its Falling Leaves campaign, it co-opted drug dealers and users 
as its fighters. 
 
The TNP was not only about investigation and suppression, however.  It 
contributed to psyops in support of other operations such as amnesty under Pitak 
Tai.  On 1 July 1998, for example, Police Chief Pracha stood with Interior Minister 
Sanan and SB-PAC Governor Palakorn at a surrender ceremony of five insurgents 
of the Kasdan Army faction of New PULO.  Led by one of their leaders, Lohmae 
Sa-i Buke, aka Mae Dam, they turned themselves in at a publicized reception at 
the TNP training school in Bang Khen.  Such psyops helped spread the word that 
Pitak Tai’s amnesty was a real program, and those who surrendered would not be 
maligned.742 
 
Like the in communist COIN, Special Branch operations were pivotal to victory and 
infrequently commented on because of their extreme sensitivity.  Special Branch 
had excellent sources and worked with SB-PAC to accumulate intelligence that 
would illuminate insurgent organizations, frequently from the inside.  Says Chuan, 
“SB-PAC and Special Branch?  Special Branch had staff at the SB-PAC; it had 
personal links to sources in the region.  The organization could extract information 
from the provinces better, not because of strong armed intervention, but because 
of its closer relations with the people there.”743  Nationwide, by 1998, Special 
Branch had 2,000 members, no doubt a large portion of them working in the far 
south in COIN operations.744 
 
Special Branch was a key actor in Pitak Tai when the Thai and Malaysian 
governments worked jointly to identify and arrest Thai Malay Muslim insurgents.  It 
cooperated with Malaysian Special Branch to locate safe houses of insurgents in 
Malaysian territory.  As a clear indication of Special Branch’s role in the defeat of 
the insurgents, when Commissioner Somkiat retired in September 1998, the 
Bangkok Post wrote: “He left behind a legacy that many of his colleagues can be 
proud of.”745  Commissioner Somkiat was behind of the arrest of four key PULO 
insurgents in February 1998.  This triggered scores of other insurgents to take 
advantage of Pitak Tai’s amnesty program and surrender.746 
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Local Forces 
 
Local forces played a major role in the southern COIN throughout the 1980s-90s.  
They were based on the exact same village security concepts as the communist 
COIN.  Accordingly, the forces were nearly the same as well – including the MoI’s 
Or Sor (VDC) – and they need not all be repeated here. 
 
The Chor Ror Bor, (“Village Defense Volunteers,” VDV) 
 
At the village level, the government again relied on a communist COIN type 
security program, the Chor Ror Bor.  This was the MoI’s 1985 version of a long 
line of CPM village level security forces that had been tested and deployed since 
the 1960s.  The Department of Provincial Administration, one level higher than 
DoLA, managed the program.747  The mission of the VDV was to provide security 
in the villages and keep out insurgent forces.  The police ceded a lot of local 
village law enforcement authority to village heads, in part because of the CPM 
concept called for it, but also because most police were Thai Buddhists and could 
not speak Malay.748 
 
Security missions of the VDV included setting up checkpoints at village entries and 
exits to control who came and went.  They participated in local patrols when 
government forces needed them, and they fended off insurgent attacks, which 
were rare.  On occasion, they provided security at schools, government facilities, 
and development projects.  Their main weapons were 12-gage shotguns.  As with 
other such programs, the village head ran the Chor Ror Bor.  CPM-43 trained 
them.749  Says Prince of Songkhla University Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri, 
“The village head was leader of the Chor Ror Bor.  They were an armed militia of 
about 20 for each village.  This was the old way.”750  And using the “old way” here 
was not surprising since this program was based on those used by Prem, Harn, 
and Chavalit. 
 
Thahan Phran 
 
Since the Thahan Phran worked well against the CPT, the government used them 
against the Thai Malay Muslim insurgents, too.  “We had Thahan Phran,” says 
General Kitti.  “They were very good because it was local people fighting local 
people, so they knew about the intelligence – they got the good intelligence from 
the people in those areas.  These were local Thahan Phran, not from the north.  I 
think everything should be local.  When they send the troops from the north, it’s 
not a correct policy.”751  The 43d Thahan Phran Regiment, headquartered in 
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Narathiwat, and the 41st Regiment, headquartered in Yala, operated in the south.  
The RTA established the latter in 1984.752 
 
Desmond Ball writes the Thahan Phran’s mission was to conduct unconventional 
warfare and special operations in support of ISOC, the Fourth Army, and CPM-43.  
They operated at the village level and mostly utilized personnel from local areas.  
Thahan Phran put much stock in collecting intelligence, including open and 
clandestine human intelligence.753 
 
Poor discipline and criminal activity blighted the Thahan Phran’s reputation in 
many instances, however, and Ball writes they were responsible for murder, rape, 
and wanton violence.  In 1981, General Harn Leenanond disbanded Thahan 
Phran units in Surat Thani and Phattalung provinces.  While these were not 
involved in the Thai Malay Muslim COIN, they were in the south and served to 
sully Thahan Phran’s reputation in the region and also demonstrated their 
sometimes-counterproductive nature in COIN.754 
 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) reports Thahan Phran in Songkhla in 
November 1987 killed four unarmed Thai Malay Muslims suspected of supporting 
insurgents, which caused the RTA to transfer the 43d Thahan Phran Regimental 
Commander out of the region.755  Ball argues that, in the south, “…criminal intent 
related to banditry, illegal logging, drug trafficking, etc., has come to dominate the 
relations between the Rangers and the so-called separatists.”756  (Ball asserts the 
government exaggerated the separatist threat in the far south.757)  
 
In 1987, the government began to reform Thahan Phran by recruiting better quality 
personnel, namely from military reserves, but they were not all from the reserves.  
Some still came from local villages.  It also instituted additional training aimed at 
instilling more discipline and skill.  By 1995, the RTA said it had increased Thahan 
Phran training to six months, but the ICG claims it is unlikely this happened.758 
 
Despite the sometimes-unsatisfactory behavior of the Thahan Phran and heavy 
criticism by their detractors, including insurgent propaganda, the force 
nevertheless proved valuable to the southern border COIN.  There are multiple 
examples of where the Thahan Phran’s expertise resulted in the neutralization of 
enemy personnel.  Even on operations where there was no kill, the Thahan Phran 
demonstrated their worth by keeping continual pressure on insurgents.  In May 
1989, for example, a combined force of 20 Thahan Phran, RTA, and TNP clashed 
with a PULO unit in Narathiwat, killing one.  In July 1996, Thahan Phran battled 
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insurgents in Narathiwat where two were wounded.  In April 1997, Thahan Phran 
killed a top BRN leader in Narathiwat.759  In August 1997, Thahan Phran raided 
the house of suspected insurgent Samaoong Sulong who eluded capture.  In his 
house, however, they found 49 sticks of dynamite, homemade explosives, an 
instructional on how to make explosives, a book on how to wage guerrilla warfare, 
and maps marking sabotage targets that included government buildings and 
bridges.760  In doing so, the Thahan Phran prevented Sulong from making and 
deploying at least 49 bombs that could have killed and maimed hundreds. 
 
For Pitak Tai, the RTA deployed 600 Thahan Phran to hunt down and destroy 
insurgent forces once and for all.  They applied relentless pressure to the enemy 
with continual operations.  In 1998, as part of an operation to hunt down BRN in 
Narathiwat, Thahan Phran began a series of running clashes against one 
particular guerrilla unit.  It began on 31 March when a platoon of 15 Thahan Phran 
located and engaged a group of BRN in a brief firefight.  There were no reported 
casualties, and the insurgents escaped.  Then in April, the Thahan Phran platoon 
caught up with the guerrillas and fought several more engagements.  One was on 
2 April, when, according to Ball, 11 Thahan Phran captured and killed several BRN 
in Si Sakhon district.761  Small unit operations such as these kept continual 
pressure on the BRN.  That pressure forced them into survival mode – escape and 
evasion – and kept them from planning and executing attacks.  Thahan Phran 
were indeed valuable. 
 
 
Intelligence 
 
Intelligence for the 1980s-90s Thai Malay Muslin insurgency came from the same 
agencies that processed intelligence for the communist COIN: 1) Division 7 of 
Special Branch, 2) the TNP, 3), the RTA, and 4) the NIA.  The latter's role in this 
conflict was kept confidential, however.  The SB-PAC also collected and 
processed intelligence since it had continual contact with the people.762  
Otherwise, there were no special intelligence units like Somchai Rakwijit’s that 
lived in villages and reported on rural people’s habits and CPT activities.  The SB-
PAC partly facilitated this end, however. 
 
The RTA’s intelligence units were highly active.  They identified threats and 
processed combat intelligence.  In fact, the RTA ran the most powerful intelligence 
network in the region, at least up to the mid-1990s when the MoI took over most of 
these responsibilities.  Says General Akanit, “Army intelligence at that time was 
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stronger than police intelligence.”763  Chuan adds, “Regarding intelligence, the 
capabilities of various forces differed; we had to accept the fact that military 
intelligence capabilities were higher than those of the police.”764 
 
General Kitti’s forces stayed in the field constantly and solicited information from 
villagers on a regular basis.  Army-run Thahan Phran did the same thing but in 
smaller units, which was ideal for clandestine intelligence work, especially 
targeting, which is vital for the capture and/or elimination of insurgents.765  
Interestingly, the army also had sources that led it to identify the whereabouts of 
insurgents overseas, indicating either strong links to Special Branch and the NIA.  
It might have also meant the RTA had some overseas intelligence capabilities, 
perhaps via defense attaches.766 
 
Locals provided the best intelligence on insurgents because they knew the pulse 
of local activities and the people who made things happen.  Moreover, the 
insurgents depended on contact with locals, forced or voluntary, for support.  
While local people provided great strength to guerrillas, they were also a 
devastating weakness when savvy intelligence units put pressure on them to 
cooperate with the government.  In the case of the latter, Chuan Leekpai says the 
people became pivotal sources of information.  Village heads were the best 
sources for all government entities.  Says Chuan, “…they provided intelligence to 
both CPM-43 and SB-PAC.”767 
 
For Pitak Tai, CPM-43 established a tips and information mailbox for citizens who 
wanted to anonymously provide intelligence to security forces.  It publicly 
announced the address, which was located outside the far south, likely for security 
reasons in case insurgents had agents imbedded in the local post offices.  It was 
(in 1998) PO Box 20, Muang district, Nakhon Si Thammarat province.768 
 
 
SB-PAC Intelligence 
 
SB-PAC had to have an intelligence capability because much of its work required 
it.  It needed political and cultural intelligence to keep informed of the population’s 
attitude toward the government, development projects, and the insurgency.  
Intelligence on these issues also helped the SB-PAC assess if it was making 
progress or not.  The SB-PAC also needed information from the people so it could 
identify corrupt and inefficient civil servants that needed to be transferred out of 
the south.  For this program to be effective, the flow of information had to be 
clandestine and secure.  Lastly, since the SB-PAC was so close to the people and 
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therefore close to the insurgency, it collected intelligence on threats and passed it 
on to CPM-43. 
 
“Intelligence,” says Chuan Leekpai; “It was not just from the army, but the MoI had 
good spies, too.  At that period, I think Interior officials had good intelligence.  We 
had a good understanding with the local people, we approached them via grass 
roots, by the SB-PAC, and we could transfer crooks out of the region, which the 
people liked us for.  At the SB-PAC, we used provincial and district level offices to 
get things done.  We could monitor all things, not just the insurgency.”769 
 
 
2. Political COIN Measures 
 
The Thai government had more political programs in the 1980s-90s COIN than 
security programs.  The SB-PAC ran most of them.  So many political programs 
demonstrate Bangkok well understood the key facets of the southern problems 
were political.  Some of its initiatives were the same as those from the 1970s but 
better run.  They included, but were not limited to, the following eight programs: 
political inclusion at the national level, political inclusion at the grass roots level, 
local advisors for the SB-PAC’s COIN programs, political integration through the 
education system, diplomacy across multiple fronts, amnesty, quality control – 
removing corrupt civil servants, and psyops. 
 
Before the SB-PAC developed a mass of programs, however, it surveyed Thai 
Malay Muslim leaders in 1981 to analyze their attitudes toward the government 
and civil servants.  The survey also gathered information on their living 
environment.  The SB-PAC’s goal was to gain an understanding of the concerns of 
southerners regarding the government and their daily lives so it could direct 
resources to problem areas.  The survey asked respondents to comment on four 
characteristics of government workers: honesty, justness, public devotion, and 
competence.770 
 
Survey results graded civil servants low in all areas.  It also stated local Thai 
Malay Muslim leaders gave loyalty to their imams first, to their communities 
second, and to the Thai state third.  This information fed back to the government 
and codified government integration strategy to continue to influence the youth of 
the far south to put loyalty to the state above religious leaders through PSTIs and 
other educational systems.771 
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Political Inclusion at the National Level 
 
Beginning in the 1980s, the government sought to enhance Thai Malay Muslims’ 
political participation to remove some of their angst that contributed to the 
insurgency.  “By providing increasing avenues for the participation of the citizenry 
in the political life of the country,” writes Ornanong, “the rulers hoped to enlarge 
their popular base of support.”772  This mainly happened through national 
recognition and national political parties. 
 
Lack of representation was not the issue, however.  Thai Malay Muslims had been 
participating in the government for years and were not excluded from the 
democratic process.  Thai Muslims had been serving in the Parliament since 1932, 
Thai Malay Muslims since at least 1976.773 
 
Thai Malay Muslims had leaders at the national level they could look up to for 
political aspiration as well.  They were living proof of political inclusion.  One such 
leader was Wan Muhammad Nor Matha.774  Born in Yala, he rose to prominence 
in the government after completing a BA and MA from Chulalongkorn University in 
1974.  From 1980-1996, he served seven terms as a representative from Yala.  He 
moreover received nine royal decorations and served high profile posts such as:775 
 
Vice Speaker, House of Representatives, 1992 
Deputy Minister of Interior, 1994 
Deputy Minister of Interior, 1995 
Minister of Transport and Communication, 1995 
Speaker, House of Representatives and Parliament, 1996 
 
Surin Pitsuwan was another Muslim that represented inclusion.  Born in Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, Surin was not Malay, but he integrated into a Malay Muslim family, so 
he held considerable influence with the far south’s population.  After earning his 
PhD at Harvard in 1982 and working as a reporter for the Bangkok Post, Surin 
held a number of high government posts:776 
 
Representative of Nakorn Sri Thammarat (eight times from 1986) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997 
Chair of ASEAN and its Regional Forum (ARF), 1999 
 
The government specified more political inclusion for Thai Malay Muslims in its 
official 1988 National Security Policy.  “It supported the Muslim leaders playing 
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greater roles at every level to solve the problems of the southern border 
provinces,” writes Ornanaong.777  At the national level, this meant political parties. 
 
One such Thai Malay Muslim party the government encouraged was the New 
Aspiration Party, of which Wan Muhammad was a key member.  General Chavalit 
established it after his retirement from the military.  It helped propel him to the 
PM’s position in 1996.778  To win, General Chavalit courted and won the Thai 
Malay Muslim vote, among others, and propelled this group to high political power.  
Patrick Jory writes in the Harvard Asia Pacific Review, “Under the Chavalit 
government a number of Malay Muslims held influential senior positions, including 
Wan Muhammad Nor Matha, who remains Parliamentary President and deputy 
leader of the New Aspiration Party, and New Aspiration Party power broker Den 
Dohmeena, whose family has a history of Muslim political activism.”779 
 
Another Thai Malay Muslim party the government sanctioned was the Wahdah 
party, officially the al Wahdah Party of Thailand.  Founded on 3 May 1986 by the 
Islamic Council of Pattani by former Narathiwat MP, Ustaz Sha-roning (aka Seni 
Madakakul), it had the support of both Den Dohmeena and Wan Mohammad Nor 
Matha.  The goal of al Wahdah was to put more Thai Malay Muslims in Parliament 
and to lobby the cabinet for southern Muslim interests.  It allied with the Chavalit’s 
New Aspiration Party because both wanted to improve the far south via national-
level politics and by economic development for its poor population.  The fact the 
General Chavalit spawned the Thahan Phran did not seem to bother the Wahdah 
party.780 
 
The Wahdah party believes it had a positive impact on the southern insurgency by 
giving people a peaceful and legal outlet to lobby for reform.  Political scholar Dr. 
Suria Saniwa thinks Wahdah and Muslims in high positions have eased southern 
political grievances as well:  “These ministerial positions have empowered the 
Muslim political leaders and have become a source of pride to the Muslim 
community.  In fact, the tactical alliance [between Wahdah and the New Aspiration 
Party] has been instrumental in appeasing the needs of the Malay-Muslims within 
the Thai political system.”781 
 
Because of initiatives such as these, Thai Malay Muslims won six parliament seats 
in the September 1992 elections.  They helped form Chuan Leekpai’s coalition 
government.  He chose a New Aspiration Party Muslim as his Deputy Foreign 
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Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, and Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, Wan Muhammad 
Nor Matha.782 
 
The government also used national cultural recognition to assuage the insurgency.  
In December 1991, On the heels of the 1991 election, for the first time in the 
history of Thailand, the government began writing a new constitution (the 1992 
Constitution) that recognized the right of all minorities to speak and promote their 
languages.  The constitution moreover, “[provided] support for the administration 
of Islamic affairs and the teaching of minority languages.”783 
 
Subsequently, one seemingly small but meaningful measure was a tenet in the 
new constitution declaring Thailand a secular state.  Up to that year, it had 
officially been a Buddhist country.  Part of the reasoning behind the secular 
declaration was to embrace Thailand’s other religions such as the Thai Malay 
brand of Islam and to make them feel more a part of the Kingdom.  Before this, 
Thai Malay Muslims felt marginalized by the previous constitutions that favored 
Thai Buddhists.  Ornanong cites Thai Malay Muslim students as saying they did 
not feel part of Thailand because, “…being a Thai is being a Buddhist.”784 
 
 
Political Inclusion at the Grass Roosts Level 
 
The government increased Thai Malay Muslim political inclusion at district, sub-
district, and village levels first via the SB-PAC and later through the 1988 National 
Security Policy that also encouraged Thai Malay Muslim participation in national 
politics.  This policy was rooted in Kriangsak’s 1979 policy of organizing annual 
seminars for the Provincial Councils for Islamic Affairs to discuss local problems 
of, and solutions for, Muslims all over Thailand.785  These programs simply 
encouraged more of them to join the local governing system.786  It had both 
positive and negative effects.   
 
Bajunid cites a 1998 study that states, “…the democratization of the Thai political 
system has significantly contributed to the deradicalization of Malay Muslim 
opposition…”787  Said Special Branch Commissioner Somkiat to the Bangkok Post 
in October 1998, “There are now legal channels for those seeking political 
freedom.  It is useless to pursue the old violent way.  I think they now realise that 
violence is not the answer.  Have they gained anything during the past 50 
years?”788 
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The Tambon Administration Organization (TAO) and the Provincial Administrative 
Organization (PAO) were, and remain, two such entities that allowed Thai Malay 
Muslims administrative say in their own provinces, the TAO being the most 
influential.789  The government established TAOs via the TAO Act of 1994.790  The 
PAO Act came later in 1997.791  PAOs and TAOs were established to decentralize 
government authority and put more power in the hands of locals over local affairs.  
PAOs consist of an elected official and their staff that supervise public works at the 
provincial level.  The TAO, at the tambon/sub district level, has 31 tasks.  They 
involve managing public services in the infrastructure development, local business, 
health, and forest/aquatic sectors.  TAOs are composed of two elected 
representatives from each village in each tambon.  The MoI appoints the secretary 
of each TAO.792  “If they stop and think about it, these are the same rights they 
have been fighting for,” said Commissioner Somkiat to the press.793 
 
Others believe democracy enabled religious radicals to infiltrate the government, 
meaning they masqueraded as participants in the state system only to subvert it 
from the inside.  “The position of this group [conservative Malay Muslims],” writes 
Gilquin, “both regional and religious, is a challenge to the country’s authority, the 
more so as there is increased democratization in society.”794 
 
Moreover, increased election competition damaged age-old systems that had 
previously been in effect, such as village headmen running security.  Chuan 
explains, “So the heads of the villages were strong enough to provide security and 
to handle any problems, handle any misunderstanding.  This man was key in the 
village structure.  In the 80s and mid-90s, the heads of the villages were strong.  
Afterward to 2007 they were weak.”795  Chuan says they went from being 
appointed by governors in the late 1990s – men who the government knew would 
keep order – to being elected, where the best politician took over.  Security 
suffered as a result. 
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Special Branch General Tritot says the new political elite made a lot of mistakes.  
“They let the locals build ponohs [pondoks] again and they reduced the security 
presence – all because local pundits kept harping on how the Muslims were not 
free and that they needed to be free.  And ultimately, it’s easier for politicians to 
push theses issues, because they get more power as a result.”796  These 
programs became platforms for a new generation of insurgents years later, though 
no one knew it in the 1990s. 
 
 
Local Advisors for the SB-PAC’s COIN Programs 
 
Aside from elected locals, the SB-PAC tapped Thai Malay Muslims for advisory 
positions to insure it was focusing on the most pressing problems and applying the 
correct solutions.  “So the southern border command set up an advisory 
committee,” says Dr. Gothom.  “It’s the correct approach to have local people as 
advisors, and they are more people friendly since ordinary people can walk in [to 
the SB-PAC] and speak to everyone.”797 
 
The result?  “Local Muslims and leaders got more access to public decision 
making and governing,” says Chuan.  “We had town meetings and got local 
leaders involved.  We worked through imams.  We invited them to be members of 
local committees and advise us on political and development matters.”798  Inviting 
imams into the equation was yet another psyops innovation in the south.  
Vehement anti-state radicals were among them, and bringing them into the system 
sought to ease their ill will by showing they could live within the state system and 
still be Malay Muslims.  Bangkok aimed to use moderate imams to broadcast to 
the villages its new pro-Thai Malay Muslim policies the same way it used local 
shamans and other leaders in the north and northeast during the communist 
COIN. 
 
 
Political Integration through the Education System  
 
The education system was the state’s main integration program.  It had been since 
the 1960s, and this did not change in the 1980s and 90s.  Ornanong calls it 
“citizenship training.”  Every school in Thailand, however, experienced upgrades in 
the 1980s-90s, much of it citizenship training and tougher curriculums. 
 
Unfortunately, many Thai Malay Muslims did not believe that school of any kind 
would improve their lot in life.  Statistics from the 1970s said after compulsory 
schooling, for example, 95% of Thai Malay Muslim teens dropped out.  The five 
percent remainder went on to achieve higher learning.  By comparison, 43 percent 
of Thai Buddhists in the far south continued higher learning.  Many Thai Malay 
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Muslims complained most of their teachers were Thai Buddhists, which did not sit 
well with the racially and religiously insular minded.799 
 
The pondok system was the main anti-government program of the insurgents, 
which the ustaz controlled.800  On the whole, the far south’s entire school system 
became the central ideological battleground for the war, and when the insurgents 
began killing and kidnapping teachers, it became a physical battleground as well.  
The MoE was a pivotal actor in the government’s education integration 
programs.801 
 
In 1979, on the cusp of Bangkok’s re-invigorated COIN campaign in the far south, 
there were 1,500 schools ranging from kindergarten to the university level.  There 
were 10,850 teachers and 283,000 students, and 23,000 of those students 
attended pondoks.802  There were five kinds of schools in the far south when 1980 
began:803 
 
1. Public schools not teaching any Islam 
2. Public schools teaching Islam two hours each week 
3. PSTIs with secular curriculums along with Islam 
4. PSTIs that have no secular teaching 
5. Unregistered and illegal pondoks that were nonetheless tolerated by the 
state. 
 
By 1985, the government had declared there would be no new pondoks, but in 
1997, TAO and PAO officials overturned this.804 
 
There were four main projects in the government’s education integration program.  
Some began in 1977 and continued into the 1980s.  The SB-PAC carried on these 
and began new ones, too.  The projects were part of the government’s Master 
Plan on Education for the Malay Muslims (1977-1982).  They were:805 
 
1. Revision of curriculum at PSTIs 
2. Use of Thai language in Islamic studies 
3. Teaching Islam in public schools 
 
By the end of 1980, the government and its Thai Malay Muslim advisors joined to 
revise PSTI curriculum.  They called it “The Curriculum for the Study of Islam in 
1980,” and it went into effect on 5 June 1981.  It had three levels of study.  The fist 
level was ibtidaiyya, or grades 1-4, which paralleled the government’s primary 
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school system.  The second was mutawatsita, or grades 5-7, which paralleled the 
government’s secondary school system.  The third was grades 8-10, the highest 
compulsory educational level.806  Aside from secular subjects, PSTI students also 
studied the Koran, Islamic traditions, and sharia law. 
 
The new curriculum was designed to make Thai Malay Muslims more competitive 
and also to assuage imams’ angst of the state making all educational programs 
secular.  It included Thai history, math, science, and the Thai language; things 
students never used to study at traditional pondoks.807  In the end, however, since 
the government controlled the curriculum, it took most of the power away from the 
ustaz.808  They were disenfranchised as a result. 
 
University affirmative action was another political integration program.  In the 
1980s, a mere 20 percent of Thai high school graduates enrolled in college, in part 
because of the system’s fiercely competitive nature.  Pondok-educated Thai Malay 
Muslims, because of their Islamic-focused education, found it difficult to gain 
entrance to secular universities.  The government recognized that these students 
needed greater access to higher learning and made changes in the education 
policy as part of its COIN strategy.  As a result, the Prem administration and 
successive governments continued the Thai Malay Muslim university quota system 
began in 1971.  DoLA ran it.809 
 
From 1971-81, 458 Thai Malay Muslim students went through the university quota 
program.  Two hundred and five had graduated by 1981, 165 were still studying.  
Just over 80 percent of the students in the programs graduated and many became 
civil servants.  The government considers the program a success and continued it 
into the 1990s.810 
 
Outside the school system, the SB-PAC promulgated Thai language education, 
some of it at the village level.  The government had done this in the 1970s as well.  
For example, in 1991, the SB-PAC ran Thai language courses for 288 people in 72 
villages.  Participants included youth leaders, schoolteachers, local leaders, and 
imams.811 
 
 
Diplomacy with Insurgents 
 
The government applied direct diplomacy with rebel leaders as an additional 
means to try and halt the insurgency.  General Kitti developed and executed the 
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strategy.  In his mind, and based on his experience in the early 1980s negotiating 
the end of the Communist Party of Malaysia using Thailand as sanctuary, 
diplomacy was an excellent tool with which to end conflict.  More, it was culturally 
in line with the Buddhist sense of restoring balance and clam to a tumultuous 
situation. 
 
Major General Perapong echoed this sentiment.  “Because the insurgent groups of 
the 80s and 90s had some political aspirations – PULO wanted political voice in 
the villages and representation in local government offices – you could negotiate 
with PULO.  It’s ok.  So we go to the table,” he says.812  “We talked to them,” adds 
Bhumarat.  “Back then, the old PULO, for example, they realized they would never 
win.  Eventually, they stopped.”813  But it took years of frustrating sessions, and 
when the end came, there was no climatic “peace talk conclusion.”  Talks served 
as a slow, droning erosion of insurgent will with no decisive end. 
 
General Kitti sent then Colonel Akanit, to several countries – first to Egypt – to 
meet with PULO and BRN leaders.  Akanit was Fourth Army Deputy of Operations 
at the time.814  Kitti saw the problem as a security issue, which put the RTA in the 
lead.  “Army intelligence knew [the rebels] were in Egypt.  Army intelligence was 
better than the police.  Everything was up to the Army,” says Kitti.815  Diplomats 
were not integral to the negotiating process, according to Akanit.  “They have their 
own mindset,” he says.  “It’s different from us because this is a security issue.”816  
He and others involved believed fighting men should talk to fighting men. 
 
Securing a place to hold the talks was sensitive.  The exact nature of the talks 
themselves were classified Top Secret and remain so.  “PULO suggested we talk 
in Malaysia, Pakistan, or Egypt,” says Akanit.  “Why Egypt?  There is one officer 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he’s a Muslim, and close to me.  This officer 
was not in the working group, but we thought he’d be a good person to cooperate 
with to help put these meetings together.”817 
 
“Our contact in the MoFA contacted all three countries,” says Akanit, “and both 
Malaysia and Pakistan declined.  But Egypt allowed us to go.  So we agreed to go 
to Cairo and meet at the Meridian Hotel.  The meeting lasted about one week.  It 
was just PULO and us.  PULO was the biggest threat at the time.”818 
 
At the meeting, PULO representatives requested one thing: autonomy for “Patani.”  
Akanit asked them to explain their conception of what autonomy would mean in 
practice, and PULO could not answer.  “They did not know what a ‘Patani state’ 
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would look like, how it would operate, how it would collect taxes, nothing,” says 
Akanit.  His counter proposal was 1) stop the violence, and 2) join the political 
process.  “I said they should let the people make decisions.  I gave them three 
months to give us an answer.”819 
 
After the Cairo meeting, however, the leader of PULO gave a statement to a 
Pakistani newspaper about the peace talks, breaking their agreement to keep the 
talks secret.  The Thai government felt betrayed, was angry, and figured PULO 
had no intention of achieving peace through dialogue.  “They simply wanted to 
raise up their status,” says Akanit, “and raise up the problem to an international 
level.”820 
 
Akanit continued informal talks with PULO for years, such as coffee with its 
leaders in Syria, but they went nowhere.  Contact with the rebels languished for 
two to three years until Akanit heard the leader of PULO in Syria was sick.  “So I 
contacted him and wanted to see him as a friend.  I sent a message to him if he’d 
agreed to a visit.  Then a newspaper in Saudi Arabia announced, ‘The Thai are 
going to negotiate with PULO again.’  So I canceled the trip.  Regardless, 
afterward, I would still call them, the insurgent leaders in Syria, Sweden, and 
Malaysia, and we kept in touch with them.”821 
 
Ultimately, Akanit’s assessment was the negotiations were a dead end.  “In the 
end,” he says, “I realized we could not talk with PULO.  I saw that the best way to 
solve the problem was to get support from the Malaysian government.  Malaysia 
must assist us.  Why?  Because most of the separatists leaders, they stayed in 
Malaysia and used it as sanctuary.”822 
 
While Kitti and Akanit’s efforts did not reach a decisive diplomatic end, they did 
seem to erode the will of the insurgent leadership over the years similar to how the 
North Vietnamese frustrated American war efforts with a “talk-fight” strategy.  Their 
cat-and-mouse diplomacy likely helped set the stage for the end of the insurgency 
in 1998 when diplomacy, force, and amnesty combined with Malaysia’s denial of 
sanctuary – spurred by Thai diplomacy – brought great pressure that PULO 
leaders could not handle.  “I know all the leaders of PULO, GMIP, BRN, and all of 
them know me,” says General Akanit.  “My concept is like tearing the pages from 
book.  I talked with them – a few pages out.  I wrote them letters – a few more 
pages.  I kept on until the book went from 100 pages to only 30, so they are very 
weak in the end.”823 
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Diplomacy with Saudi Arabia 
 
When PULO increased its violence in the late 1970s and early 80s, the 
government used diplomacy to help curb the problem.  It was probably the several 
PULO bombings in Bangkok in the early 1980s that pushed the Thai into action.  
Committing sporadic terrorism in the far south was one thing, but concentrated 
bombing campaigns in the capital were intolerable to the government.  
Accordingly, in 1984, Bangkok seemingly persuaded Saudi Arabia to shut down 
PULO’s offices in Mecca – officials from both sides have kept quiet on the subject, 
but evidence supports the diplomatic angle. 
 
True, Saudi officials were hesitant to allow too much foreign influence from any 
country in any capacity to prolong on Saudi soil.  But Riyadh’s shutdown of PULO 
came soon after its Bangkok bombings.  More, despite Saudi Arabian and PULO 
similarities on Islamic philosophy, Riyadh’s actions decisively damaged PULO, 
which was loosely a religious ally.  It erased PULO’s biggest command and 
control, recruiting, and propaganda headquarters.  PULO was critically dependent 
on Mecca and had no other location from where it could manage and grow its 
insurgency with such impunity.  From Mecca, it issued Thai Malay Muslims living 
in the region PULO ID cards, collected taxes, developed relations with the Baath 
Party of Syria, and opened an office in Iran.  These actions likely contributed to 
PULO’s demise on the Arabian Peninsula.  Saudi authorities arrested scores of 
PULO officers and deported 700 others.  The incident forced the resignation of 
PULO head Tengku Bira Kotanila.824  And while PULO was able to increase its 
presence in Malaysia in the wake of the shutdown, even with passive local 
Malaysian government support, it could not risk angering KAL by growing too 
large.  The Saudi government’s actions, then, were so injurious that PULO never 
recovered to its early 1980s level of power. 
 
 
Diplomacy with Malaysia 
 
During General Kitti’s tenure as Fourth Army Commander, he sent Colonel Akanit 
on a special mission to get Malaysia to help quell the insurgency.  It was one of 
the Thai government’s first major attempts to bring the two countries together on 
the issue.  “So I went to see a high authority within Malaysian Special Branch who 
was my friend,” says Akanit.  “After that he was Inspector in Chief of Police.  And I 
talked with him, and said that I needed his support.  I said, ‘It’s time the Malaysian 
government assisted the Thai government to solve the insurgency problem’.”825 
 
Says General Akanit: “The head of the Malaysian police went to Bangkok to see 
the Secretary of the NSC, the Supreme Commander, the Chief of Thai Police, and 
also General Kitti.  He said that Mahathir [the Malaysian PM] had agreed to help 
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Thailand solve the problem.  So we agreed to form up a working group to work 
together, the Thai and Malaysian Governments.”826 
 
“We drafted a ToR, or Terms of Responsibility,” he explains.  “But during the 
drafting, we also cooperated on other matters, such as when the Malaysian police 
arrested some members of PULO.  They seized them and sent them back to 
Thailand.”827 
 
In the meantime, Thai diplomacy led to KAL in January 1994 issuing a warning to 
Thai Malay Muslim insurgents from Thailand hiding in northern Malaysia to cease 
terrorist operations or face police action.828  While it was not the comprehensive 
arrests Bangkok was hoping for, it was a good start for the Thai-Malaysian COIN 
relationship.  But it bothered the insurgents not at all.  It is possible Malaysia’s 
central government had less sway over the outlying states, and the insurgents 
knew their local contacts would keep them secure. 
 
As the working group was making progress, however, the unthinkable happened in 
1995.  Says General Akanit:  “During our work together, General Parnthep 
[Puwanartnurak, (1 October 1994 - 30 April 1996)] took over as Fourth Army 
Commander from Kitti.  General Parnthep ordered me to stop the case.  He 
ordered me to go to Malaysia to explain we were stopping the case.  I asked 
General Parnthep about the reason [sic], and he just said, ‘Akanit, you tell them it’s 
the policy of the PM.”829  The PM at that time was Banharn Silpa-Archa (13 July 
1995 - 24 November 1996), after Chuan Leekpai’s first term.  Akanit did, and says: 
“Parnthep reported to the NSC that he wanted to form up a new working group 
headed by Major General Leawat Wattanat Pongsai that would deal with the 
Malaysian Army.  So he went through the wrong channel.”830 
 
Explains Akanit:  
 
Internal security in Malaysia is not under the army; it’s under Special 
Branch.  I have many friends in Special Branch.  So the Malaysian 
Army didn’t know much about this, the terrorists in their country’s 
border lands, because its not military work.  It’s not their job.  And 
Parnthep asked for the budget for the working group from the 
government, but he did not get it, so he could not form the group.  The 
end.  No more cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia to solve 
the separatist problem.831 
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A year later, on 19 October 1996, an incident in Malaysia forced the issue and 
provided an opening for diplomacy once more, but it did not produce immediate 
results.  Malaysian police arrested on Malaysian soil PULO insurgents Hanji 
Samail Thanam, then commander of the group’s military wing, and Jama Sateng, 
a bomb maker, for possession of several bombs and ammunition.  Samail had 
lived in KAL for several years, running a restaurant in Selangor.  They were going 
from Kelantan to Kedah when forced to stop at a police checkpoint 40 kilometers 
from the Thai border.832  The link between the insurgents and their Malaysian 
sanctuary was now embarrassingly out in the open. 
 
Despite the Malaysian penalty for possession of explosives being death, KAL on 
18 November granted Thanam bail on the equivalent of 100,000 baht.  This 
strained Thai-Malaysian relations terribly and demonstrated the support Bangkok 
had garnered from KAL was not too solid.833  PM Chavalit (25 November 1996 - 8 
November 1997) then ordered Foreign Minister Prachuap Chaiyasan to Malaysia 
to shore up their relations and to press for still more help, such as identifying and 
arresting insurgent leaders hiding in Malaysia.  Chavalit planned a follow-on visit in 
January 1997.  Malaysia’s Supreme Commander, General Tan Sri Ismail, also 
scheduled meetings with his Thai counterparts to discuss the insurgency.834  The 
talks produced no major breakthroughs, but they did keep the issue alive. 
 
In the wake of the Falling Leaves campaign, a number of politicians said publicly 
the insurgent problem demanded Malaysian help.  Said an anonymous source to 
the Bangkok Post in 1998, “Malaysia has repeatedly said this is our affair but it 
would be impossible to end the problem without help from our southern 
neighbour.”835  Interior Minister Sanan Kachornprasart said terrorists fled to the 
sanctuary of Malaysia after committing acts of violence on Thai soil, and they 
sometimes used Malaysia as a base from which to launch attacks into Thailand.836  
Thai Parliament President Wan Muhammad Nor Matha, a native of Yala, said for 
years that unless Malaysia helped Thailand with the insurgency, it would not go 
away.  He moreover said there was an economic angle to consider; “Prosperity in 
the southernmost region is not possible unless there is permanent peace in the 
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area.”837  He was referring to the Growth Triangle project originated by Malaysian 
PM Mahathir Mohammad and pushed by PM Chuan that aimed to promote trade 
between Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.838  In the long run, the plan did not 
evolve, but at the time, it was a major impetus in solving Thailand’s southern 
insurgency. 
 
In January 1998, Foreign Minister Surin announced he was working with Malaysia 
to secure increased intelligence and investigative cooperation to identify the 
perpetrators of the Falling Leaves campaign.  Going further, he said Thailand 
wanted to join Malaysia in neutralizing those threats.  “What I am expecting from 
Malaysia is an exchange of information and details, possibly involving the violence 
in the southernmost provinces of Thailand.  With the intelligence information we 
have and that from Malaysia, we expect to identify the cause of recent events,” he 
told The Nation newspaper.839 
 
Surin’s work, past diplomatic pressure from Bangkok, and the embarrassment of 
the Falling Leaves campaign obviously originating in northern Malaysia was too 
much for KAL to bare.  It resulted in a 100 percent cooperative effort by Malaysia’s 
Special Branch and other security forces.  As a result, the end came swiftly for the 
insurgents.  On the night of 12 January 1998, Malaysian Police raided PULO and 
New PULO bases throughout northern Malaysia.840  They detained individual 
insurgents near the border and in KAL on the 13th.  Among them were Hayi Abdul 
Rohman Bazo of New PULO, Hayi Da-oh Thanam, military chief of New PULO’s 
military, and Hayi Sama-ae Thanam, military chief of PULO.841   
 
The arrests sent shockwaves though the insurgent community that had for 
decades relied on what it thought was a sympathetic government in KAL to look 
the other way as they waged war in Thailand.  Malaysians in the northern part of 
the country that aided them bolstered the insurgents’ confidence.  But the 
insurgents were wrong.  Now their sanctuary was wrecked. 
 
Twelve days after the raids and arrests, insurgent leaders held several emergency 
meetings in Kelantan to discuss their situation as they were essentially being 
overrun.842  An anonymous source told the Bangkok Post, “[The insurgents] have 
held several meetings over the situation which has dramatically changed during 
the past several months.  Some feel insecure, thinking it might be better for them 
to leave the country at the moment as they are uncertain about what happens 
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next.”843  It was their final breaking point.  With Thai military, police, and political-
economic pressure, the insurgents were severely injured, but with the added 
pressure KAL denying them sanctuary, their organizations collapsed, and their top 
leadership scattered.844  In February, the leaders of PULO, New PULO, and 
Bersatu began to flee to Syria, Sweden, and Saudi Arabia.845  They were PULO 
chief Tunku Bilor Kortor Nilor, Bersatu chief Wan Suleiman, Ex-New PULO leader 
Ar-rong Mooreng and his deputy Hadi Muno.846 
 
 
Amnesty 
 
Bangkok promoted amnesty throughout the war by re-branding it.  It began in the 
early 1980s under Tai Rom Yen and the 66/2523 Plan.  In October 1987, the 
government initiated Muslim Santi (“Muslim Peace”), a pacification program that 
included amnesty.  Six hundred forty one insurgents surrendered as a result and 
took an oath of loyalty to the country in January 1988.847  The government started 
a new amnesty program the same year called Phu Ruom Pattana Chat 
(“Developer of the Thai Nation.”)848  It was a good program on paper, but the 
authorities often harassed those who surrendered, and many of them rejoined the 
insurgency.  “We admit that in the past, some members of terrorist groups were 
given a hard time by some officials, while others faced extreme hardship or 
poverty when they surrendered,” SB-PAC security coordinator Thira Mindrasak 
told the press.  “So they returned to the jungle.”849 
 
In 1998, during Pitak Tai, the government upgraded Phu Ruom Pattana Chat to 
appeal to insurgents on the run from a surge of security forces into the south.  It 
was practically the same amnesty program General Kitti designed years prior but 
was never applied, indicating Kitti was ahead if his time in this war. 
 
Since past amnesty was based on Prem’s 66/2523 policy and specifically aimed at 
communists, PM Chuan issued order 127/2541 in July 1998 to apply to Thai Malay 
Muslim insurgents.  It aimed to convince them to surrender, undergo re-education, 
and attend vocational job training programs to become productive citizens.  The 
new program also allowed suspected insurgents who escaped Thailand to other 
countries to return to Thailand without legal prosecution so long as they did not 
have criminal records.  Those with criminal records were handed over to the police 
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who were responsible for the returnees’ safety.850  Equally important, it sought to 
protect those who surrendered from harassment by ill meaning government 
officials, a key ingredient missing from earlier amnesties.  Thira Mindrasak ran the 
project.851  The government backed up the amnesty request with a veiled threat, 
however.  It told insurgents to surrender by 10 March 1998 or face harsh action.  It 
was clear.  Insurgents could rejoin the nation, or face the military.852 
 
Phu Ruom Pattana Chat followed a set process.  First, the head of the MoI and a 
16-member committee considered surrender requests.  Once accepted, the 
surrendered entered the second phase – orientation by CPM-43.  This was much 
like a parole program where former insurgents received lectures on acceptable 
behavior and what was expected of them, which was a cessation of violence and 
auxiliary support activities.  Third, the SB-PAC took over and put returnees into 
vocational training or development projects, just like in the communist COIN.  This 
included job placement as well.  Fourth, the SB-PAC also set up methods for 
communicating mistreatment of amnesty seekers by corrupt officials.853 
 
Fifth, the government made direct appeals to some insurgents to surrender.  
Minister Sanan passed the word to insurgents overseas and those hiding in 
foreign embassies in Thailand via the MoFA.  Interestingly, one of the requests for 
surrender went directly to insurgent leader Amin Tomeena in Saudi Arabia, who 
happened to be the older brother of former Deputy Interior Minister Den Tomeena.  
This situation was highly reminiscent of General Surayud Chulanont’s father who 
was a CPT Central Committee member and Chief of Staff of the CPT’s armed 
forces; the Thai did not persecute relatives of insurgents by keeping them from 
office.  This showed high flexibility and represented a key trait that allowed 
amnesty programs in the first place.854 
 
The sixth component of amnesty entailed SB-PAC teams in each district serving 
as parole supervisors.  The teams were made up of a district or deputy district 
head, an agricultural official, and a policeman.  They visited the returnees regularly 
to make sure they were not being harassed, to provide medical treatment, to 
insure they had enough food, and to register them and their houses with the 
government.855  The latter was a form of population control. 
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The seventh aspect was vocational training.  Returnees and even their relatives 
could take three-month courses at a government facility near where they lived, or 
they could attend classes in their villages.  The three-month courses included 
electronics, construction, and mechanics.  The village courses were about 45 days 
and entailed farming, dressmaking, brick laying, and furniture making.856 
 
Overall, between 1979-97, 919 separatists surrendered.  From the beginning of 
the upgraded Phu Ruom Pattana Chat to September 1998, 58 more insurgents 
joined the program.  An SB-PAC survey stated many returnees wanted land and 
scholarships for their children.  Others asked for houses and livestock so they 
could begin farming.  The SB-PAC seems to have met these needs, and the 
program proved successful.857 
 
 
Quality Control – Removing Corrupt Civil Servants 
 
Government corruption was a major problem in the far south and one of the main 
reasons for state resentment.  Part of this stemmed from Thailand’s undercurrent 
of patronage and the deluge of the sakdi na system.  Poor civil service quality, 
attitudes of entitlement, and racism helped sour the system to the point many 
thought it illegitimate. 
 
Says Chuan:  
 
But one must accept all organizations in the provinces have problems 
with human resources – personnel in the organizations.  For example, 
there were various types of misconduct, such as using influence to 
extract personal interests from various civic groups in the area, or 
getting involved in, or having knowledge of, illegal projects in the area 
– organized crime.  This is one of the conditions that have caused 
conflicts between the people in the area and the administrators.  And 
those who do not mean well [insurgents] used this as leverage to 
intensify the situation.  But misconduct is in all agencies.858   
 
While Chuan acknowledged corruption was there, he stressed there were 
thousands of dedicated and honest civil servants in country, and they were one of 
the reasons Thailand functioned well. 
 
The SB-PAC was centrally involved in expelling corrupt officials.  First, it collected 
intelligence on wrong doers from other civil servants and the local population.  
Second, it investigated suspects’ alleged misdeeds, and if true, it built a case 
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against them.  Third, it submitted their names to the Fourth Army Commander who 
would hand out punishments.859 
 
In the beginning, however, PM Prem had a direct hand in cleaning up the south, in 
part based on his relationship with General Harn.  They cut through the red tape 
and streamlined the process.  Says Dr. Gothom, “Prem had a direct line to the SB-
PAC so people could directly tell him, ‘Here’s a bad governor, a bad policeman,’ 
etc.  It was a hotline to take care of problems.  He acted immediately.  He gave 
‘ears’ to that organization to make it more powerful than it was on paper.  On 
paper, the SB-PAC had to report to many levels to get to the PM.  In reality, the 
SB-PAC talked directly to Prem, so if a local complained about a local problem, 
there was a response.”860 
 
From 1981-82, the SB-PAC identified 72 government workers for malfeasance.  
The Fourth Army Commander transferred all of them out of the south and charged 
51 with criminal conduct.  This was similar to what COIN-minded commanders did 
in CPT areas where officials harassed locals.   
 
Corruption continued to be a major problem in the south, however, and it seems 
the SB-PAC, while successful, was never able to eradicate the problem.  Even in 
1998, on the heels of the Falling Leaves campaign, and in the early stages of the 
Pitak Tai, the Chief of Police met Thai Malay Muslim leaders saying he would work 
harder to eject corrupt officials from the south.  This meant almost ten years had 
gone since Prem and Harn tried to improve the far south’s civil service, and it was 
still a troubled force.861 
 
 
Psyops and PR 
 
The SB-PAC was heavily involved in psychological operations. “Propaganda 
operations, or as you Americans call IO [Information Operations] – we called it 
propaganda and PR – we did it,” says Chuan.  “Our messages were essentially to 
‘stay away from insurgents.’  We had seminars at the village level, we had 
billboards, things like that.”862  The SB-PAC also relied on village leaders to 
exfoliate government psychological operations.  “The head or subhead of the 
village easily approached their people – they knew them,” says Chuan.  “They 
were born there.  PR was easy for them.”863 
 
One of the first things the SB-PAC did, in fact, was set up a series of seminars in 
1981-82 where local imams met and discussed Islam and local issues with the 
Masjid Committee (provincial mosque committee) and District Committees for 
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Islamic Affairs.  These were persuasive psyops based on open exchange of 
information between the two sides.  Not all locals were satisfied with the 
government’s Islamic leaders’ points of view, but the SB-PAC believed the fact 
that locals showed up was a sign they acknowledged government authority.  It 
also opened unprecedented communication between government and local 
Muslims.  The aim here was to drive a wedge between the population and the 
separatists.  Separatists and conservative imams refused to participate in these 
meetings.864 
 
Similarly, the SB-PAC held conferences with local Muslim leaders to discuss 
problems in their communities.  Doing so brought locals and government officials 
together like never before, each side talking and listening to the other, establishing 
trust and personal relationships.  “It has actually reduced the alienation and 
isolation of the minority in participating in the local projects for their community,” 
writes Panomporn.865 
 
The SB-PAC tried as well to curb radical Islam, which was a growing driver of the 
rebellion.  Says Chuan: “At that time, they also set up teams of local Islamic 
leaders to propagate true Islamic doctrine to the people to keep them from being 
radicalized, and they went to every district.  And these Muslims who taught true 
Islam were Thai Muslims.”866  Many Thai Malay Muslims, however, racially 
discriminated against Thai Muslims, believing them racially and religiously inferior; 
they rejected Thai Muslim sermons. 
 
Educating Thai Malay Muslims on the way the Thai government worked was also 
important.  Many locals were extremely isolated and susceptible to whatever wild 
rumors and accusations the insurgents could dream up.  Says Chuan,  “We held 
meetings or seminars and took them to the other provinces of Thailand for visits to 
show them how the country worked and that their problems were similar to those 
of others in the country.  We made visits to the PM and national leaders.”867 
 
The government had scores of other psyops designed to reduce the southern 
population’s mistrust of the government and demonstrate it was not trying to 
destroy Islam and Malay culture.  For example, Channel 11 in Yala broadcasted 
news for one hour each day in the Malay language beginning in 1996.868  It let the 
population know the government’s Thai language programs were not aiming to 
replace Malay.  In other programs, the SB-PAC even helped Muslims make the haj 
to Mecca on a yearly basis.  In 1991, for example, it sent 471 Muslims to the haj.  
“We helped them make the haj,” says Chuan.  “We held safety orientation for them 
before they went overseas to study.  The main points were that they were Thai 
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people, and when you go study overseas, you must behave yourself and follow a 
good way of life.”869 
 
 
ISOC and Fourth Army Psyops 
 
In the 1980s, to combat the da-wah movement, ISOC created a counter da-wah 
movement.  Called, “the official da-wah movement,” ISOC 4 ran it and staffed it 
with moderate Thai Malay Muslims.  Their mission was to protect Islam from 
radicals.  It was parallel to the SB-PAC’s moderate Islam preaching program 
Chuan described.  “This action from the government,” writes Panomporn, “is to 
bring religious activities within sight and sound [of] the government’s eye and 
ear.”870  It was also designed to capture the sphere of information in the south to 
the extent possible and head off propaganda and rumors that might goad the 
population into anti-government demonstrations.871 
 
The RTA had psyops programs as well, but not too many.  “We had some leaflet 
programs, but not too much,” says General Kitti.  “We did not need to launch a 
mass leaflet program…because the program was working.”872  The insurgency 
then was not rampantly out of control, and there were significant periods of quiet 
and normalcy, so the urgency was less than in the 1960s-70s. 
 
General Kitti’s amnesty program, Krong Kahn Thai Muslim Keh Ban Hah Thai 
Muslim, had psyops aspects, too.873  The development side entailed standard 
development projects the villagers needed.  Aside from economic goals, these 
also had political goals.  Says General Kitti, “…We did not just give them money.  
We helped them budget projects and taught them self-sufficiency.  We wanted 
them to be proud of themselves at the same time.  This was psyops, or part of it, 
because they were proud of themselves.  They didn’t think of themselves Malay.  
They thought of themselves as Thai.  It taught them to be one with the state.”874  
Here, General Kitti refers to nationality, not race. 
 
To join the Krong Kahn projects, General Kitti came up with four political tenets.  
Participants had to swear 1) to be loyal to Thailand, 2) be good Muslims, 3) be 
loyal to the royal family, and 4) reject insurgency and be good citizens.875  Because 
of the development projects and his soft political allegiance requirements, General 
Kitti established good relationships with a wide range of southerners.  “At that 
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time,” he says, “in that area, most of the Muslim leaders, they worked with me 
together with me, the imams, and the political leaders, too.876 
 
 
3. Economic COIN Programs 
 
Development programs for the 1980s-90s COIN were the same type as the 
communist COIN.  They included improving the education system, road-building 
projects, bringing electricity to rural areas, agricultural projects, job programs, etc.  
The motivation behind them was the same as the communist COIN as well – to lift 
the population out of poverty as best could be done, which would improve its 
standard of living and cultivate a grateful population.  The RTA was part of this 
effort.  Says General Kitti: SB-PAC had development projects, and so did the 
army.”877  The RTA considered southern development a matter of national security, 
a major reason it did not relinquish the entire matter to the SB-PAC. 
 
 
Education 
 
The 80s-90s COIN education programs were a continuation of what the 
government had begun in the late 1970s.  Aside form political training, they also 
they aimed at building an economically productive southern population.  State 
schools and state sponsored pondoks continued to teach secular subject material, 
and quotas for Thai Malay Muslims put over a thousand students through college, 
many of whom continued to help the south develop.  More, in the 1980s-90s, most 
Thai Malay Muslim families stopped resisting school.  Ornanong writes by 1987, 
78.1 percent of Thai Malay Muslims finished primary school, and 89.3 percent had 
achieved literacy.  Additionally, in the late 1980s, there were not enough high 
schools and colleges in the far south to accept all who had enrolled.878 
 
The PSTI program had excelled to an extent the government in 1982 categorized 
those that met the highest benchmarks as standard private schools.  It offered 
students at these PSTIs 10,000-baht subsidies.  From October 1999 and April 
2000, the government gave 68 private PSTI schools over 210,000,000 baht.879  By 
1999, the government closed 172 PSTIs that did not meet government standards, 
and Islam-teaching only pondoks had withered to a mere 37.  A 2000 survey of 
Thai Malay Muslim students in grades nine and 12 said their Thai language 
abilities surpassed the national average.880 
 
Bangkok carried on 1970s-era college level reforms into the 1980s-90s as well.  
With the help of the Islamic Development Bank, the government opened a private 
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Islamic college in Yala in 1998.  It began Islamic studies programs at the Prince of 
Songkhla University’s Pattani campus, the Teacher’s College in Yala, and the Yala 
Islamic College.881 
 
The government reduced college quotas but increased scholarships in the 1980s.  
SB-PAC educational programs in 1991 sent 128 Thai Malay Muslim students to 
universities and granted 16 scholarships worth 54,000 baht.882  The Kuruthayat 
program was the biggest such program for Thai Malay Muslims, providing four-
year university scholarships for prospective teachers.  Upon graduation, these 
people taught in the far south, which was intended to close the culture gap 
between students and teachers – teachers that had mostly been Thai Buddhists.  
These teachers also replaced Thai Malay Muslims educated in overseas Islamic 
institutions the government suspected of preaching rebellion.  The Department of 
Teacher Training and the Department of Vocational Training doled out tens of 
millions of baht for scholarships since the 1990s – 29 million baht for 1,260 
scholarships between 1994 and 1996 alone.883 
 
Bangkok’s secular education programs seemed successful.884  Thai Malay Muslim 
college attendance dramatically increased.  Ornanong writes, “One bit of evidence 
is the demonstration at Yala’s Teacher’s College in 1998, where parents and 
students called for an increase in the number of students admitted.”885  
Participation in the system in theory co-opted Thai Malay Muslims into the 
government system, which made them willing participants, which reduced 
rebellion.886 
 
 
Development 
 
The SB-PAC the RTA, and the Thai Royal Family ran development projects in the 
far south.  The SB-PAC ran national level programs and its own.  The RTA 
managed village level projects.  The royal family, via Prem organized a new 
system for its projects, the Royal Initiatives Projects (RIP). 
 
The SB-PAC carried on the 1977-81 economic plan and a number of earlier-
planned projects, among them the 150-million baht energy distribution plan to 
provide electricity to 300 southern border villages and the 2.7-million baht 
Bangrang Dam in Yala to not only provide electricity but also irrigation to farms in 
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.  It and the RTA continued road building and like 
infrastructure projects.887 
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Regarding agriculture, the SB-PAC promoted technology to double rice crops each 
year, and it supported the Rubber Plantation Board in Yala to boost rubber crop 
yields.888  It moreover pressed forward major irrigation projects such as the Munoh 
Irrigation project in Pattani and the Baroei projects in Satun.  The government 
stated these projects would allow the farmers to grow two rice crops a year instead 
of one, thereby raising the income of local farmers.889 
 
When the government passed the Southern Border Provinces Development Plan 
of 1985-87, it continued the infrastructure development and agricultural programs 
of the early 1980s.  Many programs were delayed, likely for budget reasons, and 
they made paltry progress.  A 1980s SB-PAC study stated the far south remained 
in abject poverty.  In 1985, the per capita income there was a mere 15,449 baht, 
4,814 baht below the national average.  This type of poverty continued into 1988.  
Low technology was partly to blame for keeping the agricultural sector that 
employed 80 percent of the population depressed.  Ornanong cites the SB-PAC 
economic study as saying, “most of the people are in poverty and cannot depend 
on themselves economically.”890  Because of this, the government decided to 
increase its development projects. 
 
The RTA did, too.  In 1988, it began a major development project called Harapan 
Baru, short for Krongkarn Puea Kuamwang Mai, or “The New Hope Project.”  
CPM-43 carried it out.  It ran concurrently with a similar project the army began in 
Issan at the behest of the king called Issan Keaw (“Green Issan,”) which aimed to 
bring mass irrigation to the northeast to improve agricultural output.891  It also had 
scores of subprojects such as providing dental care. 
 
The goal of Harapan Baru was two-fold: 1) to improve the standard of living of 
villagers, and 2) to let the border provinces know the government cared for them 
so they would, in turn, believe they were Thai citizens.  The budget was more than 
619.09 million baht.892 
 
Harapan Baru entailed RTA troops interacting with the local population at the 
village level, and doing small development projects villagers needed right away.  
“The army did psyops and civic action,” says General Kitti.  “It ran some medical 
teams, built houses for the poor, gave clothes, provide education, and gave 
scholarships.  The troops visited the pondoks and Muslim schools and talked to 
people about peace, citizenship, and the dangers of joining the insurgency.”893  
RTA CA also included house and farm repairs, small plot agricultural assistance, 
and minor road and bridge repairs. 
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Regarding large-scale development, the government launched the National 
Security Policy for the Border Provinces of 1988-92 to bring more business and 
industry to the far south to increase employment and diversify the economics of 
the region.  Because of this and other programs, by 1991, a vigorous business and 
industry had developed in the far south.  That year, the border provinces had a 
trade surplus of 17,423.79 million baht that included exports of natural gas, 
plastics, seafood, canned food, and rubber products.  Per capita income of the far 
south rose to 19,389.20 baht, about 2,500 baht below the national average, but 
still a 4,000 baht improvement over 1988 levels.894  By 1993, Yala, Narathiwat, 
and Pattani had an average income of 28,833.6 baht.  Songkhla had an average 
income of 43,849 baht.895 
 
In 1991, the SB-PAC helped the NESDB write a new Southern Border Area 
Development Plan as a part of Thailand’s Seventh National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1992-96).  It also managed infrastructure projects totaling 370 
million baht for the Ad Hoc Committee, a special projects board created to manage 
unique projects; in this case, the Special Infrastructure Development Project.  In 
line with the central government’s plan to turn the south into a Special Free Trade 
Zone, the SB-PAC helped the government generate investment privileges for far 
south investors, establish government backed low interest loans, design industrial 
estates in Yala and Narathiwat, upgrade the existing industrial estate in Pattani, 
and promote tourism, airport, seaport, and warehouse improvement.896 
 
These were in part in preparation to contribute to the IMT-GT proposed by then 
Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohammad and agreed to by Jakarta and Bangkok.  
Quelling the insurgency therefore became a top economic priority for Thailand.  
The fighting and bombings would keep the IMT-GT from happening, so Thailand 
needed a clean slate in the south.  Unfortunately, the IMT-GT never materialized.  
The three governments never unified enough to make it happen, and they 
abandoned it in the late 1990s. 
 
Regardless, the preparations for it still benefited the south, and the SB-PAC 
pressed its economic programs forward, adding to progress made in the late 
1980s and 1990-91.  By 1992, the far south had 8,738 factories worth over 12 
million baht employing 53,397 workers.  They processed rubber (resin and latex 
sheets), seafood, and palm oil, among other products.  The region had by that 
time 664 companies worth 1,238.2 million baht.  The south had emerged as a 
mini-economic powerhouse, its overall population no longer in poverty, its workers 
no longer unemployed on a mass scale.  So important was economic development 
to the southern COIN that Bangkok’s 1994 National Security Policy for the 
Southern Border Provinces (NSPSBP) stated economics was its primary COIN 
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weapon.  The SB-PAC’s slogan that year was, “economics leads, public relations 
follows, peace and order supports.”897 
 
These policies resulted in increases in the south’s development budget.  In 1994, it 
averaged one million baht a year.  By 1997, it was five million.  Most monies went 
into infrastructure projects.  Private investment and business associations joined 
the fray and proved pivotal in the far south’s economy.898  Ornanong criticizes the 
progress, however, by noting the 1994 economic plan focused more on business 
interests and less on the economic wellbeing of the southern population.899 
 
As business activity increased, the SB-PAC began to solve local business 
problems, some associated with development projects.  For example, in March 
1996, the Construction Business Club of Pattani asked the SB-PAC to help 
alleviate a shortage of gravel for building projects, including ARD road 
construction.  It seems most stone grinding companies in Yala had expired 
licenses and authorities had shut them down thus driving up unemployment.  The 
SB-PAC helped by lobbying Yala Governor Chuchart Pulsiri to act on the licensing 
problem, which spurred coordination with Transport and Communications Minister 
Wan Muhammad Nor Matha and the Land Department.900 
 
The 1999-2003 NSPSBP picked up were the 1994 version left off.  It aimed to 
continue infrastructure projects but also added a human element.  That was to 
improve, “the potential of human resources and society,” cites Ornanong.901  The 
government included in the policy stipulations for training locals for factory jobs 
and skilled labor, insuring incomes were adequate, and for providing for the 
general welfare of the population.  The government also sought to insure fairness, 
equal opportunity, and peaceful living conditions.  The latter might have been 
added in the wake of Bersatu’s 1997-98 Falling Leaves campaign.  The violence 
had erupted after a period of relative calm, and Bangkok likely sought COIN follow 
through; it had to let the population know its well being continued to be a top 
government priority. 
 
This was vital because economic development in the far south, effective as it was, 
had some pitfalls.  First, the industrial investment that helped alleviate abject 
poverty and increase incomes by an average of 4,000 baht did not reveal that 
Chinese and Thai businessmen ran most businesses, and Thai Malay Muslims 
provided most of the labor.  Some businessmen assert most Thai Malay Muslims 
in southern Thailand had not sought to become business leaders at the time; that 
it was not in their perceived sedentary culture. 
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Second, a lot of the investment in the south reaped profits for big businessmen 
without improving the lives of small-scale farmers and fishermen.  To be sure, 
regional investment beginning in the late 1980s saved the far south from economic 
destitution, and road projects, for example, improved the lives of laborers and 
small businessmen with increased business traffic and access to markets.  But 
because most big profits went to non-Thai Malay Muslims, some of the latter 
resented the economic boom, and anti-state advocates used it as a rally cry – “the 
outsiders are economically exploiting us.”  As a result, there developed pockets of 
the population that were mere labor pools, and they experienced less economic 
growth than other parts of the population, which created resentment. 
 
In the labor pockets, Ornanong asserts some poverty remained.  Development 
and investment did not reach everyone, and rural people with no access to 
industry jobs remained on the fringes while the rest of Thailand became known as 
an “economic tiger” in the 1990s.  In some areas, poverty remained because inept 
civil servants kept development projects from happening.  In other cases, it was 
due to Thai Malay Muslims not wanting development projects of any kind.  In this 
regard, the latter contributed to their own economic plight.902  Says Dr. Amara: 
“Locals did not fight development in the communist counterinsurgency.  But some 
southerners did.  An anti-infrastructure movement did start in the south.”903 
 
 
Royal Initiative Projects 
 
Just as in the communist COIN, King Bhumibol was highly active in the southern 
COIN.  Royal development projects were successful in the first COIN helping 
people out of poverty and convincing them the state cared for them.  When the 
king himself visited villages and personally assigned state agencies specific 
projects, the political soothing had a giant ripple effect to everyone who saw or 
heard about the project.  The king had a political multiplying impact in everything 
he did because he was, and still is, fervently revered and loved by the people of 
Thailand. 
 
Past royal projects were scattered and uncoordinated, however, and for the 
southern COIN, PM Prem organized and coordinated them via law in 1982 through 
a single office, the Royal Initiatives Project (RIP).  Managing members of the RIP 
included the Minister of Defense, the Commander in Chief of the RTA, and the 
heads of the MoI and Agriculture, the National Economic and Social Development 
Board, and the National Budget Office.  The Fourth Army Commander managed 
the projects in the field.  The RIP had its own budget and was not beholden to 
other agencies for funding, which streamlined its chain of command.904  
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RIP’s main mission was to combat poverty at the village level.  Its ministers could 
draft any civil servant, or military, or police officer into any RIP project.  It was the 
most efficiently coordinated development program in the far south, and it was by 
far the most successful.  It was moreover highly prestigious.  The main reason was 
there was no internal squabbling or personal power plays involved.  The mission 
was to carry out the king’s orders to alleviate poverty in Thai Malay Muslim and 
Buddhist villages, and his subjects carried out those orders, period.905 
 
Aside from small but numerous village improvement projects, the RIP was heavily 
involved in irrigation projects, which included irrigation ditches, small dams, wells, 
and the like to help improve agriculture.  It also introduced handicrafts to the far 
south – weaving, pottery, and silk growing.  Fish farming for fishing villages hit by 
a decreasing aquatic population was yet another RIP project, as was road 
building.906 
 
Narathiwat was the epicenter of RIP programs where in 1982 alone on 65,520 rai 
of land there were 19 irrigation projects, according to Panomporn.  The king built in 
Narathiwat the Pikulthong Research Center, an RIP agricultural research 
institution, to infuse new farming technology into the far south.907  It remains to this 
day. 
 
 
* * *  
 
As in the communist COIN, the Thai successfully applied the three pillars of 
COIN against the southern separatists of the 1980s-90s.  Unlike the communist 
war, however, force application was much smaller because of the isolated 
geographic reach of the group – the Bangkok bombings excepted – and also 
because of their limited operational tempo.  Having said this, security operations 
against the separatists were not only focused, but rigorous because their prolific 
terror operations targeted the public.  A good balance of police and military 
operations using local forces was effective.  It took deft Thai diplomacy, 
however, to enable Malaysian police to end insurgent sanctuary, which, in 
combination with other COIN operations, ended the rebels.    
 
Politically, Bangkok tried to curb government corruption and train civil servants 
to better serve what was to most Thai an alien Muslim society.  This was only 
partially effective. Education and language programs designed to decrease 
Malay Muslim isolation worked to a certain degree, but diehards resisted this as 
cultural assassination.  The government, however, was successful in bringing 
the far south’s youth into the national realm, not as fiercely loyal citizens, but 
something more like content protectorates.  Government sponsored political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
905 Ibid., pp. 393-395. 
906 Ibid., pp. 396-399. 
907 Ibid., pp. 399-401. 
	  	   212	  
party inclusion programs did more than any other political initiative to defang the 
movement. 
 
Economic integration worked in tandem with political programs to make Malay 
Muslims productive in the work arena.  Studying mostly Islam and living in a 
largely self-reliance style economy as opposed to a cash economy for multiple 
decades was difficult to undo, but the Thai did manage just enough economic 
projects, some of them large scale businesses, to alleviate abject poverty in a 
majority of the provinces. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF  
THE CURRENT INSURGENCY AND COIN 
 
 
1. Background of the Current Insurgency and COIN to 2003 
 
After their defeat in 1998, some insurgent leaders retired to mediocrity in Europe 
and Malaysia, still fervent in their cause but exiled and impotent.  Sometime 
between then and 2002, however, someone – Thai authorities are not sure who – 
engineered an insurgent revival in the far south.  Says Bhumarat: “…after 2001, 
the separatists spurred a new chapter, a new generation, which included educated 
people.”908  This time, however, gone were the political overtones, the multi-point 
demands, and the gangland goals.  This was a new movement steeped in radical 
Islam, secrecy, and terrorism.  While its origins remain a mystery, there are events 
that demonstrate a rebel storm was on the horizon and gaining momentum. 
 
Despite victory over the insurgents in 1998, the far south remained unstable.  
From then into the 21st Century, violence continued because of the growing drug 
trade.  Thai Malay Muslim gangs, corrupt politicians, crooked military officers and 
policemen, and smugglers were active during this period.  All of them killed to 
protect their turfs, revenue streams, and trafficking routes. 
 
Some assert the Thaksin Shinawatra Administration (9 February 2001-19 
September 2006) used extra judicial killings to get rid of the far south’s undesired 
elements in efforts to clean it up once and for all.  According to Chuan Leekpai, 
“The administration had the belief that the way to solve problems in the south was 
via violence and extra judicial killings.  This was the beginning of the use of extra 
judicial killings – murders of the suspects of terror and criminal organizations 
beginning in year 2001.  This was not the war on drugs.  That came later.”909 
 
A lot of those killed were former insurgents and gangsters that provided 
intelligence to the RTA, which helped it and the SB-PAC keep tabs on former 
insurgents and maintain relative peace.910  Despite their defeat in 1998, there was 
still a smattering of rebellious tension.  Southern insurgents still lived in the far 
south just like ex-CPT still lived throughout Thailand.  Whether they activated and 
fought or not in part depended on Bangkok’s handling of the peace, and in part on 
external factors, such as inspiration from regional and international religious 
radicals. 
 
While all this was happening, there was a surge of violence in Thailand’s far south, 
too – some of it apparently by insurgent groups.  In summer 2001, authorities say 
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the BRN killed six people in Narathiwat.  While it was defeated years earlier, a 
handful of old BRN cadre might have tried to continue the fight, or it might have 
been some other group.  Regardless, violence kept on.  Unknown persons 
kidnapped and beheaded two people in Sai Buri district, Pattani.911  The latter did 
not mesh with organized crime.  The decapitation signified radical Islamic 
overtones. 
 
General Akanit, one of the RTA’s top intelligence officers, watched the region’s 
turmoil and Thailand’s far south burgeoning chaos with alarm.  He was Chief of 
Staff of CPM-43 in 2002.  “There was a rash of incidents in the late 1990s and 
before 2004…,” he comments.  “They were not done by PULO and BRN.”912  He 
wrote an intelligence estimate on the violence and hypothesized a new movement 
was behind it, but he did not know its name. 
 
“When I presented this report,” he says, “they laughed at me.  I warned the Fourth 
Army commander.  I warned many people in the Fourth Army that it would face 
Islamic militants.  Nobody understood what I said.  ‘What’s the meaning of Islamic 
militants?’ they asked.  ‘Now you are facing the soldiers of God,’ I told them.  I did 
not use mujahideen or jihad terminology.  I said the struggle in the southern 
provinces was going to be a new paradigm.”913  Akanit’s warnings went unheeded. 
 
Despite these issues, violence had subsided well below insurgency levels, which 
provided PM Thaksin opportunities to make changes.  Thaksin dissolved CPM-43 
and the SB-PAC in April 2002.  Says current SB-PAC Director General Pranai 
Suwannarat, “The Interior Minister, Dr. Purachai, [Piumsombun] submitted to the 
cabinet to close the SB-PAC [and CPM-43] on grounds that it was no longer 
needed since the situation was close to normal.”914  Others speculate Thaksin 
wanted these agencies gone because they were connected to his political rivals, 
the Democrats.915 
 
The result of the shut downs were intelligence blindness in a region that still 
needed to be watched.  Insurgencies never end cleanly.  “When Thaksin got rid of 
CPM, we lost our access to the villages,” says Bhumarat.  “Our information on the 
separatist movements in the villages dropped off.”916  By design or not, the new 
crop of insurgents took advantage of the vacuum and moved in.  Violence grew in 
2002.  From March to November, there were multiple raids against police 
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checkpoints, several bombings at hotels and bars and Buddhists wats, many 
schools burned, and more than 20 police assassinated.917 
 
At the same time, security agencies in the United States, Singapore, and Malaysia 
cautioned al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and jihadists in general were 
trying to infiltrate Thailand’s far south.  Then Professor Panitan Watanayagorn said 
Islamic terrorists might indeed have begun to base in southern Thailand.  He told 
Time, “Security has been tightened dramatically in Singapore, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and now Indonesia.  If these guys have fled, where would they go?  
Thailand is the obvious choice.”918   
 
Bangkok launched investigations in fall 2002 to discover who was behind the 
upsurge and discovered eight sticks of Powergel mining explosives and extortion 
letters written in 2001 from the BRN’s Poh Ma Su-ngaibatu aimed at terrorizing 1.5 
million baht from gas stations.919  Then in December, an organization calling itself 
the Young Liberators of Pattani burned a Buddhist school – Wat Tantikaram 
School in Narathiwat – and left threat propaganda saying it would continue 
attacking government buildings, civil servants, and their families until it liberated 
Pattani.920 
 
There was more evidence of bourgeoning unrest in 2003.  On 28 April, raiders 
attacked RTM outposts in Narathiwat and Yala.921  In Cambodia on 26 May, 
authorities arrested two Thai Malay Muslims from Yala planning terror attacks.  
They were captured along with an Egyptian national.  The trio formed an al Qaeda 
cell in Phnom Penh under the guise of a Saudi Arabian funded Umm al-Qura 
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mosque.922  The operation led directly to the apprehension of JI operations chief 
Hambali (Riduan Isamuddin) months later in Chiang Mai.923 
 
On 3 July, police arrested three Muslims and a Thai Buddhist trafficking 15 AK-47s 
to the far south in Nakhon Ratchasima town, 210 kilometers northeast of Bangkok.  
Hours later, unknown attackers killed six people and injured three in Pattani.924  In 
the summer, police broke up a three-person JI cell in Narathiwat planning 
embassy bombings in Bangkok.925  A court years later acquitted the trio.  
Authorities insisted they were guilty after the fact and blamed inept police for not 
gathering enough evidence for conviction.  In late summer and through the fall, 
police had shootouts with suspected Islamic militants in Pattani, and there were 
more raids on police outposts by unknown attackers.926 
 
So there was an upswing of southern border violence – seemingly insurgent 
related – and indicators of regional and domestic jihadists in the mix as well.  Still, 
none of the evidence decisively pointed to insurgency or jihad.  Had CPM-43 and 
the SB-PAC been operational, however, the government might have been able to 
ascertain the reality of the situation.  But it did not.  When the insurgents struck 
overtly in 2004, it stunned Bangkok. 
 
 
2. Overview of the Current Insurgency and COIN 
 
2004 
 
On 4 January 2004, more than 30 insurgents raided on the Rajanakarin RTA camp 
that housed an engineer battalion in Narathiwat.  They slit the throats of four Thai 
Buddhist soldiers, told the Muslim troops to quit the army, and stole 40 pistols, 300 
assault rifles, four M-60 machine guns, and ammunition.927  At the same time, 
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arsonists burned 18 schools, killed two police with a motorcycle bomb in Pattani, 
and injured another with a bomb at a park.  Authorities found two more bombs at a 
gas station and a shopping mall.  More attacks followed, and police discovered a 
plot by 12 Thai Malay Muslims to bomb all four provinces in the far south.928 
 
In response, the Thaksin administration declared martial law in Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat and sent 3,000 soldiers for security.929  The Fourth Army saw it as an 
insurgency and developed a COIN plan complete with security, political, and 
economic measures, but it never seemed to go into effect.  Many blamed 
Thaksin’s meddling with the national security chain of command for not allowing 
the RTA to do its work.  The Army “stayed behind the wire,” said foreign military 
attaches.  The authorities kept on the defensive, and the insurgents kept on the 
offensive. 
 
On 28 April 2004, more than 100 insurgents attempted a region wide revolt, an 
operation planned on 20 April led by a man named “Ustaz Soh” Rayarong, a 
pondok teacher.  At least seven groups raided an equal number of TNP and RTA 
posts in Pattani, Yala, and one in Songkhla shouting Islamic and death slogans.  
One raid party, some 30 militants, took over Krue Se mosque in Pattani town by 
chasing down and stabbing to death nearby police.  Attackers broadcast over the 
mosque’s loudspeaker they would fight to the death for the rebellion and called for 
civilians to join them.930 
 
Armed with a few firearms and mostly machetes and knives, all but one of the 
raids failed.  Raid leaders had brainwashed most attackers with mystic Islamic 
chants and holy water into believing they were bulletproof.931  Insurgents overran 
the 5th Southern Development Unit in Yala, stealing 17 M-16 A2s and two M-203s.  
They took an M-79 grenade-launcher from the Krong Penang police station in 
Yala.932 
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RTA forces surrounded the insurgents in Krue Se and pressed for negations for 
several hours.  The insurgents responded with assault rifle and 40 mm grenade 
fire, which wounded several troopers.  A crowd of civilians that eventually reached 
1,000 gathered to protest the troops amidst the shooting.  They chanted not to kill 
Muslims after an imam entered Krue Se during the fighting to administer last rites 
to insurgents and was shot.933  They did not chant for the insurgents not to kill 
Buddhists, nor did they urge them to surrender. 
 
After many hours of failed negotiations and shooting from the mosque, two assault 
teams throwing grenades and covered by snipers cleared Krue Se, killing all 31 
inside.934  In total, insurgents killed as many as five security personnel and 
wounded scores more.  Thai forces killed more than 100 insurgents.  Political 
activists and Thaksin’s opponents condemned the action as a barbaric human 
rights violation, decrying the use of firearms against people armed only with edged 
weapons.  Relatives of the dead see them as martyrs.935 
 
Following a summer of assassinations, bombings, and arson against government 
and civilian targets, there was a government blunder at Tak Bai, Narathiwat.  On 
25 October 2004, more than 1,000 male protestors gathered at the Tak Bai police 
station to demand the release of village security personnel arrested for earlier 
handing their guns over to insurgents without a struggle.  A handful of protesters 
were armed, and they had a few weapons wrapped in plastic in the river next to 
the station.936 
 
At 3:10 pm, protestors rushed the police station, shooting and injuring an officer.  
A riot ensued.  Authorities fired their guns in the air and at protestors.  After a 
tense melee, government forces subdued the crowd.  Police and military arrested, 
handcuffed, and then stacked hundreds of them like cordwood into trucks face 
down with their hands tied behind their backs.  There were multiple beatings, too, 
which caused deadly injuries.  Seventy-eight died while being transported to the 
RTA’s Pattani’s Ingkayuth camp.  Protestors injured 15 police.937 
 
It is apparent insurgents organized the protest to goad authorities into harsh 
action, and it worked.938  While the police and military rightfully defended their 
station and arrested those who refused to leave, they blundered in killing 85 of 
them, especially the 78 who died in transport to Ingkayuth.  Opponents of the 
government, including insurgents, have successfully used it as a human rights 
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violation trump card.  The rest of the year continued with weekly assassinations, 
and monthly bombings and arson attacks. 
 
 
2005 
 
Violence increased in 2005, but the government took no significant offensive 
action to stem it, seemingly because of Thaksin’s meddling in RTA and TNP 
command and control issues.  Insurgents doubled the number of bombings and 
arson attacks.  Assassinations remained at about one a day.  It is likely that BRN-
C’s assault group, Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), which trained in Indonesia in 
irregular warfare, brought these new capabilities to the movement.  Authorities, 
however, were not a hundred percent sure if BRN-C was behind the insurgency – 
it was a hypothesis. 
 
In any case, violence grew.  On 17 February 2005 at 7:00 pm, insurgents set off a 
50-100 kilogram car bomb next to the Pikul Restaurant and Marina Hotel in 
Narathiwat.  Authorities said it was Thailand’s first car bomb.  It killed six and 
wounded 50.939 
 
On 3 April 2005, at around 8:24-8:30 pm, insurgents set off three bombs in 
Songkhla at the Hat Yai International Airport, the French-owned Carrefour 
department store in Hat Yai, and the beachfront Green World Palace Hotel in 
Songkhla town.  The bombings killed two and wounded 65, including Thai, French, 
British, American, Malaysian, and Brunei citizens.940 
 
On 15 July 2005, insurgents raided downtown Yala in a well coordinated attack.  
Witnesses said the raid consisted of at least 60 insurgents divided into three 
groups, each with specific missions.  One group pinned down Thahan Phran at a 
railroad station from responding to the attack.  The other two other bombed and 
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shot up the town’s hotels, businesses, and a movie theater.941  On 16 October, 20 
insurgents raided Wat Promprasith in Pattani.  They murdered and mutilated a 
monk and killed two temple workers.  They also desecrated the wat’s interior.942 
 
 
2006 
 
Insurgent violence increased dramatically in 2006.  There were close to 90 raids 
and ambushes, triple the number of bombings from 2004, scores of arson 
campaigns, and statistically more than an assassination per day.  Some 
insurgency watchers, however, believe 20 percent of the assassinations might 
have been due to personal conflicts.  
 
On 15 June, insurgents detonated 69 bombs between Pattani, Narathiwat, and 
Yala.  Some of the targets included Pattani City Hall (via car bomb), an Informal 
Education Office in Pattani, rail and ferry facilities in Narathiwat, karaoke bars and 
other civilian targets.  The attacks killed two and wounded 23.943 
 
Insurgents demonstrated their growing tenacity and light infantry abilities when on 
28 June, after ambushing a column of local forces, they broke cover, entered the 
kill zone, and executed all the wounded they could find.  It marked the first time 
militants decisively cleared the kill zone in an ambush.944 
 
As for the COIN campaign, Thaksin had given RTA commander General Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin, newly appointed and a Thai Muslim, complete power over all 
government agencies involved in the war.  After a few weeks, however, it was 
evident Sonthi’s power was in name only.  But Thaksin was reporting Sonthi 
indeed had all the resources and command and control he needed. The rumor mill 
asserted this was designed to cause Sonthi’s failure and allow Thaksin to seize 
more national security power as the only man who could solve the unrest.945  It 
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would have also allowed Thaksin to put his classmate and ally Assistant Army 
Chief of Staff General Pornchai Kranlert in charge of the RTA.946 
 
None of this sat well with the RTA.  It seemed Thaksin was using the insurgency to 
expand his political power while the terrorists were running amok.  Defense 
Minister Thammarak Issarangkura said on 25 July the government still did not 
have a cohesive COIN strategy, and the existing command structure lacked unity.  
He told the press “certain people in high places” had denied Sonthi full command 
to wage COIN, and the result was death and destruction.947  It followed an 
unsettling pattern of Thaksin’s apparent meddling in military affairs.  For example, 
from 2004 to the September 2006 coup, the Fourth Army had four different 
commanders. 
 
Amidst the political wrangling, on 16 September, insurgents detonated six bombs 
in downtown Hat Yai’s tourist district, killing four and injuring as many as 70.  All 
bombs went off simultaneously at 9:15 pm.  The targets were the Big C 
department store, the Lee Gardens Hotel, the Monkey Pub, the Odeon Shopping 
Mall, and a cinema toilet near the Diana department store.948  So brazen was the 
attack on Hat Yai security officials thought the insurgents might make similar 
strikes on other resort areas such as Phuket that contribute to Thailand’s $10 
billion USD a year tourist sector.949 
 
It was the last straw for the RTA.  Because of the PM’s inaction on the insurgency, 
his political intrigue, and his apparent illegal business affairs, General Sonthi led a 
coup against Thaksin on 19 September 2006 while he was in New York at a UN 
meeting.  Backing Sonthi was a consortium of RTA personalities via the Council 
for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM).  The CDRM was 
rumored to have the blessing of the king and Privy Council, of which Prem was a 
member.  Sonthi’s forces arrested the cabinet and established an interim 
government under the Council for National Security.950 
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From that point on, the RTA began the COIN campaign Thaksin had blocked for 
two years.  But the army was behind.  From January 2004 to December 2006, the 
insurgency had killed 1,900 people.951  Quelling the insurgency, then, was the new 
government’s top priority.  As a first step, retied RTA General Surayud Chulanont 
took over as PM and apologized to Thai Malay Muslims for decades of ill treatment 
and for the deaths at Tak Bai.952  In the meantime, the RTA planned its COIN 
campaign to begin in early 2007. 
 
The year ended with a series of nine bombings throughout Bangkok on 31 
December, New Year’s Eve.  They killed three and wounded 42.  The explosive 
devices and targets mimicked those in the far south.  Anonymous intelligence 
officials said it was JI on behalf of the insurgency.  The Department of Special 
Investigation insisted there was a “possible link” to the insurgency based on 
technical aspects of the devices used such as the timing devices – Casio watches.  
The most vocal pundits blamed internal wrangling in the military and/or Thaksin’s 
followers.953  The culprits were never caught. 
 
 
2007 
 
Before PM Surayud and General Sonthi could put their COIN plan into action, the 
insurgents staged the biggest bombing campaign of the war (to that point) on 
Sunday, 18 February.  For the first time, they struck all four provinces at once, 
beginning at 7:00 pm and lasting into the next day.  There were about 50 
bombings along with multiple acts of arson and scores of assassinations.954 
 
From 27-29 May, insurgents targeted Songkhla, mostly Hat Yai, in another 
bombing campaign.  On the 27th, they detonated seven bombs in Hat Yai at hotels 
and other tourist venues, killing one and wounding 13.  The next day, they set off a 
massive bomb at a market in Saba Yoi district, killing four and wounding 26.955 
 
As for the RTA’s COIN campaign, it applied the King’s advice of understanding the 
population’s needs, interfacing with them on a regular basis, and executing 
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development projects.  The government overhauled ISOC and focused its 
resources on the insurgency.  The RTA moreover brought back CPM-43, now 
simply called CPM, and the SB-PAC. 
 
For security operations, the RTA first increased its intelligence capabilities and 
began receiving more tips from villagers that resulted in scores of successful 
arrests and weapons cache raids.  On many occasions, CPM, usually the RTA 
and BPP, attempted arrests only to be met by hasty ambushes by insurgents, 
proof their intelligence was good.  Many more raids, however, were a complete 
surprise and resulted in yet more captured insurgents and more intelligence to fuel 
future COIN operations. 
 
On 29 July, for example, a battalion-sized CPM force of 500 raided tambon 
Tapoyor in Narathiwat’s Yi-ngo district at 6:00 am.  They arrested 50 suspects, 
including alleged RKK officer Abdulromae Pereesee, and found a cache of four 
pistols, two M-16s, ammunition, PVC piping, fertilizer, camouflage uniforms, and 
medical supplies.  (Insurgents used fertilizer to make bombs and PVD piping as 
bomb casings.)  Police in Yala arrested three after 22 raids throughout the 
province.  The new government’s COIN campaign resulted in nearly 2,000 
detentions since early 2007.  The government said some 300 were rank and file 
fighters and or organizers.  The rest were allegedly auxiliary support personnel.956  
Some insurgency watchers, however, say many were innocent villagers caught up 
in government dragnets. 
 
As CPM carried out its missions, the SB-PAC infused cash into the border 
provinces and assembled advisory boards of local imams, village leaders, and 
businessmen to develop solutions for the south’s socio-economic woes.  
Diplomatically, the government engaged Malaysia to try and resurrect a 1998 style 
working relationship, but it appeared slow in coming.  Internationally, Bangkok 
threw both diplomats and its top military brass into halting Middle East support for 
the insurgency, particularly the OIC. 
 
Security operations began to show some results.  Authorities discovered and 
stopped a plot to bomb Hat Yai on 5 October.  They found as many as 17 bombs 
hidden near Prince of Songkhla University and 12 near a restaurant owned by the 
RTN.957  At the same time, in Narathiwat, they discovered and shut down a 10-
person terrorist cell, including two women, that had communications equipment, 
ammunition, Molotov cocktails, bomb material such as electronic circuits, and fake 
license plates.958  Additionally, multiple bombings went bad because of poor 
device placement and faulty construction.  In a more dramatic case in December, 
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two insurgents in Pattani blew up when the device they were transporting 
exploded prematurely.959 
 
But insurgents again demonstrated their proficiency on New Years Eve by 
bombing two celebrations in Narathiwat; one at the Riviera Hotel, and the other at 
the Marina Hotel, the second time they bombed the latter.  They exploded two 
bombs behind speakers at the Riviera, and as patrons fled the building, they set 
off another in the parking lot.  They did the same thing at the Marina.  The 
explosions injured 31.960  By the end of 2007, 2,848 people had died as a result of 
the insurgency.961 
 
 
2008-09 
 
Despite political turmoil resulting in four PMs coming and going post Surayud’s 
scheduled step down on 6 February 2008. (Abhisit Vejjajiva attained the position 
on 17 December 2008), the RTA managed to decrease insurgent violence by 
nearly half, except for assassinations, which rebels continued to carry out at will.962  
Part of the army’s success happened because of General Anupong Paochinda’s 
strategy to deploy to the far south parts of each Army Regional Command, a surge 
of troops.  Anupong took over as RTA commander on 1 October 2007.  This 
bought the SB-PAC time to institute political and economic programs that had a 
positive impact on villagers. 
 
While the insurgents certainly were not down and out, RTA operations continued 
to show their effects.  On 3 August, for example, insurgents launched another 
bombing campaign against Hat Yai, but it was weak, killed no one, and was not 
exclusively against Hat Yai.  Because of city security measures, rebels were 
forced to attack several targets with little bombs in Songkhla town, north of Hat 
Yai, on the coast.  The last target they struck there was the Green World Hotel on 
3 April 2005.963 
 
By early to mid 2009, the government had managed to institute a new village 
security program, Pattana Santi (“Development and Peace”) combining village 
security forces coupled with specially CA-trained Thahan Phran and TNP and RTA 
forces.  While not decisive, they showed positive effect.  Violence had not gone 
away, but it had decreased, and intelligence tips on insurgent activities had 
increased.  Former professor and now Government Spokesman Panitan said the 
number of insurgent controlled villages, more than 400, had nearly decreased by 
half, about 200.  Violence, however, increased slightly in spring 2009, and then on 
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8 June, unknown assailants in Narathiwat fired into al Pukon Mosque in Joh I 
Rong district, massacring 10 people during prayers.  By fall 2009, the government 
had a suspect in mind, a former local force trooper apparently incensed at the 
recent insurgent murder of a pregnant Thai Buddhist woman.964  This episode 
illustrated the growing Muslim vs. Buddhist violence that had characterized facets 
of the war since 2004. 
 
 
3. The Insurgents of the Current COIN 
 
Strategy 
 
The insurgency wants to separate Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and Songkhla 
provinces from Thailand and establish Pattani Raya, a pre-1909-like Malay Muslim 
nation state.  It seeks UN or other international assistance in mediating an East 
Timor type settlement to achieve its goals.965  These goals were made clear by 
PULO in 2004-05 on its website and are akin to what Algerian insurgents achieved 
in the 1950s-60s against their French colonial masters.  While Bangkok does not 
suspect PULO of being a major actor in the insurgency, its Sweden-based leaders 
are active propagandists for the movement to the point it appears they are 
coordinated.966  Scores of propaganda leaflets saying, “We want Patani back,” 
scattered at the scenes of attack sites since the conflicts beginning also make the 
separatism point clear. 
 
Religiously, the insurgency wants to create a conservative Islamic republic.  (In 
orthodox Islamic circles, political and religious goals are the same.)  This comes 
from several sources.  Retired RTA General and advisor to PM Surayud 
Watanachai Chaimuanwong said in March 2007 the insurgency consisted of 
radical Islamists that wanted to create “a pure Islamic state” called Pattani 
Darusalam that encompasses Thailand’s Malay Muslim provinces and Malaysia’s 
two northern states.967  Well before this, authorities found a 2002-published 
insurgent guidebook, “Fight for the Liberation of Pattani,” that spoke of the 
movement’s goals.  It included the goal of founding what sounds like a Taliban-like 
regime.968 
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Some press reports said early in the conflict the insurgents wanted to rule the 
south by Shafi’i law, a tolerant form of Islam popular in Southeast Asia.969  But the 
insurgents behave like JI and al Qaeda with their vicious intolerance of other 
religions, their genocidal actions of Buddhists, and their prolific murdering of other 
Muslims.  The latter makes them takfir.  For example, on 12 March 2009, 
insurgents assassinated well-known women’s rights activist Laila Paaitae Daoh in 
Yala.  It was an example of their disdain toward her status as a woman in society, 
her peace efforts, and her development work with the government.  Insurgents had 
threatened her and her family for years, branding her munafik (“hypocrite”).970 
 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
The insurgency appears to be an umbrella organization of different groups.  
Authorities suspect the umbrella organization is the Dewan Pembabasan Pattani, 
(“Patani Liberation Council.”)  It has a pyramid structure with a leadership 
hierarchy and field lieutenants running fighters and auxiliary forces in the field.  
Operational security has effectively insulated the movement’s leadership, and its 
compartmentalized cell structure reflects professional planning designed to protect 
the movement if a cell is compromised.  It appears to be an Algerian insurgent 
organizational model.971 
 
Insurgency expert Mark Askew interviewed an insurgent field commander named 
Abdul who knew only the names and locations of his 24 fighters.  Abdul knew 
there were other cells, and his operations and theirs coincided, but he did not 
know their names or locations.  Hamad, another insurgent, told Askew: “I often 
wondered just what the structure of the organisation was like.  But I was told that it 
wasn't necessary; it was enough just to do my job.”972 
 
The Police Operation Center Forward Command in Yala says the insurgents 
operate under a five-tiered structure.  Group one consists of Islamic leaders and 
ustaz who propagandize, recruit, and indoctrinate people to hate the state and join 
the movement.  It also initiates new recruits via ceremonies designed to solidify 
groupthink and loyalty.  The ulama are part of this top tier; they study the Thai 
government’s activities and world events, and serve as a think tank for the 
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movement.973  Group two consists of the movement’s administrative body.  It 
manages the rebellion via a structure that parallels that of the state.  Bersatu’s 
Wan Kadir alleges the insurgents are also hidden inside the Thai government.974  
Group two’s other mission is to infiltrate every village it can and convince people to 
commit acts of violence. 
 
Group three is the rebels’ financial wing.  It raises and distributes money.  Group 
four is the military wing, the RKK and its many trainees.  (Runda Kumpulan Kecil 
stands for “guerrilla warfare” or “small unit tactics” in Indonesian and Malay.)  
Authorities discovered RKK in November during the investigation into the 16 
October 2005 insurgent raid on Wat Phromprasit in Pattani.  RKK is a subgroup of 
BRN.975  Interestingly, Askew’s research demonstrates insurgent combatants do 
not call themselves RKK.  Insurgents he interviewed say it is a term the military 
uses to label them.  They call themselves simply, jihadists.976 
  
Group five is Pemuda (or Permudor.)  Like its 1980s-90s predecessor, it consists 
of the far south’s youthful sympathizers.  They provide auxiliary support such as 
intelligence gathering on the routines of state officials and conduct harassment 
operations such as spike laying on roads.  Through these type activities, they 
prepare to become RKK fighters themselves.977  It also means the insurgency 
uses child soldiers. 
 
 
Numbers 
 
Regarding numbers, in the early years if the war, Bangkok estimated insurgents 
numbered 3,000 fighters.  General Sonthi said in a November 2005 press 
conference the auxiliary force numbered about 5,000.  In 2004, some observers 
had put the auxiliary force at 70,000.978  In July 2009, new reporting emerged 
based on police information there were between 7,000 and 9,000 insurgents in the 
far south.  These numbers ostensibly helped the insurgents co-opt 274 villages.  
There are a total of 2,200 villages in the area.979 
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Recruiting 
 
Insurgents have four general recruiting methods.  First, they recruit people its 
members have personally studied, such as friends or colleagues.  One youth said 
his friend recruited him for the 28 April uprising, and an imam said insurgents 
approached him because of his apparent radical and sympathetic views.980  
According to the TNP, RKK recruits its members “from devout Muslim students 
who are clever, well-behaved, and disciplined.”981 
 
Second, insurgents use ustaz at pondoks as recruiting vehicles.  This is based on 
the fact that scores of insurgent leaders are ustaz, and at the very least, half of its 
rank and file is pondok students.  Additionally, authorities discovered many 
pondoks teach separatist ideology as part of their curriculum.982 
 
Third, insurgents rely on imams to indoctrinate the masses and then recruit them.  
In October 2004, a reporter witnessed an imam preach for two hours to 50 people 
about Thailand’s social evils, its history of cruelty, and the West’s “war on Islam.”  
Upon conclusion, he made an appeal for his audience to stand up for their rights, 
join the insurgency, and liberate the south.  Another captured insurgent in 2009 
said his village imam said all Muslims had to join the insurgency, which he called 
jihad, as their duty to God.983 
 
Fourth, they use trickery and group pressure to convince people to join.  A former 
insurgent describes how an imam used to preach to him about the evils of Siam 
and how terrible the government was to Muslims.  Eventually, the preacher made 
his pitch, telling the young man everyone else in the village had joined the 
rebellion, and he was the last one not in the movement.  He later witnessed other 
people being recruited, negating the “last man to join” angle, but it was, 
nevertheless, effective.984 
 
 
Training 
 
Insurgents train locally, on the job, and outside Thailand.  Within Thailand, they 
undertake light training in indoctrination, arson, weapons familiarity, harassment, 
intelligence, and calisthenics.985  Some receive light infantry and sabotage training 
from the RKK.  On the job training is a constant theme, and insurgents obtain 
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knowledge on guerrilla warfare tactics from manuals and the Internet.  On 20 
January 2008, the 15th Infantry Division Commander Major General Jamlong 
Khunsong said the government had uncovered evidence the insurgents were 
studying terrorist tactics such as how to build bombs and set up ambushes from 
jihadist websites.986 
 
Police have discovered multiple local training facilities since the war started. In 
May 2004, a joint military and police task force raided several Islamic schools in 
Pattani and found not only written and audio-visual instructionals on weapons 
handling, explosives, and surveillance authored by al Qaida, but also a makeshift 
shooting range.  The range was nearby the dormitories of Jihad Witthaya school at 
Ban Taloh Kapo village.  Four students acknowledged that ustaz had given 
attendees firearms training and taught them how to make bombs. Authorities 
found bullet holes in coconut trees and cans.  Some documents contained 
indoctrination and propaganda material that urged students to revolt against 
Thailand.987 
 
The RTA says ustaz have provided information on Thai Islamic students in 
Indonesia and Malaysia undergoing tactical training.  They also say women 
insurgents have taken medical classes in Kedah in Malaysia.988  To date, Malaysia 
has kept quiet on the accusations.  RKK supposedly began training in Bandung, 
Indonesia, years before the current violence erupted in southern Thailand.989 
 
 
Logistics and Sanctuary 
 
Insurgents rely heavily on smuggling of weapons and explosives.  They also 
collect firearms from victims they kill.  From 2004-06, they stole scores of weapons 
from poorly trained and unmotivated village defense forces.  Authorities 
intercepted multiple smuggling operations in 2005 that demonstrate their logistics.  
One notable incident occurred on 9 March when Malaysian police arrested five 
insurgents at Sentral Station in KAL, the city’s new main rail station, who were out 
to secure weapons from a JI arms cache.  All five were armed at the time of arrest.  
Regional security officials said increased security in Thailand had made it difficult 
to secure arms in country, so they turned to outside sources.  Ironically, the very 
cache the insurgents were aiming for was, in fact, the result of arms smuggling 
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operations out of Thailand that ran to Indonesia.  JI had been using this particular 
overland weapons trafficking route since at least 2000.990 
 
On 19 October, police seized a container truck in Phetchaburi headed for Pattani 
that was carrying one AK-47, two M-16s, and 200 rounds of ammunition.  Police 
arrested three Pattani natives in the truck, and one confessed he had smuggled 
weapons to his brother in Pattani on eight previous occasions.991 
 
The most audacious weapons theft operation occurred on 26 October.  Between 
7:00-9:00 pm, insurgents raided defense volunteers for weapons at 20 locations in 
Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani, stealing 92 firearms, 85 of which were shotguns.  
Police recovered only three.  Insurgents struck while the volunteers were either at 
home or on guard duty – demonstrating their intelligence prowess, among other 
things.992  Some volunteers gave up their weapons without a struggle, and 
militants killed those who resisted.  The raids took place a day after the one-year 
anniversary of the Tak Bai protest.993 
 
Regarding financing, authorities have discovered varying degrees of information 
on insurgent involvement with drug money, Islamic charities, and cash smuggling.  
Thai Interior Minister Kongsak Wanthana linked drug dealers caught in November 
2005 moving $3 million in narcotics from Malaysia to Thai Malay Muslim 
insurgents.994  Days later, Deputy Prime Minister and Justice Minister Police 
General Chidchai Vanasatidya cited more than 10 drug gangs that were providing 
insurgents with millions of dollars from illicit narcotics sales.  He moreover 
pinpointed 20 locations in Thailand targeted for counter narcotics operations, 
many within the insurgents’ battle space.  Anti-narcotics officials said the main 
drug involved in these scenarios was methamphetamines, colloquially known as 
yaba.995 
 
Zakat is another form of insurgent financing.  In August 2005, Nimu Makaje, the 
vice president of the Yala Islamic Committee, asserted the government needed to 
more strongly regulate Islamic charities because militants were siphoning money 
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from them to fund operations.996  In December 2005, Anti-Money Laundering 
Office (AMLO) Secretary General Police Major General Peeraphan Prempooti said 
police had arrested several insurgents via tracking their illegal financial activities 
through zakat networks.  The accused had also abused charity funds for their own 
personal use to purchase vehicles, homes, and to send their children to foreign 
schools.997 
 
Police in November staged a series of raids that netted 15 insurgents who had in 
their possession six bank deposit passbooks, indicating militants spread their 
financing activities across multiple accounts to camouflage it.998  The same month, 
General Peeraphan said anti-money laundering operations had forced the 
insurgents to rely mostly on cash smuggling.  General Peeraphan also said his 
officers had evidence from 1997-2003 revealing Middle Eastern financial transfers 
into the accounts of organizations linked to the insurgency.999 
 
Tax collecting is also a factor.  A former tax collector told the press in 2009: “They 
told me to collect one baht from a person daily – as a monthly payment.  For 
annual payment, 360 baht would be collected from everyone.  And they could pay 
more than that if they wanted.  Every tenth of a month, members would have to 
get the collected money to me.  After that, another member would take it from me.  
I did not know what the organization did with the money.”1000 
 
Regarding border sanctuary, Bangkok has, since the war began, asked Malaysia 
for increased border security to shut down what it says is insurgent sanctuary in 
northern Malaysia.  Thai authorities say, for example, captured rebels who 
participated in the 14 July 2005 raid on Yala town confessed to have planned the 
operation on 28 June in Kelantan, Malaysia.1001  And in August, police captured 
Masaki Ma, a 38-year old bomber who crossed from Thailand to Malaysia and 
back regularly, further indicating the insurgents’ use of Malaysia as sanctuary.1002 
 
 
Indoctrination 
 
Insurgents indoctrinate recruits with political and religious rhetoric.  Insurgents cast 
negative dispersions on Thailand, calling it “Siam,” asserting it unlawfully invaded 
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and subjugated Pattani centuries ago.  PULO’s website specifically says that 
“Siam” in the early 1900s burned southerners’ homes, took their water and land, 
and stole their women and children.  It also says Bangkok’s present goal is to kill 
all southern Muslims or breed them out so it can establish more effective control of 
the region and its natural resources.  PULO asserts the south is made up of Malay 
people who despise being called Thai and have nothing in common with Thai 
people – not religion, not language, not history, not culture.  It says they and Thai 
people cannot live together because of these differences and historical “bad 
blood.”  For these reasons, PULO claims the southern revolt is legal.1003 
 
Insurgent religious indoctrination is powerful, and many members have sacrificed 
their lives for it.  This is best illustrated by the 28 April 2004 uprising that ended at 
Krue Se mosque when about a hundred true believers, armed with but a few 
firearms and scores of machetes screaming they were willing to die for Allah, 
charged as many as 15 TNP and RTA posts.  At least 19 ran to their deaths. 
 
The insurgents’ most prolific propaganda – taken from Fight for the Liberation of 
Pattani – calls for southern Muslims to unite and defend Islam against the infidels.  
It also says they should kill all non-Muslims and anyone who does not support the 
insurgency.  The book says it is the religious duty of all Muslims to fight and die to 
liberate “Patani” from Thailand.  It also says all true Muslims have “warriors’ 
blood,” and if they shed it for “Patani,” history will remember their glorious feats 
forever. 
 
For example, the book says: “It is known that all Muslims who have faith in God 
and his prophets have warriors’ blood.”1004  It further states: “If any Muslim betrays 
Islamic principles, even though he is a father or friend, you should kill him.  They 
are enemies of those who have true faith in religion.”1005  Perhaps its most 
powerful statement is: “Let us go and spark this fire and look for them everywhere, 
night and day, and kill those infidels to show non-believers that Muslims are strong 
while living in this world.”1006  This stanza means Muslims are victims, and they 
must fight back and prove themselves to their detractors. 
 
A former insurgent of four years describes an ayah, or a village religious leader, 
talking to him for several years in casual conversations about the history of Pattani 
and Thailand’s transgressions against it.  The ex-rebel told the press: “He never 
talked about the good side of the Thai government.  No one thought of asking him 
either.”1007  Over an extended period of time, the ayah told villagers the insurgent 
movement was powerful, that it could be successful.  He would talk to individual 
villagers alone, telling them everyone else in the village had joined the movement, 
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which he called jihad, and they needed to as well.  By doing so, the ayah 
convinced the entire village to join.1008 
 
 
Propaganda 
 
Insurgents use four kinds of propaganda: 1) anti-government, 2) threat messages, 
and 3) actionable manipulation.  They print some of it as leaflets in Thai, English, 
and Yawi.  Some of it is spoken at pondoks and mosques by ustaz and imams.  
Leaflets appear in common meeting places such as teashops, scattered around 
villages, and at arson or murder sites. 
 
Regarding anti-government propaganda, in July 2005, insurgent leaflets found in 
Yala said not to cooperate with government work and aid programs: “Those who 
cooperate are merely loyal dogs to their rulers,” and, “You are not the enemy of 
Mujahidin fighters for Pattani, but if you still cooperate and support Siamese rulers 
who invaded our sovereignty, it is the equivalent of declaring war against us.”1009 
 
Other anti-government propaganda assailed former PM Thaksin.  In November 
2005, for example, insurgents placed scarecrows draped with the Thai flag 
mocking Thaksin in 20 different places throughout Pattani during the Muslim 
holiday, Eid al-Fitri.  Eid al-Fitri, also known as Hari Raya in the far south, marks 
the end of the holy month of Ramadan and is when Muslims travel home to visit 
their families.1010 
 
As for threat propaganda, in August 2005, assassins murdered a husband and 
wife in Narathiwat and left four threat propaganda leaflets behind that said it was 
for revenge for the government’s killing and arrests of “innocent people.”1011  In a 
beheading in Yala in June, militants placed the head of the deceased in a box by a 
road with a note that stated: “We want to get Pattani State back.  You arrest 
innocents, we’ll kill innocents.”1012  This particular incident happened while six 
representatives from the OIC were visiting the region. Observers of the conflict say 
such violence is a propaganda attempt to reach out to the OIC and enlist its 
support.1013 
 
There have been several cases of actionable propaganda where militants induced 
civilians to behave in the exact manner they wanted, which bolstered their cause.  
One happened in July and August 2005 when militants distributed leaflets 
throughout Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat threatening violence against merchants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1008 Ibid.  
1009 “Leaflets tell Muslims to quit govt jobs or die,” in Bangkok Post, 7 July 2005. 
1010 “Decapitated head scarecrows of PM found in Pattani,” in The Nation, 3 November 
2005. 
1011 “Three shot dead in the south,” in TNA, 4 August 2005. 
1012 “Militants chop off plantation worker’s head,” in The Nation, 7 June 2005. 
1013 Ibid. 
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that did not close their businesses on Friday, a Muslim holy day.  Thousands 
obeyed.  In Yala, more than 90 percent of businesses closed, and across the 
south, street vendors stayed indoors.  Some buses stopped running their 
routes.1014  This gave the false appearance southern Thailand was an ultra 
conservative Islamic area and people supported the movement. 
 
 
Weaponry 
 
Based on acts of violence and seized arms caches, it is evident insurgents use a 
wide range of infantry small arms, namely M-16s, AK-47s, HK-33s, a wide range 
of pistols (1911 .45s, HK USP 9 mms, and .38 revolvers), Mk-26 hand grenades, 
and M-79 grenade launchers.  Infantry weapons stolen from the RTA Rajanakarin 
base in Narathiwat on 4 January 2004 remain in circulation.  They also have 
various explosives – mostly home made ammonium nitrate compounds, but also 
dynamite, TNT, C-4, Semtex, and PETN.1015  They also use several types of 
mining explosives such as Powergel.1016  They make bomb triggers out of cell 
phones, clocks and Casio watches, and electronic car unlock devices.  They use 
commercial detonators and home made ones constructed with writing pens.  
General Kitti Rattanachaya said 2005 militants had stockpiled more than 7,000 
weapons.1017 
 
 
Operations 
 
Insurgents have five main lines of operations: 1) assassinations, 2) arson, 3) 
bombings, 4) raids, and 5) ambushes.  Former Yala governor Boonyasit Suwanrat 
said in October 2006 insurgent tactics were not like those of the past; that instead 
of living in jungle bases, they masqueraded as civilians and lived amongst the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1014 “Three killed by insurgents in Narathiwat,” in Bangkok Post, 5 August 2005, and 
“Rebel threat shutters Yala, Pattani businesses,” in Bangkok Post, 6 August 2005, 
and “Businesses in South seek return of order,” in The Nation, 7 August 2005, and “Bt 
10,000 reward for tipoff on leaflet distributors in Pattani,” in TNA, 5 August 2005, and 
“Almost like being there: Yala closed” a pictorial and description of the forced closing 
of business, 12 August 2005, available on 
<http://www.2bangkok.com/south05August2.shtml>. 
1015 “Eight Muslim teachers face terror charges,” in Bangkok Post, 10 March 2005. 
1016 Of the hundreds of press reports consulted to conduct this pattern analysis, fewer 
than half discussed explosives compounds, but the majority that did cited urea and/or 
fertilizer compounds used with what appeared to be a dynamite initiator. As a sample, 
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1017 “Thai rebels said to have big arsenal,” in AP, 5 July 2005. 
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population.  This makes them harder to decouple from the population than the 
separatist-criminal groups of the 80s-90s.1018 
 
The tempo of insurgent operations peaked in 2005-06.  They were excessively 
violent years, and security forces appeared helpless to stop them.  In 2007, 
however, the TNP and RTA increased their intelligence activities, which drove 
scores of successful raids against arms caches and wanted suspects.  This 
severely decreased militant attacks for the next two years.  For example, attacks – 
raids, ambushes, bombings, etc. – in 2008 decreased by almost half compared to 
2007, some 47 percent.  Casualty rates decreased, too.  Insurgents killed 546 
people and wounded 1,075 in 2008.  In 2007, they killed 866.1019  In mid-2009, 
however, insurgents slightly increased their attack tempo, indicating they learned 
to circumvent some state security measures. 
 
Regarding assassinations, analysts such as Srisompob estimate at least 80 
percent of the violence in the region is by insurgents.  The rest, he says, is by 
criminals.  Statistically, in 2004, there were approximately 1.04 assassinations a 
day.  In 2005, there were 1.09, in 2006, 1.22.1020  These patterns have held steady 
since then and are the one line of operation hardly impacted by government 
security operations.  Assassins mostly kill at close range with pistols, though they 
occasionally attack people with assault rifles, knives, and machetes.  Post mortem 
mutilation such as beheadings and hacking off arms is common. 
 
Bombings grew from 6.3 a month in 2004 to 18.8 a month in 2005.  In 2006, there 
were 24.5 bombings a month.  They decreased in the second half of 2007 and 
have fallen to 2004 levels since.  Insurgents most commonly set off one or two 
bombs at a time, but in 2006, they executed nine bombing campaigns where they 
detonated scores of bombs at multiple locations almost simultaneously.  Their 
delivery methods changed year to year.  In 2004, it was motorcycle bombs.  In 
2005, they used car bombs more often.  In 2005, they went back to motorcycle 
bombs. 
 
Arson followed a similar pattern as bombings.  In 2004, there were 16.6 a month, 
in 2005, 23 a month.  In 2006, insurgents averaged 18.08 arsons a month.  
Insurgents mostly targeted schools and commercial businesses.  Arson is not 
complex, and insurgents use it as on-the-job training of recruits destined for light 
infantry operations. 
 
Regarding light infantry operations, insurgents executed a mere six raids in 2004, 
none of them too professional.  With the advent of the RKK in 2005, however, 
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1019 “Situation improves in deep South,” in Bangkok Post, 22 January 2009. 
1020 The statistics regarding the number of assassinations, bombings, raids, ambushes, 
and arson attacks from the 2004-2006 time frame comes from meticulous pattern 
analyses from news stories on violence in the south.  For each line of operation, the 
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raids increased to 43 for the year.  In 2006, there were 40.  Ambushes followed a 
similar pattern.  In 2004, there were no classic ambushes.  In 2005, there were 45; 
in 2006, 31.  These operations meant the insurgents had transformed from a band 
of saboteurs to a light infantry force in the time span of less than a year. 
 
 
Targeting 
 
Insurgents have a robust intelligence network they use to produce rapid, 
actionable intelligence. Compartmentalized auxiliary forces case targets, conduct 
surveillance, and carry out vulnerability assessments without detection. Militants 
would never have been able to bomb so many high value targets – police teacher 
escort convoys, military patrols, etc. – if they did not know when and where they 
were on the move.  Likewise, insurgents would never be able to assassinate the 
majority of their victims while they were in transit if they did not know their daily 
habits.  As proof, in May 2005, police raided several Islamic boarding schools in 
Pattani and found bombing materials along with notebooks containing the habits of 
military and police personnel and maps of several security posts.1021  They also 
found instructionals written in Arabic telling how to monitor security forces.1022 
 
Additional examples of insurgent intelligence activities surfaced in May 2005 when 
19 insurgents surrendered, telling authorities most of them had been paid to 
collect intelligence and/or assassinate people.1023  The same thing happened in 
December in Narathiwat when police arrested 46 villagers accused of collecting 
intelligence on security forces for militants.  They apparently passed their 
information to their handlers via clandestine meetings, which is basic case officer 
tradecraft and yet more proof of the insurgents’ intelligence prowess.1024   
 
The militants’ target sets include civilians, civil servants, and security forces.  They 
trend more toward civilians, however, which makes the movement a terrorist one.  
For example, while militants in 2005 directed assassinations against more than 90 
security personnel, they overwhelmingly aimed them at more than 300 civilians.  
Within this latter set, militants mostly targeted local village government officials.  
Following them was educational personnel – students, teachers, and 
administrative officials.  In July 2005, authorities captured teenage insurgents who 
confessed to having targeted teachers and especially school administrators as 
their main targets.1025 
 
Insurgent targeting patterns in 2008 were similar.  That year, militants killed 
approximately 422 civilians and 74 government personnel.  They injured 
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approximately 613 civilians and 452 government personnel.  There were 741 
attacks using pistols and rifles and 218 bombings.1026  In 2009, the government 
released statistics showing most people killed in the insurgency were Thai Malay 
Muslims, some 1,788 people.  The violence had killed 1,384 Thai Buddhists.  In 
contrast, the fighting wounded 3,224 Thai Buddhists and 1,633 Thai Malay 
Muslims.1027 
 
Insurgents target big businesses and major infrastructure on a regular basis in 
attempts to injure the far south’s economy and scare tourists.  Many of these are 
bombing campaigns such as the 3 April 2005 triple bombing in Hat Yai, Songkhla 
(the airport, Carrefour department store, and the Green World Palace Hotel in 
Songkhla.)1028  The attacks began a period of slowed tourism in Hat Yai that 
severely hurt the town’s usually bustling economy.  Hotel occupancy, for example, 
dropped more than 80 percent.1029   
 
Militant raids and ambushes mostly target military and police. This is probably 
because insurgents understand they need overwhelming force to successfully 
strike security forces.  Anything less, and they run the risk of alert police or military 
personnel returning fire that could result in casualties and compromised 
operational security by prisoners of war.  For example, despite killing three police 
in a raid on a checkpoint on 20 July 2006, the 10 attacking insurgents were unable 
to maintain fire superiority against 10 police, and they suffered two killed, seven 
wounded, and 11 firearms captured.1030 
 
 
Personnel 
 
Radical Islamic teachers and students appear to make up the bulk of insurgent 
leadership and fighters. Authorities continually cite these persons as responsible 
for leading terror operations, beheading people, and proliferating weapons and 
training.  Proof comes from personnel captured and caches raided. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1026 “Situation improves in deep South.”  
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Police said Islamic school students were amongst the main participants of the 
infamous 60-insurgent, 14 July raid on Yala town in 2005.1031  Investigations in 
April 2005 led the government to assert Islamic teachers had used Yala’s 
Thammawithaya Foundation School as an operation planning headquarters for 
several other attacks.1032  Police also discovered insurgent training facilities at 
Jihad Witthaya school in Pattani.  And authorities said insurgents had used 
Pattani’s Porming school to stage attacks from in August.1033 
 
Youth factor into the movement as evidenced by the activities of Pemuda.  
Intelligence indicates ustaz at pondoks carefully recruit Pemuda from their 
respective student bodies.  After indoctrination, their officers send them on 
harassment operations such as cutting down trees and laying road spikes to 
disrupt daily life in the south and to support kinetic operations. Those who show 
promise are apparently sent overseas to an undisclosed location for military 
training.1034 
 
Village auxiliary forces in the far south have on occasion gone operational and 
have participated in kidnappings, beatings, and murders.  Villagers who participate 
in these acts are combatants and enablers of violence.1035  On 21 September 
2005, for example, Thai Malay Muslim women used themselves and their children 
as shields to keep military and police from aiding two Marines villagers had 
kidnapped and tortured.  Eventually, insurgents in the village murdered the 
Marines.1036  
 
On 19 May, 100 villagers led by a Thai Malay Muslim woman seized Kuding Rupa 
School in Narathiwat, separated the Buddhist from the Muslim teachers, and 
proceeded to club two Thai Buddhists women, Sirinart Tavornsuk and Julin 
Kampongmoon, into unconsciousness.  A female insurgent encouraged villagers 
to join in via a mosque’s loudspeaker.  Both victims sustained life threatening 
broken bones and internal bleeding.  Other villagers scattered spikes on nearby 
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roads to inhibit security forces accessing the sight.  Julin later died from her 
wounds.1037 
 
 
Insurgent Groups 
 
Since the insurgents have not gone overtly public, no one is a hundred percent 
sure what to call them.  As of 2009, it appears to be a conglomerate of groups 
under the umbrella organization, Dewan Pembabasan Pattani.1038  Under it are 
several older groups that seem to have reconstituted themselves after 1998.  They 
consist of the BRN-C and its two sub groups, Pemuda and the RKK, Pejuang 
Kemerdekaan Patani, PULO, perhaps GMIP, and Bersatu.1039  BRN-C and PULO 
are supposed to be the biggest rebel groups in the movement.  Other groups 
mentioned include al Qaeda in Southeast Asia, Tarikah, Dewan Pimpinan Party 
(DPP) and Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Patani.1040 
 
 
BRN-C, RKK, and Pemuda 
 
General Anupong announced in 2007 the BRN-C and its military wing, the RKK, 
was the main threat in the far south.  He told the press, “This group is very 
influential.  But the RKK is not the real brains behind the unrest.  It is a militant 
wing of the BRN-Coordinate, the main group causing all the problems in 
Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala and part of Songkhla since 2004.”1041  He said the BRN-
C was the organizing asset, and RKK the kinetic asset.1042 
 
BRN-C allegedly recruited Thai college students from Indonesia in Jakarta, 
Yogyakarta, and Bandung and trained them in Indonesia with assistance from JI 
and Indonesia’s Free Aceh Movement.1043  A captured RKK member in 2009, 
however, said he had never heard of the term, “RKK.”  Some pundits assume RKK 
might be a Thai government term. 
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Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani (“Patani Liberation Fighters”) 
 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in June 2009 the Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani 
was responsible for killing 115 teachers and wounding 100 more.  HRW 
specifically linked Pejuang to the killing of five teachers in May 2009 and the arson 
of over 200 schools.1044  According to HRW, Pejuang are village militants under 
the BRN-C and the “backbone” of the movement.”1045  It is possible Pejuang and 
RKK are one and the same. 
 
 
PULO 
 
It is not clear if PULO has fighters in the far south or if it is a combat service 
support group that conducts propaganda for the movement.  It has several 
websites the government has shut down.  PULO claims it is active in the 
insurgency and asserts is speaks for at least some of it.  For example, in January 
2009, Kasturi Mahkotam, PULO’s Chief of Foreign Affairs, wrote on one of its 
websites the “Patani Malay Movement” was ready to establish a formal dialogue 
group with Bangkok in order to end the fighting in the far south.  PULO’s founder, 
Tengku Bira Kotanila remained president of the group until his death in June 
2008.1046  PULO seems to keep its headquarters in Sweden, though a forward HQ 
in Malaysia and/or Thailand is likely. 
 
 
Bersatu 
 
An anonymous security official told the press in April 2009 after a Thai-Malaysian 
security meeting on the insurgency Bersatu was responsible for attacks in the far 
south.  Wan Kedir Che Man, still its president, denies being involved.  The official 
said Bersatu was based in northern Malaysia and infiltrated fighters into Thailand 
via Sungai Kolok and Waeng districts in Narathiwat and at sea ports where there 
was little security.1047  In November 2008, another anonymous intelligence official 
told the press Bersatu collected money, weapons, and perhaps cars for car bombs 
for major attacks.1048 
 
 
Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia 
 
The Straits Times announced in March 2009 a new insurgent group in the region 
called al Qaeda in Southeast Asia was seeking to gather forces to wage jihad in 
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southern Thailand.  Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia allegedly formed in May 2009 and 
is run by Abu Ubaidah.  He proclaims the fight in Thailand is not a local insurgency 
but a “legitimate jihad.”  Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia has yet to outwardly 
demonstrate kinetic operations in the field.1049 
 
 
Tarikah (“Truth” or “Way”) 
 
In January 2008, police arrested 22-year old Waeumeng Dueramae and 26-year 
old Kari Mahman, 26, for the murder of Buddhist schoolteacher Suwit Bunsanit.  
The pair were apparently involved in the failed 28 April 2004 uprising at Krue Se 
and said they were now part of a splinter group, Tarikah.  Tarikah typically means 
“way” or “path” in Arabic, but in Sufism, it means “truth.”  Since the 28 April fighters 
believed mystic rituals and Islamic chants would make them bulletproof, Tarikah in 
this case likely refers to the Sufi meaning.  Regardless, Dueramae and Mahman 
wanted to leave Tarikah, and their leader told them they could so long as they 
murdered Suwit.  They collected their pistols during morning prayers at a mosque 
and completed their mission.1050 
 
 
Others 
 
The Dewan Pimpinan Party (“Directorate Party,” DPP) is yet another small 
insurgent group operating in the south.  Its founder, Sapae-ing Basor, is the former 
rector of Yala’s Thammawitthaya School in Yala.  The RTA says the DPP aids 
another group, the Perjuangan Merdeka Patani (“Independence Struggle of 
Pattani,”) with economic, diplomatic, recruiting, and psyops services.1051  The RTA 
says the group Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Patani (“Association of Islamic 
Graduates of Pattani”) handles finances for the movement.  It is allegedly made up 
of Thai Malay Muslim students in Indonesia.1052  It is possible several of these 
latter names are simply sub-units of the larger organizations, such as RKK and 
Pemuda are to BRN-C.  Time and more intelligence are necessary to decipher the 
insurgency’s true organizational structure. 
 
 
 
4. People – The At-Risk Population 
 
The population involved in the current insurgency in the far south is the same from 
the 1980s-90s insurgency.  They have different cultural norms than the rest of 
Thailand: Malay culture, Islam, and prestige customs.  Just like most the majority 
of Thailand, however, they live rural and agricultural lifestyles.  Crime remains 
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prevalent.  As more researchers have infiltrated the region, however, more 
nuanced information has evolved on this unique population that reveals more 
diversity than before – even as recent as 2005.  More, the people there have 
evolved since the 1980s-90s, in part due to government education and language 
programs, and it has opened up to the rest of Thailand because of 
communications, commerce, and travel. 
 
Mark Askew, an Australian researcher who has spent four years in the far south as 
of September 2009, has discovered details about Thai Malay Muslims that 
debunks some common misperceptions.  For one, he is not convinced the quest to 
get Bangkok to recognize Malay Muslim culture is a mainstay of the insurgency.  
He writes, “For every Malay nationalist who regards the Thai state as the 
perpetrator of injustice there is another who resents insurgent groups and affirms 
the claim to belong to an entity called ‘Thailand’.”1053 
 
Askew’s following description discredits oversimplifications of Thai Malay Muslims 
and their politics: 1054 
 
‘Ordinary’ Malay Muslims (ie. non-elite Muslims) are not the apathetic 
or unthinking mass of peasants depicted by Surin Pitsuwan in his elite-
centred account of Islam and Malay nationalism over twenty years ago.  
They are a highly mobile population with a diverse range of 
occupations and experiences, and their orientations towards the 
different Islamic movements that compete in the region are also 
diverse.  The essentializing anecdote ‘Scratch a Malay Muslim and you 
find a separatist underneath’ (cited by McCargo) marginalizes a host of 
variant views and positions.  It is just as common to scratch a Malay 
Muslim and hear one using the expression “Rak Chart” (love the 
country/Thailand) and happy to identify as Thai, yet conducting most of 
his/her daily life in the local Malay dialect. 
 
Askew knows pure Muslim districts in Yala and Pattani where locals have 
organized their own security forces to eliminate insurgents.  Nor do they blindly 
follow local and religious leaders; some villagers Askew met do not trust their 
village headmen and imams.  Many had never heard of some of the most 
outspoken Thai Malay Muslim leaders on the subject of Malay Muslim identity in 
Thailand.1055 
 
Srisompob purports a traditional view of the population, viz.  that many Malay 
Muslims want “political space for their own cultural and religious identity.”1056  
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Pattani National Assembly member Nimukta Waba (Puea Pandin Party) 
suggested yet another variation of southerners in February 2008 by saying PULO 
was out of touch with the political goals of the far south.  He told the press: “The 
local people are only demanding justice, fair treatment and equal rights.  I think at 
least 90 percent of people here do not want autonomy.”1057 
 
Far from being a puritanical Islamic society, AIDs is on the increase in the far 
south, mostly from heroin use and promiscuous sexual behavior by married men 
who then spread it to their wives.1058  And drug use is so widespread, ISOC anti-
narcotics personnel believe as much as 70 percent of the far south’s youth use, or 
have been exposed to, illegal drugs.  Aside from yaba, the southern border 
provinces are replete with heroin, marijuana, and a home made narcotic of cough 
syrup, boiled kratom leaves, soft drinks, and mosquito repellent.1059 
 
Medical statistics show a region with health and sanitation problems.  The 
maternal mortality rate (MMR) in the far south is higher than the rest of Thailand.  
The Ministry of Health found from October-June 2008 the MMR in the five 
southernmost provinces was 42.4 per 100,000 births.  It was 39.5 percent in 2007.  
The national average is 17.7.  Professor Banchong Withayametha of Sinidhorn 
College of Public Health in Yala told the press it was a cultural issue that frowned 
on contraception.  “We can’t tell them to stop getting pregnant.  It contradicts their 
culture and they won’t do it.”1060  As a result, many Thai Malay Muslims do not 
engage in family planning.  Banchong is working with the UN to find culturally 
sensitive solutions, a difficult proposition with ultra-sensitive Thai Malay Muslim 
culture.1061  They do not want “outsiders” to force change upon them. 
 
While part of southern border society has abandoned Islam, others continue to 
embrace it to an extent it influences policy.  In March 2005, Ustaz Abdulroni 
Kahama criticized a government-proposed lottery to raise money for scholarships 
for the far south.  He said gambling was against Islam, and Malay Muslims would 
not accept money from it.1062  These type rules inhibit development projects and 
limit options in regional problem solving. 
  
Some Thai Malay Muslims blame the government for the insurgency and want 
Bangkok out of their lives.  They have garrison mentalities and reject all the state’s 
aid.  Yousef, a Pattani villager, told the press: “Money can’t change what’s 
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happening.  No one can buy an end to the problems here.”1063  He said 
government policies caused the war and added: “They have to understand that our 
way of life is different [from] other Thais...”1064  Another villager, Arware, had a 
cynical view of government development funding.  “It could end up in the hands of 
the militant groups,” he said to reporters.1065  “Investment won’t stop the violence.  
Corrupt officials will keep the money for themselves.  This is a useless idea.”1066  
While the attitude of these men might be overdone for the press, the corruption 
angle is certainly a factor in southern perceptions.  It makes the government 
appear illegitimate no matter what side a villager might be on.  
 
The combination of violence in the far south and rural locals’ penchant for 
superstition and rumor mongering sometimes results in mayhem.  In May 2003, for 
example, when a mysterious wave of either insurgent or criminal violence swept 
the south, people in Narathiwat were convinced it was because of “black ninjas.”  
When two police stopped in Tam Nob village to have coffee and ask for directions, 
a mob of 3,000 villagers chased them into hiding.  The village headman tried to 
protect them but could not.  The mob stabbed and beat them to death in an orgy of 
violence.  This incident indicates a section of the far south is highly susceptible to 
manipulation and easily spurred into heinous murder, a characteristic insurgents 
exploit with tall tales of grotesque state repression against Muslims and the 
religious duty of villagers to join the jihad.1067 
 
In May 2009, Professor Srisompob spearheaded a poll on southern attitudes 
toward the insurgency for the Deep South Watch Center and Prince of Songkhla 
University’s Study of Conflict and Cultural Diversity.  The poll covered the far 
south’s socio-economic and security situation.  Srisompob and his team 
interviewed 1,878 people in four districts in Songkhla, plus the whole of Yala, 
Narathiwat, and Pattani.  The government’s National Research Council supported 
the project.1068 
 
Regarding economics, the study found 88.2 percent of participants said their 
incomes were adequate, and 37.4 percent said they were not.  Ninety-one percent 
said unemployment was the most critical issue confronting the region, while illicit 
narcotics were second, and the insurgency was third.  Srisompob’s analysis 
concluded, “These opinions show that locals seem to perceive that the current 
problems confronting communities in the deep south are largely economic and 
social.  Such perceptions are reflective of the alarming rates of unemployment and 
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drug abuse – particularly among young men – plaguing the region… Hence, 
though the current conflict and violence are viewed by locals as a key problem, 
more pressing issues are economic and social, specifically the often related 
problems of unemployment and drug abuse.”1069 
 
Regarding the insurgency, 23.6 percent said “unequal treatment by state officials” 
was the main driver of the violence.  Nearly the same amount, 23 percent, said 
insurgent groups were driving the conflict.  Some 16.6 percent said it was injustice, 
13.5 said it was state-sponsored violence, 8.5 said poverty, and 8.5 blamed poor 
education and an excessive population “resulting from large Muslim families.”  
Only 4.5 percent insurgency was driven by the quest for autonomy.1070 
 
 
5. The Current COIN Strategy 
 
Thailand struggled for two years to develop its present COIN strategy.  From early 
2004 to fall 2006, the government had a patchwork of temporary strategies with no 
singular vision and no effective coordination.  Aside from a few wide arrest sprees, 
Thaksin’s COIN campaign was continually on the defensive.  Only when the 
military overthrew Thaksin in September 2006 did an effective COIN strategy take 
shape. 
 
 
2004-September 2006: Thaksin’s COIN strategy 
 
The government decided from the beginning to fight the insurgency and not simply 
give up the far south.  Says Dr. Arun: “How can we accept those provinces as a 
different part of our country?  Our constitution says we are a unitary state.  
Secondly, we have about at least 20 percent of Thai Buddhist people in that area.  
What are we going to do?  Change their status?  And about Islam, we have 
Muslims in other areas that are not ethnically Malay.  Do we change their status, 
too?  It’s impossible.”1071 
 
Thaksin’s strategy was: “The Policy to Promote Peace and Happiness in the Three 
Southern Border Provinces,” sanctioned by PM Order No. 68/2547 and approved 
in March 2004.  General Chavalit, Deputy PM (DPM) for Security Affairs, 
apparently drafted the plan.  It included socio-economic and good governance 
measures.  A Thai government PR announcement said the plan would “promote 
cultural and traditional identities of the region, as well as their religions and 
languages.  The government will promote the education of people in the localities, 
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and will respect their cultures, traditions and religious faiths. Everybody will be 
given freedom to hold any religion, faith and lifestyle.”1072 
 
Order 68/2547 moreover included the king’s COIN guidance, issued in February 
2004, citing khao jai (“understanding”), khao tueng (“reaching out”), and pattana 
(“development”).1073  It meant understand the people and culture you are dealing 
with, interface with them, and provide the assistance they need.  Despite all these 
measures, PM Order No. 68/2547 does not appear to have been a cohesive COIN 
plan.  It did not illustrate a decisive end state, nor the security, political, and 
economic operations to achieve it. 
 
The RTA did have a decisive strategy.  Its COIN coordination body, the Southern 
Border Provinces Peace-building Command (SBPPC), developed it.  Its goal was 
to carry out the intent of 68/2547: “…to build peace by using psychological 
operations together with social and economic development leading political and 
military operations.  Organizations with unity will be established by government 
officials and the patriotic community leadership (local people), to terminate 
violence, and to quickly establish order, peace and stability in the southern 
areas.”1074 
 
The SBPPC’s five strategies were:1075 
 
1. Promoting peace and protecting resources 
2. Building trust and economic and social strength 
3. Developing of potential of people, communities and society 
4. Developing cooperation with neighboring countries 
5. Exercising good and sound administration and management 
 
Thaksin blocked the RTA’s strategy, however.  He retained power over all national 
security issues.  His strategy suffered from five main inadequacies:  1) he did not 
accurately explain to the public his strategy included politics and economics, 2) he 
did not put enough effort into politics and economic development, 3) in press 
conferences, he overemphasized both force and his personal control over the 
troubles, 4) he failed to establish an adequate coordination system to drive 
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strategy in the field, and 5) Thaksin never gave the RTA full authority to carry out 
its strategy. 
 
Interestingly, Thaksin wisely instituted martial law in the affected areas 
demonstrating he understood the basics of population control.  He gave police and 
the military wide arrest and detention powers and also declared an evening until 
dawn curfew to cut down on insurgent mobility.  It was not strictly enforced, 
however, and he let his detractors portray martial law as an excessive set of 
regulations that punished the population’s freedoms, which it did not. 
 
Despite some genuine COIN efforts, Thaksin’s attitude sent the wrong message to 
the people about his COIN strategy.  His reaction to the 28 April 2004 uprising, the 
heavy-handed detention of rioters at Tak Bai, and subsequent callous remarks to 
the press indicated he was taking a purely forceful approach to the insurgency.  
Thaksin in November 2004 told the press he was ordering “a crackdown” and 
would use an iron fist “to sweep out these people” as well as a soft approach.1076  
He claimed, “We will decisively prosecute the separatists who wanted a separate 
territory… Don’t worry, if there is a separatist war, I will be on the front line.”1077  He 
additionally instructed the police and military to be more decisive in dealing with 
southern militants who wanted a religious war in the south.1078 
 
All these issues combined to give the appearance his was a strategy of force when 
it was more than that.  In fact, Thaksin used soft military power, politics, and 
diplomacy the first year of the conflict.  In May 2004, he authorized the RTA to 
deploy former East Timor peacekeepers to the border provinces.  The 
peacekeepers excelled at political and development tasks – Civil Affairs.1079  
Thaksin moreover sought dialogue with the former leader of Bersatu.  He met at 
least twice with Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi over enhancing 
border control, the Tak Bai incident, and requested Malaysian imams in southern 
Thailand to correct radical Islamic propaganda spread by insurgents.1080 
 
In April-May 2005, as Thaksin continued to take heavy criticism for using only 
force to quell the insurgency, which indicated he had lost control of the 
insurgency’s information sphere, he made a series of strategic changes to 
assuage such rhetoric.   First, he announced he was curtailing the use of the 
military.  “Our forces need to focus on investigation and prevention instead of 
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heavily armed troops,” he told the press.1081  Second, he announced DPM and 
Interior Minister Police General Chidchai was taking over the COIN effort, and he 
would be using the Thai National Police as its main COIN tool.  Thaksin said using 
military force was “pointless.”  Third, until the government could arrive at a 
cohesive COIN plan, which would take about a year more, Thaksin said it would 
deal with the insurgency on a day-to-day basis.1082  This indicated he did not like 
the SBPPC’s COIN plan. 
 
Fourth, on 28 March 2005, Thaksin, by PM Order No. 104/2548, sanctioned an 
insurgency study group called the National Reconciliation Committee (NRC).  He 
put the highly respected former PM Anand Panyarachun in charge of the 
project.1083  It grew to include at least 48 members.1084  It undertook a widely 
publicized insurgency study, and its solutions were nearly all cultural and 
economic.  It gave little, if any, credence to security measures save for a proposed 
unarmed security force to maintain law and order in the face of bombings, raids, 
and beheadings.  The government never adopted its strategies, which it published 
in May 2006. 
 
Fifth, Thaksin announced he was ending martial law and replacing it with an 
Emergency Decree.  The legislature passed 30 August 2005.1085  The Emergency 
Decree was supposed to reflect a strategy of crime prevention, as proposed by the 
NRC’s Anand, UN crime prevention officials, and DPM Chidchai.  The law, 
however, was the same as martial law.  It restricted the sale of items that could be 
used for bomb components, required people to register the SIM phone cards, 
restricted public gatherings, allowed the detention of suspects for 30 days without 
showing cause, and gave immunity to government personnel involved in the death 
and injury of civilians and also damage of property.1086  Getting rid of martial law 
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was supposed to alleviate locals’ concerns the military was “too fierce.”  Its 
deployment had somehow made the situation “more tense;” all this despite the fact 
the military had not launched a single offensive against the insurgents.1087 
 
The government’s molested logic, then, was self-defeating.  It appeared Bangkok’s 
strategy was all or nothing; either deploy the military and have it widely exert 
haphazard force – which it had not – or redeploy back to barracks.  There was no 
flexibility.  Retraining military units to adjust from a conventional to a COIN role 
was not an option for Thaksin or the NRC.  No one in the government – not 
Thaksin, not Chidchai, and not Anand – had a realistic strategic solution to protect 
the southern population.1088 
 
 
2006: The Surayud-Sonthi COIN Plan 
 
On 21 September 2005, the government appointed General Sonthi Boonyaratglin 
as RTA Commander-in-Chief.  He developed a new COIN plan.1089  A Vietnam 
War veteran and SF commander, Sonthi had ample experience in small wars and 
contingencies.  Though unafraid to use force, he was a proponent of winning 
hearts and minds via CA.1090  His COIN fundamentals were: 1) the war had to be 
fought and won at the village level, 2) the government still did not understand Thai 
Malay Muslim culture to an effective degree, and 3) separating the insurgents from 
the population was critical.1091 
 
Thaksin stifled Sonthi’s COIN efforts, however.  Thailand’s political rumor mill said 
he wanted the general to fail so he could retain wide power as PM.  This and the 
PM’s narcissistic business activities, some of them apparently illegal, earned him a 
coup on September 2006.  A military ruling commission, led by retired RTA 
General Surayud Chulanont, immediately designed a new COIN plan, in part 
based on Sonthi’s 2005 plan.  Successive administrations and RTA commanders 
naturally added to the strategy, but none significantly altered the 2006 plan. 
 
Post coup, Sonthi held his post as Commander-in-Chief of the RTA.  Fourth Army 
Commander Lieutenant General Ongkorn Thongprasom assumed command of 
the southern COIN until Lieutenant General Viroj Buacharoon replaced him by 
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November.1092  Aree Wong-araya was appointed head of the MoI.  Banyat 
Jansena was his deputy.  These men and their planning staffs also arrived at a 
new COIN strategy, but public statements indicate Sonthi and Surayud had the 
heaviest influence.1093 
 
The first part of the generals’ new strategy was to stop the daily violence; it 
prevented political and development programs.1094  Containment was their first 
concern, and pressuring insurgents offensively to the point they could not freely 
operate was his second.  Restraint was pivotal, Sonthi said, so as not to isolate 
the population.1095 
 
Aside from security, Sonthi believed in continual contact with the people.  He told 
the press: “Our strategy to tackle the unrest is to stay close to local people and 
keep a close eye on violence-prone areas, and suspected insurgents.”1096  Parallel 
to this strategy was Sonthi’s heavy investment in local forces.  He said they were 
key to the southern COIN strategy.   He told the press: “To win the hearts of local 
residents through their participation in community defense and local activities, 
which will also create better understanding between the local villagers and state 
officers, will lead to the end of the spate of violent unrest”1097 
 
As far as politics were concerned, Sonthi believed the government had to take 
time to relate to and understand Thai Malay Muslims.1098  He told one COIN 
planning conference of military, police, and civilians that diversity in society was 
good and represented “flowers of various colors.”  More, gaining their trust and 
cooperation was a cornerstone of his COIN beliefs.1099  Justice and fairness were 
imperative to win the population and separate them from the insurgents.1100 
 
At the same time, Surayud and Sonthi believed in integrating isolated Thai Malay 
Muslims into Thai society.  They sought to befriend government-friendly Muslims 
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as a way of segregating anti-government forces.  They aimed to convert the 
skeptical via political means such as exposing the far south’s youth to the rest of 
Thailand, modernize pondoks, and carry out his Peaceful Village Program, which 
entailed military CA projects to improve rural standards of living.1101 
 
Surayud and Sonthi said politics must lead the military – a nod to the policies of 
Thai COIN strategists past.  They believed heavy suppression created more 
insurgents and negated cooperation between locals and the government.1102  And 
as with Thailand’s exceptional COIN thinkers of times past, Surayud and Sonthi, 
too, believed in amnesty and peace talks with rebels, but they did not know what 
rebels to speak to because none had stepped forward.1103 
 
Surayud and Sonthi had their COIN strategy written and ready to apply in 
December 2006.  It had two core aims: 1) to win the support of the alienated Malay 
Muslims population, and 2) to engage with and defeat insurgent forces.  The title 
of the strategy was, “Policy for Peace-building the Southern Border Provinces” and 
contained in PM Order No. 206/2549.”1104 
 
Before applying the strategy, Surayud and Sonthi first set out to restructure of the 
government’s main security coordinating body, ISOC.  The government changed it 
into a national coordinating centre for security, almost like a combined U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security and Combatant Command.  Under ISOC and 
pivotal to executing the new strategy in the field was the SB-PAC and CPM. 
 
The new COIN strategy had four core strategic tenets.  They were:1105 
 
1. Apply King Bhumibol’s strategy of “understand, approach, and 
development” and add to it His Majesty’s “Sufficiency Economy” 
philosophy.  (The king believed sufficiency economics were more 
important to individual empowerment than enterprise economics.) 
2. Apply the rule of law via the nation’s justice system to restore authority. 
3. Involve local people in developing the region and promoting peace. 
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4. Communicate with the domestic and international sectors to insure they 
understand the truth about the conflict and to realize the state promotes 
harmony, diversity, and multiculturalism. 
 
The strategy had 12 tenets: 
 
1. The political offensive is supreme and “ensure[s] justice in society.”  The 
latter includes law enforcement adhering to rule of law, building up robust 
intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, and protecting the 
population, which will increase their trust in the state. 
 
2. Foster understanding amongst the at-risk population and the government 
by exchanging “...views among the government, leaders, religious teachers, 
community leaders and the private sector…” to increase cooperation in 
stabilizing the area. 
 
3. Purge the conditions causing the at-risk population to feel inferior and 
isolated.  Treat the people as dignified Thai citizens with a unique and 
valuable culture. 
 
4. Disseminate accurate, timely, and truthful information on events in the 
affected area and counter rumors and disinformation to instill popular 
confidence in the government’s problem-solving abilities. 
 
5. Uniformly increase communication with insurgent leaders and field 
personnel and their auxiliary forces. 
 
6. Instill popular confidence in the judicial system by revamping it, including, 
“eliminating all forms of injustice,” dispensing justice “in an integrated 
manner,” creating laws that adhere to local culture, encouraging popular 
participation in the judicial system to insure peoples’ rights are protected, 
and by developing a “community judicial system” and “alternative judicial 
system” based on local customs. 
 
7. Strengthen society, families, communities, and build peace via “social 
development,” including embracing different cultures, bolstering “inter-
religion relations,” advancing non-radical religious teachings, fostering 
exchanges of variety of culture between the region’s many ethnicities and 
religions. 
 
8. Upgrade the region’s education sector rapidly with advice from the 
region’s religious leaders and scholars to adhere to local customs. 
 
9. Create an economy capable of sustaining itself, improve standards of 
living, and fight poverty using the King’s principles of Sufficiency Economy 
and local resources while adhering to local customs. 
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10. Rely on state and private PR, including education and religious sectors 
and “public forums,” to keep the people informed of government programs 
to garner their support in problem solving.  The King’s guidance of 
“understand, reach out, and develop” is key here. 
 
11. Inform regional countries and global organizations on the truth of the 
insurgency in the far south and insure they understand the state guarantees 
the rights of all it s citizens regardless of race or religion. 
 
12. Train government personnel in the far south to appreciate and adhere to 
local customs and to enact good governance.  Deploy only competent 
officials to the area.  Punish civil servants and government personnel who 
abuse their power and make the insurgency worse. 
 
The strategy also established a chain of command.  The NSC was to monitor the 
progress of the COIN and advise ISOC on planning and budgets.  ISOC was 
made responsible for coordination and implementation.  The NESDB was to 
provide budget and monitoring advice to ISOC on economic and social projects.  
Finally, the order stated, in bold, “All government agencies concerned shall 
support operations stated in this Order.”1106 
 
The main tenets of the strategy were none too different from the Tai Rom Yen plan 
and the societal retooling goals of the 1970s-90s.  The strategy sought to 
decrease the trust gap between the people and the government, increase the far 
south’s exposure to the rest of Thailand thereby reducing its isolation, reign in and 
stamp out radical Islamic sentiment used for separatist purposes, include local 
people in generating solutions for the south’s problems, embrace the at-risk 
population as cherished by the government and the country as a whole, use 
diplomacy to isolate the insurgency from foreign aid, and improve the quality of 
civil servants and security officials in the region.  As with Thailand’s past COIN 
strategies, the 2006 strategy mentioned little about using force, but it was indeed 
policy.  Martial law and military operations would remain as population control and 
insurgent suppression tools.1107 
 
Lastly, the new strategy said nothing about amnesty, though it did evolve as a 
government line of operation.  One of the reasons Bangkok sought close relations 
with teachers and Islamic leaders was to get these community pillars to convince 
insurgents to turn themselves in.1108  Overall, the main differences in the new 
COIN strategy compared to those of Prem, Harn, Kitti, and Chuan was operational 
execution – the new COIN would employ different tactics. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1106 “Policy for Peace-building the Southern Border Provinces.” 
1107 “Suspected insurgent shoots villagers in Narathiwat,” in TNA, 18 January 2007. 
1108 “PM: Al Qaeda not funding Muslim insurgents in deep South,”  in TNA, 18 January 
2008. 
	  	   254	  
 
2007 
 
As 2007 continued, the Thai COIN chain of command changed, most notably with 
the ascension of General Anupong to Commander-in-Chief of the RTA on 1 
October 2007.  On 28 November, General Anupong, upon returning from a tour of 
the south, wrote a 16-page report on his additions to the Sonthi strategy.  He 
likened COIN to treating a cancer patient and cautioned it would take a long 
time.1109  He announced he was deploying elements of all of Thailand’s Army 
Regional Commands to the far south to better provide security.  His strategic 
objectives were:1110 
 
1. Gain the trust of Malay Muslims. 
2. Instill Malay Muslim confidence in the security forces. 
3. Provide security for the southern border population. 
4. Streamline the chain of command and coordination regimen. 
5. Deploy troops from every RTA Region in the far south to enforce 
security. 
6. Take the offensive against the insurgents (being on the defensive 
allowed insurgents, who live in the villages, to intimidate villagers into 
whatever political funnel they want them to be in; “Villagers fear them 
because it’s mainly about survival,” General Anupong told the press.1111) 
7. Increase the police, BPP, and military in/near the villages with visits and 
nearby kiosks so they will have confidence in the government and reject 
the insurgents. 
 
General Anupong’s main additions to the original strategy were coordination and 
security.  Without coordination, the strategy and three pillars mattered not at all, 
and though the government had brought back the proven effective ISOC, CPM, 
SB-PAC trinity, Anupong seemed to understand even with these concrete 
institutions, Thai political wrangling could infiltrate and muddle the works, hence 
his reiteration of coordination.  And though the 2006 COIN strategy did include 
security, it mentioned the subject only once.  Since there were near daily 
assassinations, weekly bombings, and monthly raids and ambushes going on, 
Anupong likely believed more emphasis on security was necessary.  In fact, under 
Anupong, a new village security program evolved, Pattana Santi, that, according to 
a Thai security official, aimed to “put government-friendly fish into the water of the 
villages” instead of merely separating the two.1112  This followed a Village Scout 
type concept. 
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In spring 2008, General Vaipot Srinual, Director-General of the RTA’s Office of 
Policy and Planning, explained the overall Thai COIN strategy this way:  “The 
priority now is to stop the killing.  The second priority is to quell the insurgent ideas 
and propaganda and indoctrination.  So you talk about initiative, you talk about 
poverty, you talk about economic development; this you have to address and 
implement, but it takes time.  But you have to stop the daily killings first.  That is 
what we are trying to do.”1113  An anonymous RTA trooper in the field elaborates: 
“They use security first, so the armed forces to come in and make an area safe.  
And if an area is safe, they do development after it’s a secure area.  The military 
also knows the insurgents know this, too.”1114 
 
 
 
6. Coordination for the Current COIN 
 
COIN Coordination Under Thaksin 
 
Thaksin constructed a three-tiered chain of command to coordinate the more than 
40,000 RTA, TNP, and civilian workers for the southern COIN.  The senior most 
agency was the Committee on Southern Provinces Peace-Building Policy 
(CSPPP), based in Bangkok.  Next in line was the Southern Provinces 
Administrative Committee (SPAC), also in Bangkok.  On the ground in the far 
south was the SBPPC. 
 
The SBPPC was formed on 24 March 2004 shortly after the war began.  A series 
of orders, including 68/2547 (Thaksin’s strategy order), PM Orders No. 260/2547 
and 261/2547 made the SBPPC legal and operational.1115  General Panlop 
Pinmanee, then Deputy Commander of ISOC, ran it.1116  After the PM fired him in 
the wake of clearing Krue Se of militants, Fourth Army commanders began 
running the SBPPC.  In December 2005, Lieutenant General Ongkorn 
Thongprason took over the post.1117  The SBPPC indicates Thaksin understood 
the value of a coordinating COIN authority even though he scuttled the SB-PAC 
and CPM-43 in 2000. 
 
The SBPPC’s mission was to wage COIN in the far south by military, social, and 
political means.  Its motto was the king’s strategy: understand, access, and 
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develop.  General Ongkorn listed his commander’s intent as: “…to [conduct] 
operations to terminate unrest and establish peace and stability in the southern 
border provinces by the implementation of winning at the village strategy, 
accompanied by various parallel operations: offensive operations to terminate 
daily violence and development for security programs under the political-led-
military principle.”1118  The SBPPC was in charge of RTA and TNP in theater, and 
it had personnel, intelligence, operational, and logistics functions.1119 
 
On 31 May 2005, the government established the CSPPP, supposedly to 
streamline security operations, shorten the chain of command, and increase 
coordination.  This is odd, because it added another layer of bureaucracy to the 
chain of command.  Regardless, the CSPPP’s primary tasks were to formulate 
COIN strategy and policy.  PM Thaksin supervised it, and DPM Chidchai managed 
it.1120 
 
The SPAC’s mission was to coordinate with the SBPPC, see that Bangkok’s new 
COIN policies were carried out, and advise the military.  The CSPPP formed the 
SPAC in October 2005.  The SPAC’s 10 members included the armed forces chief 
of staff and the commanders of the RTA, RTN, RTAF, TNP, and personnel from 
the MoI.1121  General Sonthi headed it, and Supreme Commander General 
Ruengroj Mahasaranond served as an advisor.1122 
 
As Bangkok was formulating these agencies, it further refined the coordination 
effort with one major organizational and one leadership change.  For organization, 
in February 2005, the RTA clarified the coordination effort by color-coding the 
insurgency zone into red, yellow, and green areas.  Green was friendly to the state 
and low violence – permissive to government operations.  Yellow was neutral to 
the state and had medium levels of violence – semi-permissive to government 
operations.  Red was hostile to the state and had high levels of violence – non-
permissive to government operations.1123  As for leadership, Thaksin handed over 
management of the war to DPM Chidchai on 13 March 2005.  Chidchai then 
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assumed COIN control over all the coordinating agencies and the MoD, MoI, NSC, 
and NIA.1124  
 
 
Coordination Under Surayud and Sonthi 
 
When the coup group reformulated strategy, it also reformulated coordination.  
Almost without hesitation, it brought back the familiar and effective SB-PAC and 
CPM-43 coordination structure.  The government called the latter simply “CPM,” 
however. 
 
Upon the advice of the NSC, it also reinserted ISOC back into the southern COIN 
chain of command, yet another familiar and proven system.  The red-yellow-green 
color-coded identification system remained since it was an effective tool to gage 
the expanse of insurgent vs. pro-government territory to better allocate resources. 
 
General Vaipot says coordination was critical to the fight.  “The political view of the 
government or the lead organization needs to be 100 percent, not only the 
government or lead agency, but all the agencies” he says.1125  “The lead 
organization needs to have a program to make sure all agencies involved 
understand the strategy.  They must have the same objective. They must have the 
same picture of the strategy.  And we try to encourage everyone to accept the 
strategy.”1126 
 
 
ISOC 
 
The government revamped ISOC via PM Order No. 205/2549 dated 30 October 
2006.  It became operational on 1 January 2007.1127  Its technical name was 
“Reform era ISOC,” but everyone called it ISOC.  It expanded to all 76 provinces – 
it previously was in only 40 – and added 60,000 personnel.  Its COIN mission was 
to help coordinate the end to the insurgency.  It also had another missions, such 
as combating money laundering, drug trafficking, and political “undercurrents” – 
such as Thaksin and his clique that were trying to stage a comeback.  General 
Sonthi assumed command of ISOC.  The Army Regional Commanders took 
command of regional ISOCs in their respective areas.1128 
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Saiyud’s Kerdphol’s son was running ISOC as of spring 2008.  “One of the 
reasons they do this,” says Bhumarat, “is so the younger brother or son can 
consult the brother or dad.  And the Muslim community looks favorable upon this, 
so some of their fears are relieved.”1129 
 
Under ISOC in the far south, ISOC 4, specifically, was the SB-PAC and CPM.  
Lieutenant General Wiroj Buacharun was Fourth Army Commander when ISOC 
began and therefore was ISOC-4 Commander, too.1130  ISOC’s new structure 
incorporated personnel from 25 government bodies – five agencies and 20 
ministries.  The agencies were: the TNP, the Department of Special Investigation, 
the AMLO, the Department of Immigration, and the Office of Narcotics Control 
Board.  ISOC also coordinated with provincial governors of the far south and the 
MoJ.1131 
 
 
CPM 
 
PM Surayud on 30 October 2006 revived CPM and the SB-PAC by PM order No. 
207/2549, the same day it revamped ISOC.1132  Order No. No. 207/2549 moreover 
nullified seven previous coordinating legal orders issued by Thaksin and one by 
the coup group, in part to pave the way for CPM and the SB-PAC and to sweep 
away previous orders to give the standing government the authority to essentially 
begin its COIN anew.  It also ordered budgetary authorities of the RTA, the 
Comptroller General’s Department, and the Budget Bureau to transfer all funding 
from previous coordinating bodies to the new coordinating structure in two 
months.1133  This was a mammoth undertaking, and the fact that Surayud wanted it 
done in such a short time indicates how serious the government was about turning 
the tide of insurgency.  CPM’s tasks were: 
 
1. Implement the government’s policies in solving the southern unrest while 
also coordinating with the SB-PAC. 
2. Supervise all civilian, police, and military assets involved in preventing 
and resolving violence and promoting understanding. 
3. Generate CPM plans and projects and administering their finances.  
Submit all such plans to ISOC-4 for approval.  Track and evaluate 
progress of projects. 
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4. Improve intelligence capacity across all relevant civilian, police and 
military agencies.  Establish local forces to aid in protecting the 
population. 
6. Establish TFs as needed to help carry out projects. 
7. Carry out other tasks assigned by ISOC-4. 
 
Also part of CPM was the Intelligence Operations Center.  It was an RTA-run 
intelligence fusion center that collated and distributed intelligence to units in the 
field.  It also disseminated intelligence to the TNP in Region 9 and its operations 
center run by Police Lieutenant General Adun Saengsingkaeo.1134 
 
 
SB-PAC 
 
General Sonthi met with advisors to formally discuss reinstating SB-PAC on 16 
October.1135  The PM and the Ministers of Defense and Interior met on 23 October 
for the same.1136  PM Surayud on 30 October 2006 revived the SB-PAC by the 
same order that brought back CPM.1137 
 
The SB-PAC and CPM still had to pass legislative muster to become wholly legal 
via the pending Internal Security Act (ISA), but they began operations, 
nonetheless.  (The National Assembly passed the first ISA on 7 November 2007, 
and then another in February 2008.)  Of the legality of the organization, SB-PAC 
Director General Pranai says, as of 18 March 2008, “…the last page of the new 
security law said the SB-PAC will be under a special office of the ISA.  So there’s 
no need to have a specific law for SB-PAC – it’s under ISOC and operates under 
the Fourth Army Area.”1138  The SB-PAC began preliminary operations on 1 
November 2006.1139  The Interior Minister was its temporary chief.  Pranai was the 
former governor of Nonthaburi and its first regular director.1140  PM order No. 
207/2549 granted all SB-PAC chiefs status as Deputy Permanent Secretary of the 
MoI.1141 
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Says Pranai: “I was a governor of the best province in Thailand at that time – 
Nontaburi.  I was approached, and it seemed like it was very hard to deny the 
posting.  It was a chance to pay back the country.”  He had good experience.  “I 
was in the south 15 years ago,” Pranai explains, “three years in Pattani as a 
Deputy District official, or ‘DO.’  Also my brother was the old SB-PAC director.  He 
was in Pattani province for four years before getting the post.”1142 
 
SB-PAC’s vision is to “Restore peace and reconciliation to the five southern 
provinces.”1143  Its mission is to help the government carry out development and 
like problem-solving missions in an orderly and unified manner to achieve peace in 
the far south.1144  And as in the 1980s-90s, the SB-PAC consists of multiple 
government agencies.  They include the Ministries of Justice, Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, Commerce, Interior, Education, Public Health, and Industry, just to 
name seven.  Pranai explains the overall gist of SB-PAC this way:  “We have 
[multiple] areas we cover.  They include education, health, psychological 
operations, how to win hearts and minds.  The best way to get things done is to 
spend money on these type programs, so it’s war without bullets.”1145 
 
Top security officials welcomed the return of SB-PAC.  Says an anonymous senior 
Thai officer: “In the past, during the communist COIN, many other government 
ministries came and went from the field, and some of their projects were 
sustainable, and some were not.  But under the SB-PAC, the other organizations 
worked under the governors, so it’s a clearinghouse of ministries so they can 
quickly support their work in each province.  This makes it flexible and fast, easy 
for them to operate and respond.”1146 
 
The SB-PAC has seven main tasks.  They are:1147 
 
1. Supervise all civilian government agencies related to justice, 
development, development, local grievances, and cultural understanding.  
Coordinate activities with CPM to prevent and resolve unrest. 
2. Recommend, manage, and execute all SB-PAC projects, plus manage 
project funding, and finance all participating government agencies.  
Submit budgets to ISOC-4 for approval.  Monitor and evaluate the 
progress of all projects. 
3. Monitor all justice ministry activities and developments to insure local 
people are treated fairly in the eyes of the law, including processing 
citizen’s complaints about corrupt officials and seeking punishment of the 
guilty. 
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1143 Anonymous. 
1144 Chulanon, op. cit. 
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4. Improve civil servants’ abilities to operate according to local cultural, 
social, and economic conditions. 
5. Widen participation in security and development problem solving to “all 
parties concerned.” 
6. Establish advisory boards as needed to help carry out projects. 
7. Carry out other tasks assigned by ISOC-4. 
 
The SB-PAC has an Advisory Council for Peace consisting of 35 personnel from 
the government, private, journalist, and religious sectors.  The government 
authorized it in PM Order No. 207/2549 and established it on 16 March 2007.  Its 
job is to advise the Director General of SB-PAC on what types of community-
friendly projects to carry out.  Aside from focusing on education, social, cultural, 
and development issues, one of its main assignments is to arrange forums where 
people in the far south could talk about their experiences and views while 
encouraging equity and liberty. 
 
The SB-PAC has seven committees:  
 
1. Education, religion, and culture 
2. Socio-economic Development 
3. Justice, equality, and Security 
4. Environment and Natural Resources 
5. Communication and Society 
6. Cross-cultural Participation 
7. Southern Border Provinces Study, Analysis, and Solutions 
 
Shortly after it began operations, the government identified five problems the SB-
PAC needed to improve.  First, because it was a war zone and insurgents targeted 
government employees, working at the SB-PAC was not too favorable.  Says 
Pranai: “It’s hard to get people in there to work in the south.  It’s hard to attract 
people.  There is a threat of being killed because these workers must go out into 
the field and work in red zones and in remote areas, and the insurgents don’t want 
these projects to work.”1148 
 
Second, the SB-PAC had a “lack of clear-cut vision” to shepherd the 
organization.1149  Third, it had yet to establish effectual communications with red 
zone villagers because of the unstable situation.  Fourth, the SB-PAC lacked 
support from local government and Islamic leaders, which impeded support from 
the people.1150  The fifth problem was, because the NLA had not passed the ISA, 
technically, the SB-PAC had no legal authority, but all this changed in 2007 when 
parliament passed the bill. 
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To better focus the SB-PAC on these issues, the PM passed on 13 September 
2007 Order No. 229/2550, which established the CSD or Committee on Special 
Administrative Development Zone in the South.  The CSD’s mission was to 
develop a framework that would more effectively focus the SB-PAC’s resources.  It 
was, in essence, an NSC type board for the SB-PAC the way the NESDB used to 
function for the 80s-90s version of SB-PAC.1151  In March 2009, the government 
was considering making SB-PAC a permanent government agency.1152 
 
 
General Anupong’s Coordination Adjustment 
 
In November 2007, General Anupong adjusted COIN coordination regarding the 
chain of command and manpower for each province.  He deployed elements of all 
Army Regional Commands to the far south.  The First Army deployed assets to 
Narathiwat, the Second to Pattani, the Third to Yala, and the Fourth to the four at-
risk districts in Songkhla.1153  This was to increase the number of RTA troops to 
provide more security, and it worked to a certain degree.  Violence did decrease 
as a result.  Anupong’s design was a decentralized system where Army Regional 
Commanders and their staffs used national strategic guidance working within 
coordination guidelines – including the red, yellow, and green color code system – 
to plan and implement security operations as they saw fit.1154 
 
 
Pattana Santi 
 
By 2008, Chavalit was back inside the government as DPM in charge of national 
security.  He developed a village security system similar to the CPM units 
deployed during the communist COIN.  Initially, it was a trial program applied to six 
districts that began 11 October, the exact ones kept secret.1155  After its success, 
Bangkok standardized the program throughout the entire insurgency zone in 
February 2009, calling it Pattana Santi, or the “Development and Peace” program.  
Pattana Santi seeks to professionalize local forces by integrating them with 
government kinetic and CA assets.  More than just a security-CA program, 
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however, it also aims to enlist locals into development and job programs, and it 
has a psyops and PR component that reinforces the program’s ultimate goal.  The 
end goal, according to Chavalit, is, “to engender a sense of shared national and 
local pride in all the races, religions and cultures present in Thailand.”1156 
 
Pattana Santi utilizes the wide gamut of 66,000 security personnel in the far south; 
38,000 are RTA.  The program deploys forces to 217 red zone villages.1157  Each 
Pattana Santi unit has 31 personnel made up of RTA, Thahan Phran, RTP, and 
local defense volunteers.  An RTA spokesperson said the units’ missions are to 
“stay in the villages and promote better understanding, extend a helping hand and 
provide mobile medical services.”1158  It openly injects government forces directly 
into the red zone villages to counter the presence of guerrillas and auxiliary forces.  
The spokesman also said the RTA would reduce its hunting of insurgents, but the 
deployment of 4,000 Thahan Phran to the south hints targeting of rebels will 
continue, nevertheless.1159  These are new Thahan Phran, however, with CA 
training. 
 
 
*** 
 
The current insurgency has definite jihadist overtones, which separates it from its 
political-nationalist-criminal predecessor.  It is also more monolithic in 
organization, seemingly BRN-C controlled, though compartmentalization keeps its 
wider membership and leadership protected from wide, penetrating dragnets.  Its 
operational tempo is astoundingly high, and its use of terrorism and small unit 
tactics is prolific. 
 
The Thai government was slow to realize and act on these issues when the 
insurgency began, and when it did, blunders resulted.  PM Thaksin’s political 
meddling at the expense of security insured an inept COIN strategy.  The 2006 
coup government remedied this via sound COIN strategy based on the three 
pillars.  Publically addressing radical Islamic insurgent issues, however, remains 
lacking.  Coordination has mirrored that of the last southern COIN, though the 
government is wrestling with moving the SB-PAC out from under the military and 
directly under the PM to improve government-population relations a decades old 
sticking point vital to solving the southern question.  Still the RTA has managed to 
put in place a strategy that has stabilized the war. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
The Three Pillars of COIN 
Against the Current Thai Malay Muslim Insurgents 
 
 
This chapter addresses Kilcullen’s “three pillars of COIN” against the current 
insurgency in Thailand’s far south.  The beginning section covers security ways 
and means to halt insurgent violence and terrorism.  The next section addresses 
political COIN measures, and the last cites economic efforts. 
 
 
1. Thai COIN Security Measures 
 
RTA 
 
RTA forces in the current COIN come from the First, Second, Third, and Fourth 
Army Regional Commands, plus the newly designated 15th Division.  SF 
contributes as well, as does the RTM and RTAF.  These forces supply CPM with 
the units it needs.  Most operations are battalion-sized and smaller.1160  The RTA 
relies heavily on SF troops for direct action and CA missions as well.  RTA troops 
serve in the far south anywhere from six months to a year.1161  In an effort to 
professionalize and better motivate its forces, PM Abhisit in March 2009 ordered 
an increase of pay for security forces in the far south, in some cases, by nearly a 
third.  Rank and file troops’ pay, for example, increased from an average of 1,500 
to 2,500 baht a month.1162 
 
As of 2009, Bangkok had deployed more than 60,000 RTA and TNP to the south, 
covering 1,000 villages and 33 districts.1163  The RTA carries out the same kinds of 
security operations in prior campaigns.  These include, but are not limited to, 
physical security and population control, incident response, QRF, raids, and 
ambushes.  General Anupong said in 2008 the RTA’s main mission was to raid 
separatist hideouts, sanctuary, and arms caches.  These type missions depend 
heavily on actionable intelligence.1164 
 
The RTA, via CPM, works jointly with the police.  An RTA official describes it this 
way:  “The south still has the normal police in their regular areas at police stations, 
etc.  Everything operates as normal, but CPM helps the police do their job of 
investigation, checkpoints, arrests, maintaining order, etc.  But if the police find an 
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insurgent or group of insurgents they can’t handle, then they can request help from 
CPM.  It can feed more forces into the operation.  And if the army wants to capture 
an insurgent, then it must coordinate with the police.”1165  RTA security operations 
also protect various development projects. 
 
The effectiveness of RTA operations varies.  Says an RTA trooper: “The security 
sweeps are sometimes effective, sometimes not.  Some units train poorly and then 
deploy poorly.  Sometimes…their communications are ineffective and hammer 
units and anvil units are not in position when the hammer force strikes.1166  This 
allows the insurgents to escape.  Also, in many sweeps, it’s the army, the police, 
and the Thahan Phran combined on one operation, and they are not 
coordinated.”1167  The high number of caches discovered, arrests made, and 
insurgent operations deterred as of 2008, however, demonstrates overall 
proficiency. 
 
As for RTA training and doctrine, a high-ranking RTA general says the Thai 
military trains its officers to value and work with locals, which is key in COIN.  “This 
is the knowledge that has passed through generations of officers.  We learned this 
in Staff College as well.  They are aware of the significance of this – it’s our 
way.”1168   He stressed it was not doctrine for Thai officers to “go around kicking 
doors,” but of course, kinetic operations require a good deal of door kicking.1169  
Another senior military official stressed the king’s philosophy of “understand, 
access, and develop” was indeed RTA doctrine.  “That’s the king’s philosophy, and 
it’s proper, and we follow it,” he asserts.1170 
 
All RTA troops receive pre-deployment briefings on Islam, Malay Muslim culture, 
the basic problems of the far south that contribute to the insurgency, and insurgent 
tactics.  The RTA’s Intelligence Command published a guidebook on the south to 
educate troops on their deployments to the far south.  At 408 pages long, it 
provides background on the origins of the war and the groups involved.  It also 
lists by name over 1,000 auxiliary force personnel.1171  The RTA also has a COIN 
manual, FM 100-20, a derivative of a U.S. COIN manual from the 1980s, but not 
all forces are familiar with it. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1165 Anonymous. 
1166 “Hammer and anvil” refers to a military tactic where mobile attacking forces push an 
enemy formation into another unit that is stationary. 
1167 Anonymous. 
1168 Anonymous. 
1169 Anonymous. 
1170 Anonymous. 
1171 “PM cancels rebel boss bounties.”  
	  	   266	  
COIN Operations in the Field 
 
Teacher escort duty is one of the most prevalent and dangerous security jobs in 
the far south, namely because teachers are one of the insurgents’ main target 
sets, and they bomb them frequently.  Says reporter Nick Nostiz: “All security 
forces do teacher escort duties, but it’s dangerous, because it’s regular and 
predictable.  They hit the pickup point, the drop off point, the same road to and 
from the schools, etc.  Teachers own the cars they convoy in and they usually 
have an escort in front and back, and sometimes just in front if there’s not enough 
people to cover their six [rear].”1172 
 
In other cases, some government entities such as the SB-PAC do not always want 
security.  “CPM can provide security for SB-PAC, but mostly Or Sor does physical 
security of SB-PAC buildings and places like that,” says an RTA soldier.  “In the 
field, normally, the SB-PAC does not need security.  Mostly, if it looks good for the 
villagers, they can work the projects with no violent incidents.  But if it’s Thai 
language instruction, then they must have security.  SB-PAC usually tries to avoid 
military escorts.  For example, the health department workers usually don’t want to 
ride with military that has weapons in the vehicle.”1173  Ambulance crews in 
Songkhla, however, report if they do not carry guns with them and demonstrate to 
insurgent road sentries they are armed, they will surely be attacked.1174 
 
The RTA has also introduced police forensics into the field.  Gathering evidence 
against insurgents is vital.  Neither the military nor the police are supposed to 
detain suspects on no or little evidence.  To help identify insurgents, General 
Sonthi in 2006 tapped Thailand’s top Ministry of Justice Crime Scene Investigator 
(CSI), Dr. Pornthip Rojanasunand, to deploy to the far south with her team to 
collect and process evidence at attack sites.  To date, she has helped identify and 
arrest scores of insurgents through painstaking CSI work, including building a 
massive DNA database of thousands of samples taken from bombings, 
assassinations, raids, and ambushes. 
 
In January 2009, Fourth Army Commander General Pichet Visaichorn announced 
DNA had confirmed the army had killed in a firefight wanted insurgent leader 
Imran Binma-eng.  Authorities had his DNA on record from multiple bombings in 
Narathiwat.  Accordingly, the government was able to prove he was indeed an 
insurgent and not simply an innocent bystander murdered by authorities as human 
rights organizations and insurgents often allege.1175 
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RTA-run operations have several flaws, according to army personnel.  Some 
officers complain poor information management impedes the decision-making 
echelon in the far south.  They say the CPM staff will not discuss the war on the 
ground at the staff level – the end goal of the campaign and how to get there, for 
example.  This seems potentially symptomatic of less flexibility at the theater 
operational planning level.  What CPM needs, say many, is to build up the basic 
COIN soldiering skills of their forces.  Others say it needs to include more civilians 
in operations to make more effective the combined nature of the organization.  At 
present, despite it being overall a good and effective organization, even the some 
military personnel complain CPM has too heavy a military influence.1176 
 
At the same time, security operations are having an impact on the insurgency.  
Marc Askew interviewed one insurgent, Hamad, who described how security 
forces chipped away at his cell by arresting his cohorts, one by one.  This isolated 
and demoralized him to the point he wanted to get caught.1177 
 
Authorities, through their 2007-08 security sweeps, captured Hamad’s teacher and 
then found bomb-making equipment at Islamburapha school.  This severed his 
chain of command and removed his bomb-making base.  Then the government 
arrested other insurgents he knew, which shrank his network until he was nearly 
alone.  Hamad was reduced to making bombs at home.  His expertise was 
shallow, and he eventually began making errant devices.  This angered his 
insurgent comrades and put him in danger.  “I was starting to get scared of this 
pressure,” he told Askew.1178 
 
Eventually, the civilian casualties caused by his bombs forced him to reconsider 
his involvement.  When he blew up a bomb at his home and shredded his hand in 
2009, the authorities arrested him.  Askew writes, “When Hamad was arrested by 
soldiers outside his parent’s home in January 2009, he was already tired, 
depressed, and disillusioned with the insurgency.  He admits that he was relieved 
to be captured, though also anxious in case the soldiers mistreated him.  
Fortunately, he was not treated roughly.”1179  The arresting officers laughed at their 
long quest to capture Hamad and offered him cigarettes.  In turn, Hamad provided 
them with intelligence on the movement.1180 
 
 
TNP 
 
The police from Police Region 9, the local BPP, and Special Branch make up the 
bulk of police forces in theater.  The TNP established a Police Operation Center 
Forward Command in Yala to help organize and execute its COIN operations.  It 
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serves personnel, material resource, and intelligence functions.1181  Special 
Branch operations in the far south are highly classified, and it has representation 
on SB-PAC’s staff. 
 
The mission of the TNP in the southern COIN is the same as in past COINs.  It 
exercises regular police duties, investigates violent attacks, builds cases against 
and arrests suspects, and provides physical security for checkpoints, government 
facilities, infrastructure, monks, and teachers.  The TNP also works with village 
security forces as it did in the past.  The BPP are especially active in rural areas 
and carry out COIN missions such as patrols, raids on caches, and arrests, 
especially high-risk arrests where the subjects might be armed.  The police are 
highly active in tracking down over a hundred insurgent suspects.  Their wanted 
posters appear all over the far south in hotels, restaurants, on billboards, and 
common areas.  People who provide information that lead to arrests can earn 
20,000 baht.1182 
 
Police CPM duties require interaction with the military.  There are rivalries between 
the two, and they have not nearly achieved seamless cooperation.  Says a Thai 
officer, “The police and army relationship is up and down.  It’s caused a lot of 
problems in the south because they don’t coordinate strategy together.  It’s been 
rough.”1183  In one case, both the police and the army were going after the same 
suspects, and when they arrived on scene, the insurgents opened fire, but neither 
the army nor police had coordinated their actions, and some chaos resulted.1184 
 
In other cases, they work well together.  The 2 January 2006 beheading case of 
an SF trooper, Sergeant Somjit Lorsaeng of the First SF Battalion, provides a 
good example.1185  According to a military officer,  
 
Last year, an SF team was ambushed, and one of the insurgents cut 
off an NCO’s head.  Afterward, the police, with the army in tow, 
launched an operation to find the insurgents who executed the 
ambush.  SF went with a police team on its investigation but as liaison 
only.  The police were in charge of the investigation.  However, they 
requested the military stand by as QRF to aid in the apprehension of 
the suspects if needed.  The police in this case had a great intelligence 
network, and in seven days, they found all the insurgents involved.  
Their investigation found the SF NCO’s head, his red beret, and his 
GPS [Global Positioning System unit].  And they tracked the insurgents 
to their houses, including the head insurgent, and they all lived in 
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different areas.  The operation was over in two or three months, and it 
was integrated between the police and military.  The police were a 
huge help.1186 
 
Despite successes such as this, the bad reputation that plagued the police in times 
past still follows them and is a major impediment to effective COIN.  Some accuse 
the police of being corrupt and abusive, and some are.  Since the police represent 
the state and have power over the population, such abuse, both real and 
perceived, feeds the insurgency by de-legitimizing the government.  Some 
observers add to this, saying the police are neither properly staffed nor trained to 
stem the tide of insurgent violence.  Says Nostiz: “The police - they can’t properly 
work.  There are lots of deaths – too many to investigate properly – so they all get 
filed away as being part of the insurgency.  And they don’t collect evidence, and 
they just can do nothing, really.  Plus, they are underpaid and corrupt.”1187 
 
The Cabinet on 19 August 2008 agreed to create a southern COIN police unit.  It 
would be responsible for recruiting and training its own members.  The 
hypothetical name for the unit would be the “Southern Border Provinces Police 
Operation Centre,” commanded by a police lieutenant general.1188  Such a unit, if 
properly trained, staffed, and deployed, would dramatically assist government 
COIN efforts. 
 
 
Local Forces 
 
Local forces are a significant part of the security-politics-development equation in 
Thailand’s current COIN, especially the Pattana Santi program.  The Thai see 
them as prudent, effective, and the best way to drive a wedge between guerrillas 
and the people.  The government as of 2006 has taken steps to insure their 
professionalism and efficiency by reinforcing doctrine and increasing training of Or 
Lor Bor (“Buddhist Security Units”), Chor Lor Bor (“Village Security Units”), the 
VDC, and the Thahan Phran. 
 
A top Thai military officer describes why the government continues to rely on local 
forces in COIN:   
 
Regarding the government use of local forces, they have many 
advantages over some standard government forces.  They know the 
local areas.  They know the local language.  They know the local 
people.  Soldiers from other parts of the country will have difficulty 
operating smoothly in these areas regarding intelligence and 
operations that require contact with villagers.  Also, the community has 
the natural propensity to look out for its own safety, and again, local 
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forces are highly motivated to do this because it’s their families, 
friends, and property they are protecting.1189   
 
 
Or Lor Bor 
 
Or Lor Bor are exclusively Buddhist.  They began at the behest of Buddhists in the 
far south that were continually under attack and had no protection from radical 
Muslims bent on genocide.  The queen sponsors their training.  Their mission is to 
protect Buddhist personnel and places.  In 2008, the Or Lor Bor only operated at 
night, however.  Says Pongsak, the Mayor of Yala, “The Queen’s Or Lor Bor is 
only a partial solution.  They work in the day and provide security only at night.  
We want to have a full time security force.”1190 
 
The program’s royal ties are supposed to insure its high quality.  The exact 
number of Or Lor Bor is elusive.  Figures have been quoted as high as 30,000.  
Originally armed with just shotguns, their training and armament increased as 
insurgents killed more and more Buddhists.  Srisompob says, “…they are very 
strong and well armed; better armed than the village security groups.”1191  They 
are increasingly being armed with assault rifles such as AK-47s and M-16s.1192 
 
Chor Lor Bor 
 
Chor Lor Bor are village protection units made of both Thai Malay Muslims and 
Thai Buddhists.  They also carry out some village development projects.  They are 
approximately 50,000 strong.  An MoI program, they initially carried shotguns but 
are expanding their arsenals with assault rifles.1193  Says Srisompob, “The village 
head is leader of the Chor Lor Bor.  They are an armed militia of about 20.  The 
village headman secures the money to pay them 20,000 baht a month for the 
whole group.”1194  This pay is quite low and violates CPT COIN era lessons that 
proved poorly paid and trained local forces perform poorly.  Chor Lor Bor exercise 
population control at the village level by manning checkpoints at village entry and 
exit points.1195 
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Komg Asa Raksa Dindaen, Or Sor (“Volunteer Defense Corps,” VDC) 
 
Or Sor are the same VDC forces used in past COIN campaigns and also for 
internal military contingencies.  The government has increased their training and 
given them new uniforms – distinct American desert camouflage uniforms from the 
early 1990s era informally known as “chocolate chip.”  Or Sor duties include 
physical security of government buildings such as the SB-PAC building in Yala, 
and they are increasingly deploying for teacher protection duties, close protection 
for government officials, and urban patrol.  Sometimes, they augment village 
defense forces.1196  They carry M-16s and other light infantry weapons.  Or Sor 
remain a joint MoI and RTA program, but the MoI commands it.1197  Srisompob 
says the Or Sor are professional and effective, but their ever expanding role puts 
them more and more into harms way.  “More and more of the Or Sor are being 
killed,” he says.1198 
 
Thahan Phran 
 
Thahan Phran remain a staple in the Thai COIN arsenal.  General Sonthi 
announced in August 2006 he was deploying 30 new Thahan Phran companies 
(along with 20 regular RTA companies) to the far south at a cost of 800 million 
baht.1199  One reason for the deployment was some poorly trained local militias 
have been too timid and handed over their weapons to insurgents too easily – the 
exact scenario that led to the Tak Bai protests.  Scores of other such forces, 
however, have died in the line of duty defending their villages, and many have 
successfully defended their homes.  Most of the latter, however, were Thai 
Buddhist-only units, and the new Thahan Phran were slated to be a combination of 
Thai Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists.1200 
 
In March 2009, Abhisit announced 4,000 more Thahan Phran were deploying to 
the far south.1201  Most of these were specially trained CA Thahan Phran aimed at 
deploying in the Pattana Santi program.  While Abhisit said they were deploying in 
a non-combat role, the Thahan Phran are combat capable and will likely be used 
as such when the need arises.1202 
 
Thahan Phran have the same missions as in past COINs – intelligence and DA – 
but in light of past and a few current allegations of wrongdoing, Bangkok has 
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increased their training and widened their tasking to include CA.  Says Srisompob, 
“The new Thahan Phran are better, more professional, than the older Thahan 
Phran.  They don’t rape and commit atrocities, but that bad image is still there.”1203 
 
One aspect of upgrading the Thahan Phran is indoctrination.  Thahan Phran are 
heavily indoctrinated regarding the Thai Royal Family.1204  In this regard, Thailand 
has taken the motivational aspect of the Village Scouts and transferred it to the 
Thahan Phran.  This also helps prevent them from barbarism – to behave badly or 
commit atrocities is to sully the honor of the king.  Another upgrade is increased 
pay.  As of 1 October 2009, Thahan Phran will get paid 55 baht a day instead of a 
mere 10.1205  Increasing pay and training of these forces indicates Bangkok is 
heavily relying on them to make progress in the current COIN. 
 
Thahan Phran go through three months of training.  SF runs training, and regular 
RTA forces command them in the field.1206  They carry M-16s and AK-47s, but 
they prefer the latter because they are more durable and the round is heavier. 
Thahan Phran continue training on the job after basic.1207 
 
Scores of foreigners such as Desmond Ball and analysts at the ICG decry the 
Thahan Phran as ineffective.  Some say the Thahan Phran do the “dirty work,” the 
hard jobs the RTA does not want to do or cannot do.1208  The Thai defend their use 
of Thahan Phran vigorously, however.  Says one civil servant in Yala, “People who 
criticize them don’t understand this about guerrilla war, how gangster-like it is.  
The Thahan Phran can do things the army can’t always do well at the local level, 
and that is getting intelligence and killing insurgents.”1209  He continues, “This is 
guerrilla war, and the normal rules don’t apply.  If we fight by all the normal rules, 
then we will lose.  The state will lose.”1210 
 
 
Border Security 
 
Bangkok is convinced insurgents are using sanctuary in Malaysia as a logistics 
and operations staging area.  This is based on insurgent logistics captured coming 
from Malaysia, and insurgents being caught in KAL and other locations in country.  
Both governments say dual citizenship is contributing to the insurgency.  There is 
also major historical precedent for it from the 1980s-90s insurgency.  More, 
Bangkok frequently cites intelligence saying insurgents are using Malaysia for 
sanctuary.  In May 2006, for example, an anonymous Thai intelligence unit 
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claimed it had evidence insurgents had trained 50 females in three groups in the 
capital of Perak sate, Ipoh, and in Kota Baru, Kelantan.1211 
 
As a result, Bangkok has increased security at border checkpoints, but this is not 
as effective as joint Malaysian-Thai operations that intermittently sealed the border 
in the 1970s-80s and contributed to the ultimate defeat of Malaysian communist 
guerrillas.  As of 2009, both countries are in talks, however, to increase border 
security.  General Akanit, General Kitti’s aid from the 1980s, is a key leader of that 
effort. 
 
Colonel Ahmed Ghazi says of the southern border population: 
 
[Locals] don’t respect the borders, because they are artificial.  They 
shop, visit relatives.  In some places they can wade over the river 
border.  There is smuggling, but it’s not serious smuggling.  It’s fuel, 
flour, bread, rice.  Rice is cheaper in Thailand.  Back and forth 
smuggling is common.1212 
 
Colonel Ghazi also believes, however, the insurgents are using northern Malaysia.  
“Kelantan is the only state ruled by the PAS [Pan Malaysian Islamic Party] and Nik 
Aziz, and they are more sympathetic to those people, the Thai separatists.  My gut 
tells me that they might be connected.  They have more sympathies with their 
cross border friends.  This is not so in Kedah.”1213 
 
A top Thai government official says:  
 
Border control is a big part of this conflict.  We must find ways to 
secure the border to make sure the insurgents cannot get away after 
hit and run operations or to escape our dragnet operations of targeted 
personnel.  We’ve been working with Malaysians on this.  In the old 
days, Malaysia was facing the CPM [Communist Party of Malaysia], 
which is why they put emphasis on border control.  But now, they don’t 
have the challenge that they used to have, so there is less urgency, but 
we still cooperate.1214 
 
In April 2009, Bangkok and KAL announced up-and-coming increased border 
security and intelligence sharing.  Thai Supreme Commander General Songkitti 
Chakkabhat and Malaysian Defense Forces Chief General bin Haji Zainal met to 
confer on the subject to address insurgent use of Malaysia as sanctuary.  On their 
agenda were specific insurgent border crossing points such as where Narathiwat’s 
Sungai Kolok and Waeng districts meet Malaysia’s Kelantan state and certain 
maritime ports.  General Zainal said he agreed with getting rid of dual Thai-
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Malaysian citizenship by border peoples that made insurgent crossing between the 
two nations easy.  He also announced the return of 89 Thai Malay Muslims – 
Narathiwat natives – from Malaysia.  They were part of 131 men, women, and 
children from Tak Bai, Sungai Kolok, and Sungai Padi districts who in 2005 fled to 
Kelantan citing fear of annihilation by Thai authorities.1215  Both the Malaysian 
government and the UN investigated the matter and found no credence to their 
assertions.  Malaysia branded their entry into Kelantan as illegal.1216  A suspected 
insurgent officer led the group, and authorities saw it as a propaganda ploy to gain 
international sympathy. 
 
 
Intelligence 
 
The intelligence agencies involved in the current COIN are essentially the same 
from past COINs: Special Branch, 2) the TNP, 3), the RTA, 4) the NIA, and 5) the 
newly designated Department of Special Investigations (DSI).  The NIA sees the 
southern COIN and terrorism as two of its top priorities.  The DSI serves as 
Thailand’s FBI or MI-5 type organization and is heavily engaged in the far 
south.1217 
 
As for the RTA’s intelligence apparatus, organic intelligence units – both 
reconnaissance and HUMINT units – collect information, and upper echelons 
process and disseminate it.  Deputy Permanent Secretary of Justice Charnchao 
says the RTA’s intelligence prowess is nearly autonomous.  He says: “Most of 
time, the military has its own intelligence and investigative network and uses the 
police sparingly.”1218 
 
The best information sources for the RTA (and other intelligence assets) continue 
to be the population.  Security forces look for opportunities to reward and build 
relations with people who volunteer information.  After all, insurgency is of, by, and 
for the people – at least the rebellious people.  Says an RTA officer, “If the 
villagers provide intelligence information, then the troops try to help, and when 
doctors give away drugs and help with medical things the villagers don’t have, it 
helps build a trustful relationship with the villagers.”1219  He adds: “Success most 
often happens when there is information from a hunter, local villagers, and our 
spies.”  The officer says local defense forces also provide good intelligence.1220 
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According to another RTA officer, “[Local forces] can be used to set up a 
centralized system to watch the villages, as in intelligence and reconnaissance… 
Not everyone needs to be shooting.  Sometimes, they can just watch and report.  
Headquarters expects local forces to report on enemy activities...”1221 
 
Other times, CA spurs intelligence sources.  “We can get intelligence from walk-ins 
or when the army does community relations,” says an RTA field officer, “but if the 
insurgents can easily strike back at the village or the information source, then the 
military might not act on it.”1222  This is a clear indication the government, as of 
2008, had not enough security personnel to protect the population. 
 
A top Thai official says teachers also provide information on suspect students.  In 
this regard, Thai teachers act similarly to American teachers working with truancy 
police providing information on wayward teens.  “The Ministry of Education is 
trying to work closely with the teachers to make sure the insurgents don’t come to 
the schools and recruit,” says a Thai general.1223 
 
As in COINs past, the RTA uses Thahan Phran to collect intelligence at the village 
level.  Nick Nostiz has seen them in action.  “Thahan Phran try to get good 
intelligence. The Thahan Phran and RTA get phone call tips, and they do 
reconnaissance, and take photos, etc.  They talk to the village heads, and the 
village heads might be 100 percent legitimate, or they might also be mafia, but 
also an RTA supporter, so it’s always a bit difficult to deal with these types.”1224 
 
In other cases, Thahan Phran set up observation posts in critical areas.  Says 
Nostiz, “They will also pull an operation on a road that gets bombed a lot.  They 
will watch, wait, and see who the bomber is.  They can see at night, some of them, 
through old night vision goggles, but they complain a lot about them.  They say 
they are too old.”1225 
 
As of 2008, the Thai intelligence system was proving effective.  “At the present 
time,” says Bhumarat, “there are many insurgent defectors.  Things are working 
very well.  The government has information on the separatists.  The RTA has a 
good intelligence network.  It gets a lot of intelligence and can send it to other units 
and organizations to exploit.”1226  Intelligence helped reduce 2005-06 levels of 
violence by nearly half by 2008 with accurate information on arms caches and the 
whereabouts of insurgent suspects. 
 
Thailand’s southern intelligence apparatus is not without its problems, however.  
The people, culture, and language create barriers to collection and analysis.  
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Somchai Rakwijit says, “The situation in the south today is much more difficult 
than getting information from northeast Thailand during the communist insurgency 
because here you have the cultural gap, the language gap, and the religious 
gap.”1227 
 
A senior officer expands on the impact culture has on intelligence.  “At pondoks, 
we have no control, no eyes and ears, but slowly, we are reaching out to local 
Islamic leaders.  They are always there amongst the people, and they know the 
people well, and so our troops have to contact them, work with them, and 
intermingle, doing good things with the community.  We also work with community 
leaders.  The teachers and imams are but two of the groups we contact.”1228 
 
The government has to worry about insurgent spies, too.  In 2007, authorities 
accused 10 government intelligence personnel of spying for insurgents at the 
RTA’s joint intelligence center at Sirindhorn camp in Pattani.  Investigators 
arrested three RTA personnel, including a lieutenant colonel, in late December 
2007 who implicated seven police in their scheme.  All accused are Thai Malay 
Muslims.  Authorities discovered the moles after finding an insurgent laptop with 
classified information they traced to government intelligence personnel.  
Authorities accused them of providing insurgents with information on security 
tactics, techniques and procedures, including checkpoint locations, troop rotation 
schedules, and the timing of missions.  The insurgents then made the intelligence 
actionable; they staged several ambushes and bombings that resulted in scores of 
casualties.1229 
 
General Pichet’s “Pineapple Eye” is a new intelligence program as of June 2009.  
The pineapple aspect refers to “eyes everywhere.”  The network turns the 
insurgent network idea on its head by providing local people – small businessmen, 
concerned citizens, local forces, etc. – with an armed, insurgent-reporting 
communications network.  This is exactly what insurgents do in their villages.  It is 
also politically oriented in that the program connects the people to the state.1230 
 
Pineapple Eye volunteers are organized via a network of static and roving 
observers who report suspicious activities via walkie-talkies – specifically, pre-
attack behaviors.  This could range from persons reconnoitering a target for a 
bombing to insurgents placing a motorcycle bomb.  Volunteers also report violent 
events to alert medical and security forces to improve response times.  Pineapple 
Volunteers provide security at targets insurgents traditionally strike such as 
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government buildings, markets, stores, and banks.  The program is low cost.  The 
radios cost a mere 3,200 baht.1231  
 
The program began in Songkhla and aimed to expand to other provinces.  In the 
beginning, it had a mere 100 volunteers in Hat Yai.  After General Phichet pitched 
the program to local leaders and businessmen, it expanded to 576 people.  He is 
planning to extend it to Phuket as well.  In July, the system extended to Yala.1232 
 
 
2. Political COIN Measures 
 
The political programs the government is using in the current southern COIN are in 
many cases identical to what it used in past campaigns.  Other programs from the 
80s-90s the government having to retool because the insurgents are using them to 
their advantage.  Current political programs include, but are not limited to, 
revamping grass roots level political programs, hiring SB-PAC advisors from the 
local community, upgrading the education system, engaging in international 
diplomacy, offering amnesty, running a complaint department at SB-PAC, and 
fielding psyops and PR. 
 
 
Political Reform at the Grass Roots Level 
 
The question of Thai Malay Muslim political participation is no longer a real issue 
in the far south.  Programs in the 1980s-90s were successful.  For example, in the 
December 2008 legislative lections, 75 percent of the population in the far south 
voted, indicating, according to the RTA, a majority of the population agreed with 
democracy and did not want to separate from Thailand.1233  The population also 
joins in the elections of lower level officials such as TAO presidents, and before 
2006, local imams, and village heads.  (These officials were elected from 1997-
2006.) 
 
The increased number of elected lower level officials, however, gave an opening 
to the insurgents, and they exploited it.  Says Srisompob, “Many of the MoI officers 
don’t trust the leaders of TAO.  They believe that most of the presidents of the 
TAO are supporters of the insurgents, that they are a front group of the 
separatists.”1234  As a result, the SB-PAC and TAO officials do not work together 
too often. 
 
“But many of the presidents of TAO,” says Srisompob, “they are not [insurgents] 
because they themselves are targets of assassinations and bombs, many of them 
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get killed…maybe the insurgents have infiltrated some TAOs.”1235  Srisompob says 
scores of TAO leaders are caught between the government and the insurgents.  
“They are pressed by the military and the governors,” he says, “and at the same 
time, they are threatened by the separatists in the villages, so they have to be 
careful.  They are sitting on the fence.”1236 
 
Accordingly, many Thai believe increased democracy – or too much democracy 
too fast for a population that was not prepared for it – has added to the insurgent 
turmoil and allowed it to flourish.  The increase in democracy was embodied in 
many institutions, but mainly by the TAOs, created by the 1997 Constitution.  
Ironically, the TAO and like organizations were designed to counter the 
insurgency.  The theory was, give locals more say in government, and they will 
appreciate being part of the Thai state, and the insurgency will further weaken.  It 
was part of a governmental decentralization effort, much touted by the UN even 
today.  The new southern insurgency turned this on its head. 
 
Srisompob explains: 
 
Before Thaksin came to power, the village head was elected by locals, 
the villagers, to serve a five-year term.  (The 1997 Constitution made 
this so.)  It became messy.  You had an election for the tambon 
administrator and an election for the village headman.  And also, the 
imam – they were elected from the members of the mosque.  This is 
why local people complain there are too many elections.  Local leaders 
became more politicians than leaders.  They have local parliament 
elections, senate elections, provincial administrative elections.  It’s a lot 
for the locals to handle.1237 
 
Too much democracy manifested itself most evidently in the mosque.  According 
to Director of the Chularatchamontri’s Office Niran Pantharakit, the election of 
imams caused competition and power struggles.  Those struggles contributed to 
the insurgency.  The implication is some imams, in their zeal to retain power, 
strived to become “more Islamic” than their competitors, and some leaned toward 
radical Islam that was sweeping the region at the time.  One of Niran’s solutions to 
the problem was to meticulously screen Islamic leaders before they entered 
government service, a proposition the government began considering in 2007.1238 
 
The creation of TAOs combined with their elections and those of village heads 
caused friction, too.  Chuan describes the local power shift between village heads 
and tambon chiefs as a critical miscalculation.  “So the head of the village was 
strong enough to provide security and to handle any problems, handle any 
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misunderstanding.  This was key,” he says.  “In the 80s and 90s, the heads of the 
villages and tambons, were strong.  After the 90s to 2005, they were weak.”1239 
 
To relieve local “election pressure,” PM Surayud changed the imams and the 
village heads back to being appointed in 2006.1240  “So right now [April 2008],” 
says Srisompob,  “we have three local leaders in the south.  One is an elected 
leader, the president of the TAO; you have the village headman, now appointed by 
the governor; and you have the imam, now appointed by the central Islamic 
committee in Bangkok and through the provincial Islamic committee.”1241  Village 
heads now serve 60 years.1242 
 
Aside from these national and local programs, governors, under ISOC-4, have 
their own grass roots political programs.  For example, Yala Governor Thira 
Mintrasak has the Yala Santisuk (“Peaceful Yala”) program.  It established a local 
council of 10 in every district where villagers can seek advice, lodge complaints, 
and ask for justice in cases of wrong doing against them.  Councils also advise 
villagers on their legal rights as Thai citizens and encourage participation in 
problem solving with the state.  In this regard, the government is essentially 
teaching Thai Malay Muslims, many for the first time in their lives, what it means to 
be a citizen of Thailand.  This, in turn addresses the isolation and fringe mentality 
of many.1243 
 
Despite all the local politics and empowerment at the grass roots level, some 
politicians complain good governance is the real key to fixing the far south.  As 
long as local politicians are corrupt, the people will not trust Bangkok, they say.  
Pattani Senator Anusart Suwanmongkol told the press, “What we need is not 
autonomy but good governance and transparency.  Even Muslims are clamoring 
for good governance.  There is already decentralization – 60 to 70 per cent of the 
budget is in the hands of local officials – but that is meaningless without good 
governance.”1244 
 
 
SB-PAC Advisors 
 
As in the 1980s-90s, in April 2007, the SB-PAC established an advisory board 
made of 35 locals to help guide its projects.  Its purpose is to help the SB-PAC 
identify and solve problems plaguing villagers at the local level.  Heading the 
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council as chairman is President of the Yala PAO Aziz Benhawan.  His deputies 
are the rector of Yala Rajabhat University, Kraisorn Sritrairat; National Legislative 
Assembly member Vichai Ruangroengkulrit; and Prince of Songkhla University’s 
Worawit Baru, a senator as of 2009.  The head provincial Buddhist monks and 
head imams also serve on the board.  Other members included academics, 
journalists, and businesspersons.  Their span of service is two years.1245 
 
 
Local Education System Changes 
 
MoE inspector Prasert Kaewphet, in charge of education in the far south, 
submitted a pondok upgrade plan to Southern Education Board Chair Education 
Minister Wijit Srisa-arn on 23 July 2007 in Narathiwat.  It was in many respects a 
copy of the 1980s pondoks via the PSTI program that the government killed in the 
late 1990s.  The new plan standardizes pondok curriculum, checks the 
backgrounds of pondok executives and teachers, and establishes benchmarks to 
judge the progress of the schools.  Specific aspects of the program include 
standardizing correct teachings of Islam and nullifying radical Islam, providing 
vocational training, and upgrading teachers’ training.  The Southern Education 
Board, staffed by Muslim scholars, local leaders, and southern MoE personnel, 
supervises the program.1246   
 
Yet another pondok reform program surfaced in August 2008: the Curriculum 
Pondok Reform (CPR) program.  Secretary General of the Office of the Higher 
Education Commission (OHEC) Sumeth Yamnoon explained CPR was attempting 
to empower pondoks to reform themselves but could not force them to; they had to 
work with Bangkok and develop curriculum that prepared students for the real 
world.  Secretary Sumeth said OHEC partnered Prince of Songkhla, Ratjabhat, 
and Thaksin Universities with pondoks to help them modernize.  CPR has a 
diploma program for ustaz to attend math and science classes so they can teach 
secular subjects to their students.1247 
 
A like program in April 2008 focused on training tadika teachers – private Islamic 
schools for children ages five to 12 – so they would not teach children radical or 
incorrect Islamic tenets before sending them to pondoks.  Justice Secretary 
Charnchao started it.  Tadika teachers directly requested the training from 
Charnchao on one of his many fact-finding missions to the far south.  They also 
wanted to learn about Thai state law. 
 
Charnchao’s and similar programs directly address the teacher-insurgent nexus, a 
major enabler of the movement.  Pattani tadika teacher Nisit Nirano told the press 
some teachers joined the insurgency out of “…ignorance, lack of education and in-
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depth knowledge of Islam…”1248  He said others joined to earn money because 
their salaries were not enough.  Others feared the insurgency but were likewise 
fearful of authorities that did not trust them under suspicion they might be 
insurgents.  Charnchao’s educational system is supposed to alleviate some of the 
pressures.1249 
 
The Privy Council runs a pondok reform program called San Jai Thai Su Jai Tai 
(“Uniting Thai Hearts for the South.”)  It is designed to expose pondok students to 
the rest of Thailand and instill a sense of confidence in students with vocational 
training.  Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn sponsored it.  Through San Jai Thai, 
many southern border youth have gone to live with host families in Bangkok, and 
others have learned carpentry and welding skills where they repaired their own 
schools.  In 2008, the program was working with the 295 students of Yala’s 
Darussalam pondok in Muang district.1250 
 
Says Bhumarat, “I think the program works very well.  After one or two months, 
before they return home, many of them cry and say they were treated very well by 
the other Muslim families in the central part of the country, and that life, and the 
lives of Muslims, is more than what they originally thought.”  The RTA, the 
southern border governors, and the MoI chose the participants.1251 
 
ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan, a student of pondoks himself, praised 
Bangkok’s efforts to reform the pondok system.  At an April 2008 educational 
reform conference in Pattani titled, “Educational Systems in Majority and Minority 
Muslim Societies: Strategies and Perspectives,” he said no government should 
force pondoks to change; “We are entitled to learn any subject Allah could 
offer.”1252  At the same time, he urged ustaz to take the initiative to boost their 
teaching skills and widen their curriculum to teach students more than just Islam.  
“But are we ready to do that?  I’m not sure,” Surin told the conference.1253  He said 
it was time for Muslims to shed their “long-held siege mentality,” which would pave 
the way “to interact with the outside.”1254 
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Diplomacy 
 
As with past COINs, Bangkok has put significant diplomatic effort into its current 
COIN.  It has sought peace talks with southern insurgents hiding in Asia, 
Switzerland, and Egypt.  It has moreover strived to block Middle Eastern support 
for the insurgency, namely via the OIC.  Bangkok has also secured votes of 
confidence from Arabic countries for its conciliatory approach to its southern COIN 
and its religious tolerance. 
 
As for peace talks, the Thai government has tried to meet with insurgents many 
times, but to no avail.  Says General Perapong, “In the past, we could negotiate 
because PULO and the other groups wanted political access.  But this current war, 
they have merged nationalism and Islam together and latched themselves onto an 
international movement, the jihadists.”1255 
 
The government attempted talks with current insurgent leadership on Langkawi off 
the northwest coast of Malaysia during the Thaksin administration.  The talks were 
secret and supposedly brokered by former Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamad, but 
they went nowhere.  Says a Thai military general:  
 
At Langkawi – we are always open for dialogue, and we’ll talk.  There 
are many occasions that there was an approach about dialogue, but 
nothing came out of it.  The insurgent leaders are still reluctant to show 
their presence.  So they remain in the dark, in the shadows, waiting to 
see how their war will play out.  Most of our dialogue has been with the 
older insurgent groups, PULO and the like.  We went to them, and they 
also came to us.1256 
 
PULO Foreign Affairs Chief Kasturi Mahkuta said talks with the government began 
in June 2005 with the Thaksin administration and continued into the Samak 
Sundaravej (29 January 2008 - 9 September 2008) administration.1257  In 2007, 
Thai academics held talks in Geneva and Jeddah with insurgents.1258 
 
In September 2008, there were more talks in Indonesia.  Indonesian Vice 
President Jusuf Kalla moderated them.  Other moderators included Anis 
Baswedan, rector of Paramadina University, and M Hatta, Indonesian ambassador 
to Thailand.  The talks were in Bogor, West Java.  Five representatives from 
Thailand attended, headed by Lieutenant General Khwanchart Klahan, former 
Fourth Army Commander.  Eleven insurgent representatives led by a man named 
Wahyuddin Mohammad attended as the “Pattani Malay Consultative Congress.”  
After the talks, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono greeted the 
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insurgents at his palace on 22 September.  It is not clear if the talks were official 
Thai government policy or not.  It seems they might have supposed to be secret, 
and when they were exposed in the press, Bangkok indicated they were unofficial.  
Regardless, they ended without achieving peace.1259 
 
COIN cooperation with Malaysia continues to be one of Bangkok’s top priorities, 
but to date, progress has been slow.  General Akanit is on the case, but rarely do 
bilateral negotiations in Southeast Asia happen quickly.  Says Dr. Arun: 
“Diplomacy…first we give notice to our neighbor, [Malaysia].  No separatist 
movement in the world is located far from the border from which it fights. 
Movements in Ceylon, Africa, the Middle East, in other areas – most of them rely 
on other countries.”1260 
 
Says General Vaipot: “Malaysia is an ASEAN country, so it won’t agree with 
Islamic extremism, and they’ve been a great help to us so far.  Malaysia’s new 
policy is a modernized, new Islam… They are creating a ‘modern Muslim’ and are 
expanding the ‘modern Muslim’ community, and that is something we are keenly 
interested in.”1261 
 
Bangkok engaged Malaysia on a continual basis, joining at least five major 
meetings with KAL from August 2007 to April 2009, and these were just the public 
ones.  One was in April 2008 when PM Samak went to KAL on a two-day visit.  He 
was specifically interested in Malaysia arresting and extraditing two insurgent 
suspects who allegedly staged terrorist attacks in Thailand and then fled to 
Malaysia for sanctuary.  Samak met with both PM Abdullah Badawi and Foreign 
Minister Rais Yatim.  Pattani Senator Worarit Baru indicated the trip was useless 
because Malaysia was not harboring any insurgent suspects.1262 
 
In April 2009, in tandem with the diplomacy between the RTA and Malaysian 
Defense Forces, PM Abhisit met with newly elected Malaysian PM Najib Razak to 
discuss COIN cooperation.  They met during the ASEAN summit in Pattaya.  They 
discussed reinvigorating cooperation between the two countries, COIN security, 
and restarting the IMT-GT to not only combat insurgency, but also to financially 
benefit all three countries involved.1263 
 
Dr. Arun sees Thailand’s diplomatic efforts to stave off support from the insurgents 
as effective.  “And now I think we are successful in the diplomatic effort with the 
OIC….  No country has given overt support to those movements; some material 
support, yes.  Like only from some areas in the name of Islamic donations [zakat], 
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so…we think they seek to internationalize the issue.  That is why our policy is to 
manage it.  If we cannot solve it…we can manage it.”1264 
 
Bangkok’s diplomatic managing efforts have been Herculean.  From 20-25 April 
2007, Foreign Affairs Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram visited Bahrain and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) to shore up support for its COIN efforts and to demonstrate 
Thailand was not slaughtering Muslims as had apparently been reported by 
insurgent psyops.  Both countries had provided education and mosque building 
assistance to Thailand, and thousands of Thai worked in and/or visited Bahrain 
and UAE.  Thammasat University political science professor Charan Malureem, 
who was an advisor to PM Surayud, said Thailand saw Bahrain as a “gateway 
through which Thailand connects with the Muslim world.”1265  UAE, he told the 
press, was “the region's biggest investment powerhouse.”1266 
 
In May 2007, the Thai government successfully prevented the OIC at its 34th 
ministerial meeting on 17 May 2007 from calling for an independent Malay Muslim 
state within Thailand, which would have fired up the rebellion with higher levels of 
violence.1267  Bangkok does not want another China or a North Vietnam aiding yet 
another internal rebel group.  And there is evidence things were leaning in this 
direction. 
 
The coordinator for Yala’s Civil Society Empowerment Project, Mansour Saleh, 
said in 2007 Thai Malay Muslims in Thailand wanted more control over their own 
governance.  He told the press, “They do not want an advisory role.  They want to 
have their own path of doing things.”1268  Saleh said the secretary general of the 
OIC “promised the Muslim ummahs in the South that he would cooperate with the 
government in finding a way for the locals to lead their own lives with dignity, 
peace and prosperity.”1269 
 
More, several Muslim scholars told a visiting OIC delegation in early May headed 
by Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu that Thai Malay Muslims needed an 
autonomous zone within Thailand.  Their language leaned more toward a separate 
state than autonomy.  In this regard, insurgents and some in the OIC might believe 
this means the OIC should aid the insurgents in gaining independence, something 
Surin Pitsuwan warned against.1270 
 
General Sonthi personally applied considerable diplomatic efforts to the issue.  
The OIC, he said, based on “information from some place else,” was set to 
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demand Thailand establish autonomous zones for Thai Malay Muslims because it 
believed Bangkok denied them religious freedom.  Secretary General Ihsanoglu 
changed his mind after visiting Thailand and speaking to General Sonthi, a 
Muslim, who convinced him the complaint, was, in fact, a lie.1271 
 
Thai Foreign Minister Nitya also made Thailand’s case.  He attended the 34th 
session of the OIC at Islamabad, Pakistan.  From his Serena Hotel room, he and 
his staff lobbied the OIC to not criticize Thailand as being anti-Muslim and also not 
to call for an independent governing status for Thai-Malay Muslims.  Minister Nitya 
disapproved of the first draft of the OIC’s opinion on Thailand’s far south that 
called for “elected Muslim representative[s] and elected governors” for a Malay 
Muslim “southern state.”1272  The OIC’s Ambassador Sayyed Kaseem El-Masry, 
special envoy of Ihsanoglu, coined these pro-insurgent terms.  The OIC previously 
agreed it would not use such terms and concepts in its report on the matter when it 
met with Sonthi, so said the Thai.1273  In its statement, the OIC also was calling for 
the Thai government to violate its constitution – the MoI appoints governors.  They 
are not elected. 
 
The OIC’s final statement on the matter said it approved of the way Thailand was 
handing the southern unrest – via a “conciliatory approach.”  It acknowledged the 
insurgency was not about religion, but about “political, economic rights and 
culture.”  It praised PM Surayud for apologizing for past wrongs done to Thai 
Malay Muslims by the state.  The OIC applauded Thailand’s efforts to adjust the 
local governing system to recognize and embrace the cultural uniqueness of the 
southern border population while remaining a part of Thailand.  The OIC 
demanded an immediate halt to violence in the southern provinces and said 
people of different faiths living there should exist peacefully side-by-side.1274 
 
 
Amnesty 
 
As in Thailand’s past COINs, amnesty is a major proponent of the current COIN.  
Says an RTA officer, “[We have] big campaigns on TV requesting insurgents and 
their supporters join the amnesty program and surrender.  The message of this 
initiative is to stop fighting and help develop the south together.”1275  As of 2009, 
amnesty is available for low-level operatives and auxiliary forces only. 
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Bangkok began to develop amnesty as an official policy in April-May 2007.  Then 
Fourth Army Commander Ongkorn Thongprasom and his staff developed the core 
concepts.  Defense Minister General Boonrawd Somtas said he would support it if 
it brought peace to the far south.1276 
 
Then on 1 May, PM Surayud announced a general amnesty “to all persons 
involved in the ongoing violence” that had not violated Thailand’s criminal code.  
By 2008, the National Assembly had passed the measure.  He said ISOC-4 and 
the Fourth Army Commander would work out the details on how to implement the 
order on the ground.1277 
 
In the meantime, in March 2008, Yala provincial authorities, including Governor 
Thira and Deputy Governor Gissada Boonraj, established their own amnesty 
program with ISOC’s blessing.  Called the “Peace Outreach Centre” (POC), it 
grants amnesty to insurgents and auxiliary personnel.  More than a simple 
surrender program, however, POC provides security, job training, and job 
placement, much like General Kitti’s program in the 1990s.1278 
 
ISOC General Akara Thiproj told the press in March 2008:  
 
[Insurgent sympathizers] see others who have turned themselves in 
are able to lead normal lives and I guess they’re wanting that too.  
Most separatist sympathizers joined the separatist movement not 
knowing any better.  If they wish to turn themselves in, our priority is to 
change their past beliefs about the southern situation instead of 
punishing them.  We will then support them in their career development 
to ensure they are able to lead a happy life.”1279  
 
Deputy Governor Gissada said many militants surrendered because the conflict 
“didn’t seem to have an end game.”1280 
 
ISOC announced in April 2008 the POC was experiencing success.  On 7 March, 
for example, 77 auxiliary support persons surrendered to authorities along with 
three insurgent leaders.  Yala Governor Thira oversaw their surrender ceremony 
administered by the Yala Islamic Committee.  It undid the radical Islamic oath the 
insurgents took upon joining the movement.1281 
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SB-PAC Complaint Department 
 
The SB-PAC resurrected its complain department for the current COIN.  Says 
Charnchao, “The complaint unit is run by MoI and MoJ, and supervised by Pranai.  
But the problem is, when we found something wrong, a human rights violation, for 
example, we could not do much about it because we had little power.”1282  
Charnchao says the Fourth Army Commander is backing the program, which now 
gives it teeth.1283  Adds Pranai, “Concerning local officials’ abuses, we have 
measures to deal with them that are the strongest of anywhere in Thailand.  We 
have a law that says the SB-PAC can report any bad doings by the army or police 
directly to the PM.  If we take it seriously, as SB-PAC did in the past, then we can 
expect changes soon.”1284 
 
 
Psyops and PR 
 
The Thai government has a wide array of information related COIN programs such 
as education, spreading moderate Islam, airing grievances, PR, and psyops.  
Psyops are the most prolific.  Scores of government agencies carry out these 
programs.  The RTA is one of their biggest proponents. 
 
As for education, the SB-PAC runs a series of conferences and workshops to, 1) 
spread moderate Islam, 2) air and reconcile local grievances, and 3) address 
gross misperceptions of Thai state and Thai Malay Muslim histories.  These 
programs are akin to “population repair” where the government seeks to mend 
social ruptures and overdone government-population friction caused by decades 
of maligned historical perceptions and propaganda.  
 
Regarding spreading moderate Islam, the SB-PAC invites learned and mainstream 
Muslims from countries such as Jordan to southern Thailand to meet with locals to 
teach them proper Islam as opposed to the radical view proposed by poorly 
educated imams and ustaz.  “We try to keep the RKK from getting too radical, 
partly by talking them out of it,” says Pranai.  “We get them to un-commit to their 
religious insurgent commitment, and we do it with the help of non-radical 
Muslims.”1285 
 
Adds Bhumarat:  
 
In southern Thailand, some try to say they are fighting for jihad.  But it’s 
actually not jihad; jihad is simply an excuse to get some youngsters to 
fight, so we bring the Muslim teachers from Saudi Arabia and 
Indonesia to tell southerners they are not fighting jihad, that their war 
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has nothing to do with religion.  We try to bring the youngsters who 
walk in the wrong way to come back to society.1286 
 
Regarding airing grievances, the SB-PAC hosts workshops for locals, imams, and 
ustaz so they can vent their frustrations about southern border inadequacies, 
injustices they have suffered, and changes they would like to see.  During these 
sessions, the SB-PAC corrects misperceived wrongs; not all Thai Malay Muslim 
accusations of wrongdoing are factual.  “We work with religious teachers and 
make all grey religious and ethnic issue clear,” explains Pranai:   
 
We do this via workshops; seven-day and a fifteen-day workshops.  
For these grey area people, we have Muslims come in from Bangkok 
and tell them about being a Muslim in other parts of Thailand and how 
the government is not out to destroy Islam or kill Muslims, as insurgent 
indoctrination says.  We have dialogue day-in and day-out about their 
beliefs and history.  They exercise their frustrations and their views of 
the government, and we try to tell them what is and is not true.  They 
even write their views down.  We start with 10 people, and if two 
change their minds, it can be a good model.  We’ve had this program 
for a long time, quietly.  We print books for them on what true Islam 
discusses.  We get experts in, like the Great Imam of Cairo, rector of 
one of the most famous universities in Cairo.  The Muslim League, 
represented by al Turki [Dr. Abdullah al-Turki], helps out with this 
program, too.1287   
 
Many Malay Muslims have vented genuine concerns, such as police corruption – 
something Bangkok must correct if it is serious about COIN.  Others have stated 
what they perceive as problems that are actually issues rooted in exceptionally 
narrow minded and/or limited thinking.  Pranai explains,  “One asked, ‘I am a 
Muslim in a city of sin, surrounded by prostitutes, karaoke, whiskey.  What can I 
do?  How am I supposed to live here?  I have to do something [war].’  So a Muslim 
advisor said, ‘Look, you are a Muslim born in a non-Muslim country, so don’t 
participate in sinful activities and teach your children to do the same.’  “This helps 
clear the air,” says Pranai.  “This program began at the beginning of the SB-
PAC.”1288 
 
Concerning historical distortions, SB-PAC has a program to counter not just 
specific insurgent propaganda, but general misperceptions of Thai and Malay 
Muslim history that provide the foundation for propaganda and general malcontent 
toward the state.  Says Pranai, “One [captured insurgent] said his parents were 
taken to Bangkok with chains through their ankle tendons as slaves to dig a canal.  
It’s just illogical.  It’s impossible.”1289 
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Thai rulers in the 1800s had canals dug throughout Bangkok for transportation.  
The most famous is the Khlong Saen Saeb, which connects the Chao Phraya 
River to Prachin Buri and Chachoengsao provinces.  King Rama III had it built 
between 1837-40.  Some rulers used slaves to dig the canals, and many Thai 
Malay Muslims assert they provided the bulk of the forced labor – even in recent 
decades. 
 
While slavery was involved in building the canals, the SB-PAC explained to the 
young insurgent it was historically impossible for his parents to have done so.  It 
was at least 160 years ago.  And being cut and chained through the Achilles’ 
tendon and not dying shortly thereafter from gangrene on a several hundred mile 
forced march in tepid Southeast Asia is yet another improbability.  But this is the 
perceived history Bangkok must contend with.  People murder other human beings 
over it.  “…So we try to work the truth into people like this,” says Pranai, “but this 
type of propaganda uses material from 200 years ago, so we work with academics 
to fix this; try to forget the bad past, look to the future, and fix it.”1290 
 
Fixing it has to date entailed Thai Malay Muslim and Thai historians working 
together to try to wash out ultra-nationalist aspects of state history and the ultra-
fantasy aspects of Malay Muslim history.  Powerful issues of race, religion, and 
culture are at loggerheads.  Says Pranai, “We try to work out on clearing up our 
historical differences, that we are talking to clear up misconceptions by people 
who use history improperly.  And it’s not easy, because everyone has real 
difference in historical views.  Historians, even from the universities, have real 
differences in the history of Thailand and southern Thailand, and that’s proven to 
be a sticking point.  So our job is more difficult, but we know where we must go 
now.”1291 
 
As for psyops, says an RTA trooper, “Psyops – we try to do that all the time.  
Psyops are very important because in this style of war, the main factor is the 
people.  They decide who will win and lose, and we can’t win the hearts of the 
people by killing.  This is a reasonable way to think.  This is also an army 
policy.”1292 
 
The Psychological Affairs section of CPM is responsible for carrying out most 
psyops in the far south.  SF runs it, but regular RTA units also have their own 
combination CA-psyops teams.1293  The SF units are called “Peace Teams,” just 
like the Santi Nimit units deployed in 1980.1294  Their message is simple, says an 
RTA soldier.  “Psyops mainly try to tell the locals that the government and police 
and troops don’t want harm them,” he says.1295  A combat medic says the RTA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1290 Ibid. 
1291 Ibid. 
1292 Anonymous. 
1293 Anonymous. 
1294 Anonymous. 
1295 Anonymous. 
	  	   290	  
also tries to explain to locals, “There are insurgents in your village, in your 
homeland.  Even though you have another religion, everyone thinks you are Thai 
[a Thai citizen], and we must work together to push out the bad people.”1296  
Another army message is, “ ‘Buddhists and Muslims can work and live together,’ 
and ‘the war does no good – both sides die’.”1297  Two unifying messages the 
government uses are, 1) “people living in the southern border provinces are part of 
the nation – not outcasts,” and 2) “the king wants everyone to live in peace.”1298 
 
The Thai do not restrict psyops to just psyops units, however.  “Every soldier in the 
south helps with psyops,” says an RTA officer.  “They do this by being friendly with 
people, talking to the villagers, asking what they need; fostering community 
relations.”1299 
 
CPM gets its message out by passing out leaflets – in Jawi and Thai – by going to 
demonstrations, coordinating with medical services and health departments, by 
going to districts and talking with local leaders, and visiting red zones with Medical 
Mobile Units.1300  Radio is also a common information outlet in the far south where 
CPM psyops recruit villagers as “DJs” to spread their message.  “But once you 
become a DJ, you get targeted,” says Nostiz.1301  The RTA also uses TV.  It owns 
“Channel 5” and uses it as a psyops platform on a regular basis.1302 
 
In other cases, Thai forces enter villages to explore their options.  An RTA CA 
officer describes it as a two-phase process.  “In Phase 1, we initiate contact with a 
person we can rely on, such as a village leader.  We don’t go in with a big force.  
We assess the problems of an area and gather information on the insurgents and 
the people.”  This is what many COIN experts call “human terrain mapping.”  “We 
don’t talk about the war or fighting or anything like that.  We just make contact,” 
says the officer.1303 
 
“In Phase 2,” he explains,  
 
We find the best application by which to access the village.  
Sometimes, we want to go a village where the Thai forces and medical 
people and are not well received.  So we look for an ‘in.’  For example, 
in one case in a denied area, a Peace Team found an elderly man who 
had a leg injury, and it had become severely infected, and they could 
not move him.  So the psyop unit visited him every day and talked to 
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him.  They also spoke to a lot of villagers about him and eventually got 
to know everyone.1304   
 
By doing this, the team achieved situational awareness. “So, after a while,” he 
continues,  
 
On the fourth visit, they were able to bring in a doctor.  The old man 
still would not let them look at him, but the fifth time was ‘the charm,’ 
and he allowed it…  It took about a month, but in the end, they took 
him to a care unit.  Each sub district has a small building where they 
can clean wounds, do sutures, basic medial procedures, first aid, etc.  
The moral of the story was, they won the confidence of the village over 
this.1305 
 
The RTA had a re-education program for suspected insurgents that caused 
controversy in 2006-07.  The MoJ’s Charnchao says it had the right goal but was 
executed incorrectly.  The program had the police and military arrest or detain 
multitudes of Thai Malay Muslim males at-risk of joining the insurgency and then 
put them in job training camps against their will.  The camps were not hard labor or 
jail-like, but they did have loyalty and citizenship indoctrination classes – Thai 
history and the like – but it was still illegal.1306  Charnchao says, “A local NGO run 
by the wife of missing lawyer Somchai filed a complaint in the Thai court system, 
saying the program was illegal.  The court agreed, in part, saying persons 
attending the program could not be forced to do so.  They had to attend on a 
voluntary basis.  So the military approached the MoJ, asking if they could work 
together on the project, and the MoJ agreed.”1307 
 
Thai courts ordered the RTA to release the detainees, 85 at the time, in October 
2007.  MoJ-RTA cooperation reestablished it as a voluntary program where the 
RTA invited Thai Malay Muslims to the camp from one to several days for 
vocational and citizenship classes.  Diana Sarosi of the NGO, Working Group on 
Justice for Peace, told the press, “People are too scared to turn down these 
invitations.”1308  The RTA is open and public about the camps and asserts no one 
is forced or coerced to go.1309 
 
As for counter propaganda, an RTA soldier says, “Counter propaganda…in the 
communist war era, this was possible.  But now, the villagers are not all innocent.  
They have already been indoctrinated by the RKK, and government psyops are 
less effective.  Bad government officials and police have helped to bolster this 
indoctrination.”1310  Billboards and posters are the government’s main counter 
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propaganda media.1311  Says Chuan Leekpai, “One of our billboards reads, ‘Killing 
one innocent person means to kill the whole world’.”1312 
 
“Insurgents tell villagers they are not Thai, that they are ‘Patani Darussalam 
people’,” says an RTA medic.   
 
They say the Thai will always refuse you and take your jobs…the Thai 
will take everything from you and take advantage of you.  The 
government tells the villagers the government would never do these 
bad things to them.  ‘You are Thai,’ is the message.  ‘You have all the 
same rights as other Thai despite having a different religion, but you 
have to do your duty.  If you want something in your village to be fixed, 
or if there is a situation we can fix, you cannot kill over it or organize a 
mob; there is a way to go through channels’.1313 
 
The SB-PAC does psyops through its office of public relations.  Normally, civilian 
psyops or PR is left to the central government’s Department of Public Relations, 
but warfare requires a more nuanced effort.1314  “Like the army,” says an RTA 
trooper, “the SB-PAC sets up posters that encourage peace, and togetherness.  
Its workers will put up a big poster of the Koran that says, ‘peace, not war,’ and 
things like that.”1315 
 
Mass PR is one method Thailand has adopted to help refurbish its not wholly 
deserved tarnished reputation.  In May 2009, for example, Foreign Minister Kasit 
Pimromya led a host of European Union (EU) diplomats on a tour of the far south.  
In particular, Kasit led the delegation to the Islamic College in Yala to talk to 
students.  He also introduced them to the NGO, Muslim Women for Peace in Yala.  
The NGOs said they had received complaints of torture and disappearances.  
Kasit also took the delegation to the Working Group of Justice and Peace where 
they heard Mrs. Angkhana Wongrachen’s version of the 8 February 2009 raid on 
her office by authorities looking for links to insurgents.  
 
Mrs. Angkhana Wongrachen is the wife of the missing and presumed dead Mr. 
Somchai Neelaphaijit.  He was once Chair of the Muslim Lawyers Association and 
Vice-Chair of the Human Rights Committee of the Lawyers Association of 
Thailand.  His supporters say he was a “human rights lawyer.”  In reality, he was a 
lawyer for New PULO, something his supporters hide.  He successfully defended 
two New PULO fighters in court but lost three others life sentences for charges of 
violence and treason against the state in 2002.1316  Police allegedly abducted and 
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murdered him in 2004.  Some authorities suspect his wife and her NGO might 
have links to insurgents. 
 
In being open, Kasit wanted to prove to the EU that the assertions by many that 
Thailand was harming Muslims with reckless abandon was patently false.  He also 
wanted to demonstrate Thailand was not trying to hide what was going on in the 
insurgency zone, that there was no NGO or press blackout trying to hide alleged 
government atrocities.1317 
 
ISOC’s counter narcotics section runs a dual-purpose national security program 
aimed not only at getting kids in the far south off drugs, but also psyops aimed at 
building trust between villagers and the government.  RTA Colonel Suwan 
Chirdshai runs it for ISOC-4.  His title is, Chief of Office of Coordination for Mass 
Strategies to Solve the Problem of Narcotics in the Three Southern Border 
Provinces. 
 
Colonel Suwan says drugs have become rampant in the far south and are 
interconnected to the insurgency.  He estimates 70 percent of southern youngsters 
have been exposed to, or regularly use, drugs such as marijuana, yaba, ecstasy, 
ice, and kratom.  The latter is a natural growing narcotic in Thailand, and the 
insurgents mix it with cough medicine and give it to teens to inebriate them for 
certain missions to remove their fear.  Insurgents and non-insurgents alike grow 
marijuana in red zones because authorities no longer patrol many of them.  Drug 
use has gone up because teens are bored, restless, and live in a stressful 
environment.1318 
 
To execute the program, Colonel Suwan says ISOC uses RTA CA units.  “So it’s a 
campaign to teach people about the negative side effects of the drugs and how 
bad it is for the local people.  The output here is trust.  They’ll trust this operational 
unit as a result.  And they don’t suspect we are up to no good.”1319 
 
The anti-narcotics teams focus on the parents of the drug addicts, who frequently 
resist the program at first because, he says, no parent wants to admit their 
children use drugs.  He says they say to the parents, “ ‘Agree with us.’  We must 
solve the drug problems of the children together.”  They also work with the 
community leaders and religious leaders.  Says Suwan, “they need to support us 
so that we can work with the parents and drug users.”1320 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1317 “Kasit leads EU envoys visit Islamic College in Yala,” in The Nation, 4 May 2009, 
and “Diplomats take note of Angkhana’s work,” in Bangkok Post, 5 May 2009. 
1318 Colonel Suwan Chirdshai, RTA, ISOC, Chief of Office of Coordination for Mass 
Strategies to Solve the Problem of Narcotics in the Three Southern Border Provinces, 
interview by author, 9 April 2008, Pattani, Thailand. 
1319 Ibid. 
1320 Ibid. 
	  	   294	  
The teams then meet with the children, parents, and community and religious 
leaders all at once.  “We make sure they understand that we want to help them 
help themselves to keep away from drugs,” says Suwan.  “We tell the kids they are 
not on any list of suspects.”  After the villages and kids understand the program, 
ISOC takes them to an educational camp in Songkhla called Yalanan Baru, a 
Malay phrase for “New Road.”  It means to adopt a new way of life.1321  An 
understated but primary goal of the program is to steal kids back from the 
insurgents who get them hooked on drugs and then use them as auxiliary forces 
and fighters. 
 
At the anti-drug camps, for six days, the kids run through light military boot 
training, learn about the military and citizenship, and also life’s journey and how a 
person formulates good and bad decision making skills.  Srisompob and his team 
conduct surveys of the attendees to analyze their attitudes and if their outlooks are 
changing or not. 
 
The camps have been in operational since June 2007 and can take 60 youth at 
once.  As of spring 2008, 3,000 had been through the program.  ISOC-4 has 
enough personnel and space to run 10 camps at once.1322 
 
The results are so far positive.  Says Suwan, “Before this project, the local 
communities did not trust the army, did not trust the officers who are working on 
the ground.  But right now, in many areas where the military was worked with kids 
on this anti-drug program, the kids went back to the villages and now organized 
youth groups to help the soldiers.  They have become informants and supporters 
of the army.  Before, the army could not penetrate into the communities, but right 
now, they have the contacts and the imam and the leaders of the village, the 
headman, too, and many realize this is a good project for the Muslim youth.”1323 
 
 
3. Economic COIN Programs 
 
The development programs currently applied in the far south are none too different 
from past COINs – especially those of the 1980s-90s.  All government ministries, 
the SB-PAC, and the military engage in development ranging from small village 
projects to large industrial concerns.  As in the past, education is also part of the 
government’s strategy to integrate isolated Malay Muslims into the state to create 
productive citizens who study more than just Islam.  The Royal Family is intricately 
involved in developing the far south, as it always has been.  While the government 
has furiously engaged in development, the many administrations that have come 
and gone have initiated a wide range of projects. 
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Multiple Development Plans 
 
Administrations from Thaksin to the current Abhisit government have all submitted 
development plans for the far south.  Since there have been so many turnovers in 
government since 2004 – five to be precise – not all these plans had time to take 
effect.  Some administrations borrowed from those gone by, and others developed 
wholly new plans.  It has been confusing to say the least.  It is noteworthy that the 
RTA’s SBPPC had the first actionable development plan for the south. 
 
Thaksin wanted all government agencies to have their COIN development plans 
finalized by December 2005.  Initiatives under his watch included the Board of 
Investment of Thailand (BOI) sponsoring the “Promotion Years,” which was a “fire 
sale” of sorts for advantageous investment terms in the southern border provinces 
for three years.  These measures were also aimed at protecting businesses in the 
south that were floundering because of the violence.1324  The Ministry of Industry 
began planning to expand fishing businesses and create a halal food industry.1325 
 
One project the government has kept promoting is transforming the far south into a 
Special Economic Zone, began under Samak’s tenure on 1 January 2007.  The 
impetus behind it was to improve investment in the area by lowering taxes and 
improving infrastructure.  For example, Bangkok lowered corporate taxes in the 
region from 30 percent to three percent, lowered interest rates for easier loans, 
eased restrictions on importing laborers from outside the south, and compensated 
businesses for higher insurance premiums as a result of operating in a war 
zone.1326 
 
The Samak government in March 2008 gave the SB-PAC and its associated 
agencies 45 days to write the far south’s economic COIN plan.1327  In early April 
2008, the SB-PAC submitted, and the cabinet thereafter approved, a more 
detailed COIN plan for the far south than what it began with in 2006.  This plan has 
more or less remained in tact despite two successive turnovers of government 
since Samak. 
 
The SB-PAC’s plan was essentially a restatement of its 2006 goals but with more 
precise tasks to carry out on the ground.  The government planned for Pattani to 
become an international Islamic educational and halal food center.  Yala was to 
become the region’s agricultural hub.  Narathiwat was slated to become an export-
processing zone for goods destined for Malaysia’s East Coast Economic Region.  
Songkhla was chosen to become a global center for rubber farms, sports, 
education, and tourism.  The SB-PAC included Satun in the plan as well – it was to 
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become a major international and domestic cargo transport center.  The NESDB 
approved the plan on 8 April.1328 
 
The current administration – Abhisit’s government – is trying to make these 
projects more permanent than past governments, however.  Abhisit says the 
government is focusing on, “Education, entrepreneurialship, employment – the 
‘three Es’.”  The Surayud government began it, and Abhisit’s administration 
expanded it.1329 
 
In March 2009, Abhisit said he wanted to downsize military forces in the far south 
by 10,000 troops in 2010 “to rid the region of its frightening image and boost 
tourism and investment.”1330  Under Abhisit, Bangkok’s top economic specialists 
began planning 605 major industrial development projects with a price tag of over 
80 billion baht.  Projects included industrial parks and special economic zones for 
export.1331 
 
On 11 June 2009, Abhisit announced an emergency 54 billion baht development 
package for the far south.  The money would support 300 projects, presumably 
already lined up by Abhisit and past administrations.  Government Spokesman 
Panitan said 15 billion baht would be released immediately.1332 
 
 
Education 
 
In April 2007, Deputy Foreign Minister Sawanit Kongsiri went to Egypt to tend to 
Thai students at al Azad University.  Approximately 1,500 Thai students were 
enrolled there.  Sawanit donated one million baht to the university and came to an 
agreement with Dean Sheik Tantawi that Thai students should study secular as 
well as Islamic subjects such as “engineering, finance and rural development.”1333  
The reason was economic.  Said Sawanit to the press: “Thai students studying 
religion overseas often find difficulty landing jobs when they return to Thailand.  It 
is because there are already too many religion teachers.  If they study other 
subjects, with their experience and education background they could find other 
jobs.”1334 
 
Pranai heralds education as the government’s most important COIN instrument.  
He says, “On March 21st [2008], we submitted to the pm that the Education 
Ministry must fasten their job under this new strategy as fast as possible.  If we 
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don’t tackle education in the south, things are going to go on like this for some 
time.”1335  He told the press: “Through education, people will have more hope, 
which is very important in this region.  The SB-PAC will provide more educational 
opportunities for Muslim students in the provinces to enable them to achieve their 
dream.”1336 
 
Pranai faces an uphill battle.  Over 70 percent of Thai-Malay Muslim students 
attended 6,000 pondoks in the far south.  The remaining 30 percent attend public 
schools.  As a result of the heavy pondok attendance, fewer Thai Malay Muslims 
make it to universities than any other ethnicity in all of Thailand.  This is why 
scholarship is one of the SB-PAC’s biggest programs.  In 2008, it provided 1,000 
scholarships for southern border youth to study in the Middle East, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia.1337  Scholarships for Thai Malay Muslims are not a new program, 
however.  Says Pranai, “Since 46 years ago, the MoI has had scholarships for 
southerners.”1338 
 
In July 2008, the Office of the Basic Education Commission (OBEC) in the South 
announced it was increasing the amount of time students studied Islam in public 
schools.  Primary schools would increase from two to 10 hours a week.  High 
schools would increase to 12 hours a week.  It began as a test project in 2006 in a 
few schools and is being expanded because it was achieving its goal: increased 
Thai Malay Muslim enrollment in public schools where there were secular 
subjects.  The new Islamic curriculum covers Islamic history and culture, and the 
increased hours of study allow students to receive Islamic studies certificates.  
About 274 public schools had adopted the program as of July 2008.1339 
 
In 2006, Bangkok sanctioned an experimental program where public school 
teachers used Jawi and Malay in the first two years of new students’ schooling to 
help explain their lessons.  After two years, teachers weaned students off these 
and onto Thai.  The government believes speaking Thai is necessary for students 
to be able to function in Thailand’s job market after graduation, but Jawi and Malay 
are necessary to lure Thai Malay Muslims into public school in the first place.1340 
 
The project began at 12 schools and expanded to 24 by October 2007.  It applied 
to primary schooling, a six-year program.  To date, the program has been 
successful.  Parents in the region urged Secretary General Kasama Varavarn na 
Ayudhya of OBEC to broaden it, hence the October expansion.  More, Thai Malay 
Muslims attendance at public schools increased and absentee went down.1341 
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Development 
 
Government agencies, the SB-PAC, and the RTA have launched scores of 
programs aimed at improving the far south’s economic plight.  These initiatives 
range from jobs and investment programs to agriculture support, import-export 
initiatives, and cash handouts to victims of the fighting.  As of June 2009, it is too 
early to tell if these programs are having an effect.  COIN development programs 
are rarely, if ever, decisive, but they provide the long-term foundation that can lift a 
population out of poverty and keep it from backsliding into mediocrity. 
 
Concerning investments, on 15 June 2007, the BoI said existing business in the 
far south would pay no taxes, and new projects applied for by 31 December 2007 
would have an eight-year tax holiday regardless of the value of their companies.  
The new investment rules were supposed to spur new investments.  From 2003-
06, a mere eight companies worth 2.42 million baht applied for BoI investment 
incentives in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.1342 
 
Pranai says: “We asked the government to instruct the finance ministry to facilitate 
tax incentives for the very wealthy to invest in the south, like for the top 10 richest 
bracket, so they can get a reduced tax rate if they invest...  We just submitted the 
plan to the government [March 2008], and the PM told the Finance Ministry to 
work it out.”1343 
 
The government continually talks about the IMT-GT as a way to expand the far 
south’s economic prowess and economically link it to similar cultures.  General 
Surayud in January 2007 attended the 2d annual IMT-GT meeting in the 
Philippines.  Surayud and Indonesian and Malaysian leaders agreed to a five-year 
roadmap and “flagship projects” to begin the project but provided no details.1344  
Despite all the talk, however, pushing it forward has been slow, the projects small.  
In May 2008, Thai representatives attended an IMT-GT conference in Bangka 
Belitung, Indonesia.  The conference was on insuring the authenticity of halal food 
products via labelling and the potential to expand halal food manufacturing 
between the three countries.  As of 2008, IMT-GT members included Thailand’s 
Narathiwat, Pattani, Satun, Songkhla and Yala provinces; northern Malaysia’s 
Kedah, Penang, Perak, Perlis and Selangor states; and Indonesia’s Aceh, North 
Sumatra, South Sumatra, West Sumatra, Bengkulu, Jambi and Riau provinces on 
Sumatra Island.1345 
 
Employment programs are yet another focus of government development projects. 
“Job programs,” says Pranai, “yes, as far as the economy in the area is 
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concerned, in the past four years, five years ago, there was no investment, not 
one real plan, no existing one, really.  The services industry down there is the 
hotel and restaurant business.  GDP in the south has dropped, purchasing power 
has fallen.”1346 
 
“So this caused a lot of problems,” explains Pranai,  
 
especially for those in need of jobs.  So what the government did in the 
past two to three years was hire those people who’ve been 
unemployed.  We have almost have 3,000 jobs that pay about 4,500 
baht a month, carried out through various channels, like the Labor 
Department, the army, ISOC, etc. [...]  “And we have other job 
programs, too, such as those in the rubber tapping industry, which is a 
part time job for a lot of people; they might also do security as their 
other part time job, and in that way, they can help protect the rubber 
plantations where so many have been killed.1347 
 
SB-PAC pays particular attention to the south’s sometimes-neglected fishermen.  
“Small fishermen,” says Pranai,  
 
maybe there are 300,000 from Narathiwat to Songkhla.  We are talking 
about the way to empower them to help themselves.  We talk about 
underemployment during the monsoon season when they cannot go 
out to sea and fish – it’s a seasonal industry.  We figured out some 
local jobs that they can do when they are not employed during 
monsoon.  They can make a secondary product from the sea like 
crispy snacks.  We are trying to upgrade to a higher quality so we can 
export these things to the Middle East as halal food.  We talk a lot 
about this.1348 
 
Pranai says it is hard to get people to invest in a war zone to create jobs, so, he 
says, “…we have to go out looking for jobs.  We’ve tried a program in the Middle 
East where we’ve trained a lot of people in Songkhla in oil the service industry – 
pipeline welding and things like that.  We’ve sent them to Oman, Bahrain, etc.”1349  
In May 2008, the SB-PAC announced it was recruiting for 200 jobs as pipe fitters 
at 20,000 baht a month plus benefits in Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and Oman.”1350  
Pranai continues, “We’ve also talked with Malaysia and worked out a cross border 
jobs program.  Yesterday, in fact [27 March 2008], we finished a training program 
where such people can go to Malaysia with grace and work professionally and not 
underground.”1351 
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Agricultural support is another area the government is pushing for the far south.  
The SB-PAC’s May 2008 program to help some farmers transition from rubber to 
rice cultivation had resulted in 424 tonnes of rice and enough income to keep 
those in the program from abject poverty.1352  Since the insurgency had prevented 
many farmers from cultivating rubber, their incomes were suffering and their 
plantations were failing from lack of care.  Rice, on the other hand, is easier to 
grow and was in high demand in 2007-08, resulting in good profits.  As a result, 
the SB-PAC provided funding and expertise to help farmers in five districts in 
Narathiwat transform 900 rai of abandoned rubber farms into rice paddies.  It 
aimed to transform 7,900 rai by August 2008.1353 
 
Health is another major area of importance.  While the SB-PAC has Ministry of 
Health (MoH) personnel on its roster, the MoH also has local health departments 
in each province it runs independently.  Its project for the area is called the Health 
Center Administration of the South.  They provide medical outreach care to locals 
who in the past needed health assistance but did not know the state could provide 
it.  They moreover cooperate with universities in the far south.  The MoH supplies 
the money and research.  It cooperates with universities in the south to expand its 
reach.1354 
 
Other than these specific programs, there are a host of scattered, smaller 
programs throughout the south.  Says a Thai soldier: “Every branch of government 
will have a development project.  They are not forced to set up a development 
project, but they try to apply the King’s concept.  For example, teachers, 
educational departments, etc., set up local educational programs, or they teach 
people how to grow vegetables at the schools they attend so they can eat them 
there at school for lunch and things like that.  They also do things like set up 
fishponds, take care of the fish, they feed the fish, and so then they can then feed 
the school.  Gardening, farming programs are done by the Department of 
Agriculture and at lower levels through the district governor’s local agriculture 
depts.  The Health Department uses lots of local volunteers to work for it and to try 
and combat, for example, dengue fever.  They spray ponds and jars of water to kill 
mosquitoes.”1355 
 
 
RTA CA 
 
Development was one of the first measures the government took when the war 
began.  In fact, the SBPPC’s development program was one of the first, if not the 
first, cohesive government COIN plan in the war.  Specifically, in March 2005, 
SBPPC spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Sanirote Thammayos announced its 250-
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tambon, 250-million baht development project was in full swing.  It had an 11-
person advisory board made of local leaders, including imams, to help propose 
needed projects such as irrigation.1356 
 
The RTA’s projects are usually small scale and impact villagers directly.  Each 
battalion has 20 CA personnel, including medics and doctors.1357  Says an RTA 
general, “We send medical teams into the villages, and we send some advisors to 
go out to help with their day-to-day living; some construction teams, some 
agricultural and animal husbandry experts to teach things like cattle and goat 
herding, fruit and vegetable farming.”1358  He hopes by reaching out to locals, the 
government will demonstrate it wants people to have better standards of living and 
that it understands their culture. 
 
RTA SF has CA programs, too.  It works through the RTA’s Civil Military 
Operations Center.  An SF CA officer says, “If a TF wants to operate in an area, it 
goes in and coordinates with district managers and police (and other district 
leaders), and it asks what the problems are of the whole group, sort of a mini 
conference or round table, and then they set up small centers to execute problem 
solving.  It’s worked well.  In Betong, Yala, the police, civilians, and army work well 
together.1359 
 
Current Fourth Army Commander (October 2009) Lieutenant General Phichet had 
put so much effort into development many in the south call him the “EM General” – 
EM standing for effective microorganisms.  It is a fertilizer his community center 
encourages southerners to use on their crops.  Located across from the Fourth 
Army and CPM headquarters at the Sirindhorn RTA camp in Yarang district, 
Pattani, locals visit daily to learn how to raise fish in homemade ponds, grow 
vegetables, and raise livestock.  Phichet’s experience as Second Army 
Commander helping Issan farmers provided him with the expertise to support the 
center.  It also doubles as a drug treatment center, and auxiliary force insurgents 
can turn themselves in there, undergo rehabilitation, and reintegrate back into 
society.  The center focuses on positive reinforcement and foregoes crime and 
punishment, so long as insurgents have not committed major crimes.1360 
 
An army medical technician says the RTA deploys Mobile Medical Teams into 
villages to provide health services to rural villagers who cannot travel the to 
hospitals.  He says, “We set up a medical clinic by working together with the local 
district and hospital staff and army staff.  We have nurses, dentists, etc., and a 
place to print and give out ID cards.”1361  Other government administrative 
personnel participate and run side programs.  “The villagers can get local 
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paperwork done there,” says the medical technician.  “The agriculture department 
brings good seeds to the villages.  Animal husbandry people get in and help and 
teach people how to improve local fruit and garden production.”1362 
 
The RTA also tells villagers to contact nearby army camps for development 
assistance when they need it.  In one case, swarms of mosquitoes made villagers 
sick with malaria, and they sent the nearby RTA medical staff a letter requesting 
help.  Says a medic, “Villagers used not to do this at all, but now they do because 
of the new approach the army has taken in the south.  If the army can solve it, 
then it does.  If not, then it gets another government office to do it.”1363 
 
Regarding the malaria problem, the army medics could not eradicate the 
mosquitoes.  So they contacted the malaria control unit of the MoH to spray the 
village and provide medicine.  They moreover informed the villagers every step of 
the way as part of a PR effort, and the problem was solved.1364 
 
The villagers sometimes do and sometimes do not appreciate government help.  
Says an RTA medic, “Some Muslim villagers come and say thank you for helping 
the kids, or for helping with drugs.  In these cases, they might give a glass of water 
and say thanks.  Before, they said nothing.  There is always a mix.  Some take the 
medicine and then leave quickly.”1365  The technician says, “Some programs, such 
as free food distribution, attracts some villagers.  But when the army doctors 
come, everyone shows up.  People like the doctors.”1366 
 
There are indications development is making an impact in the far south.  A former 
insurgent says eventually, the war took its toll, and he felt “only chaos and strain.”  
In 2008, government development personnel came to his village and, according to 
him, “showed their sincerity” through development projects.  The combination of 
pressure from war and government aid convinced him and anti-state villagers to 
give the government a chance and reject the insurgency, which is what 
happened.1367  In 2009, General Phichet told the press that troops deployed to 
villages, meaning security and CA forces, had proven so successful that 
insurgents were beginning to attack them in the villages, something not seen on a 
great scale in the past.1368 
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Royal Programs 
 
King Bhumibol’s development programs are a prolific now as in past COINs.  At 
his and the queen’s personal urging, the government began a Kampung Janda, or 
“Widow Village,” for women whose husbands were killed in the insurgency.  There 
are a few poor couples living there, too.  Some Malay speakers also call it 
Kampung Bujang (“Unmarried Widow.”)  It is reminiscent of Malaysia’s planned 
villages.  The Kampung Janda is located in Narathiwat near Kampung Rotan Batu.  
It consists of 124 homes inhabited by 300 women and children on 24 hectares of 
land.  The government did not want the far south’s widows to succumb to immoral 
occupations to make a living, and it did not want them to slide into abject poverty, 
hence the farm.  The army guards it.1369 
 
The women’s occupational choices include pottery, growing fruits, vegetables, 
rice, and/or mushrooms, and raising farm animals.  The government buses their 
children to school.  Women living there stay in houses better than what they lived 
in when their husbands were alive, and some make enough money to send their 
children overseas for their education.  They also are provided with dreg technology 
to turn cooking and other oils into motorcycle fuel – a bio-diesel project.1370  A 
widow and mother of a seven-year old told the press, “I had nobody to turn to after 
my husband died five years ago.  So when the authorities here asked me whether 
I wanted to stay here, I immediately agreed and I'm glad that I made that 
decision.”1371 
 
 
 * * * 
 
The Thai are applying many three pillars programs to the current COIN that they 
did in the past southern COIN.  This is especially true of security operations.  
Differences, however, include a dramatic increase in the number of security forces 
deployed, a better trained Ranger force that also conducts civil affairs, and 
inclusion of the public as early warning and attack prevention assets.  It has cut 
violence by approximately 40 percent. 
 
Politically, the government has reduced local election capacity to centralize control 
under village heads and governors.  Bangkok has also dramatically increased the 
number of Muslims in, or advising, local government, and insurgents have 
countered this apt move via widespread assassinations.  Bangkok has a quiet de-
radicalization program joined by Middle Eastern countries, but it appears to have 
lost control of the public relations realm and suffers heavy criticism for nearly all its 
policies.  Diplomacy wise, Thailand is fending off the OIC’s attempts to politically 
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co-opt the insurgents, a move that would empower them beyond Thailand’s 
control. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION: COIN THEORY ANALYSIS 
 
 
Below are an executive summary and the detailed final conclusions on the Thai 
way of COIN.  The executive summary provides a brief overview of the findings 
for overall Thai COIN theory and each component of the COIN Pantheon.  For 
the latter, the analysis start from the core research questions posed at the 
beginning of this study.  It builds on a comparison of each component of the 
edifice from each war to see what patterns might have emerged.  Following this 
analysis are comparisons of Thai COIN strategy and methods to the main 
theories of Galula, Thompson, and Kilcullen.  These help further illuminate the 
Thai way of COIN.  The chapter concludes with a summing up the Thai way of 
COIN – the answer to the final research question of this thesis. 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
COIN Theory 
 
Thailand uses strategy, coordination, security, politics, and economics to wage 
COIN.  Thailand seeks to understand its enemies and separate them from the 
population.  The Thai struggle to apply their COIN theory evenly in the face of 
internal political wrangling. 
 
COIN Strategy 
 
Thai COIN strategy aims to separate the insurgent from the people.  Politics 
leads COIN a majority of the time.  Force is just as critical and makes some 
political and economic programs possible.  Economic development is a 
constant.  The Thai believe co-opting the population into the fight is crucial, and 
it has political and development implications, too. 
 
COIN Coordination 
 
The Thai assert coordination of security, political, and economic operations are 
pivotal.  Though the Thai built coordination bodies for each COIN, they do not 
always translate seamlessly to the field because of internal turf battles. 
 
Security 
 
Destruction of the enemy’s forces and protection of the population are critical.  
Thailand uses a mix of military, police, and a wide array of local forces. 
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Politics 
 
Politics are supreme in COIN.  The Thai believe convincing the enemy to reject 
rebellion and rejoin society is a moral imperative, though they do so less with 
insurgents who use terrorism.  The Thai believe politically shaping the at-risk 
population is essential for separating the people from the insurgents.  The 
government will change itself to influence insurgents only piecemeal and as a 
last resort.  Diplomacy is essential to help isolate the insurgent from outside 
support. 
 
Economics 
 
Economic development of the at-risk population both at the village and 
enterprise level is dogma in Thai COIN, but they do not believe it is decisive.  
Rather, the Thai see it as an erosion tool that helps separate the people from 
the insurgency over time. 
 
Enemy 
 
Insurgent groups in Thailand varied in their goals from toppling the government, 
to autonomy, to secession.  Their size varied from national to regional.  All 
engaged in guerrilla warfare and some terrorism, but only the current insurgency 
is fully vested in killing civilians.  All insurgencies relied on outside sanctuary 
and material aid, and all of them harnessed enough of the population to 
maintain high functionality. 
 
At-risk Population 
 
All at-risk populations embroiled in insurgency in Thailand at least began with 
impoverished peoples ethnically different from the status quo Thai.  All 
experienced some measure of government neglect and endemic corruption. It is 
obvious the Thai use strategy, coordination, and the three pillars of security, 
politics, and economics to quell insurgency and stabilize the at-risk population.  
They have done so in three COINs spanning over 35 years, which resulted in 
victory in the first two cases, while they are still fighting the third.  None of these 
elements were evenly applied throughout, and there were internal faults such as 
power wrangling that kept the Thai from being more efficient, but the pattern is, 
nevertheless, clear.  Drilling down into these individual components reveals 
more about the Thai way of COIN.  Comparative listings help decipher Thai 
methods. 
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1. Strategy: What is the Thai strategic approach to COIN? 
 
 
Analysis 
 
These strategic COIN equations reveal definite patterns.  First, politics has led 
every successful Thai COIN strategy, the one exception being in 1994, when, 
for about three years, economics was the leading pillar.  Politics also leads the 
current COIN strategy with the king’s philosophy as doctrinal guidance.  The 
Thai use politics in the lead because they understand insurgency is people’s 
war, whether voluntary or coerced, and rarely do the insurgent army and its 
support element coagulate in the field.  They are scattered, nebulous, and hard 
to police.  Therefore, the Thai believe convincing the insurgent to put down the 
pistol, rifle, and propaganda chit and stop fighting is the best COIN tool they 
have.  Parallel, to this, in every COIN, they have also used diplomacy to isolate 
insurgents from foreign sponsors and sanctuary. 
 
Interestingly, the Thai did not put faith in politics at the beginning of the 
communist COIN; they had to learn the hard way its usefulness, but when they 
did, it became doctrine.  On the other hand, they applied politics to the southern 
insurgency as early as the 1960s, so they knew it was a logical COIN tool.  The 
Thai understood from the beginning of the 1980s-90s COIN the far south’s 
population was ethnically and religiously different from the rest of Thailand.  
These patterns indicate the Thai readily believe in using political measures in 
COIN to change people, to shape the at-risk population.  Having said this, the 
Thai are slow to change their political system in COIN to shape the at-risk 
population.  Changing the domestic political front in both the communist and first 
far south COIN (increased democracy in the former, more 
democracy/decentralization by the TAOs in the latter) took a more than a 
decade.  It should be noted in the two instances cited here, democracy post 
communist COIN did not take full root the way Prem initially proscribed, and 
insurgents took advantage of the TAO system to undermine decentralization 
and democracy. 
 
The second definite pattern is that every successful Thai COIN strategy has 
used aggressive and focused force except one.  In that case, economic 
development led the strategy during a lull in insurgent violence, and they 
decreased security.  The Thai brought it back, however, when insurgents 
attacked in force. 
 
Regarding force, it is clear the Thai believe destruction of the insurgents’ war-
making abilities is vital to protecting the state and the people.  It took them many 
years to merge the two concepts, however – destroying the enemy, which 
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includes pressuring the auxiliary force – while not damaging the at-risk 
population.  The concept was confusing at first because insurgent fighters, their 
auxiliary forces, and the at-risk population were mixed together, as they are in 
most insurgencies.  Conventional Thai military commanders in the late 1960s 
did not separate them.  They assumed an infected area meant the whole 
population was the enemy. 
 
But the Thai learned by the 1970s using indiscriminate force against this entire 
entity added to insurgent ranks by alienating the at-risk population.  The Thai 
realized they could apply aggressive military and police pressure against 
insurgents and their supporters so long it was focused – not necessarily surgical 
like the tactics of a hostage rescue team – but something between this and 
conventional warfare.  It required actionable intelligence, an understanding of 
the population (human terrain), good local diplomatic skills, and patience. 
 
Protecting the population has come late in two Thai COINs: the communist, war 
and the current one.  In the first case, security forces began with destruction of 
the enemy as their key goal.  In the second case, it was a combination of 
destruction of the enemy and doing nothing, a result of the executive branch’s 
meddlesome tactics and anti-government PR.  Thailand began its 1980s-90s 
southern COIN as it reformed its communist COIN, so population protection was 
by then doctrine.  Thailand otherwise learned the hard way via dead and angry 
and insurgent sympathetic citizens the supremacy of population protection. 
 
Development has been a constant aspect of Thai COIN strategy.  While the Thai 
have shifted the priorities of politics and security in their wining COIN formulas – 
albeit fleetly – they have kept development at a constant level in each COIN.  
They see it as an anchor of their strategy.  It is dogma.  The Thai believe 
uplifting the at-risk population from abject poverty is a moral imperative in a 
Buddhist sense.  They are loath to let the less fortunate whither on the vine once 
they understand it is a critical problem.  Unfortunately, Thailand has been late in 
discovering just how impoverished some of its population has been; witness 
General Prem hiking through Issan in the early 1970s and being astounded by 
its dilapidated conditions.  But once they discovered it, they smothered the 
affected people with aid programs, sometimes too many. 
 
Moreover, development is dual-use in Thai COIN: it is believed both to increase 
the standard of living of the poor and endearing the state to them.  But there is 
also a realisation that development is rarely decisive. 
 
Empowering the people through CPM programs is also a constant in every 
COIN, though many COIN practitioners in Thailand have put more emphasis on 
destruction of the enemy’s forces.  Regardless, empowering the people 
combines elements of politics, security, and development, but General Saiyud 
thought it important enough to separate it as an individual factor in his “COIN 
algebra.”  The people, after all, are the prize in COIN.  And the people 
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themselves are the battlespace just as much as the terrain is.  Insurgency 
happens in villages and homes, amongst families, and in neighborhoods.  The 
Thai believe in taking the fight to the enemy in these places and separating the 
insurgent “fish” from the popular “water.”  They have termed it in many different 
ways, to include “the villages surrounding the jungle,” which was the direct 
opposite of Mao and the CPT’s, “villages surrounding the cities,” and also 
“adding good fish to the water” to control, neutralize, and/or marginalize the “bad 
fish.” 
 
To put it another way, the people are a tool the insurgents steal to use against 
the state, and the Thai believe in stealing them back.  They steal them back by 
granting them political concessions, by development, and by putting weapons in 
their hands to fight insurgents shoulder to shoulder with state forces as local 
forces.  This is necessary for political reasons; nothing sends a political 
message to the opposition like a man shouldering a rifle and using it.  It means 
locals have taken ownership of the problem along side the state.  Development 
rounds out this “state theft.”  It either buys off locals with aid projects or truly 
convinces locals the Thai state cares. 
 
The Thai believe all these individual variables multiply together to generate an 
equation that aims to separate the people from the guerrillas.  The Thai aim to 
then arrest, rehabilitate, and/or kill the guerrilla.  Victory comes softly with little 
fanfare.  Most insurgencies fade instead of crashing in a single decisive wreck 
like a conventional army being routed on the battlefield.  In Thailand, some 
insurgents have gone to jail, especially if they committed acts of terror, but 
others teach, work for aid organizations, advise prime ministers, farm, or simply 
quit and fade back into society. 
 
 
2. Coordination: How do the Thai, if at all, coordinate COIN?  	  
 
 
Analysis 
 
An obvious pattern here is the Thai believe in coordinating COIN.  Even before 
the communist COIN broke out in earnest, the Thai fielded a coordination center 
to better marshal law enforcement resources against the then mostly political 
threat.  The subsequent iterations of CSOC and ISOC, plus the CPM programs 
in each conflict and the two SB-PACs, clearly demonstrate the Thai’s penchant 
for coordination.  Formation of SB-PAC for two wars shows the Thai learned 
from the uncoordinated and lacking political and development mess of the 
1960s-70s.  From their mistakes, the Thai gained a full understanding of the 
criticality of parsing out manpower, finances, and material resources. 
 
Regarding village approach, it seems the Thai were more methodical in the 
communist COIN than both the southern COINs.  General Saiyud described an 
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intricate village chain of command government forces worked through in order to 
co-opt villages into the fight.  For Thai Malay Muslim villages in the far south, 
because of cultural differences, the Thai seem to be more comfortable working 
through village heads than with multiple village leaders, though they do co-opt 
imams into government advisory panels.1372  The Pattana Santi program’s 
requirement of each soldier getting to know five villagers might demonstrate 
otherwise, however; the program is young and still evolving. 
 
On the other hand, despite such steadfast belief in coordination, the Thai also 
work against their own coordination systems.  This is not because they are 
poorly designed, but because of rivalries, turf battles, and personality conflicts.  
Such wrangling debilitates and stifles COIN, as it did from 1967-77 when the 
Army Regional Commanders disregarded CSOC’s authority.  But the Thai know 
this and tried with COINs in the far south to make coordination systems more 
robust and permanent via legislation.  They succeeded, but the defects in the 
Thai national security and political system still plague coordination.  If the Thai 
could overcome these problems, their COIN effectiveness might be 50 percent 
higher.  It seems certain characteristics of Thai command sometimes stifles 
precise Thai organizational logic. 
 
 
3. Security: What security programs – ranging from military to police to 
local forces (and intelligence throughout) – did the Thai apply to COIN? 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Security programs for each Thai COIN are nearly identical.  They all have the 
same missions, which include pressuring the guerrillas, physical security, 
population control, and village protection.  Thai intelligence operations are 
designed both learn about the enemy to feed planning and operations, and also 
to identify and turn the enemy.  They all use the same forces as well.  The RTA 
and all its regular and irregular forces was the lead security force in every COIN 
regarding force application (and strategy and coordination, for that matter.)  
Though the RTA technically cannot arrest suspects, it nevertheless conducts 
intelligence operations and raids.  For arrests, however, it ideally backs the 
TNP, when necessary. 
 
The main security difference between all these wars was the scope of 
operations.  For the communist COIN, it was countrywide; it not only took all of 
Thailand’s forces, it had to create new units to contend with the insurgency (and 
the threats that evolved from Cambodia and Vietnam).  For the 1980s-90s 
campaign, the threat was small enough the Fourth Army, regional police units, 
and local forces could handle it.  For the current COIN, the geographic area is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1372 Sascha Helbardt, interview by author, 6 September 2009, Arlington, Va, USA. 
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the same as the 1980s-90s COIN, but the scope of violence is astronomical, 
comparably.  This has forced Thailand to add military forces from other regions 
to the fray. 
 
While the TNP have been integral in every Thai COIN, its general lack of ability 
to adapt to insurgency and partial avoidance of COIN missions has rendered it a 
less than optimal COIN force.  The TNP overall performed well in the first COIN 
and marginally in the second two.  This is not to say it has been useless.  The 
BPP has been exceptionally capable regarding multiple COIN roles, and many 
patrolmen and investigators have helped collapse insurgent cells.  By and large, 
however, the police have had to upgrade themselves for two COINs – the 
communist war and the current one.  These were forced changes because the 
TNP’s performance was initially dismal.  The RTA has had to assume traditional 
TNP roles such as urban patrol in the current COIN, something that dilutes the 
former’s abilities. 
 
Special Branch, and to a lesser extent Thailand’s intelligence agencies such as 
the new DSI, proved pivotal in COIN campaigns by penetrating deep into 
insurgent cells and then collapsing them.  In some cases, Special Branch was 
able to influence the demise of command and control echelons.  All Thailand’s 
intelligence agencies well exposed the capabilities and intentions of insurgent 
groups.  However, except for Special Branch and Somchai Rakwijit's CSOC 
intelligence unit, Thai intelligence services have had to play catch up in COIN.  
When they finally did, however, they excelled beyond expectations.  Intelligence 
performance in the current COIN has yet to reach optimal levels, but it did, 
nevertheless, contribute to a 40 percent reduction in violence by late 2007. 
 
Local forces are a mainstay of Thai COIN.  Decried by a great many pundits, 
especially insurgents and anti-government types, the Thai put great faith in local 
forces, especially Thahan Phran and village security.  Whether reckless or 
surgical, they have proven decisive.  While the police and military support them, 
local forces are the tip of the spear regarding separating the insurgent “fish” 
from the popular “water” kinetically.  In each COIN, village security forces more 
or less are static, while the Thahan Phran have played the reconnaissance, 
intelligence, and hunter killer role.  The Thai put stock in these forces because it 
understands insurgency is local, so it must fight a local war.  The guerrillas are 
imbedded in the roots of the village, and the Thai root them out with troops that 
serve as the state’s guerrillas.  The Thai understand no rank and file soldier 
knows local geographic and human terrain better than a local.  And that 
knowledge is critical for victory, which means harnessing locals into the fight is, 
too.  After all, the insurgents do it; so does the Thai state. 
 
Just as guerrillas sometimes commit atrocities – especially in the current war – 
so have the government’s local forces.  Many Thai see aspects of insurgency 
and counterinsurgency as dirty and underhanded.  While this has caused 
considerable PR problems and in some cases worked counter to government 
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COIN programs, the Thai have not discarded their local forces.  They try to 
counter poor local force performance with better training and higher pay, which 
has been successful.  They also experiment with local force missions; for 
example, Thahan Phran in the current COIN have a significant CA role. 
 
 
4. Politics: What political programs and means – from the local, regional 
and national to the international levels,– did the Thai apply to COIN? 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Thai political COIN measures show both similar and different patterns from war 
to war.  Similarities across the board include psyops and PR, separating 
insurgents from sponsors outside Thailand via diplomacy, and enticing the 
enemy to stop fighting via amnesty.  These are definite Thai political COIN 
methods. 
 
Truce talks are a lesser pattern.  They were absent in the communist COIN.  
The Thai have tried talks with southern insurgents in the last two wars many 
times despite the fact none of them were productive.  Accordingly, the Thai 
penchant for talks might be true attempts to secure peace, or they might be 
intelligence-gathering missions, or both. 
 
A side pattern here is the lead of the RTA in these political programs.  With 
security operations, and absent a more effective police force, an RTA in the lead 
is expected, but not so with politics.  Still, the RTA has been the vanguard of 
many, if not most, political efforts listed here.  Other agencies such as the MoFA 
and Special Branch have played decisive roles, too, but the RTA seems to have 
overall ownership of Thailand’s most prolific non-military initiatives. 
 
Another pattern common to all COINs is better governance programs, but they 
seem to have been weak.  The results have not gone deep enough, nor have 
they lasted.  For example, better governance certainly improved Bangkok’s 
legitimacy in the communist COIN, but corruption and substandard performance 
persists in many places in Issan to the point Thaksin was able to exploit it, and, 
by using credit lending and other methods, created a staunch political base that 
has helped him destabilize the country from exile.  Likewise, such programs 
were supposed to correct gross negligence in the far south in the 1980s-90s, but 
they were not enough to help preclude a second war.  Complaints about 
government corruption and ineptitude in the southern border provinces 
continues in the present.  This is unfortunate for Thailand as bad governance 
has provided insurgents with anti-state fodder; it is an effective rebel rally cry. 
 
In each COIN, the Thai have sought to improve the government-people 
relationship via a wide array of tactical measures, including PR, psyops, village 
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security projects, and leadership training.  In the current COIN, the government 
is engaged in what is essentially population repair – correcting erroneous 
political, cultural, and religious perceptions fostered by government neglect, a 
poorly educated and gullible population, and insurgent propaganda.  
Government deficiencies such as corruption have enabled these, however.  The 
exact mix for each war always differed.  Bangkok’s main goal in this has been to 
establish legitimacy over the insurgents. 
 
Political and cultural and integration COIN measures have been unique to the 
far south.  They did little of this in the communist COIN because the most 
affected areas, such as Issan, while different from the iconic central Thai, were 
at least culturally similar to the Thai.  The one exception was the hill tribes, 
which the Thai tried to change by urging them to settle down in one geographic 
area and halt their nomadic lifestyles and ecologically ruinous slash and burn 
agriculture.  Hilltribe integration was only marginally successful.  Their 
citizenship status remains tenuous even in 2009, but their allegiance to the state 
stabilized. 
 
In the far south, integration programs were the mainstay of political COIN.  The 
government believed a swath of the population there was culturally and 
politically insular, which the insurgency used to nurture anti-state resolve.  The 
government was right.  The difference between Thai and Malay culture 
prevented many ethnic Malays from participating in the Thai Buddhist-designed 
state system.  This is not to say the state system was overbearing and 
prevented ethnic Malays from being Malay Muslims.  Thailand has a pluralistic 
society and government that accepts all religions.  There were a few exceptions 
for sure; a handful of political measures post WW II/pre-1980 urged ethnic 
Malays to shed their names, clothing, and the like, but these were nationwide 
programs aimed at every ethnicity in Thailand, and the government eventually 
scuttled these programs because they were counterproductive. 
 
Most of the time in the southern border provinces, it was sections of Malay 
Muslim society that rejected things that were not Malay and Muslim.  The radical 
section of this swath aimed for a pure Malay Islamic society.  Its purveyors 
promoted ultra conservative Islam as the only correct political, business, and 
educational model, and Malay as the only acceptable cultural identity.  
Unfortunately, such a society cannot survive without a more diverse 
employment sector, and Thailand recognized this and sought to change it via 
the education system without nullifying Malay culture and mainstream Islam. 
 
ISOC’s counter drug program is wholly unique to all Thailand’s COINs.  The 
insurgents use the drug culture and trade as a way to fund and control their 
movement.  The Thai use it as an avenue of approach to the youth and their 
parents to 1) keep children and teens off narcotics, and 2) demonstrate 
government legitimacy. 
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Regarding education, more and better quality schooling was the norm in the 
communist COIN.  Southern educational COIN programs for both wars, 
however, have aimed not only at improved education, but convincing the youth 
of state legitimacy.  This worked to a certain degree.  It helped increase 
government acceptance among Thai Malay Muslims and shaped a swath of 
them into a pro-state or neutral entity.  Poorly run programs, a lack of follow 
through, and exceptionally well-designed insurgent countermeasures have 
stifled more stellar outcomes, however. 
 
 
5. Economics: What economic programs – from the local, regional and 
national to the international levels – did the Thai apply to COIN? 
 
 
Analysis 
 
In every COIN, the Thai have run extensive anti-poverty programs at the village 
level.  The RTA has been the lead element in these because, in its security role, 
it has constant contact with the villages and can protect itself while on CA 
missions.  The RTA moreover perceives itself as protectors of the Thai people, 
and it follows the strategic intent of His Majesty the King, part of which is 
philanthropy for the poor.  The SB-PAC has taken on village level development 
in the far south, too, but in a less involved role.  Subsequently, royal aid projects 
have existed pre- and post-COIN, but they are especially vigorous during COIN. 
 
Likewise, in every COIN, there were agricultural aid programs, road building and 
infrastructure development, health initiatives, educational, and job 
creation/investment programs.  This is not simply because they seemed like 
good COIN programs, it is because the at-risk population genuinely needed 
them.  In short, Thailand, in every COIN, has had to nation build to a certain 
degree.   Despite its many modern amenities and highly functional national 
system, Thailand remains a developing country in certain regions and wrestles 
with associated problems.  These problems feed insurgencies and fester badly 
during war. 
 
Besides the RTA and SB-PAC, a hodgepodge of agencies has participated in 
COIN development projects, many with zeal.  This is interesting for a country 
with seemingly chronic pockets of poverty.  One would assume they would 
disappear with so many agencies involved. 
 
For sure, in each COIN, the Thai have tailored these variables for the realities of 
each conflict.  Job creation in the communist COIN was an issue, but more so in 
the 1980s-90s COIN – so much so that it plus enterprise industry was the lead 
COIN strategy in the mid-1990s.  More, education in the far south has meant 
more than just increasing opportunities for schooling as it did in the communist 
COIN.  It has aimed at shaping the population to embrace secular as well as 
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Islamic programs, so it can make a self-sustaining living and simultaneously 
retain its unique culture.  Job creation in the current COIN is more than 
employing people through enterprise investment; the government is seeking 
employment avenues at the local, regional, and international levels, too. 
 
 
6. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions: What have been the insurgent 
capabilities and intentions in Thailand’s COINs, and how has that shaped 
Thailand’s COIN efforts? 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Aside from the use of violence, each insurgency has been different.  Their 
ideologies and political goals have varied, substantially. This is interesting 
because Thailand has used strikingly similar methods to quell them – the first 
two, successfully. 
 
The only rooted similarities in all three insurgencies are they all used/are using 
classic insurgency tenets to push their movements forward; that is political 
subterfuge and guerrilla warfare.  They all used propaganda, psyops, and light 
infantry weapons and tactics, and they all relied/rely upon cross border 
sanctuary.  But these are the core of insurgencies.  The corresponding 
countermeasures are likewise similar.  From this variable, the differences in 
each insurgency expand. 
 
As for goals, the communists wanted to overthrow the government and replace 
it with a Maoist style regime, an idea initially spurred from outside forces, 
namely Beijing.  The first crop of southern border insurgents wanted 
independence and might have sued for benign autonomy had they been united.  
Besides, increased local political control seemed to weaken their movement.  Its 
ideas for rebellion came largely from within political, religious, and ethnic 
factions of society.  The current insurgency appears to want an independent 
Taliban style regime. Its ideas seem to come from a radical Islamic faction of 
society, although political power is an obvious motivator, too. 
 
Geographically, the communist movement spread from disaffected areas to the 
entire country, in part because of its prowess, and in part because government 
autocracy gave some in society no other choice but to embrace it.  The southern 
movements have restricted their secession to the border provinces, though the 
1980s-90s iteration struck Bangkok more than once and had bases in Malaysia.  
The current insurgency’s operatives have been arrested in other parts of 
Thailand and Malaysia. 
 
The communist insurgency was well organized, disciplined, and outwardly 
published its manifesto.  The 1980s-90s insurgent movement in the far south 
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was part criminal, part insurgent, and fractured into scores of groups.  Only the 
main groups such as PULO published demands.  The current movement 
appears singular in structure, but it is highly compartmentalized, maybe along 
old insurgent group lines.  Its leaders remain hidden, its manifesto only 
passively revealed by threat and anti-state propaganda.  
 
And while guerrilla warfare is common to all three movements, the first used 
terror sparingly; the second quite often, and the current movement uses it 
regularly.  Terror, to include grotesque body mutilation, is the latter’s primary 
method of violence.  The population is both prize and target.  The current 
insurgency bombs regularly, too.  Other movements used bombs, but not to 
excess.  The latter reflects a modern jihadist tactic perfected by insurgencies 
primarily in Iraq. 
 
 
7. Population’s Main At-risk Factors: What has been the situation of the 
at-risk population in Thailand’s COINs and how has their plight shaped 
Thailand’s COIN efforts?	  
 
 
Analysis 
 
In each case, the at-risk population was ethnically and culturally different from 
the ideal central Thai ethnicity, exceedingly poorer than the rest of the country, 
politically underrepresented, had substandard education systems, and, at the 
very least, was somewhat rebellious of Bangkok’s central authority to begin with.  
It should be noted, however, that only pockets of the far south are presently 
exceedingly poor, but unemployment is high. 
 
Issan had a particular sharp political independent streak.  The ethnic and 
cultural issue was especially strong regarding the hill tribes and the far south’s 
Malay Muslims.  And the latter is critical – Muslims in other parts of Thailand 
have no problems being a part of Thai society and being practicing Muslims.  It 
appears the Malay ethnic aspect is a key driver in the radical faction of the 
border society’s “us versus them” attitude.  It seems Malay Muslims think 
themselves “more Muslim” than Thai Muslims who have not adopted jihadist 
tendencies to a threatening degree.  All these issues made these populations 
vulnerable to insurgency.  Central government neglect and chronic maltreatment 
was another commonality amongst these groups, a tremendous feeder of their 
respective revolts in the first place. 
 
Then there are anomalies that show differences.  The entire Thai population 
became at-risk in the communist COIN because tyrannical government antics.  
The government de-legitimized itself by denying loyal political opposition, forcing 
people into the communists’ arms.  This did not come close to happening in the 
far south, though government critics abound.  And Thailand won over a swath of 
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the at-risk southern population in the 1990s, and the insurgents had to develop 
new tactics to bring to the surface at-risk factors that had been dormant or 
forgotten; things like historically skewed “Patani-Siam” animosity from the early 
1500s and the pre- and post-WW II period that created a revenge and “justice 
seeking” faction of the border population.  The communists molesting hill tribe 
Meo “savior lore” to endear tribes to “Meo Tse Tung” is similar.  Poor education 
and gullible villagers were factors here, too. 
 
A violent environment and drugs played a role in both southern insurgencies.  
Insurgencies can breed easily in high crime areas, the latter feeding the former.  
This was true toward the end of the 1980s-90s insurgency when the rebels 
came to rely on drug dealers for their fighters.  In the present, the line between 
the drug trade and the insurgency is blurry, especially regarding funding, 
thereby giving the current insurgency a Colombia-like narco-insurgency flavor. 
 
 
8. Comparative Analysis with Prominent COIN Theorists 
 
While it is well beyond the scope of this study to compare all Thai COIN 
methods to all the COIN theories of the multitudes of commentators, pundits, 
and authors that exist today, it is indeed useful to compare them to the counsel 
of some of the most prolific COIN theorists such as Galula, Thompson, and 
Kilcullen – all covered in the literature review.  These three are pertinent 
because Galula and Thompson, as previously stated, are the “anchor” COIN 
theorists, and Kilcullen is best known for building on their theories and arriving at 
a new COIN paradigm to meet modern asymmetric threats.  And by comparing 
Thai COIN methods to these authors, the Thai way of COIN can better be 
illuminated. 
 
The Thai indeed followed most of Galula’s COIN concepts, especially his 
strategic and operational concepts.  Galula said, from a strategic approach, the 
population was the prize in COIN because insurgency is political.  He also said 
ideology in COIN is more powerful than armaments, and analyzing the political, 
economic, and cultural aspects of the conflict area was vital to understand the 
nexus between the enemy and the people.  Galula moreover said isolating the 
insurgent from outside political and military support was critical to victory.  All 
this was imbedded inn his axiom, “A revolutionary war is 20 percent military 
action and 80 percent political.” 
 
The Thai have applied all of these.  To be sure, they did not do so from the 
beginning of all their COINs; it took them nearly 15 years to use this approach in 
the communist COIN, for example, a direct result of dominant field commanders 
applying enemy centric methods over the protests of COIN-minded strategists.  
But when the Thai did follow these Galula ideals, their COIN campaigns were 
effective.  The Thai certainly made the population the prize in their 66/2523 plan 
to defeat the CPT, and it was likewise with the Tai Rom Yen plan for the far 
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south.  The current COIN in the far south also puts the population as the prize, 
even to the point population control – checkpoints, for example – have been left 
a little lax as not to pressure the population too much, so say government 
officials in Bangkok. 
 
As for ideology, the Thai fully understand its usefulness as a COIN tool, and in 
the communist COIN and the 80s-90s COIN in the south, they made it one of 
their main weapons.  This is evidenced by their a) making political space for the 
politically disenfranchised – providing more freedoms to its citizens in the 
communist COIN and political parties for southerners, and b) making a 
competing political movement against the communists via the Village Scouts 
and integrating locals into SB-PAC programs in the south.  In today’s COIN, the 
Thai are still ramping up their political programs, but the SB-PAC concept is in 
use, and the prime minister in 2011 received legal authority to personally direct 
it, which will enhance its civilian and political emphasis.  The latter will include 
increased anti-jihad counseling at the local level. 
 
All these mesh with understanding the local population and culture in order to 
comprehend the population-insurgent nexus.  The Thai strive to achieve this.  In 
the CPT COIN, they applied Somchai Rakwijit’s village intelligence program to 
seek information into this realm.  In the 80s-90s COIN in the south, they did this 
through the SB-PAC, RTA human intelligence, and like outreach programs.  In 
the current war, it is again the SB-PAC, but it has gotten a slow and 
cumbersome start.  It should be noted here that excellent COIN concepts on 
paper are just that – concepts on paper.  They are nothing without full and 
effective application on the ground by competent, understanding, and 
enthusiastic people. 
 
As for Galula’s “four laws of COIN” listed in the literature review, as it refers to 
his strategy for pacification, the Thai have certainly followed them.  Regarding 
the first law, the Thai have realized the importance of, and tapped, support of 
the population in COIN.  Witness their wide ranging political programs meant to 
bring the population to its side in each war, and also their extensive use of local 
forces to fight insurgents and secure the population.  Regarding the second law, 
the Thai have also sought support through an active minority in each war.  
Specifically, their village programs, the local level of the CPM program in 
particular, have always been applied in friendly areas first and then branched 
out to the more contested areas.  Regarding the third law, the Thai have learned 
the hard way support from the population is indeed conditional.  In the CPT 
COIN, for example, scores of villages rejected RTA CA assistance until troops 
helped harvest crops and the like, which proved their sincerity.  Only then did 
certain villages accept the CPM concept.  In the south in the 1990s, insurgents 
who surrendered were harassed by corrupt police and ended up returning to the 
fight until Special Branch commissioner Somkiat insured their post surrender 
safety in through the Ptiak Tai plan.  Regarding the fourth law, the Thai have 
indeed – once they achieved effective strategy, coordination, and leadership – 
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applied intensity and vastness of means to their COIN efforts.  For the CPT 
COIN, once Kriangsak and later Prem took over the effort, they applied a whole 
of country effort to the problem, not just by using all the state’s resources, but by 
expanding them – building the 12,000-strong Thahan Phran, for example – and 
uniting it all under as much intellectual capital they could muster.  This latter 
point included the surge of democracy and easing of harsh domestic conditions 
such as poor wages, shrunken political protest outlets, and freedom of the 
press.  In the far south, the Thai have done the same by applying all regional 
assets to the fight – the entirety of Police Region 9, for example, and the all 
encompassing political-economic and security entities of the SB-PAC that was 
designed to carry out its mission via set policies regardless of who was in power 
in Bangkok.  There is a like effort happening in the current war in the south, and 
the Thai have even created a new division, the 15th, to be permanently stationed 
there. 
 
Regarding Galula’s pacification strategy, the Thai have more or less followed his 
eight-step program that can generally be encapsulated as clearing and keeping 
enemy forces from a given area; integrating COIN efforts with locals, including 
improving their administrative and leadership capabilities; and rooting out local 
insurgent shadow government institutions and personnel. 
 
This can best be highlighted by the use of the CPM concept in every war, 
though it was poorly applied in the early years of the communist COIN.  CPM in 
the 1980s-90s worked well enough in the south to hold the line against the 
insurgents, but it did not help improve the population’s local government to a 
significant degree.  Nor did CPM link the population enough to the central 
government to a stabilizing degree.  Accordingly, there is weakness in the Thai 
execution of these particular Galula tenets in the far south, especially in the 
current war.  This is particularly true of Galula’s third and fourth steps of his 
eight-step strategy: “Establish contact with the population, control its movements 
in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas;” and “Destroy the local insurgent 
political organizations.”  Difficulties here, again, stem from not knowing local 
culture well enough to prevail.   
 
As for assets and coordination, the Thai indeed follow Galula’s basic structure – 
that COIN needs to be done by an array of military, police, and civil servants, 
because co-opting the population requires a balance of security, socio-political, 
and anti-poverty and investment programs.  All aspects of the Thai government 
have been involved in all its COIN efforts, including the military, which has 
traditionally led these affairs, and all ministries, including agriculture, education, 
interior (another key actor), and health.  And the Thai have coordinated them all, 
as Galula prescribes, under a unified command.  But individuals and 
bureaucracies also push back against these united commands in Thailand.  
Under Prem against the CPT and under Harn in the far south against insurgents 
there – all in the early 1980s – was perhaps the only time when Bangkok’s 
COINs were truly united as single, well-coordinated efforts.  All other COINs 
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have been united on paper, but government rivalries – the RTA vs the MoI in the 
1990s in the south, for example – always hurt COIN.  In this case, as mentioned 
in Chapter 2, the MoI took over COIN in the south, and the RTA, perceiving its 
command usurped, disengaged, and security suffered because of it.  In the 
current war, apparent turf rivalries have kept the RTA and the SB-PAC less than 
coordinated, and political-economic efforts have been half hearted. 
 
As for Galula’s “adaptation of minds” concept, the Thai indeed adapted their 
approach to defeat the CPT on a massive scale in the 1980s.  To be sure, the 
CSOC and CPM concepts of the 1960s and the innovative Thahan Phran 
program were adaptations, but it took Kriangsak’s wide ranging political and 
security programs of the late 70s and Prem’s total domination of coordination in 
the 1980s for adaptation of minds to fully take root.  Only then – when the top 
leadership imposed a new mentality on the RTA, civilian leadership, and the 
country – could mass amnesty, surge democracy, and a high quality village 
security program proliferate and succeed.  But it did not happen overnight.  
Kriangsak, Prem and his exceptional second in command General Harn, and 
other innovators such as Chavalit, had seen their country suffer under 
insurgency, poor civilian and military leadership, and bad economic conditions, 
so changed the downward slide of the country based on national survival. 
 
The Thai, via General Harn, applied this new COIN minded in the far south, and 
others in the Fourth Army area, seemingly influenced by their astute 
predecessors and also spurred by their own experiences, were likewise 
innovative – General Kitti, for example.  And when the far south went into 
dramatic decline in 1997 under the Falling Leaves campaign, the entire civilian-
military establishment adapted, handing most of the war over to the RTA, which, 
using a combination of intelligence, PR, focused force, and diplomacy with 
Malaysia, defeated the insurgents.  The police and SB-PAC camp, however, 
were pivotal in making this happen as well, particularly via a renewed and 
improved amnesty program run by Special Branch.  So in sum, the RTA and the 
civilian faction switched roles in the late 90s because the region’s stability was in 
sharp decline.  They were forced to adapt by dire circumstances, much like in 
the CPT COIN. 
 
Adaptation of minds in today’s COIN has been slow.  The Thai have applied 
classic COIN methods and increased security has indeed brought violence 
down, but they have been slow to incorporate deep cultural knowledge of Malay 
Muslim villages into their operations, which is an old problem in the far south.  
On the other hand, the Thai are beginning to implement counseling against 
radical Islamic ideology that fuels much of the area’s violence.  Similarly, they 
have tapped into anti-drug programs for the far South’s youth to firstly curb 
rampant drug use and secondly to improve the relationship between the people 
and the government.  This demonstrates an innovative approach to COIN by 
attacking an insurgency contributor indirectly. 
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Regarding Galula’s advice for security operations – mobile strike forces and 
static occupying forces working in tandem to continually pressure insurgent 
forces – the Thai have done this in every war.  Witness the RTA and police 
implementing population control while using Thahan Phran and Special Forces 
in DA roles in each COIN demonstrated here.  And, as Galula suggested, the 
Thai have applied PR and psyops along with force application operations to 
convince insurgents to give up while simultaneously assuring the population the 
government was there to uplift and protect them.  
 
Where the Thai and Galula differ is two fold.  First is in his strategic advice not to 
mimic the insurgent.  Galula says it is a trap and a formula for failure.  But if one 
views Thailand’s winning COIN schematics on a wide scale, it appears they do 
indeed mirror their enemies.  Take the CPT, for example.  When the Thai fought 
it using conventional methods, they failed.  In contrast, when the Thai met the 
CPT’s guerrilla tactics with RTA SF and Thahan Phran guerrilla tactics, when 
they met the CPT’s political infiltration and organization with the Village Scouts, 
and when they met village infiltration with the village security programs, they 
were victorious.  Similar patterns emerge from the war in the south in the 1980s-
90s with force application mentioned here and also when insurgents leveraged 
Malay Muslim identity to separate the people from the state, and the Thai 
mirrored their enemy with political inclusion programs.  Similar scenarios are 
playing out in the current insurgency in the south with the government 
countering radical Islam with state sponsored counseling and lobbying the OIC 
to not recognize the insurgents as insurgents petition for global Muslim and 
international recognition. 
 
The second place where Galaula and the Thai disagree is civilian control over 
COIN.  Civilians did not run COIN well in the 1970s, they did not do an effective 
job in the late 1990s in the far south via the MoI, and Thaksin faired worse in the 
current war, which was part of the reason for overthrowing him.  In fact, the RTA 
successfully managed Thailand to victory in the first two COINs, and it managed 
to decrease violence in the far south by approximately 40 percent in the current 
war.  Having said this, the old school faction of the RTA ran a shoddy COIN 
campaign in the 1960s, ignoring their subordinate and innovative COIN-minded 
thinkers to the country’s severe detriment.  And in the current war, in order for 
the SB-PAC to function effectively, it seems it needs to be under civilian control, 
something PM Abhisit recently achieved.  How this plays out in the field will be 
another story. 
 
Thompson’s COIN advice is more detailed than Galula’s, and it is evident the 
Thai have followed much of it.  Regarding Thompson’s five leading principles 
stating what a government must do in COIN, the Thai have done the following 
once they established their winning strategies: 1) have had clear political aims, 
2) functioned according to the law, 3) had overall COIN plans, 4) gave priority to 
defeating political subversion, and 5) secured government controlled areas first 
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and systematically moved into guerrilla controlled areas thereafter.  Thai 
compliance with issues 1, 3, 4, and 5 were made clear under the Galula section.   
 
Issue 2, functioning according to the law, is a key Thai COIN approach for 
certain.  Critics say the Thai pass any COIN law (or any law, for that matter) that 
suits whoever is in power – not always true because of the complex law-
designing and pre-vote maneuvering that goes into Parliament passing or killing 
a proposed law.  But pre-ordained or not, the Thai are aware of the procedural 
formalities of a constitutional nation state, and they do see laws as a way of 
achieving either perceived or genuine government legitimacy.  For example, to 
make operations against communist guerrillas illegal, the government passed 
multiple Anti-Communist Acts in 1933, 52, 69, and 79.  This does not mean they 
were not controversial to critics, but it does mean the Thai sought legal cover, 
and, therefore, legal legitimacy, for what they were doing.  And each of these 
laws allowed the government to establish COIN institutions and enact prime 
minister orders to address specific insurgency issues.  The Anti-Communist Act 
of 1969, along with PM order No. 219/2508 for example, made CSOC legal.  It 
also made law the 110/2512 COIN strategy, but the Army Area generals ignored 
it, conjuring up Denny Lane’s admonition about laws in Thailand that there are 
“relationships and suggestions,” not laws as understood by Western standards.  
But modern times are changing Thailand, ever so slightly. 
 
Regardless, there are many other examples of the Thai using laws in COIN to 
achieve legitimacy.  General Kriangsak, who took over by coup in 1977, enacted 
a law in 1978 releasing the “Bangkok 18” student protestors.  He moreover 
formulated a new constitution by 1978 and brought back parliament in 1979, all 
as legal weapons to achieve more legitimacy in the eyes of the Thai citizenry 
than the CPT.  Additionally, the 66/2523 plan to defeat the communists was a 
PM order but also sanctioned by the Cabinet.   
 
From the 1980s-90s COIN in the south, there are several examples of the Thai 
using the law to apply COIN measures such as the TAO Act of 1997 and PAO 
Act of 1997.  They also put Thai Malay Muslims into parliament via the New 
Aspiration Party and the Wahdah Party – here a move to achieve legitimacy in 
the far south by making locals actual lawmakers.  More, the PM’s office had to 
officially ordain the Pitak Tai plan via PM Order No. 127/2541 in 1998 to make 
that strategy and its operations legal.  Similarly, in the current war, the 
government passed versions of the ISA 2007 and 08 to make legal Bangkok’s 
flexibility in applying security methods to border province areas in revolt. 
 
The Thai surely follow Thompsons’ theory of harnessing the three key 
influences on a population: “Nationalism and national policies, religion and 
customs, material well being and progress.”  They have used these sentiments 
to rally the nation to undercut insurgent sentiments such as when Kriangsak 
took oppressive policies off the population, brought outspoken students back 
into the national fabric – a very popular move – and increased minimum wage.  
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Prem followed by rallying the nation around what is generally thought to be 
Harn’s democracy surge throughout the country.  Even the Thahan Phran used 
the motto, “nation, religion, king, citizens,” a direct appeal to their ranks’ sense 
of nationalism and protectionist nature.  The Village Scouts were the 
embodiment of the political aspect of Thompson’s sentiments. 
 
In the 1980s-90s COIN in the far south, the Thai focused on bringing Malay 
Muslims into the national fold via specially formed political parties, via teaching 
secular subjects at pondoks, by incorporating Malay Muslims into advisory 
positions at SB-PAC, through CA at the village level, and enterprise investment 
at the regional level.  Similar programs are happening in the current conflict in 
the far south.  The include more secular pondok reform, teaching Islam in public 
schools to attract higher attendance from Malay Muslims, and encouraging 
moderate Islam as a proper societal code of conduct as opposed to takfir based 
Islam. 
 
As for Thompson’s theories on good governance being pivotal in COIN to 
strengthen legitimacy, the Thai have tried to do so in all its COINs and 
understand its importance, but corruption has plagued these efforts. CPM has 
been and remains part of this good governance effort, especially the aspect 
training village leaders in effective management and administration.  Getting rid 
of corrupt police and local administrators in the hinterlands such as the forestry 
officials who used to elicit bribes from the Hmong was key in proving to tribal 
people the government was legitimate.  Kriangsak’s national level improvement 
efforts were likewise, and Prem’s direct line to the SB-PAC in the far south in the 
1980s was, too.  Police who harassed former insurgents who re-entered society 
via amnesty in the 1990s sullied these efforts and was one reason the 
insurgency flared in the late 1990s.  Conversely, Police Commissioner 
Somkiat’s correction of these particular transgressions was a reason the 
insurgents reversed course yet again and took amnesty post Falling Leaves.  
The current war in the south has likewise seen attempts by Bangkok to 
implement better governance with General Sonthi’s apology to all the south for 
suffering poor treatment, the reinstitution of the SB-PAC, the royal-sponsored 
Widow Farms, the RTA’s prolific vocational training programs, and the attempt 
to weed out lackluster civil servants.  But the problem of poor governance 
remains in this region, according to Pattani Senator Anusart’s 2009 statement to 
the press (previously stated):  “What we need is not autonomy but good 
governance and transparency.  Even Muslims are clamoring for good 
governance.  There is already decentralization – 60 to 70 per cent of the budget 
is in the hands of local officials – but that is meaningless without good 
governance.” 
 
The Thai would also agree with Thompson’s – and Kitson’s, for that matter – 
emphasis on intelligence.  Witness Somchai Rakwijit’s intelligence operations to 
understand Thai village life and how it was juxtaposed with the CPT.  The Thai 
also expanded Special Branch to fight the CPT and moreover had the DCI/NIA 
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on the case as well, plus CSOC’s JSC intelligence network.  Through all this, 
the Thai were able to understand the human terrain of the insurgent battlespace, 
the CPT’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the key insurgent players 
involved at national, regional, and local levels.  They had achieved intelligence 
mastery of the CPT by the late 1970s. 
 
In the far south in the 80s-90s, the RTA and Special Branch, the latter housed at 
SB-PAC, had exceptional intelligence on the insurgents as well.  The RTA in 
particular had an amazing human intelligence network that security personnel 
still marvel over in the present.  So well plugged in was the RTA in the far south 
that Thaksin sought to destroy this network in the 2000s to dampen rival 
influences.  In the current war, partly because of Thaksin’s dismantling of these 
networks, the RTA is paying catch up regarding intelligence, and the police and 
Special Branch are both ramping up their activities in light of the PM directly 
assuming control of SB-PAC.  All three entities have informants, and they have 
captured and/or killed scores of insurgents as a direct result of good intelligence.  
But they have yet to achieve intelligence mastery of the human terrain or the 
enemy. 
 
The Thai are for certain in agreement with Thompson on information services.  
They have used this to entice insurgent surrenders in all three wars, and it 
worked to wondrous effect against the CPT, good effect against the insurgents 
of the 80s-90s in the south, and in the current war, it is a work in progress, but 
the program is there.  Regarding psyops, the Thai have applied this in all three 
wars, too.  It was particularly effective against the CPT, especially when the 
government had survivors of Pol Pot’s regime speak about the side of 
communist revolution not addressed by the CPT.  Psyops in the 80s-90s by the 
SB-PAC was more subtle with signs and billboards and the like, but it was most 
effective at the personal level by coopting government friendly imams and 
having them influence the villages.  At present, the Thai are generally following 
the 80s-90s psyops game plan, though countering radical Islam will require 
additional efforts.  And while the Thai believe in effective pro-government PR, 
they have not done too well at it in the current war.  They appear to have let the 
insurgents and NGOs command the information sphere to avoid being seen as 
a harsh, dictatorial, Muslim hating regime as they have been painted in the anti-
Bangkok press pool. On the other hand, the Thai have made good progress 
touting their Widow Farms and Fourth Army Commander vocational training 
programs. 
 
The Thai also generally followed Thompson’s operational concepts, which are 
similar, if not the same, as Galula’s.  Thompson describes them as clear, hold, 
winning, and won.  For certain, the Thai have sent military forces onto enemy 
held areas to clear them of main force insurgent assets, and then established 
CA and more involved economic programs while simultaneously implementing 
wide ranging political programs to integrate disaffected populations.  The Kaho 
Kho campaigns of the 1980s clearly typify theses types of operations. 
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Village security has been a linchpin of these operations as well, which meshes 
100 percent with Thompson’s strategic hamlet method of villages and smaller 
subdivisions having internal defense or police measures to clear out insurgents 
and keep them out. This is most typified by Thailand’s CPM concept.  
Interestingly, in the clear-hold vein, Thompson said state guerrilla forces were 
necessary to root out deeply penetrated insurgents.  He described them as the 
state’s fiercer tomcat going after the guerrilla’s tomcat.  The Thai describe it as 
getting a gangster to go after a gangster. 
 
The Thai disagree with Thompson in two areas.  First, like Galula, Thompson 
says COIN should be a civilian run affair by a war council or cabinet headed by 
a civilian who understands COIN and the military-civilian nexus of it all.  While 
there have been civilians who have well understood COIN, PM Chuan Leekpai, 
for example, the RTA has decisively run Thailand’s COINs in every case.  The 
SB-PAC has been a civilian-run affair since its inception, but it has to contend 
with the RTA in the far south.  Sometimes they cooperate well, and sometimes 
not.  PM Abhisit in 2011 oversaw the passing of a new law to put the SB-PAC 
directly under the PM’s command as it was under Prem in order to have more 
influence over its operations and to give it more power.  This is in line with 
Thompson, but it is not the norm. 
 
The second Thompson tenet the Thai disagree with is balance of forces.  
Thompson says COIN is largely a police affair and the military should be 
subordinate to them and civilians unless the security situation is too unstable 
and the terrain inhospitable to police forces.  In Thailand, the RTA has always 
been the largest COIN force in the field.  The police have rarely been up to the 
task of COIN because the force as a national entity has not seen it as its 
mission.  There have been exceptions such as the latter portion of the CPT 
COIN when the nation’s survival was at stake.  In this case, the police 
cooperated well with the RTA, especially regarding the CPM concept as it linked 
to village security.  And even while Special Branch and the police have at times 
been major assets in the COINs in the south, they have taken a back seat to 
RTA intelligence. 
 
Regarding Kilcullen’s modern COIN theories, the Thai have not adopted his 
tenets on any great scale.  For certain, they apply some of his “Twenty-eight 
Articles,” but not so much his disaggregation theory.  Still, there are similarities 
among Thai and Kilcullen approaches. 
 
Again, while disaggregation is not in the Thai COIN vernacular, “management” 
is.  And Kilcullen says one of the outcomes of disaggregation is a conflict 
dampened down to an acceptable situation advantageous “to us,” or in this 
case, the Thai.  History shows that the Thai, despite wrestling with the far south 
for decades via scores of effective and ineffective COIN programs, is unlikely to 
give up the region.  It is a country fiercely jealous of its borders and, unless a 
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non traditional Thai takes over the government and changes this border custom 
in favor of a business minded, “stock loss cutting” mentality, the Thai will 
continue to manage the cantankerous region for the foreseeable future.  Based 
on its track record, then, Thailand seems content to manage the South’s 
rebellious streak.  More, even Dr. Arun, the former Thai diplomat quoted in 
previous pages, said of the far south, “That is why our policy is to manage it.  If 
we cannot solve it…we can manage it.”  But the Thai would not call this “modern 
COIN” theory.  They have been managing the far south for decades. 
 
Regarding the “Twenty-eight Articles,” the Thai acknowledge issues such as 
“know your turf,” “diagnose the problem,” “organize for intelligence,” “organize 
for inter-agency operations,” “find a political/cultural adviser,” “have a game 
plan,” and “avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions.”  Most of these have 
been covered previously, but it is interesting to note “diagnose the problem” is 
also the King’s COIN guidance for the current war in the far south, and “find a 
political/cultural adviser” has been part of the SB-PAC’s standard operating 
procedure since its inception.  “Avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions” 
became key especially after the Tak Bai massacre of insurgents and their 
sympathizers, certainly a knee jerk response, after being detained for rioting at a 
police station. 
 
The Thai struggle with other advice from the “Twenty-eight Articles” in their 
current COIN.  For example, “Train the squad leaders – then trust them,” is hard 
for the Thai to do with conscripts but easier with professional SF troopers.  
“Rank is nothing: talent is everything” is wholly against Thailand’s reverence for 
rank and status.  It supersedes talent.  “Remember the global audience” is 
something the Thai have been able to ignore for decades, but with globalization 
of communications and information, it now must contend with a faction of the 
ummah and the OIC that believes Bangkok is targeting Muslims out of hatred or 
is using the fake specter of hatred to fuel the current insurgency.  As for “local 
forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves,” the Thai inn the far south have 
yet to establish on a wide scale a truly effective village security force that mirrors 
the enemy because of a lack of understanding of Malay Muslim culture.  The 
Thahan Phran, especially the local ones, somewhat remedy this.  The Thai 
indeed followed “fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces” in the CPT COIN 
once Kriangsak and Prem’s policies took root, and their political-economic 
strategies in the far south in the 80s-90s set the insurgency up for a knockout 
blow with Pitak Tai in 1998.  In the present war, the Thai are fighting the 
enemy’s strategy, but without understanding the local culture to a masterful 
degree, their effectiveness will continue to muddle along at a mediocre pace.  In 
line with this, “build your own solution – only attack the enemy when he gets in 
the way,” requires the Thai take the initiative across a security, political, and 
economic front, something they have not been able to do to a dominant degree 
as of yet.  The Thai, in short, remain on the defensive, even with a reduction of 
southern border violence by 40 percent. 
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As for Kilcullen’s theory that the state may be faced with “resistance insurgency” 
that seeks not a state but an idea, this does not wholly apply to the current war.  
The southern insurgents do want an independent state in the classic sense – 
they say so repeatedly in their propaganda and indoctrination.  In this regard, 
they are a classical insurgency.  In a modern COIN sense, however, they have 
not exposed their leadership, and their organization remains highly 
compartmentalized – just like many modern jihadi movements in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  And they certainly use jihadi issues as motivators to spur the 
population and their fighters without a clear definition of what an independent 
“Patani” state might look like.  So the current southern Thai insurgents include 
elements of both modern and classical insurgencies.  Probably because of this 
and Thailand’s tradition of following classical COIN methods, the Thai have not 
adopted disaggregation methods and a return to normalcy asserted by Kilcullen.   
 
Nor have the Thai called the far south an “insurgent ecosystem.”  They do 
realize, however, that there are complex dynamics at work in the far south, such 
as the region’s ethnic, religious, economic, and familial connection with 
Malaysia’s northern states, the movement’s educational connectivity to schools 
in the Middle East (some of them radical Islamic), and its political connection to 
the OIC.  The Thai also see its connection to the local and regional drug trade.  
And the Thai have vigorous programs to deal with all but the first.  Thailand has 
no physical operations to seal off the insurgency from Malaysia, just diplomacy.  
This worked in defeating the insurgents in 1998, but only until several 
embarrassing incidents over a few years regarding the capture and detention of 
scores of Thai Malay Muslim insurgents with weapons and/or explosives in 
Malaysia.  It is not apparent the Thai and the Malaysians have a strategic 
understanding regarding the insurgency, but the Indonesians seem to be 
leaning in that direction as evidenced by their struggle with JI and its possible 
undercurrent connections (training and ideology, perhaps) with fighters in the 
south such as RKK. 
 
As for Kilcullen’s seven modern COIN tenets, the Thai are engaged in many of 
them.  Regarding “…the side may win which best mobilizes and energizes its 
global, regional and local support base – and prevents its adversaries doing 
likewise,” again, the OIC example demonstrates the Thai are engaged in this 
realm. The Thai did the same via negotiations with China regarding the CPT and 
with Malaysia regarding PULO and like rebel groups in the 1990s.  The same 
can be said for the Thai following Kilcullen’s advice that a security force’s “area 
of influence” may need to go regional and even global, which the Thai have 
done – again, via RTA and civilian government diplomacy with China, Laos, and 
Cambodia regarding CPT; with Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt regarding the 
80s-90s war, and also with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Middle Eastern countries in 
the current war. 
 
As for the security force controlling a complex “conflict ecosystem,” again, the 
Thai have not called it that but realize in the current war the drug trade’s nexus 
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with the insurgency.  This spurred an ISOC counter narcotics program to deal 
with the issue, especially regarding youth education.  The Thai moreover 
comprehend the intricacies of local politics – voting for imams and TAO officials, 
for example – and how these democratic processes actually suck insurgents 
into the polling process over local power and money.  This is one reason of 
several the government reduced local democratic institutions in 2006. 
 
Regarding common diagnosis of the problem, in the current war, Thailand’s 
government remains divided on a lot of the root causes and remedies.  The 
members of the former NRC, for example, saw the war as ethnic and cultural 
issues, while certain members of ISOC see jihad – based on jihadi propaganda 
and indoctrination – as an additional and significant motivator of the movement.  
Former NRC members have reach within the government and can influence 
policy, and their diagnoses and solutions, such as sending unarmed formations 
of guards to assert stability, bolster anti-Bangkok sentiment. 
 
As for modern COIN possibly being 100% political, this does not apply in the far 
south.  Whereas Islamic sentiment in the global ummah seems to generally be 
against Bangkok, which significantly boosts the insurgent cause, the war indeed 
is a shooting, bombing, light infantry, and decapitating war.  But Kilcullen’s 
assertion that in modern COIN, permanent containment in lieu of victory might 
be the solution is a real possibility in the far south.  The war has existed in many 
forms for decades and, as long as there is jihadi sentiment there, sanctuary in 
Malaysia, and moral support from Islamic states, the war, even in a purely 
political sense, can continue.  And in this case, the possibility of a pure terrorist 
group emerging from the fight is indeed possible. 
 
As far as secret intelligence possibly mattering less than situational awareness 
is concerned, this does not apply in the far south.  Special Branch and human 
intelligence operations by the RTA are vital to identify and capture or kill key 
insurgents.  It is evident, however, from many Thai troopers being killed in the 
same manner over and over again – being bombed repeatedly at rest stops and 
breakfast areas at markets, for example – that many RTA units have not at all 
achieved situational awareness.  This needs to be changed in order to gain the 
initiative. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
So it appears the Thai followed about three fifths of what Galula and Thompson 
prescribed and about one fifth or less of what Kilcullen prescribed regarding 
modern COIN (not including his reconstitution of classic COIN concepts.)  
Clearly, the Thai are steeped in classical COIN theories, for sure at the 
conceptual, strategic, and operational levels.  Does this mean, then, the Thai 
way of COIN offers nothing unique?  Not quite.  Again, most any successful 
COIN campaign follows Galula and Thompson regarding strategic and even 
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operational design – separate the insurgents from the people, attain legitimacy 
over the enemy, rely on local people to provide insight into local problems and 
for certain security issues, politics leads, clear main force insurgents from areas 
before politics and economic operations begin, etc.  Where COIN begins to vary 
from these points is specific strategy aimed at specific problems, and, even 
more, is specific ways/methods and means aimed at specific problems.  It is the 
unique political, religious, security, and human terrain issues, which trigger 
deviation from, or creative adaptation of, the most prominent COIN theories and 
methods.  And this has been the case in Thailand in several instances. 
 
Most of Thai COIN innovations are methods, but there was one instance where 
the Thai generated an innovative COIN strategy wholly apart from classical and 
modern COIN prescriptions.  This was when, in 1994, the Thai instituted the 
1994 National Security Policy for the Southern Border Provinces as its primary 
COIN weapon, which was economics.  In the face of massive poverty, Bangkok 
injected massive funds into the far south via industrial and business projects.  
As a result, and for a few short years only, the government changed its COIN 
strategy to “economics leads, public relations follows, peace and order 
supports.” It is not in in line with any Galula, Thompson, Kitson, or Kilcullen 
theory.  Interestingly, nor is it in line with traditional Thai strategy of “politics 
leads.”  Nor has it ever been repeated.  This COIN strategy seems to be an 
anomaly in Thai history, but it was, nevertheless, significant.  Accordingly, it is a 
unique, “Thai way of COIN.” 
 
Aside from this strategy, there are several original methods the Thai have 
applied in their COINs that were never in any manual, never directed by Galula, 
Thompson, or Kitson, and never prescribed by Kilcullen.  For example, the Thai 
application of Thahan Phran is indeed a local force, as many COIN theorists 
such as Thompson suggested be used, but the Thai took it much farther than 
Thompson intended.  Instead of a small, elite hunter-killer unit of locals to apply 
sparingly, the Thai made the Thahan Phran their largest anti-guerrilla force, 
especially as the Vietnamese Army sat poised on the Cambodian border, ready 
to drive on Bangkok.  The specter of invasion kept the RTA focused on border 
defense, so the Thahan Phran became essential to fight the CPT on a wider 
scale than perhaps intended.  It was a matter of necessity.  But the Thai, as 
evidenced by their belief that insurgency is war by the people, believe it should 
also be countered by the people – on a wide scale.  This makes the Thahan 
Phran a unique “Thai way of COIN.” 
 
It also highlights a unique “Thai COIN theory.”  And that is the people should 
shoulder equally, or near equally, the burden of COIN that the state does.  This 
is not only demonstrated by the kinetic-focused Thahan Phran, but also the 
CPM concept and amnesty programs.  The CPM concept aims to use better-
trained administrators and leaders coupled with newly trained security providers 
at the village level, the epicenter of the COIN battlespace, to fend off insurgents 
and keep them from the villages.  The government’s involvement post setting 
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these programs up is minimal.  The people bear most of the burden.  Even 
amnesty seekers and local workshops tend to follow General Kitti’s philosophy 
of the local citizen, with initial government guidance, must learn to solve their 
own problems in order to have confidence and be productive citizens. 
 
Yet another Thai COIN method that has traits parallel to the sentiment of the 
Thahan Phran is amnesty.  Thompson, because of his involvement in Malaya, 
touted amnesty and surrender programs, and the Thai found them useful as 
well.  But instead of a selective and focused amnesty program, they applied it 
massively across the board once they achieved the initiative in their COINs.  
Witness Kriangsak’s pardoning of 3,000 students with the stroke of a pen in 
1978, Prem’s massive rehabilitation programs for CPT in the 1980s that resulted 
in thousands of surrenders, and the BRN’s capitulation in 1984 under the Tai 
Rom Yen strategy.  In the current war, amnesty has yet to take wide root, but it 
is a program in the works.  As previously stated, Thai experts such as Denny 
Lane say such stock in amnesty comes from the Buddhist belief in compassion 
for another’s moral capacity.  It also seemed a matter of national survival 
because the country was so severely divided.  To prosecute so many tens of 
thousands of the enemy seemed impractical.  That attitude, particularly the 
Buddhist compassion aspect of it, likely drove the amnesty programs in the far 
south, too.  In summary, pardoning as much as a third of a guerrilla movement 
is unique action, rare in the field of COIN, and therefore yet another unique 
“Thai way of COIN.” 
 
The same can be said about the Village Scouts in the CPT COIN.  It was never 
listed as a method to follow by any COIN theorist.  And while Galula said to 
counter the guerrillas’ political movement, he also said not to mimic guerrilla 
actions.  With the Village Scouts, the Thai both countered the CPT’s political 
movement and mimicked the CPT’s political method.  Specifically, the Thai 
inserted three Scouts into all the villages they could and had them proselytize 
the benefits of the program and the legitimacy of the government writ large, and 
then recruit more members.  This is exactly what the CPT did to turn villages 
communist.  The Thai simply reversed the process, a unique “Thai way of 
COIN.” 
 
In the same vein in the far south, the Thai have mimicked the radical Islamic 
aspect of the da-wah movement with a direct counter to it, the “official da-wah 
movement.”  In the current war in the south, the Thai have similarly applied de-
radicalization programs to reeducate persons warped by intolerant and 
murderous takfiri Islamic tenets.  Reeducation of radical Islamic persons, 
however, is not too unique – it is also done in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
Singapore, and Indonesia. 
 
Diplomacy is a unique “Thai way of COIN” as well.  True, all major COIN 
theorists say to separate the insurgent from sanctuary and outside aid.  It is also 
true that Kilcullen stresses using all sources of national power on the 
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international stage to counter modern insurgent movements.  But the Thai were 
using diplomacy as a COIN in tool through the 1970s-90s long before Kilcullen 
wrote his exceptional COIN works, so it cannot be that the Thai use of 
diplomacy is not unique.  More, no prominent, classic COIN theorist mentioned 
here stressed using diplomacy as a primary COIN tool.  To disregard Thailand’s 
use of diplomacy as such, then, is fallacy.  Bangkok assigned diplomats, military 
officers, and prime ministers to counter outside support for insurgents by 
engaging China, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
Countries, Indonesia, and organizations such as the OIC.  It is a definite pattern, 
and an effective COIN method. 
 
 
9. Summing Up:  Given the collective answers to all these questions for all 
three Thai COINs, what is the Thai way of COIN? 
 
What is the Thai way of COIN?  The detailed dissection in the bulk of this thesis 
as reflected in the conclusion so far, and the findings have also been measured 
against Galula, Thompson, and Kilcullen in particular. The detailed conclusions 
have been set out above. In the process, unique Thai COIN methods have been 
exposed.  But what is, in the final analysis, the overarching picture that 
emerges?  
 
The Thai way of COIN largely follows Galula and Thompson’s key tenets, save 
for civilian control and police leadership – it is the Thai Army that has 
traditionally run Thailand’s COINs.  The Thai way of COIN is also, unfortunately, 
self-hindering due to interference from turf battles, rivalries, and egos.  But the 
Thai way of COIN is innovative and practical in the security, political, and 
economic realms.  It generates new and edgy COIN methods, it mirrors the 
enemy when necessary, and it meets each line of effort of the enemy with 
matching counter strikes until achieving the upper hand.  Then it deals a 
decisive series of blows.  The learning curve to achieve that upper hand, 
however, is sometimes lengthy because of the relative slowness the Thai have 
exhibited in seeing beyond the political and cultural status quo.  The Thai way of 
COIN, then, can be clumsy and messy, and it can be sleek and elegant.  By and 
large, however, the Thai way of COIN is mostly successful. 
 
	  	   332	  
APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
Socio-Economic Statistics 
 
The following statistics demonstrate increased socio-economic prosperity 
throughout the whole of Thailand from 1970 to the present decade.  While none of 
these mean Thailand’s economic COIN programs decisively increased the at-risk 
population’s standards of living in each COIN, they do, nevertheless, indicate 
broad well being across the population occurred.  (Still, the poorest regions of 
Thailand that experienced insurgent activity remain the poorest regions of 
Thailand.)  Statistics per region were not available.  Information here was provided 
by the Thai Government’s Statistical Information Service and Dissemination Group 
on 28 August 2008 via Excel spreadsheet.   
 
 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
 
1970: 60.0 
1971: 60.4 
1972: 60.8 
1973: 61.2 
1974: 61.6 
1975: 62.0 
1976: 62.4 
1977: 62.8 
1978: 63.2 
1979: 63.6 
 
1980: 63.9 
1981: 64.3 
1982: 64.7 
1983: 65.2 
1984: 65.6 
1985: 66.0 
1986: 66.5 
1987: 66.9 
1988: 67.3 
1989: 67.7 
 
1990: 68.0 
1991: 68.3 
1992: 68.5 
1993: 68.7 
1994: 68.8 
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1995: 68.9 
1996: 68.9 
1997: 68.9 
1998: 69.0 
1999: 69.1 
 
2000: 69.2 
2001: 69.4 
2002: 69.6 
2003: 69.9 
2004: 70.2 
2005: 70.6 
2006: 70.6 
2007: 71.4 
2008: 71.8 
2009: 72.1 
 
 
Adult Literacy Rate Percent 
 
1970: 80.1 
1971: 81.0 
1972: 81.9 
1973: 82.7 
1974: 83.6 
1975: 84.4 
1976: 85.0 
1977: 85.6 
1978: 86.2 
1979: 86.8 
 
1980: 87.4 
1981: 88.0 
1982: 88.5 
1983: 89.1 
1984: 89.7 
1985: 90.2 
1986: 90.6 
1987: 91.1 
1988: 91.5 
1989: 91.9 
 
1990: 92.3 
1991: 92.7 
1992: 93.0 
1993: 93.4 
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1994: 93.7 
1995: 94.1 
1996: 94.3 
1997: 94.6 
1998: 94.9 
1999: 95.1 
 
2000: 95.4 
2001: 95.6 
2002: 95.8 
2003: 96.0 
2004: 96.2 
2005: 96.3 
2006: 96.4 
2007: 96.6 
2008: 96.7 
2009: 96.8 
 
 
Gross School Enrollment Percentage 
 
1975: 48.0 
1980: 53.0 
1985: 51.5 
1990: 49.6 
1995: 54.9 
2000: 73.6 
2001: 74.9 
2003: 75.2 
2004: 73.6 
 
 
GDP per capita (1995 USD converted to 2002 USD) 
 
1975: $2,071 
1976: $2,071 
1977: $2,376 
1978: $2,571 
1979: $2,660 
 
1980: $2,731 
1981: $2,731 
1982: $2,955 
1983: $3,042 
1984: $3,177 
1985: $3,288 
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1986: $3,425 
1987: $3,683 
1988: $4,103 
1989: $4,521 
 
1990: $4,953 
1991: $4,953 
1992: $5,708 
1993: $6,051 
1994: $6,517 
1995: $7,041 
1996: $7,417 
1997: $7,266 
1998: $6,493 
1999: $6,665 
 
2000: $6,833 
2001: $6,922 
2002: $7,222 
2003: $7,681 
 
 
Human Development Index 
 
1985: 0.729187797 
1990: 0.749832296 
1995: 0.771429292 
2000: 0.809945658 
2001: 0.814073649 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
Analytical Logic Chain for the Three-war Analysis Through the COIN 
Pantheon 
 
Below are the policies and programs per COIN Pantheon edifice from each of the 
three wars discussed in this doctorate.  They are listed to here to show the trail of 
logic used to achieve final conclusions.   
 
1. Strategy 
General Saiyud’s “COIN algebra” from the communist war provided a unique way, 
a Thai way, of demonstrating strategy for that conflict.  Accordingly, the same 
method applied here helps understand patterns of Thai COIN strategy for all three 
wars.  Thai “COIN algebra” variables are:  
 
POL = politics 
S = security 
D = economic development 
P = people 
C = communist insurgents 
TMMI = Thai Malay Muslim insurgents 
KP = King’s philosophy 
V = victory 
 
The Successful Communist COIN Strategy: 
 
1. 66/2523 Plan: POL(scuttle autocracy/surge democracy, amnesty, diplomacy w/China)3 
(S(aggressive/focused) + D + P(CPM, increased freedoms)2) – C = V 
 
The Successful Thai Malay Muslim 1980s-90s COIN Strategies (four): 
 
1. Tai Rom Yen: POL(diplomacy w/Saudi Arabia, amnesty)2 (S(aggressive/focused) + D + P(CPM, 
increased freedoms)2) – TMMI = (path to)V 
 
2. General Kitti’s iteration: POL(diplomacy w/rebels, upgraded amnesty developed)2 
(S(aggressive/focused) + D + P(CPM)) – TMMI = (path to)V. 
 
3. Economics leads: D(surge @ village/enterprise levels) (POL(increased democracy/97 Const, amnesty)2 + 
S + P(CPM, increased freedoms)2) – TMMI = (path to)V. 
 
4. Pitak Tai: POL(diplomacy w/Malaysia, Kitti’s amnesty applied)2 (S(aggressive,/focused) + D + P(CPM, 
increased freedoms)2) – TMMI = V. 
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The Current COIN Strategy: 
 
1. KP + POL(diplomacy w/Malaysia & int’l) (S(aggressive/focused) + D + P(CPM, “population repair”)2) – 
TMMI = V. 
 
 
2. Coordination 
 
Core goals per section    Core programs per section 
 
Communist COIN: 
To martial military, police, and civil forces  CSOC/ISOC, CPM 
under a single authority, doctrine, and  
commander’s intent to wage COIN  
in an effective manner with distribution 
of resources when and where needed 
 
1980s-90s COIN: 
To martial military, police, and civil forces  ISOC, CPM-43, SB-PAC 
under a single authority, doctrine, and  
commander’s intent to wage COIN  
in an effective manner with distribution 
of resources when and where needed 
regardless of what PM or military leader  
was in charge 
 
Current COIN: 
To martial military, police, and civil forces  ISOC, CPM, SB-PAC 
under a single authority, doctrine, and  
commander’s intent to wage COIN  
in an effective manner with distribution 
of resources when and where needed 
regardless of what PM or military leader  
was in charge 
	  
	  
3. Security 
	  
Main goals, Communist COIN   Main programs 
 
Pressure CPT, protect people  Military (primarily RTA) and police 
patrols, sweeps 
 
Investigate and/or arrest CPT Police, Special Branch 
investigations 
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Target and eliminate CPT RTA SF, Thahan Phran, BPP 
Direct Action 
 
Turn CPT Special Branch, NIA, RTA 
HUMINT operations 
 
Separate people from CPT Local forces (CPM) supported by 
all security forces, but mainly 
police and RTA 
 
Shed light on CPT Intelligence by all security forces, 
intelligence agencies at all levels 
 
 
Main goals, 1980s-90s COIN   Main programs 
 
Pressure TMMI, protect people Military (primarily RTA) and police 
patrols, sweeps 
 
Investigate and/or arrest TMMI Police, Special Branch 
investigations 
 
Target and eliminate TMMI RTA SF, Thahan Phran, BPP 
Direct Action 
 
Turn TMMI Special Branch, NIA, RTA 
HUMINT operations 
 
Separate people from TMMI Local forces (CPM) supported by 
all security forces, but mainly 
police and RTA 
 
Shed light on TMMI Intelligence by all security forces, 
intelligence agencies at all levels 
 
Main goals, current COIN    Main programs 
 
Pressure TMMI, protect people Military (primarily RTA) and police 
patrols, sweeps 
 
Investigate and/or arrest TMMI Police, Special Branch 
investigations 
 
Target and eliminate TMMI RTA SF, Thahan Phran, BPP 
Direct Action 
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Turn TMMI Special Branch, NIA, RTA 
HUMINT operations 
 
Separate people from TMMI Local forces (CPM) supported by 
all security forces, but mainly 
police and RTA 
 
Shed light on TMMI Intelligence by all security forces, 
intelligence agencies at all levels 
 
	  
4. Politics 
 
Main goals, Communist COIN   Main programs 
 
Counter CPT ideology, misinformation Psyops, PR, inundate masses with 
democratic reform, led by RTA, 
CSOC/ISOC supported by TNP 
and gov agencies 
 
 Village Scouts 
 
Improve gov-people relationship CA, PR, psyops, led by RTA CA, 
supported by TNP and gov 
agencies 
 
Separate insurgents from sponsors Diplomacy by PM, MoFA, RTA, 
NIA, Special Branch 
 
Entice CPT to stop fighting   Amnesty, led by RTA 
 
Better governance Local gov/administrator training, 
RTA, MoI 
 
 
Main goals, 1980s-90s COIN   Main programs 
 
Counter TMMI ideology, misinformation Psyops, PR, by RTA, ISOC, RTA, 
SB-PAC 
 
Improve gov-people relationship, integration RTA CA 
 
SB-PAC advisory section, civil 
servants training, and complaint 
dept 
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 Political inclusion at national and 
local levels 
 
 Secular education, pondok quality 
control  
 
Separating insurgents from sponsors Diplomacy by PM, MoFA, RTA 
 
Intel ops by NIA, Special Branch 
 
Entice TMMI to stop fighting Amnesty program, by RTA, Special 
Branch, SB-PAC 
 
Peace talks RTA, MoFA 
 
Better governance Civil servant training and working 
with locals by SB-PAC, MoI’s 
DoLA 
 
 
Main goals, current COIN   Main programs 
 
Counter TMMI ideology, misinformation Psyops, PR, by RTA, ISOC, RTA, 
SB-PAC (such as 
 
ISOC counter narcotics youth 
program 
 
Improve gov-people relationship, integration RTA CA 
 
SB-PAC’s advisory section, civil 
servants training, complaint dept, 
“group therapy” 
 
Secular education 
 
ISOC counter narcotics youth 
program 
 
Secular education, pondok quality 
control 
 
 Youth programs by royal family 
 
Separating insurgents from sponsors Diplomacy by PM, MoFA, RTA 
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Intel ops by NIA, Special Branch 
likely 
 
Entice TMMI to stop fighting Amnesty program, run by RTA, 
peace talks 
 
Better governance, decrease local 
political pressure Civil servant training, reduce local 
elections, increase appointed 
officials, governors’ local district 
councils by PM, SB-PAC, 
MoI/governors 
 
 
5. Economics 
 
Main goals, Communist COIN   Main programs 
 
Uplift villagers from abject poverty 
(root cause of the insurgency according 
to Prem) Village aid by RTA CA, Royal 
programs, (Hilltribe Development 
Project), ARD, Community 
Development Department, Mobile 
Development Units, Department of 
Public Welfare’s Hilltribe Division, 
private entities such as Rotary 
Club 
 
Regional farm aid Mostly dams and irrigation by 
Royal Irrigation projects, ARD, 
RTA CA 
 
Road Building and infrastructure devel  ARD (principally), Royal projects 
 
 
Health Eg., potable water, protein 
development, Ministry of Health, 
RTA CA 
 
Vocational/scholastic education More and better schools, 
scholarships, school supplies, 
Ministry of Education’s Mobile 
Trade Training units, BPP rural 
school houses 
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Main goals, 1980s-90s COIN   Main programs 
 
Uplift villagers from abject poverty Village aid by SB-PAC, RTA CA, 
The New Hope Project by CMP-43, 
RIP 
 
Regional farm aid Dams, irrigation, crop management 
(such as boosting rubber and rice 
yields) by SB-PAC, RIP 
 
Road Building and infrastructure devel 
NESDB and SB-PAC, RTA, ARD, 
governors, Ministry of Transport 
and Communications, Land 
Department, private businesses 
 
Health      SB-PAC, RTA CA 
 
Education Vocational training, increased 
secular curriculum, PSTI, new far 
south universities, scholarships, 
quotas, Thai language training by 
MoE , SB-PAC, Department of 
Teacher Training, Department of 
Vocational Training 
 
Enterprise investment (primary COIN 
weapon in 1994) Mass infusion of industry devel, 
IMT-GT (it failed), NESDB and SB-
PAC’s Southern Border Area 
Development Plan 
 
 
Main goals, current COIN  Main programs 
 
Uplift villagers from abject poverty Village aid by SB-PAC, RTA CA, 
Royal projects such as the Widow 
Village 
 
Regional farm aid Crop management, switching from 
rubber to rice, SB-PAC, RTA CA 
 
Road Building and infrastructure devel NESDB and SB-PAC, Ministry of 
Transportation, RTA 
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Health Increased clinical and hospital care 
by SB-PAC, RTA CA, Ministry of 
Health’s Health Center 
Administration of the South 
 
Education (most important COIN tool,  
says Pranai) Vocational training, increased 
secular curriculum, PSTI, new far 
south universities, scholarships, 
quotas, Thai language training, 
increased Muslim studies in state 
schools by MoE, SB-PAC, MoFA, 
RTA CA, Office of the Basic 
Education Commission 
 
Enterprise investment Improved investment terms, halal 
food investment, cash infusions, 
IMT-GT by NESDB, SB-PAC, 
Board of Investment of Thailand, 
the Chamber of Commerce of 
Thailand, the Government Savings 
Bank, Ministry of Finance; Ministry 
of Industry 
 
Jobs Job creation by SB-PAC, Labor 
Department, ISOC, RTA CA, SB-
PAC, Ministry of Public Health 
 
 
6. Enemy 
 
Communist COIN     
 
Highly organized Overthrow existing Thai 
government, replace it with a 
Maoist communist government 
 
Infiltration of civic groups, 
unions, societies, universities, villages 
 
Prolific propaganda and indoctrination  
 
Platoon and company-sized light infantry 
operations, battalion-sized defensive operations 
 
Countrywide operations, high operational tempo 
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Some terrorist operations against civilians 
 
Extensive and open support from 
China and North Vietnam  
 
 
1980s-90s COIN    
 
Fractured, multiple groups Secede border provinces from 
Thailand and/or gain autonomy 
and run criminal empires 
 
Infiltration of mosques, pondoks, 
some villages 
 
Some propaganda and indoctrination  
 
Platoon and squad-sized light infantry operations 
 
Operations in many districts of southern border provinces, medium operational 
tempo 
 
Many terrorist operations against civilians 
 
Criminal schemes against civilians 
 
Extensive sanctuary in northern Malaysia, 
passive support from Middle East 
 
 
Current COIN     
 
Highly organized and compartmentalized Secesion of border provinces from 
Thailand 
 
Infiltration of mosques, pondoks, villages, 
local government, possibly national 
government 
 
Prolific propaganda and indoctrination  
 
Platoon and squad-sized light infantry operations, 
some company-sized operations 
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Operations in nearly all districts of southern border provinces, high operational 
tempo 
 
Extensive terrorist operations against civilians 
 
Apparent sanctuary in northern Malaysia, 
passive support from Middle East 
 
 
7. At-risk population 
 
Communist COIN     
 
• Extreme poverty in outlying regions, government neglect 
• Poorly educated population in regions where war began 
• Poor government-people relations based on corruption, neglect 
• Lack of communications, infrastructure 
• As war progressed, country at large subjected to autocracy 
• 1970s era global recession, low wages, high inflation, high unemployment 
• Poor health conditions 
 
 
1980s-90s COIN    
 
• Extreme poverty 
• Poorly educated, conservatives focus studies on Islam only 
• Poor government-people relations based on corruption, neglect 
• Malay ethnicity/Muslim religion sets at risk population apart from rest of 
country 
• Slight understanding of Islam 
• Intolerant conservative Islamic views growing, outsiders are kuffar al harb 
• Historical lore of a vanquished and subjected people and past glorious 
empire 
• Legacy of revolt against the government, crime 
• Drug trade/use growing as of late 1990s 
• Prestige culture ignored by state 
• Islam comes before the authority of the state for conservatives (not all 
southerners believe this) 
• Little aspiration to adapt from subsistence to cash economy 
• Poor health conditions 
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Current COIN     
 
• Some abject poverty but not prolific, unemployment the region’s top 
concern 
• Poorly educated, conservatives focus studies on Islam only 
• Poor government-people relations based on corruption, neglect 
• Malay ethnicity/Muslim religion sets at risk population apart from rest of 
country 
• Fractured pro-state, anti-state and neutral/practical factions of society 
• Slight understanding of Islam 
• Intolerant conservative Islamic views strong 
• Mainstream not imbued in historical lore of a vanquished and subjected 
people and past glorious empire, anti-state population is 
• Legacy of revolt against the government, crime 
• Drug trade/use rampant 
• Prestige culture ignored by state 
• Islam comes before the authority of the state for conservatives (not all 
southerners believe this) 
• Resent ethnic Thai and Chinese business leaders 
• Poor health conditions, AIDS on the rise 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
Dr. David Kilcullen’s Three Pillars of COIN 
 
 
 
  
5 
      INFORMATION 
Intelligence 
Information Ops 
Media Strategy 
 
SECURITY 
 
Military  
Police 
Human 
 
Public Safety 
 
Population  
Security 
 
ECONOMIC 
 
Humanitarian       
Assistance 
Development                     
Assistance 
Resource & 
Infrastructure    
Management 
Growth Capacity 
 
POLITICAL 
 
Mobilization 
Governance 
Extension 
Institutional 
Capacity 
 
Societal 
Reintegration 
CONTROL 
Tempo                       Violence                    Stability 
Effectiveness x  
Legitimacy 
Establish,  
Consolidate,  
Transfer 
Global, Regional 
Local 
Concept, research, and design by Dr. David J. Kilcullen, Chief Strategist, Office of the Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State 
Three Pillars Concept by Dr. David Kilcullen:  
“A Possible COIN Framework” 
 
As presented by Dr. David J. Kilcullen, U.S. Department of State, COIN conference, Washington D.C., 28 September 2006  
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
The COIN Pantheon
7 
Government Strategy/Policy  
Lead Agency &/or Interagency Effort 
Security Politics Economics 
Insurgents 
Population 
Three Pillars Concept Adapted to Thai 
COIN Research Plan: The COIN Pantheon 
Dictates the overall 
approach to quelling 
insurgency 
Establishes (ideally) 
leadership & 
coordinates three 
pillars efforts 
Operations of three 
pillars “push” 
against insurgents - 
seek to uplift 
population from 
insurgency 
Organization, 
capabilities & 
intentions (includes 
operational prowess, 
goals, indoctrination, 
etc.) 
The “prize” & focus 
of all strategic, 
operational, & 
tactical efforts 
Military 
 
Police 
 
Local 
forces 
National 
level 
 
Regional 
level 
 
Local 
level 
 
Special 
programs 
National 
entitlement 
 
Regional 
development 
 
Local aid 
projects 
 
Other 
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